Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and, Constitutional Due Process: Part II - Deontological Constitutionalism and the Ascendency of Kantian Due Process by Bayer, Peter Brandon
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
2017 
Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and, Constitutional 
Due Process: Part II - Deontological Constitutionalism and the 
Ascendency of Kantian Due Process 
Peter Brandon Bayer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by 
the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact 
david.mcclure@unlv.edu. 
DEONTOLOGICAL ORIGINALISM: MORAL TRUTH,
LIBERTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL "DUE PROCESS"
PART II - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE ASCENDENCY OF KANTIAN DUE
PROCESS
PETER BRANDON BAYER*
This article offers what has been needed but lacking in modem legal
commentary: thorough, meticulous and timely proof that, pursuant to
principles of Originalism, the Constitution -- the highest law of the United
States -- mandates that any governmental act is unconstitutional if it is
immoral.
Specifically, this article returns fundamental constitutional
jurisprudence to where it rightly was until roughly a century ago; and, where,
recently, it has been returning in the form of Supreme Court substantive due
process precedents based on admittedly ill-defined principles of human
dignity. The overarching concept, which I call Deontological Originalism,
asserts that both the Founders of this Nation and the Reconstruction Congress
properly believed in natural rights derived from principles of natural law.
Accordingly, they sought to enforce through the Constitution, the natural
rights philosophy set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Most
importantly, natural law and resultant natural rights are deontological, that is,
they enforce apriori, immutable moral precepts that descend not from human
imagining but from the natural order of existence, what the Declaration
denotes as, "Nature and Nature's God." That is why, under the Constitution,
any and all immoral governmental conduct is unconstitutional regardless of
bureau or actor -- legislative, judicial, executive, or administrative -- and
regardless of level --- federal, state or local.
* Peter Brandon Bayer, Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The author thanks deeply The Thurgood Marshall Law
Review for having the faith to publish the lengthy work. I am grateful that the editors have
given me a full platform for my constitutional metatheory. I thank as well Dean Daniel
Hamilton for his support and great patience. The author thanks as well his uncomplaining
colleagues Ian Bartrum, Tom McAffee, Ruben Garcia, and Thom Main, for their thoughtful
comments when discussing the ideas in this article. This article was written in remembrance
of my Father, Stephen R. Bayer, whom I was fortunate to know for over 60 years and whose
stalwart decency inspires me to this day. This article is written as well thinking of my Mother,
Susan Bayer, who, thankfully is still with us and who is just the greatest person in the world.
Most of all, I dedicate this work to my wonderful wife Joan, who has made my lfe a
blessing and who, as always, is my strongest support and my most perceptive yet devoted
critic.
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Unlike articles that aver similar ideas, this writing presents
Deontological Originalism as a metatheory, meaning, it expounds at once
essentially all fundamentals, and their respective proofs, as indeed any work
defining and defending a theory of Originalism should do. Metatheory
accounts for this commentary's length; but, frankly, it is time that one law
review article presented a metatheoretical perspective given the exasperated
skepticism and postmodernist complacency most often greeting serious
assertions that the Constitution enforces natural law and, therefore, the bench
and bar must become "natural lawyers" when addressing constitutional
rights.
After roughly thirty years of perhaps sporadic writings addressing many
of the relevant aspects, I offer Deontological Originalism, a venture
proceeding from the utility of Originalism, to the meaning of Deontology, to
the intent of the Founders and of the Reconstruction Congress, to the
deontological principles of Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant, to
modem due process dignity theory enforcing Deontological Originalism via
Kantian morality, culminating in the Supreme Court's bravura rulings
requiring that Government accord same-sex marriage the full and equal legal
status accorded opposite-sex marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION -- "BY JING, THAT'S ALL THERE IS TO IT, RIGHT AND
WRONG."
Throughout the century-and-a-half since his assassination, scholarship
and popular culture alike have extolled America's sixteenth and arguably
greatest President, Abraham Lincoln.' Likely, most law review articles
accent the scholarly aspect. Nonetheless, this introduction embraces popular
culture observing that, beginning with the "silent era," motion picture
dramatizations of Lincoln's life and legend are plentiful, usually respectful if
not worshipful, although often lacking steadfast historical accuracy.2 One of
1. "Surveys of historians and of presidential scholars consistently rank Lincoln as one of
the greatest Presidents and many surveys rank Lincoln as the greatest President. See, e.g.,
Lincoln Wins: Honest Abe Tops New Presidential Survey, CNN.com, Feb. 16, 2009, http://
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/16/presidential.survey/index.html" Jeffrey M. and Linda
B. Samuels, Lincoln and the Patent System: Inventor, Lawyer, Orator, President, 3 ALB.
GOV'T. L. REv. 645, 675 note 219 (2010).
2. Important movies about Lincoln include Abraham Lincoln (1930), produced and
directed by film pioneer D.W. Griffith, one of Griffith's but two sound films. Prior to
Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth president was an important figure in Griffith's 1915
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the most respected such films is 1939's Young Mr. Lincoln, directed by the
legendary John Ford and starring stalwart American actor, Henry Fonda, in
a performance justly considered iconic.3 Recently reissued in digital form by
the respected video production-distribution company The Criterion
Collection, Young Mr. Lincoln, as the title implies, recounts Lincoln's early
adulthood from storekeeper to attorney. Apparently inspired by the writings
of venerated poet and Lincoln chronicler Carl Sandberg, one pivotal scene
depicts the future president's first encounter with legal doctrine and theory.
Professor Albert W. Alschuler described Sandberg's famous account: "a man
driving west in a covered wagon lightened his load by selling a barrel of
goods to a village store clerk. 'I did not want it,' Abraham Lincoln explained,
'but to oblige him I bought it, and paid him half a dollar for it.' Among the
goods in the barrel, Lincoln discovered Blackstone's Commentaries."4
momentous, innovative if extremely controversial silent epic, Birth of a Nation. Other
significant quasi-biographical movies include Abe Lincoln in Illinois (1940), featuring a
rightly celebrated portrayal by Canadian actor Raymond Massey, and 2012's acclaimed
Lincoln, co-produced and directed by the highly regarded film-maker Steven Spielberg and
starring lauded actor Danial Day-Lewis whose nuanced performance earned him his third
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Academy Award - "Oscar" -- for Best Actor.
While most films understandably present him as the beloved personage he was and
remains, no less than with other revered historical figures, Hollywood has not hesitated to
exploit Lincoln for fun and profit as evidenced by 2012's Abraham Lincoln, Vampire Hunter
and the "direct to video" Abraham Lincoln vs. Zombies (2012) (advertisements of which
touted, "While the Civil War rages on, President Abraham Lincoln must undertake an even
more daunting task - destroying the Confederate Undead") -- two movies that, if nothing else,
reconfirm the wisdom of the adage sic transit gloria mundi ("thus passes earthly glory").
3. As critic Derek Malcolm expressed it sixty years after Young Mr. Lincoln's release,
"Fonda's performance was once considered the sole reason for the film's success, and it is
extraordinarily subtle even as it looks direct and simple." Derek Malcolm, John Ford: Young
Mr. Lincoln, The Guardian (June 24, 1999),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/1999/jun/24/1, (accessed, March 3, 2018).
This writing notes in passing that Young Mr. Lincoln was part of the exceptional film
output that has inspired critics and film historians to credit 1939 as "Hollywood's greatest
year." E.g., 1939 in Films, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1939_infilm#citenote-
EWArticle-3, notes 2 and 3 (accessed March 3, 2018). Other films of high repute produced
in 1939 include: Gone with the Wind; Mr. Smith Goes to Washington; The Wizard of Oz;
Stagecoach; Ninotchka; The Women; Gunga Din; The Hunchback of Notre Dame; Goodbye,
Mr. Chips; Beau Geste; Dark Victory; Confessions ofa Nazi Spy; Destry Rides Again; Dodge
City; Golden Boy; Juarez; OfMice and Men; Only Angels Have Wings; The Private Lives of
Elizabeth and Essex; The Roaring Twenties, Son ofFrankenstein; The Rules ofthe Game; and,
Wuthering Heights.
4. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1996)
(quoting, I Carl Sandburg, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE PRAIRIE YEARS 163 (1926)).
Alschuler added that, "Chroniclers less credulous of traditional stories have reported that
Lincoln purchased a set at a Springfield auction." Id (citing, See David Herbert Donald,
LINCOLN 53 (1995); Benjamin P. Thomas, ABRAHAM LINCOLN 43 (1952)).
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Prof. Alchuler continued, "Sandburg pictured Lincoln reading
Blackstone's declaration that no laws are valid unless they conform to the
law of nature or of God while lying 'on the flat of his back on the grocery-
store counter, or under the shade of a tree with his feet up the side of the
tree.'"' Indeed, ala Sandburg, director John Ford presented Lincoln
immediately after acquiring his first law books, resting on the grass, feet
pressed against a large tree, marveling at the new insights Blackstone sparked
in his eager, inquiring mind. As history does not chronicle Lincoln's exact
thoughts or words at that moment, Ford relied on his screenwriters, including
beloved poet Steven St. Vincent Ben6t whose book-length poem of the Civil
War, John Brown 's Body, won a Pulitzer Prize in 1929, a decade before
Young Mr. Lincoln 's release. Completely captivated having at last found a
professional calling, the young Lincoln exclaims while reading Blackstone,
"Law -- that's the rights of persons and the rights of things. ... Wrongs are
violations of those rights. By Jing, that's all there is to it, right and wrong.
Maybe I ought to begin to take this up serious!"6
Young Mr. Lincoln's sentiments are a compellingly simple and, for so
few words, an amazingly apt expression of the meaning, the purpose, and the
function of law, particularly constitutional law. As this writing seeks to
prove, "right and wrong" actually is "all there is to it," at least regarding the
basic foundation upon which the many and varied complexities of American
"due process of law" doctrine derive. Therefore, a thorough and earnest
understanding of "right and wrong" is the sole route to appreciating
constitutional civil rights' importance and magnificence. That is, only
though correct moral philosophy can, as John Ford's Lincoln admonished,
sincere lawyers,judges, politicians, and legal scholars, "take this up serious!"
In that spirit, for whatever it is worth, this article is the culmination of my
forty years as an attorney and law teacher. It is essentially everything I
understand and hold dear about the unique greatness of American
constitutional law -- greatness that, if after two centuries still remains more
potential than actuality, nonetheless often has manifested in the triumph of
right over wrong, justice over bigotry, fairness over inequity.
5. Id. at 7 (quoting Sandberg at 164).
6. Young Mr. Lincoln, The Criterion Collection, at 00:06:25-00:07:00 (emphasis added).
While contrived, the tone and sentiment of the screenplay seem accurate. For instance,
historians note that Lincoln never cursed nor swore, "though Judge Weldon said at the Salem
Chautauqua that once in his life when [Lincoln] was excited he said, 'by Jing!"' William E.
Barton, THE SOUL OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, U. of Ill. Press 55 (2005) (quoting, T.G.
Onscott, LINCOLN AND SALEM -- PIONEERS OF MENARD AND MASON COUNTIES,
at 24).
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The editors of the Thurgood Marshall Law Review graciously have
divided Deontological Originalism: Moral Truth, Liberty, and Constitutional
"Due Process, " into two parts. Part I, Originalism and Deontology,7
demonstrates that morality is not consequentialist but rather is deontological.'
Thereafter, Part I explicates "Kantian morality" as the best among competing
deontological theories. Kantian morality comprises the holistic framework
of ethics exhorted by the eminent Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant
(but does not necessarily embrace "Kant's ethics," the specific resolutions of
discrete moral dilemmas Kant himself might have deduced from his own
framework).' In addition to expounding abstract moral philosophy, Part I
elucidates why, to be valid, any theory of American constitutional law must
be originalist,'o that is, the United States Constitution, "should be interpreted
according to its original meaning."" Hence, Originalism and Deontology
presents in the abstract, the theory of Deontological Originalism, the fusion
of Kantian morality with constitutional originalism.
This second part, Deontological Constitutionalism and the Ascendency
ofKantian Due Process, verifies that both the original Founders (the drafters
of the Declaration of Independence and the original Constitution) and the
Reconstruction Congress (which drafted, inter alia, the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments) embraced Deontological Originalism by enforcing
7. 43 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (2017) (hereinafter, "Originalism and Deontology").
8. Id. at Section 2. Put very briefly, regarding any particular problem, the morally correct
answer is not that which produces the best consequence -- the most pleasing outcome.
Accordingly, Utilitarianism, the most prevalent form of Consequentialism, wrongly avers that
morality is utilitarian, meaning the proper moral result maximizes the happiness of some
designated person, group or society. Rather, morality is deontological, a flow of a priori,
immutable precepts discernable through neutral reason and descending not from human
inventing but from the natural order of existence. That is why, according to Deontology,
morality concerns not "the good," meaning what people want, but rather "the right," meaning
what they must do regardless of how understandably undesirable any resulting outcome may
be.
9. Id. at Section 3.
10. Id. at Section 4.
11. Jeffrey M. Shaman, The End of Originalism, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 83, 83 (2010)
(criticizing Originalism). Prof. Keith Whittington likewise expressed Originalism's major
premise: "the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial adoption [is]
authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present." Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 599 (2004); see also, e.g.,
Ozan 0. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSACT. LAW 1239, 1248 (2011) (footnote omitted) ("In simple terms, originalism is a
method for interpreting a constitutional provision by seeking to uncover its meaning at the
time of its adoption."); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism:
The Case ofExecutive Power, 106 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 9 (2018).
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through the Constitution as America's supreme law, the Natural Law
principles of the Declaration.1 2 Additionally, Part II recounts the
development of the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence
which, at present, surprisingly espouses two distinct and essentially
incompatible constitutional frameworks. The first, designated as the deeply
rooted principles approach, holds that governmental actions comport with
"due process of law" if, as an empirical matter, they advance certain popular
American traditions and customs. That standard purports to subordinate the
personal partialities of judges in favor of the accrued, aggregate wisdom of
the American people. In so doing, courts purport to eschew making moral
judgments regarding the governmental actions under review."
The second substantive due process standard -- designated the dignity
paradigm -- avers that governmental action violates "due process of law" if
it offends innate "human dignity." This "human dignity" judicial paradigm
arguably is steeped in Kantian morality although it declines to acknowledge
formally a Kantian source. Despite its lack of attribution to Kantian
principles, Section 6 argues that the "human dignity" approach comports with
Deontological Originalism, as intended by the Founders and the
Reconstruction Congress. Accordingly, the dignity paradigm is correct and
the deeply rooted principles framework should be abandoned."
Highlighting the foregoing, Part H concludes by demonstrating that the
Supreme Court's line of precedent sometimes denoted as "the homosexual
rights decisions,"" particularly its recent Obergefell v. Hodges16 ruling that
States must treat same-sex marriages equally with opposite-sex marriages, is
eminently correct constitutional moral theory sounding in the Deontological
Originalism exhorted by this article.
12. See infra Section 2 (discussing the deontological theory justifying the American
Revolution), Section 3 (original founders), and Section 4 (Reconstruction Congress).
13. See infra notes 771-98 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Sec.3-c. In that regard, I was considering entitling Part II either
Deontological Originalism -- The Deontologists Strike Back or Deontological Originalism --
Revenge ofthe Framers. However, I decided my dedicated and hard-working editors would
not be amused.
15. Martin A. Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The Decision and Its Implications for the
Future, 20 ToURO L. REv. 221, 225 (2004).
16. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). See infra notes 945-1020 and
accompanying text discussing the Supreme Court's "homosexual rights" jurisprudence.
170 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART H - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
II. THE DEONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION -
Having proved in Originalism and Deontology that moral comportment
is deontological, not consequentialist, this writing now turns to establishing
the deontological bona fides of the American Revolution and resulting
Constitution, including how, nearly a century later, those bona fides
influenced the pivotal amending of the Constitution during the
Reconstruction Era. Through this discussion I substantially expand and
elucidate earlier work wherein I demonstrated that America's Founders were
deontologists who understood and embraced morality's integral link to
legitimate government" -- a link they stressed in The Declaration of
Independence to defend the American Revolution. Thereafter, to enforce the
Declaration's principles as the new nation's highest law, the Framers wrote
and helped to secure the ratification of the Constitution, requiring, inter alia,
that offices and agents of American government act morally in all regards.
Deontological morality is America's highest law because, as the Founders
rightly expressed in the Declaration and operationalized in the Constitution's
original text plus Bill of Rights, nothing but strict moral comportment
legitimizes Government however any particular government might be
structured. 18
In addition to reconfirming that Deontological Originalism best
expresses the Founders' intent and meaning, this writing explains how the
post-Civil War Fourteenth Amendment completed the Constitution's
deontological structure. Specifically, as a matter of law (but arguably not as
a matter of moral philosophy), prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill
of Rights, including that part of the Fifth Amendment guaranteeing "due
process of law," constrained only the Federal Government, leaving the states,
as a matter offormal constitutional law, free to abide by moral governance
17. Peter Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is a "Suicide Pact,"
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 287, 335-42 (2011); for a similar perspective, see also, e.g., D.
Scott Broyles, Doubting Thomas: Justice Clarence Thomas's Effort to Resurrect the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 46 IND. L. REv. 341, 346-53 (2013).
18. While all governments and their constituent offices and agents must act ethically, the
Founders understood that, depending on their more particular priorities, a citizenry might
design distinct offices of government in diverse fashions. For instance, under our system of
federalism, "states will approach problems differently than the federal government because
state governments are structured very differently than the national government, with many
states electing judges, providing line-item veto authority to the Governor, and allowing the
public to enact policy change through referendums." Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism's
Floor, 80 Miss. L. J. 69, 71 note 8 (2010) (discussing, M. Elizabeth Magill, The Revolution
that Wasn't, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 47, 73-74 (2004)).
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at their respective discretions.19 Thus, as originally ratified, the Constitution
failed to enforce the Declaration's avowal of governmental moral legitimacy.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Reconstruction Congress enacted and
fostered the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to the
States, mandating, inter alia, that all state and local governmental conduct
must comport with "due process of law."20 The Reconstruction Congress did
so to realize at last the unfulfilled promise of the original Framers that,
pursuant to the Constitution, all branches and levels of American government
are obligated to conform with the deontological moral imperatives originally
set forth in the Declaration of Independence. Because the Reconstruction
Congress finished what the Founders began, specifically, mandating
governmental moral comportment as America's dominant law,
Deontological Originalism alone explains how to define and apply provisions
of the Constitution.
A. The Founders Embraced Natural Law-Natural Rights Principles --
Logically, the proof of Deontological Originalism's principal premise
that the Founders espoused and actualized deontological morality emanating
from natural law begins with the American Revolution. Nearly seventy-five
19. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. [7 Pet.] 243, 247-50 (1833). Indeed, as a matter
of technical law, to this day, the Bill of Rights is inapplicable to the states. Id.; see also, e.g.,
Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing, inter alia, Barron,
"The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, applies only to the federal
government.")); Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (Sixth Amendment
read alone applies only to federal prosecutions). Nonetheless, of vital importance herein (see
infra, Section 5-b), the Fourteenth Amendment's guaranty of "due process of law ... has [not
only] the procedural component that these words suggest, but it also has been construed to
have 'a substantive component,' ... that [effectively has] incorporate[d] most of the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights ... and that protects other 'fundamental rights and liberties' that are not
expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights ... " Bailey v. City of Port Huron, 507 F.3d 364,367
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
20. That amendment reads in pertinent part, "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. That text
seemingly denotes "due process" and "equal protection" as two separate and implicitly distinct
constraints on state actions. The federal courts, however, rightly explain that, in fact, "equal
protection of the laws" is an offshoot or subset of "due process of law," a proposition urgent
to the thesis of this writing that all constitutional fundamental rights are subsets of, and
emanate from the idea "due process of law." E.g., Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
see infra notes 570-82 and accompanying text.
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years ago, Pulitzer Prize winning historian Charles Warren21 aptly lamented,
"It is a singular fact that the greatest event in American history -- the
Declaration of Independence -- has been the subject of more incorrect
popular belief, more bad memory on the part of participants, and more false
history than any other occurrence in our national life."22 To that effect, some
critics complain that naive academicians over-romanticize its abstract,
theoretical prose, to minimize the partisan pragmatics that impelled the
drafting and adoption of the Declaration. As Timothy Sandefur related,
Russell Kirk, for instance, wrote that the American revolutionaries
"meant to keep their old order and defend it against external interference,"
rather than fighting for any "theoretic dogma." In his view, the
Declaration, "[hiastily drawn up by Jefferson and a committee of four
others," was meant as "an apology to the world - France in particular -
for the Patriots' armed rising, in hope of assistance from abroad." 23
Regardless that numerous and powerful practical political motives
doubtless underlay the American Revolution, historian Alexander Tsesis,
cogently summarized the Declaration's extraordinary importance and
abiding grandeur as, "both a statement of national independence and a
foundational guarantee of individual rights and popular self-government.
The document is the country's original written statement of national
principle, purpose, and sovereignty. Scholar Douglas Kmiec agrees that,
whether for political reasons, moral imperatives, or indeed both, "In the
21. The noted scholar of legal history and jurisprudence won the 1923 Pulitzer Prize in
History for his book, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1922). Dumberton Oakes Research Library and Collection, Charles Warren (1868-
1954), https://www.doaks.org/resources/bliss-tyler-correspondence/annotations/charles-
warren, (accessed, February 22, 2018).
22. Charles W. Carey, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Declaration of Independence, 3
AvE MARIA L. REV. 45, 45 (2005) (quoting, Charles Warren, Fourth ofJuly Myths, 2 WM. &
MARY Q. 237, 237 (1945)).
23. Timothy Sandefur, Liberal Originalism: A Past for the Future, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 489,494 (2004) (quoting, RUSSELL KIRK, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 395-96, 400-
01 (3d ed. 1991)). Kirk sullenly and inaptly continued, "[T]he Declaration really is not
conspicuously American in its ideas or its phrases, and not even characteristically
Jeffersonian.... [I]t was meant to persuade the court of France, and the philosophes of Paris,
that the Americans were sufficiently un-English to deserve military assistance.... [Ilt is not a
work of political philosophy or an instrument of government .... " RUSSELL KIRK,
INTRODUCTION TO ALBERT JAY NocK, MR. JEFFERSON, at xiii, xvi (Hallberg, 1983) (quoted in
Sandefur, supra note 23, at 495).
24. Alexander Tsesis, The Declaration ofIndependence and Constitutional Interpretation,
89 CALIF. L. REv. 369, 372 (2016).
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context of a revolution ... the founders needed a 'higher law' check to make
their case for independence, "25 That is, the Founders had to devise a
theory of revolution,2 6 but, of utmost importance, they properly chose not to
ground that theory simply in competing partisan policies, pragmatic
economics, or cynical real6 politik.2 7
Pursuant to their appreciation of moral transcendence, the Founders
built their arguments legitimizing the Colonies' revolt against England on
more than immediate political and financial policies. As significant as those
policies were to denote extreme dissatisfaction with English rule, the authors
of the Revolution rightly understood that justifying insurgency on current
partisan frustration is not sufficient. Few if any governmental actions please
all constituencies, leaving no disgruntled persons or groups. Likewise, few
if any official programs engender only beneficial results with no consequent
burdens felt more heavily by some than by others. Additionally, even if long
in duration, unfair policies presumptively may be amended or rescinded
through normal, lawful political processes. If transitory discontent were
adequate to warrant rebellion, no government would have moral authority
to resist armed insurgency, nor to arrest and prosecute the disgruntled
individuals or groups who pursue reform by force of arms over peaceful
means. In this regard, Enlightenment philosopher John Locke, well known
as highly influential on the Founders,2 8 sensibly admonished that, in the
25. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural Law Originalism for The Twenty-First Century - A
Principle ofJudicial Restraint, Not Invention, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 383, 393 (2007).
26. "From the time of its drafting, the Declaration of Independence was almost universally
viewed by the colonists as, first and foremost, a proclamation and justification of
independence." Carey, supra note 22, at 46 (citing, Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing
Reputation of the Declaration of Independence: The First Fifly Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q.
557, 558-65 (3d ser.) (1962) and CARL BECKER, THE DECELARTION OF INDEPENDENCE: A
SUTDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 226 (Vintage Books ed. 1958) (1922)).
27. Reald politik or realpolitik is, "political realism or practical politics, esp. policy based
on power rather than ideals." Random House Kernerman Webster's College Dictionary,
(2010) (quoted by, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Real+politik(visited, August 20, 2010)).
Similarly, "a ruthlessly realistic and opportunist approach to statesmanship, rather than a
moralistic one, especially as exemplified by Bismarck." Collins English Dictionary -
Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 (quoted by,
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Real+politik(visited, August 20, 2010)).
28. As leading jurisprudent Prof. Charles Fried summarized, "[T]here is an immense
literature demonstrating that the thought of Locke and other quite systematic Enlightenment
thinkers had a profound influence on the American Revolution, on those who drafted, debated,
and adopted the Constitution, and on the politicians, lawyers, and judges who interpreted it in
its early years." Charles Fried, Philosophy Matters, Ill HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (1998)
(citing sources); see also, e.g., Mark C. Niles, Ninth Amendment Adjudication: An Alternative
to Substantive Due Process Analysis of Personal Autonomy Rights, 48 UCLA L. REv. 85, 108
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words of one scholar, pursuant to natural law, "the right of revolution" arises
"only under the most dire circumstances." 29
Of like significance, nor could the Founders resort solely to English
legal principles, including the English Constitution,30 as those principles did
not fully recognize the type of rebellion the Founders contemplated. Thus,
in the absence of helpful positive law, the Founders had to present a
philosophical justification predicated on higher law. As Prof. Gedicks
summarized:
The English constitution provided an incomplete justification of the
American Revolution because revolt necessarily entailed withdrawal
from that constitutional system. Thus, the Declaration of Independence
begins with the natural rights theory drawn from Locke's Second Treatise,
rather than arguments of higher-law constitutionalism drawn from the
English common law. Nevertheless, the colonial belief that the common
law captured and reflected natural rights and the natural law, imported
from the English seventeenth century, enabled them to combine the
Declaration's appeal to natural rights with arguments about customary
rights based on the common law."
(2000) (citations omitted; noting Locke's inspiration on the Founders); Carey, supra note 22,
at 47-48 (citing, Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 914-15 (1993) (same)).
29. Christian G. Fritz, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 13 (2008) (cited in, Tom Ginsburg,
Daniel Lansberg-Rodriguez, Mila Versteeg, When to Overthrow Your Government: The Right
to Resist in the World's Constitutions, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1184, 1203 note 78 (2013)).
30. Unlike the U.S. Constitution which is a single, formal document, what is called the
"English Constitution" actually evinces, "the foremost example of a 'living' constitution,
drawing its authority ... from the promulgation of statutes, the evolving interpretations of
common law, and faith in custom and convention. The English constitution represents an
unbroken legal tradition reaching across fourteen centuries." RALPH C. CHANDLER, RICHARD
A. ENSLEN AND PETER G. RENSTROM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK § 1:9 English
Constitution (accessed via Westlaw, 07/23/2017). Of particular importance among the English
Constitution's constituents is the Magna Carta. Id (listing as well numerous other pivotal
statutes).
"The English constitution is a 'living' constitution because the people of Great Britain
have never felt compelled to commit their governing agreements and processes to paper. It is
a remarkably stable system in view of the fact that the government of Great Britain has not
undergone any significant upheaval in at least three centuries." Id
31. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense ofSubstantive Due Process: Magna
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L. J. 585, 622
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
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Accordingly, the Founders' philosophy was not simply that George I
was so hostile to colonial interests that revolution would be beneficial for the
Colonies -- that is, insurgency would be a good thing. Rather, they argued
that, based on principles greater than and preceding anything humanly
created, revolution was not only legitimate, but morally required -- that
revolt, perhaps ultimately a good thing for the colonies, more importantly
was the right thing, that is, moral precepts inherent in natural law demanded
that the Colonists free themselves from British bondage through violent
means as nothing less was availing. Thus, whether revolution actually would
foster the colonists' comfort and contentment was secondary to the necessity
of the now which had triggered their incontrovertible duty as human beings
to mutiny; or, as they famously expressed the idea, sometimes, "in the Course
of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the
powers of the earth, [a] separate and equal station ."3 Indeed, The Founders
unequivocally explicated their concept of not merely a benenficial, but rather
a "necessary" revolution -- a revolution born of natural obligation: "But when
a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object,
evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right,
it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards
for their future Security."33
32. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, par. I (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
33. Id. at par. 2 (emphasis added). Modem eyes may wonder about the Declaration's
syntax and punctuation, particularly the now unfamiliar frequent capitalizing of words that
neither begin a sentence nor are proper nouns. "Twentieth-century orthography has blinded
us to [a] powerful piece of textual evidence ... In formal writing of the late eighteenth-century,
nouns generally were capitalized; adjectives and pronouns were not. This rule is followed
throughout the Declaration." Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration ofIndependence: A 225th
Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. REv. 701, 738-39 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
The importance of such style is not insignificant. For example, Larson argues that the
Founders' phrasing such as "United Colonies" evinces not an adjective - United -- modifying
a noun - Colonies - but rather a "complete noun phrasing." Id. at 739. Accordingly, the
Founders' use of capital letters helps inform the meaning of the text. Id. at 740 ("It does not
seem implausible that capitalization played some role in their arguments.").
Similarly, "Carl Becker proposed that Thomas Jefferson's use of capitalization and
italicization in the Declaration was designed to emphasize words he considered to be the most
important." Bayer, supra note 17, at 336 note 270 (citing, CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION
OF INDEPENDENCE: STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS 220-21 (Vintage Books ed.,
1958) (1922)). Moreover, some capitalization might evince a proper noun not often used
today. For example, "The capitalization of the word 'Men' [in some but not all instances] may
suggest that Jefferson was referring to a collective body of men rather than a few or a small
group." Thompson Smith, The Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree of Liberty with
Fertilizer Bombs and the Blood of Martyrs, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 269, 303 note 296 (1997).
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Doubtless then, the Founders knew that arguments sufficient to
challenge this or that law, or combinations of laws, as unwise, unsound or
even unjust are inadequate to justify systemic revolt34 seeking either to
replace the existing governmental structure or, as in the case of the American
Revolution, to extricate as free and independent, the Colonies from the
British Empire." Recognizing Locke's admonition, the Founders urged that
independence was fully justified due to a complete and irrevocable failure of
Great Britain to fulfill its higher duty -- indeed, its moral duty -- as the
Colonies' sovereign. The substance of that moral duty, the Founders
understood, derives not from governmental officers' or even the Sovereign's
personal preferences or predilections, but from natural law, specifically, the
natural rights inherent in natural law. As the Declaration's famous second
paragraph explains, "Nature and Nature's God" bestows "unalienable
Rights" inuring to "all Men"; and, that "That to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed," 36  The Founders' theory then, "reflected a
34. Some scholars advocate, "distinguishing between a rebellion (an unlawful uprising for
personal gain or selfish reasons) and a revolution (an uprising to establish liberty and justice)."
William C. Plouffe, Jr., A Federal Court Holds the Second Amendment Is an Individual Right:
Jeffersonian Utopia or Apocalypse Now?, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 55, 82 (1999) (citing,
Thompson Smith, The Patriot Movement: Refreshing the Tree ofLiberty with Fertilizer Bombs
and the Blood ofMartyrs, 32 VAL. U. L. REv. 269, 311 (1997)). This writing does not see a
need to make such distinctions, but does not impugn that, regarding different issues,
distinguishing a revolution from a rebellion might advance a theorist's proposition.
35. One might think that the justification becomes all the more arduous when insurgents
revolt against a monarch whose royalty may be considered decreed by divine right, thus
revolution is not only sedition, but could, as well, be sacrilege. However, historical research
indicates that such was not the widespread outlook under English thinking. To the contrary, a
commonly held, arguably prevailing belief among Eighteenth Century philosophers and
laypersons averred religious justifications for overthrowing despots. John M. Kang, Appeal
to Heaven: On the Religious Origins of the Constitutional Right of Revolution, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 281 (2009). Kang argues, inter alia, that by the time of the American
Revolution, the "divine right of kings" did not per se mean that, through celestial ordination,
the King could do anything and everything he wanted. Rather, even if royal linage is divinely
decreed, theorists including John Locke and many clergy firmly believed that, "God had given
people reason to discern moral principles and make meaningful decisions about self-direction.
And because people were reasoning beings, government had to rest on their consent; when
government transgressed its authority, the people were justified in their right to alter or abolish
it." Id at 318.
Accordingly, an accepted sentiment in Eighteenth Century America and Europe held
that a proper reading of sacred texts, particularly St. Paul's epistle, "implore[s] rulers to
dedicate themselves to the people's happiness, and that the people had a right from God, even
a duty to Him, to overthrow despots." Id. at 324. Indeed, such principles informed the drafting
of the Declaration of Independence.
36. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, par. I (U.S. 1776).
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well-known justification for revolution under both natural law and English
constitutional doctrine."3 7 The proposition was nicely expressed by historian
Carl S. Becker:
When honest men are impelled to withdraw their allegiance to the
established law or custom of the community, still more when they are
persuaded that such law or custom is too iniquitous to be longer tolerated,
they seek for some principle more generally valid, some "law" of higher
authority, than the established law or custom of the community. To this
higher law or more generally valid principle they then appeal in
justification of actions which the community condemns as immoral or
criminal.3 8
Even Judge Richard Posner, thoroughly and wrongly skeptical about
American positive law's link to natural law,3 9 acknowledged that the
Founders were, "imbued ... with the philosophical thinking of the
Enlightenment ... "0 Regarding its overall prevalence, Prof. Robert George
explained,
The concept of "natural law" is central to the western tradition of thought
about morality, politics, and law. Although the western tradition is not
united around a single theoretical account of natural law, its principal
architects and leading spokesmen ... have shared a fundamental belief
that humanly created "positive" law is morally good or bad -- just or
37. Fritz, supra note 29, at 13.
38. CARL S. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 277-78 (1942) (emphasis
added; quoted in Scales v. U.S., 367 U.S. 203, 268 note 4 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
Becker worries that proponents may use such rationalizing disingenuously, even, perhaps, to
delude themselves that their cause is just "They formulate the law or principle in such a way
that it is, or seems to them to be, rationally defensible. To them it is 'true' because it brings
their actions into harmony with a rightly ordered universe, and enables them to think of
themselves as having chosen the nobler part, as having withdrawn from a corrupt world in
order to serve God or Humanity of a force that makes for the highest good." Id. at 278.
Doubtless, even well-meaning insurgents might misconstrue, deliberately or
innocently, unjustified principles as rightful and apt. History is replete with mistaken or
hypocritical rebels. Regarding America's Founders, however, this writing joins the seemingly
general consensus that their revolution was justified not merely on practical grounds, but
indeed impelled by moral political theory.
39. Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARv. L. REV.
1636, 1695 (1998).
40. Id. at 1696.
178 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART I - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
unjust -- depending on its conformity to the standards of a "natural," (viz.,
moral) law that is no mere human creation. 4 1
Famously, much of the validation for the Revolution against England
stems from profound and embedded sources of English law. Sir. William
Blackstone, arguably England's most eminent fount of law and legal
meaning,42 and a profound influence on the Founders, 43 espoused the natural
law as the source of all right legal value,
[A]s God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of
mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction of that
motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with freewill to conduct
himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain immutable laws of human
nature... and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport
of those laws....
41. Robert P. George, Natural Law, The Constitution and the Theory and Practice of
Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2269 (2001)) (natural law colloquium).
42. "Blackstone's Commentaries was 'the first important and the most influential
systematic statement ofthe principles ofthe common law. For generations of English lawyers,
it has been both the foremost coherent statement of the subject of their study, and the citadel
of their legal tradition."' Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 422 note 18 (1995) (quoting, DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE
MYSTERIOUS SCIENCEOF THE LAW 3 (1941) (quoting C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
BAR 187 (1911)).
43. "Early Americans drew heavily on legal scholars like William Blackstone,..."
Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2613 (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the influence of
Blackstone on the Framers). Commentators agree with Justice Thomas' conclusion, "[N]o
other figure so influenced American lawyers and political figures during the Revolutionary
period and the nation's first century, ... " Alschuler, supra note 4 at 19 note 106. Likewise,
Douglas Kmiec wrote, "In the eighteenth century, the leading American colonists regarded Sir
William Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the Laws of England as the best treatise on
the English common law." Kmiac, supra note 25, at 392. In this regard, Daniel J. Boorstein
remarked,
To lawyers on this side of the Atlantic, it has been even more important. In the first
century of American independence, the Commentaries were not merely an approach
to the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law ....
And many an early American lawyer might have said, with [influential exponent of
American law] Chancellor [James] Kent, that he owed his reputation to the fact that
when studying law ... he had but one book, Blackstone's Commentaries, but that one
book he mastered." DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAw 3
(1941) (quoting C. WARREN, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 187 (1911) (quoted in
Bernard H. Siegan, Separation of Powers and Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 415, 422 note 18 (1995)).
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... These are the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil. . . . Such
among others are these principles: that we should live honestly, should
hurt nobody, and should render to every one his due; to which three
general precepts Justinian has reduced the whole doctrine of law."
Moreover, Magna Carta," the most influential predecessor of the
Declaration,46 "is the embodiment of transcendent principles of natural
law."'4 7 Prof. Mary Sarah Bilder recently explained,
The important connection to Magna Carta is made apparent in [historian
Ken] Macmillan's comment:
"As Coke, Hale, and later writers such as John Locke and William
Blackstone explained, in exchange for their allegiance, those living in the
[American] colonies retained basic rights to life, limb, health, reputation,
44. Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural Law,
36 PEPP. L. REV. 491, 492 (2009) (quoting, William Blackstone, I Commentaries *3940).
45. "The Magna Carta was the 'Great Charter' issued by King John at Runnymede on June
15, 1215," to forestall a thoroughgoing civil war against the Crown by disgruntled barons
complaining of over-taxation. RALPH C. CHANDLER, RICHARD A. ENSLEN, PETER G.
RENSTROM, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK § 1:16 MAGNA CARTA (Westlaw). As noted,
Magna Carta is part of the English Constitution. See, supra notes 30-31 and accompanying
text.
46. Chandler, Enslen and Renstrom noted, "Magna Carta is not unlike the American
Declaration of Independence in that it serves as a focal point for the living tradition of a
government." CONSTITUTIONAL LAw DESKBOOK § 1:19 ENG. CONST. (Westlaw).
47. Dr. Jur. Eric Engle, Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment Became
Illegal in America -- A Future History, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 485, 490 (2008); See also, Martin H.
Redish and Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and The Values OfProcedural
Due Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 460 (1986) (citing, see II COKE, INSTITUTES 50 (4th ed. 1671),
"It was Lord Coke's position that the term 'per legem terrae,' [the law of the land] the Magna
Carta's equivalent of due process, included components of natural law and was therefore
capable of overriding parliamentary action."); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Dynamic Incorporation
of Foreign Law and the Constitutional Regulation of Federal Lawmaking, 38 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y. 337, 430 (2015) ("'[Tlhe law of the land' as Magna Carta used that term ... was
a small set of principles, rooted in natural law and contemporary mores, which governed
English society in the thirteenth century and would evolve over time,...").
However, attorney and scholar Timothy Sandefur opined, "[I]f in some sense the
Magna Carta contained elements of natural law reasoning, it was not a natural rights document.
On the contrary, the Magna Carta was one of those documents, like the English Bill of Rights
or the Edict ofNantes, that represented only promises by the throne to respect certain specified
freedoms of the subject." Timothy Sandefur, Lex Terrae 800 Years On: The Magna Carta's
Legacy Today, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 759, 772 (2015) (emphasis removed). In sharp contrast,
while influential to the origin of the United States, one may argue that unlike Magna Carta,
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were, to borrow Sandefur's terms,
"natural rights document(s)" that represent not merely "promises," but true protection of
individuals' rights emanating from the natural order of existence.
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property, and protection that all subjects enjoyed as part of their English
subjecthood and as guaranteed by natural law."4
Considering this wealth of references, the Founders would have agreed
with Prof. Kmiec's gripping "chicken-or-egg" summary: regarding, "the
pervasive significance of the natural law tradition to the common law of
England[:] 'one may say that men establish governing power through the law
of nature, but in the last analysis it is better to say that it is the law of nature
that establishes the power through men . . . ."
In sum, "The British colonists who founded the United States developed
their theory of self-government within the philosophical framework of the
British seventeenth and eighteenth century 'natural law-social contract'
movement.""o Their justification for revolution was grounded earnestly in
the immutable morality of natural law, a validation, the Founders believed,
that reasonable persons could not honestly refute. Thus, commentators of
various bents agree that,
there is a growing scholarly recognition that natural law and natural rights
did, in fact, form the theoretical basis for the political philosophy of the
Founding Fathers. ... [A competent] review of the historical role played
by natural law and natural rights during the Founding era confirms, as
historical fact, that natural law and natural rights were the foundation
upon which the new nation was erected."1
48. Mary Sarah Bilder, Charter Constitutionalism: The Myth of Edward Coke and the
Virginia Charter, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1545, 1557 (2016) (emphasis added) (quoting, KEN
MACMILLAN, THE ATLANTIC IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION: CENTER AND PERIPHERY IN THE ENGLISH
ATLANTIC WORLD 27 (2011)).
49. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 391-92 (quoting, JOHN FORTEScuE, DE NATURA LEGIS
NATURAE, 1, C. 18 (Garland Pub. 1980)); see also, John S. Baker, Jr., Natural Law and Justice
Thomas, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 471, 477 note 21 (1999-2000) (likewise quoting Fortescue).
50. Niles, supra note 28, at 108 (citing, Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of
the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223, 230 (1983); see also, STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE
UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 34-35
(1990); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 139-47 (1988)
(discussing the influence of Montesquieu, William Blackstone, Locke, and David Hume on
the thinking of the Framers); and, MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW
REPUBLICANISM 20-21 (1994)).
51. Broyles, supra note 17, at 346 (citing, RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES IN CONTEXT 3-16 (Vicki L. Been et al. eds., 1st ed. 2008)); see also, e.g., Hamburger,
supra note 28, at 914, 918-24; Robert G. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The
Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights And Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
361, 363 (1993) (noting the Declaration asserts, "natural rights to life, liberty, and property.");
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Given the foregoing, a verbatim litany of the Founders' sentiments
seems almost unnecessary. As Prof. Kmiec stressed, "'it would be amazing
if any Revolutionary leader of the Commonwealth could be found who did
not subscribe to the doctrines of natural law and right"'5 2 However, citation
to some original sources adds useful buttressing to this writing's basis that
the original Founders and the Reconstruction Congress did not reference
these principles simply to provide a worldly gloss to their political
ambitions." Rather, they were sincerely dedicated to the concept that:
Humanity's capacity to reason reveals moral truths; and, such truths:
-- are immutable because they arise from natural law;
-- are animated by natural rights, the birthright of each individual;
-- should be practiced dutifully by individuals in their private conduct;
and,
-- must be enforced under law through the offices of legitimate
government. 54
Certainly, historians have claimed that the Founders selfishly
prosecuted the American Revolution to preserve and to promote their own
economic interests and those of their peers." Not incompatibly, 56 other
scholars, perhaps most notably Douglas Adair who arguably spearheaded the
elucidation, argue that the Founders sought fame, esteem and the acclaim of
R. Randall Kelso, Contra Scalia, Thomas, and Gorsuch, Originalists Should Adopt a Living
Constitution, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 112, 128 (2017).
52. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 391 (quoting, Chester James Anticau, Natural Rights and the
Founding Fathers - The Virginians, 17 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 43 (1960)). I disagree
strongly, however, with Kmiec's attendant belief, predicated largely on Blackstone, that
legislatures, not courts, are the rightful authorities to assure that governmental policies
conform with the principles of natural law. Id. at 392-93. See infra, notes 480-520 and
accompanying text.
53. See generally, Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original
"Original Intent", 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965, 971-74 (1992) (recounting the virtually
unanimous agreement ofthe Founders that "no plan ofgovernment would be acceptable unless
the natural rights of the people were secure." Id. at 972).
54. A strong line of scholarship argues that at least as originally understood by the
Founders, under principles of natural law, Government legitimately could constrain
individuals' natural rights to promote the greater societal good. This writing addresses why
any such original concept misperceives the actuality of natural law and, thus, no longer can
control constitutional adjudication. See notes 245-79 and accompanying text.
55. E.g., CHARLES BEARD, AN EcONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
56. "The economic interpretation of the founding is now widely regarded as inadequate."
PETER MCNAMARA, THE NOBLEST MINDS vii (1999).
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history. 5 7 Still, historians such as Adair recognize that personal ambitions
notwithstanding, Jefferson, Adams and their fellows, strongly believing in
the ethical mandates of natural law, earnestly pursued their revolution both
to free the colonists from tyranny and to create a freer, better nation. Subject
to human foibles as well as human decency, the Founders were "complex
personalities, susceptible, as are we all, to various complementary and
conflicting inducements," including, as they, "candidly admitted their quite-
human longing for fame, honor, glory and posterity's favor which, along with
patriotism, and a calling to serve the best interests of their community,
'urge[d] some of them to act with a nobleness and greatness that their earlier
careers had hardly hinted at.'" 8
1. The Founders' Words --
Perhaps it is appropriate to begin with Thomas Jefferson, the primary
author of the Declaration's text, who unequivocally averred "[B]ut that
between society and society, or generation and generation there is no
municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of nature."" Prof. Broyles
encapsulated the future third president's abiding belief in immutable
principles of right and law:
Jefferson never wavered in his dedication to natural rights as the
cornerstone of republican government, stating that "[e]very species of
government has its specific principles. Ours perhaps are more peculiar
than those of any other in the universe. It is a composition of the freest
principles of the English constitution, with others derived from natural
right and natural reason." For Jefferson, natural rights were not
contingent upon discrete historical periods, or changing human mores.
For him, "Nothing then is unchangeable but the inherent and unalienable
rights of man."'
57. In this regard, one of the most notable works is Douglas Adair's truly groundbreaking
article, "Fame and the Founding Fathers." DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 8 (1974).
58. Bayer, supra note 17, at 341 (quoting, DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE FOUNDING
FATHERS 8 (1974) and generally discussing Adair at 8, 24-25).
59. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in I THE REPUBLIC
OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-
1826, at 631-36 (1995).
60. Broyles, supra note 17, at 348-49 (emphasis added) (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON,
NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 93 (1853)).
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John Adams too accepted the existence of natural law and attendant
moral commands as shown by his letter penned nearly two decades after the
Revolution:
To him who believes in the Existence and Attributes physical and moral
of a God, there can be no obscurity or perplexity in defining the Law of
Nature to be his wise benign and all powerful Will, discovered by Reason.
A Man who disbelieves the Being of a God, will have no perplexity or
obscurity in defining Morality or the Law of Nature, natural Law, natural
Right or any such Things to be mere Maxims of Convenience, to be Swifts
pair of Breeches to be put on upon occasion for Decency or Conveniency
and to be put off at pleasure for either.6 '
Influential advocate for the Constitution Alexander Hamilton, "made his
natural law principles clear early in his career, stating, '[N]atural liberty is a
gift of the beneficent Creator . . . . Civil liberty is only natural liberty,
modified and secured by the sanctions of civil society."' 62 Prof. Marc Trapp
recounted that "Hamilton once defended the natural rights of man against a
British loyalist by arguing, '(T)he fundamental source of all your errors,
sophisms and false reasonings is a total ignorance of the natural rights of
mankind."' 63  Employing remarkably poetic prose, Hamilton further
enthused, "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for, among
old parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam, in
the whole volume of human nature .. . and can never be erased or obscured
by mortal power."6"
61. Id. at 349 note 42, (quoting Letter from John Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams (Mar.
19, 1794)). As Prof. Broyles explained, "In language strikingly similar to Jefferson's, John
Adams wrote that the principles of the American Revolution 'are the principles of Aristotle
and Plato, of Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke; the principles of nature
and eternal reason; the principles on which the whole government over us now stands."' Id.
at 349 (quoting, JOHN ADAMS, NOVANGLUS: ADDRESSED TO THE INHABITANTS ON THE COLONY
OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, No. 1, IN THE POLITICAL WRITING OF JOHN ADAVs 26 (2000)
(emphasis added)); See also THE FOUNDERS ON RELIGION: BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 132 (2005).
62. Broyles, supra note 17, at 350 (quoting, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER
REFUTED (1775), reprinted in I THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN TWELVE VOLUMES
53, 87 (1904)). "Hamilton, similar to Jefferson and Adams, emphasized the centrality of
natural rights to ajust regime of liberty[.]" Id.
63. Mark Trapp, Created Equal: How the Declaration of Independence Recognizes and
Guarantees the Right to Life for the Unborn, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 831 (2001) (quoting,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), in I THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 104 (1961)).
64. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in I THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 122 (1961) (quoted in Trapp, supra note 63, at 832 note 58).
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During the ratification of the Constitution, Hamilton was no less vocal
about the dominance of the metaphysical:
The principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those
absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature,
but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and
intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social
communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws
is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals."
Likewise, James Wilson, a member of the Continental Congress and
Constitutional Convention, signer of both the Declaration and the
Constitution, and, future Associate Justice of the Supreme Court66 exclaimed,
"we may infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will
be progressive in its operations and effects." John Jay, advocate for the
65. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (1775), reprinted in I THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON IN TWELVE VOLUMES 63-64 (1904) (quoted in Broyles, supra note 17,
at 350).
66. Commenters rank Justice Wilson among, "the most significant [of the] Framers ...
whose important role in drafting the U.S. Constitution remains unnoticed by many
constitutional scholars." Deborah A. Roy, Justice William J Brennan, Jr., James Wilson, and
the Pursuit ofEquality and Liberty, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 665, 667, 670 (2013). In that regard,
the eminent scholar Akhil Reed Amar explained,
Most important [regarding the theory of popular sovereignty] were the arguments of
James Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Though less famous
today than some of his companions, Wilson deserves our most careful attention. He
was one of only six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. At Philadelphia, he played a role second - if that - only to Madison.
As Gordon Wood has written, Wilson was the Federalists' preeminent popular
sovereignty theorist; and it was his hand that first penned the bold first three words
of the Constitution, "We the People." In the 1780s, Wilson was universally regarded
as perhaps the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in America. Within
three years of the Constitution's ratification, he would spearhead a successful effort
to replace the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, serve as one of the first five
Associate Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, found the University of Pennsylvania
Law School, and deliver the most important and celebrated lectures on law ever given
in eighteenth century America.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article
V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 473-74 (1994) (quoting, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) and citing, 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (1937)).
67. JAMS WILSON, OF THE LAW OF NATURE, IN I COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
525 (2007).
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proposed Constitution, 68 an author of The Federalist, 69 and, future first Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court, reminded that although
government is necessary to protect liberty, "the people must cede to it some
of their natural rights in order to vest it with requisite powers."7 0 No less a
profound thinker, Thomas Paine7 1 succinctly extolled the fundamental basis
68. Hon. Richard E. Welsh I, Associate Justice, Superior Court, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, called John Jay, "a critically important supporter of the Constitution,..." Hon.
Richard E. Welsh III, Mr. Sullivan's Trunk- Constitutional Common Law and Federalism, 46
NEW ENG. L. REV. 275, 289 (2012). Regarding his influence on its ratification, along with his
essays in The Federalist, Jay's address of June 23, 1788, to the New York Ratifying
Convention is considered instrumental in that State's decision to adopt the proposed
Constitution. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, THE Duilous ENUMERATED POWER DOcTRINE, 22 CON.
CoMM. 25, 46 and note 76 (2005).
69. Although authoring significantly fewer essays than his co-authors Alexander Hamilton
and James Madison, John Jay's contributions were significant. For instance, Prof. Robert F.
Turner noted that Jay's The Federalist No. 64 is, "by far the most important of the Federalist
Papers on foreign affairs ... " A Forum on Presidential Authority, 6 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 23,
84 (2007) (Remarks of Prof. Robert F. Turner; emphasis in original).
70. The Federalist No. 2 (John Jay) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003). Of significant importance,
while correctly understanding the dominance of natural rights, like many others then and now,
Jay wrongly conflated forming and abiding by social contracts with ceding some natural rights.
To the contrary, as Kant explained regarding his third Categorical Imperative, the Kingdom
of Ends, formation of societies is not merely sensible, it is a moral imperative. See,
Originalism and Deontology, supra, note 7 at Section 3-d-5-B. Not only during interactions
with others within a given social order, but indeed when forming and preserving Society itself,
as Kant clarified, individuals may neither treat others nor themselves in an immoral fashion.
Specifically, persons may not treat either themselves or others merely as means without regard
to each individual's, including the given actor's, innate human dignity. Id.
Accordingly, compelling individuals to perform immoral acts to form or to preserve
their social orders is illegitimate because, as Deontology proves, there is never a moral
justification for immoral behavior. Id. at Sections 2-a, f. It must follow that whatever freedom
to act individuals relinquish as the price to form legitimate social orders cannot include losing
or renouncing actual natural rights for such rights are moral imperatives, as this writing shortly
will accent. See, infra notes 245-79 and accompanying text. Indeed, as this writing is now
proving, the entire legitimacy of Government depends on preserving not inhibiting natural
rights. Thus, no person may legitimately be compelled to abandon any natural right because
denying rights to others is an immoral act against those others, and, indeed, allowing oneself
to be denied rights is an immoral act against oneself. Therefore, although carelessly denoted
as natural rights, any freedoms properly and morally resigned by leaving the state of nature
were never moral imperatives and likely were immoral choices in and of themselves.
71. Patriot Thomas Paine's inspiring 1776 pamphlet Common Sense strongly affected
colonists' positive sentiment towards breaking from English rule. Paine's work was
"enormously influential" with Common Sense heralded as "America's first literary best seller."
J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.
REV. 463, 468 (2007). Indeed, Common Sense has been called, "the most brilliant pamphlet
written during the American Revolution, and one of the most brilliant pamphlets ever written
in the English language." Judge Grant Dorfman, The Founder's Legal Case: "No Taxation
without Representation" Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 Hous. L. REv. 1377, 1387 (2008)
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that the Revolution established "Government founded on a moral theory ...
And, patriot Samuel Adams,7 3 "echoed the principles of natural law when he
wrote that it is 'by the eternal and immutable laws of God and nature' that all
men are entitled to 'just and true liberty."' 74
2. The Shared Understanding of the Colonists --
As the numerous quotes above show, there is no doubt that the
Founders' concept of legitimate political theory sprang from their deeply
rooted belief in natural law. Moreover, as though anticipating Original
Public Meaning Originalism, 75 the Founders believed that the substance of
the Declaration's premises and arguments were commonly understood and
shared among the colonists. Granted, neither the Founders nor their
contemporaries agreed in all regards about the composition and scope of
natural law and its subset, natural rights, particularly regarding whether and,
if so, to what extent natural law constrains natural rights for the greater public
good.76 Yet, whatever disagreements or misunderstandings about that
(quoting, ERIC FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 75 (1976) (quoting Bernard
Bailyn, Common Sense, 25 AM. HERITAGE 36, 36 (1973)).
72. THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE PHILOSOPHIC UNDERSTANDINGS OF HlUMAN NATURE
INFORMING THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CHALLENGE TO
LOCKE, MONTESQUIEU, JEFFERSON, AND THE FEDERALISTS FROM UTILITARIANISM,
HISTORICISM, MARXISM, FRUEDIANISM, PRAGMTISM, EXISTENTIALISM 10 (Allan Bloom ed.,
1990) (discussing Locke and Montesquieu) (quoting THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, IN THE-
BASIC WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 148 (Willey Book Co., 1942).
73. Samuel Adams was cousin to John Adams and, like his cousin, both a signatory to the
Declaration of Independence and "one of the most influential Revolutionary leaders ... "
Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for The Common Good, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 1609, 1630 (2013).
74. Trapp, supra note 63, at 832 (quoting, WELLS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF
SAMUEL ADAMS 7502 (1865)).
75. See generally, Part : Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, Section 4-G-1.
76. The astute scholar of natural rights Jud Campbell recently noted,
But while largely in agreement on substance, the Founders spoke in a confusing
assortment of ways about the retention of natural rights. ...
This dizzying array of statements -- that individuals retained some, all, or none
of their natural liberty -- has created an extraordinary amount of confusion among
scholars. And it would seem to indicate substantial differences of opinion among the
Founders about the scope of their natural rights. In truth, however, the disagreement
was semantic, not substantive, because competing views about the terms of the social
contract mirrored the competing views about the scope of pre-political natural rights.
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L. J. 246, 274 (2017)
(footnote omitted).
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complex matter might have existed, as Alexander Tsesis explained, "The
Declaration of Independence so quickly gained colonial assent because its
author, Thomas Jefferson, drew his inspiration from ideas about governance
that enjoyed widespread support throughout the colonies."" Barely a year
before his death, Jefferson candidly acknowledged that the Declaration was
premised on well established, widely held theories justifying the imposition
of government over the affairs and conduct of the citizenry.7 8 As Jefferson
emphasized, "with respect to our rights, and the acts of the British
government contravening those rights, there was but one opinion on this side
of the water. All American whigs thought alike on these subjects."79
Indeed, as Jefferson stated, the philosophy of natural law was generally
appreciated and accepted by the people in whose name the Founders
conceived and prosecuted the Revolution. Respected scholar Philip
This writing answers Prof. Campbell's urgent point by proving that the Founders'
"dizzying array of statements" are interesting but, as a matter of moral philosophy, extraneous.
Deontological Originalism verified that no social contract legitimately -- that is morally -- may
require as the price of residency that individuals -- citizens, sojourners, visitors, or even
trespassers -- relinquishing their natural rights, because safeguarding such rights is the singular
moral imperative -- the legitimizing characteristic - of any Government through which civil
society enforces order. See, infra notes 245-79 and accompanying text.
77. Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitutionalism: Liberal Equality for The Common Good,
91 TEX. L. REv. 1609, 1631 (2013) (footnote omitted). Indeed, the principles collected in the
Declaration were found as well in numerous state constitutions adopted in 1776 and 1777.
"These individual state constitutions reflected the common voice of the American people as
similarly expressed in the Declaration of Independence." Broyles, supra note 68, at 348
(having discussed at 346-47, MASS. DECLARATION OF RTS.; NEW HAMPSHIRE BILL RTs.; VA.
DECL. RTs. (authored by George Mason), adopted by the VA. CONST. CONVENTION (June 12,
1776); PA. CONST. of 1776; N.J. CONST. 1776; MD. CONST. 1776; N.C. CONsT. 1776; and VT.
CONST. 1777)).
78. For instance, Jefferson famously wrote to fellow Virginian Continental Congress
delegate Richard Henry Lee, that,
the object of the Declaration of Independence [was] [n]ot to find out new
principles, or new arguments, never before thought of, no[r] merely to say things
which had never been said before; ... Neither aiming at originality of principle or
sentiment, nor yet copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended
to be an expression of the American mind .... All its authority rests then on the
harmonizing sentiments of the day, whether expressed in conversation, in letters,
printed essays, or in the elementary books of public right, as Aristotle, Cicero, Locke,
Sidney, etc.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), 16 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 117, 118-19 (Library ed. 1904) (quoted in, Broyles, supra note 17, at 348
note 38); see also, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. McCreary County,
Kentucky, 354 F.3d 438, 452-53, and note 7 (noting that the Declaration collects and presents
an amalgam of ancient and Enlightenment political theory).
79. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Henry Lee (May 8, 1825), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1501 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984).
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Hamburger noted the integral connection: "Americans [of the late Eighteenth
Century] tended to take for granted that natural law had a foundation in the
physical world and yet had moral implications. Natural law, according to
Americans, was a type of reasoning about how individuals should use their
freedom."so Prof. Charles W. Carey similarly explained, "It is important to
note that, despite their differences over the derivation of the natural law,
Americans of the founding era still had ample grounds for meaningful
dialogue, given their shared understanding of the conditions in the state of
nature to which this natural law -- however derived -- would apply." While
the degree of depth varied among the assorted populations, the Colonists
accepted that from natural rights and natural law derived the duties of
government, the right to expect government to meet its duties, and, the
attendant right to revolt against a government that adamantly and obdurately
refuses to meet its duties.82
Jefferson's admission that the Declaration of Independence expressed
neither original ideas nor novel embellishments makes eminent sense
because the Founders' purpose in publishing that document was instrumental.
As he clarified, the Founders' "objective was 'to place before mankind the
common sense of the subject, in terms so plain and firm as to command their
assent, and to justify ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to
take, ... "'83 Through his words, Jefferson explicated the Declaration's
advocacy character: elucidating to "mankind," using principles generally
accepted and understood among experts and laity alike, the logic and theory
("the common sense of the subject") validating the Revolution ("to justify
ourselves in the independent stand we are compelled to take") sufficiently
"to command their [mankind's] assent." Accordingly, as Prof. Broyles
rightly determined, "Jefferson wrote the Declaration ... with the belief that it
80. Hamburger, supra note 28, at 923 (quoted in, Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last
Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 999 note 16 (1997)).
Prof. Hamburger explicated the close association assumed between natural law and morality.
"Thus, Americans derived social obligations from enlightened self-interest - morality from
something deceptively similar to materialism - and therefore could talk about natural law both
as a law of human nature and as the foundation of moral rules." Hamburger at 924 (footnote
omitted); see also, R.J. Arjo, S.J., Thomas Aquinas: Prudence, Justice and the Law, 40
LOYOLA L. REV. 897, 921 (1995).
81. Carey, supra note 22, at 52.
82. Id. (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 47 (2005) (quoting, LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON To RIcHARD HENRY LEE
(May 8, 1825), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1501 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
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reflected the understanding of the American people, not a mere ideological
or political tract.""
Agreeing with Broyles' assessment of Jefferson and the Founders,
scholars accent that the Declaration was not an elitist expression of highbrow
principles unappreciated and undecipherable by the Public. Rather, "From
the time of its drafting, the Declaration of Independence was almost
universally viewed by the colonists as, first and foremost, a proclamation and
justification of independence."" Prof. Bernard H. Siegan nicely summarized
the point:
From the sixteenth through the eighteenth century, the natural law concept
[requiring government to act in a moral fashion] commanded a great deal
of scholarly attention, and by the time of the Constitutional Convention
of 1787, a considerable number of philosophers, ecclesiastical scholars,
social commentators, and jurists had written on the subject. All agreed
that people by reason of their humanity possessed natural rights which
could not be abridged by positive law. American constitutional and bill
of rights models were constructed at a time when the natural law school
ofjudicial thought was highly influential. '
In sum, the Declaration was not an "apology" as Russel Kirk scornfully
averred,87 but rather, an unequivocal, noble, unapologetic explanation of the
moral imperatives that rightly dominate human existence, of how those
imperatives delimit legitimate government, and how George HI's
government irredeemably violated its duties to the point that the Colonies
were left with only two choices: either exist in pathetic hypocrisy by
acquiescing to incorrigibly immoral governance, or rebel.
In light of the foregoing litany of quotes and historians' analyses, it
strains credulity to believe that the Founders simply were appealing to
cynical politics when they stressed so emphatically the inextricable link
between natural law and the legitimacy of Government. As Jefferson
explained nearly a half-century after the drafting of the Declaration, "'an
appeal to the tribunal of the world was deemed proper for our justification'
after the colonists were 'forced ... to resort to arms for redress."' 88
84. Broyles, supra note 17, at 348.
85. Carey, supra note 22, at 46.
86. Siegan, supra note 42, at 421-22 (emphasis added).
87. See supra, note 23 and accompanying text.
88. Carey, supra note 22, at 46 (quoting, LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO HENRY LEE
(May 8, 1825), in THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1500 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
190 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART II - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Importantly, the sentiments expressed therein were, in Jefferson's apt
reckoning, "an expression of the American mind."8 9 In that regard, the aged
Jefferson contemporaneously stated that Americans should, "cherish the
principles of the instrument [The Declaration] in the bosoms of our own
citizens.. . . I pray God that these principles may be eternal." 90
Steeped in the credo of natural law, a doctrine embraced not only by the
Founders themselves but also by the society whose government they sought
to change so radically, we now can appreciate how the Founders incorporated
those principles explicitly into the Declaration of Independence.
B. The Declaration's Text --
1. The Declaration as a Legal Brief--
As taught to American youth from their elementary school days, the
Declaration of Independence expresses a litany of detailed grievances
supporting rebellion against England.91 These specific, implacable failures
of George III's reign to respect the responsibilities of legitimate governance
constitute the Founders' detailed factual support for their lawyerlike
argument asserting the Colonies' right, in fact duty, "to dissolve the political
bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, ... "92 Indeed, the Declaration has
the form of a legal memorandum,9 3 particularly argument formation referred
to among legal writing faculty as the "CREAC" paradigm. 94 Following the
89. Id (quoting, LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO HENRY LEE (May 8, 1825), in
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1501 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984)).
90. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 395 (quoting, LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO JAMES
MADISON (Aug. 30, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 460, 463-64 (Andrew
A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905)).
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
92. Id. para. 1.
93. Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited Constitution, 4 So. CAL. INTERDIS. L. J.
549, 551 (1995) ("The Declaration might be said to be a kind of legal brief, setting forth the
colonists' case against King and Parliament."); see also, JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 49 (1980).
94. Highly respected professor of theory and legal writing Linda H. Edwards, among
others, aptly instruct budding law students (and indeed experienced lawyers) to use the
following "paradigm" of "small-scale" argument-discussion formation for any legal writings'
major points and sub-points: the CREAC form. Specifically: Conclusion, Rule, Explanation,
Application, Conclusion (restated). Accordingly, for ease of understanding, the legal writer
should first state the conclusion she plans to draw. Next, set for the applicable rule on which
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logic of what roughly two centuries later would be conceived as CREAC, the
Declaration's text presents: (1) its ultimate conclusion -- the validity of the
American Revolution as matters of law, reason and history; (2) the
overarching legal premises supporting the conclusion - the legitimate
function of Government and the right to revolt when Government utterly
refuses to function legitimately; (3) facts relevant to prove the illegitimacy of
the challeneged government - numerous and consistent instances where
England failed to govern the Colonies in a legitimate fashion despite frequent
entreaties from the Colonies beseeching for proper treatment; and, (4)
reassertion of the basic conclusion that, under the circumstances, revolution
is appropriate, if not mandatory.
Therefore, "The language of the Declaration of Independence is not
that of a mere political manifesto[.]"9 5 Rather, in prose at once accessible yet
lyrical, the Dcclaration is a stunningly exquisite exposition of the character
and purpose of government - an unprecedented use of Enlightenment liberal
political theory addressed to the World, articulating a tangible, rational
justification for open, armed rebellion against presumptively lawful but
provably illegitimate sovereign authority." The Declaration is a
sophisticated advocacy brief, applying abstract political and moral
philosophy to discrete but cumulative offenses by the British Government
the conclusion will be premised. Then explain the rule, particularly how the rule works as
well as explicating the rule's policy, that is, why the rule exists. Based on the explanation, the
writer applies the rule to the given set of facts to ascribe those facts' legal meaning under the
rule. With analysis complete, the writer restates the initial conclusion the derived from
applying the explanation of the controlling rule or set of rules. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING AND ANALYSIS, Chs. 8 & 9 (Wolters Kluwer, 4th ed. 2015).
The process differs slightly if the writers' project is to create or define an as yet
unestablished rule. However, the Founders' project falls into the classic CREAC paradigm,
for them, the application of rules of natural rights to the facts arising from George III's
despotism against the Colonies.
95. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Apportioning Due Process: Preserving the Right to Affordable
Justice, 87 DEN. U. L. REv. 437, 437 (2010).
96. John C. Holmes accented the then-extraordinary nature of reducing to writing such a
justification:
[Alt the time of the founding of the United States, the very concept of a written
document being paramount in a governmental system was unique. The framers of
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution were aware of the potential
influence that these documents might have throughout the world, and they made
frequent references to the universality of the principles they hoped to establish. John
C. Holmes, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the World, 1776-1989: A Global
Perspective by George Athan Billias New York University Press, New York, NY, 2009, 57 SEP.
FED. L. 64, 64 (2010) (book review).
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thereby demonstrating the legal basis - indeed the lawful necessity - of
armed revolution against England."
2. God, "the Pursuit ofHappiness" and Natural Law --
Turning to the text itself, the Founders opened their argument by
explaining why they drafted and published the Declaration: specifically, to
convince all and sundry that revolution can be and, in the case of the
Colonies, is morally and legally justified. Accordingly, in the Founders'
words, "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should
declare the causes which impel them to the separation."" In that same
opening paragraph, they introduced what would be the consistent,
predominate theme of the Declaration: natural law theory appreciating laws
higher than and existing prior to those that might be formed by human
intellect. The Founders referred to the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's
God,"" thus, as commentators agree, invoking the idea of natural law,'" as
97. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE 189-208 (1997) (discussing that it was during the early to mid-1800s, one or
two generations after its initial dissemination, that the American public viewed the Declaration
not only as a blueprint for legitimate revolution but as well, a basic theoretical exposition of
fundamental human rights).
98. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
99. Id
100. Hon. Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution -- The
Declaration ofIndependence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L. J. 983, 995 (1987);
Hon. Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, The Natural Law in the American Tradition, 79 FORD. L. REv.
1513, 1516 (2011) (Natural Law Colloquium) (through the term "Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God," "The Declaration explicitly appeals to the natural law."); Kmiec, supra, note
25, at 395 (same, but suggesting interestingly that "Nature's God" refers to "scripture."); Mark
C. Rahdert, Exceptionalism Unbound: Appraising American Resistance to Foreign Law, 65
CATH. U. L. REv. 537, 571 note 250 (2016) ("Natural Law: The Ultimate Source of
Constitutional Law, National Center for Constitutional Stud., https://www.nccs.net/natural-
law-the-ultimate-source-of-constitutional-law.php (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) (noting that that
Founders alluded to a higher law as the ultimate source 'to protect ... natural rights for all of
mankind."')); A. Scott Loveless, The Forgotten Founding Document: Considering the Ends
of the Law, 27 BYU J. PuB. L. 365, 368 (2013) ("The Declaration and its reference to natural
law thus comprise a chapeau by which to read the Constitution."; footnote omitted, emphasis
in original); Charles Fahy, The Supreme Court in The American System of Government, By
Robert H. Jackson, 69 HARv. L. REv. 580, 581 (1956) (book review) (noting Justice Robert
Jackson's lecture identifying the reference to the "Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" as
"The natural law").
The courts as well have recognized that "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God"
references the Enlightenment belief of rights deriving from a natural, not humanly created,
existence. See, e.g., Newdow v. Rio Linda Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1030 & n.23 (9th Cir.
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the source that, under dire circumstances, "entitles" "one people to dissolve
the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the powers of the earth, [a] separate and equal station ... "101
With the foregoing prelude, the Founders explained what circumstances
would permit "dissolve[ing] the political bands." They expressed their
foundational concept in what certainly is among the most celebrated and
quoted paraphrasing of the theory of natural rights emanating from natural
law: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."'02 From this
single, elegant assertion, if nothing else, we understand that the Founders
were deontologists, not consequentialists. The "Rights," as they noted,
derive not from human manufacture, but from a "Creator" who devised the
"Laws of Nature and Nature's God."io3
a. What Is "Nature 's God?"
With regard to their use of terms such as "Creator," the arguably
prevailing understanding is that the Founders predominately were deists,
meaning they believed in a supreme being or unifying force in the Universe,
but, unlike theists, not necessarily one who intervenes incessantly in human
affairs, preordaining and ordering the destinies of each discrete member of
Humankind, a theology that Rick Fairbanks called, "a weak understanding of
God's governance."l 04 There remains an ongoing and lively debate regarding
2010) (stating that the Declaration embraces natural law theory); ACLU of Ky. v. McCreary
Cnty., 354 F.3d 438, 453 n.7 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted), affd, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
101. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. I (U.S. 1776).
102. Id. para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added). Perhaps it should go without saying but
nonetheless this article notes that the Founders' references to "men," should and must be
understood now to mean "persons," including, doubtless controversially but appropriately,
corporate and other such legally recognized artificial persons created by human beings to serve
human beings. E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 342-43
(2010) (corporations have First Amendment speech rights equivalent to those of natural
persons).
103. Moreover, as natural rights arise from natural law, and as natural law precedes
Humankind and, likewise, must have been created by "Nature and Nature's God," the
Founders declared themselves to believe in immutable principles of morality. See, infra,
Section 3.
104. Rick Fairbanks, The Laws of Nature and of Nature's God: The Role of Theological
Claims in the Argument of The Declaration ofIndependence, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 551, 555 (1994-
95). Alternatively, depending on your choice of definitions, it could be said that generally,
the Founders were theists in that they believed in a supreme being, but took a deist view of
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the religious precepts of the various founders and how those precepts
informed their respective theories of morality and government.10 5  The
God's relationship with human beings. "There is no doubt that, to the Framers, religion
entailed a relationship of man to some Supreme Being ... [but] [w]hile they were theists, there
is no clear evidence that the Founders wished to protect only theism." Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1060 (1978). Or, as Prof.
Fairbanks put it, "a theist is someone who believes in one god who is both creator and
'governor' of the world. So far as I know all of the founders were theists in this sense, including
those called deists." Fairbanks at 555.
105. For instance, Steven K. Green concluded,
deism should be understood as a rational belief in a God, his goodness, and
providential plan (though most viewed providence as indirect, rather than an active
force). Most deists, like many of the Founders -- Benjamin Franklin, George
Washington, Thomas Jefferson -- denied the divinity of Jesus, of his substitutional
atonement, and the reality of biblical miracles. But it mischaracterizes their faith to
claim that deists rejected theism or the importance of piety and civic virtue. Most
deists viewed their rational theology as consistent with general principles of
Christianity -- if not a perfection of the latter -- and most felt no tension in reading
the Bible or attending more orthodox Protestant churches (though George
Washington avoided taking communion throughout his adult life). Efforts by
modem-day religionists to canonize the Founders are thus misplaced, but so too are
those efforts by secularists to characterize the Founders as unconcerned about
religious issues.
Steven K. Green, Understanding the "Christian Nation" Myth, 2010 CARDOZO L. REv. 245,
257 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
Somewhat similarly, historian David Barton attributes "Jefferson's [early] writings
very critical of organized religion" to a youthful enamor of David Hume's critiques which,
Jefferson later recalled with amiable candor, "'I remember well the enthusiasm with which I
devoured it [Hume's work] when young, and the length of time, the research and reflection
which were necessary to eradicate the poison it had instilled into my mind."' David Barton,
The Image and the Reality: Thomas Jefferson and the First Amendment, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 399, 445 (2003) (quoting, LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO COL.
WLLIAM DUANE (Aug. 12, 1810), in 12 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 405 (Andrew
A. Lipscomb ed., 1905)). Therefore, according to Mr. Barton,
While Jefferson might fail the standard of being a Christian by an orthodox definition
(on occasion he expressed his doubts about the divinity of Christ), there is no
evidence to impute any charge of deism to Jefferson. A deist believes in an impersonal
God uninvolved with mankind and embraces the "clockmaker theory" that there was
a God who made the universe and wound it up like a clock but it now runs of its own
volition; the clockmaker is gone and therefore does not respond to man. None of
Jefferson's religious writings from any period of his life reveal anything less than his
strong conviction in a personal God, and that every individual would stand before
God to be judged by Him.
Id. at 446 (footnotes omitted).
In this regard, Barton, among others, debunks the legend of a so-called "Jefferson
Bible," wherein Jefferson took a scissors to expunge from the New Testament all
"objectionable" and "unreasonable" references to religion and miracles, leaving only historical
accounts and moral precepts. Id. According to Mr. Barton, "there is, in fact, no such single
Jefferson work." Id. at 447. Rather, in 1804, 1813, and 1817, Jefferson composed three
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consensus nonetheless remains that, consistent with their Enlightenment
roots, the Founders were captivated by science, logic, and free will allowing
individuals to discern from reason the precepts of right living and, thereby,
to make independent choices of how best to attain their respectively personal
goals informed by and consistent with abiding moral precepts. In sum, as
historians Charles and Mary Beard explained, "Jefferson, Paine, John
Adams, Washington, Franklin, Madison and many lesser lights were to be
reckoned among the Unitarians or Deists. It was not Cotton Mather's God to
whom the authors of the Declaration of Independence appealed; it was to
Nature's God.""
Accordingly, Humankind's "endowment" from "their Creator" -- from
"Nature's God" -- is the amalgam of rights, derived from the natural order of
things - from an innate actuality - which human beings can discern through
reason, a classic expression of Enlightenment liberalism.' 07 Moreover, and
distinct but related collections of Jesus' moral teachings in Jesus' own words, intended to set
forth without complexities and confusing interpretations, "the most sublime and benevolent
code of morals which has ever been offered to man. . . . The result is an octavo of forty-six
pages of pure and unsophisticated doctrines, such as were professed and acted on by the
unlettered Apostles, the Apostolic Fathers, and the Christians of the first century." Id.
(quoting, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 389-90 (discussing JEFFERSON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF JESUS). While
believing his biblical abridgements would assist all interested students of Christian morality,
Jefferson intended his "wee-little book" for what he considered to be unsophisticated, usually
uneducated audiences, particularly Native Americans of his era. Id. (quoting, LETTER FROM
THOMAS JEFFERSON TO CHARLES THOMPSON (Jan. 9, 1816), in 14 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 385).
106. CHARLES A. & MARY R. BEARD, THE RISES OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 449 (1940).
Regarding the quote's comparative reference, from the late 1600s into the 1700s, "the
Reverend Increase Mather and his son, the Reverend Cotton Mather, were both influential
Puritan Ministers and intellectuals enamored with science. Yet, their scientific views were
animated by their belief in the invisible world, both diabolical and divine. ... Some scholars
opine that the genesis of the Salem witchcraft trials may have been the publication in 1689 of
Cotton Mather's widely-disseminated treatise, Memorable Providences." Jane Campbell
Moriarty, Wonders of The Invisible World: Prosecutorial Syndrome and Profile Evidence in
the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43, 50-51 (2001) (footnotes omitted). The
Mathers, pare et fils, were renowned for fanatical religious beliefs. "Increase and Cotton
Mather were outspoken on many issues of morality and proper conduct. ... [They] contributed
to the witchcraft hysteria in Salem in 1692." Mary Wishner, "That Most Congenial
Lawyer/Bibliographer, " 104 LAW. LIBR. J. 135, 142 (2012) (footnote omitted).
107. E.g., Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of the Pursuit of Happiness, 7 WASH. U.
JURISPRUDENCE REV. 195, 257 (2015) (noting that Benjamin Franklin understood that rights
such as "the pursuit of happiness" are properly understood through reason, not passion). In
point of fact, comprehension and the attribution of meaning require the interaction of reason
and passion. Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding - The "Russian Dressing"
Theory of Emotions: An Explanation ofthe Phenomenology ofEmotions and Rationality with
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certainly consistent with any endowment from a metaphysical force, 08 rights
are "unalienable," meaning something that no Government, indeed no person
nor humanly created entity, can eradicate, abrogate or mitigate.1 09 Such is
the very fabric of Deontology, the concept that something, in this case rights,
emanates from a natural order and may not be altered by Humankind for any
reason regardless of the outcome.' As scholar A. Scott Loveless precised
"All law rests on some fundamental deontology or moral philosophy, some
idea of right and wrong, what we might term the objectives or 'ends' of the
law."' 1' These are principles the Founders well understood.
Suggested Related Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 MERCER L. REV.
1033 (2001). Nonetheless, the point for this article remains that, as scholars such as Conklin
and the others referenced herein accent, the Founders believed in the deontology of natural
rights.
108. E.g., Craig A Stem and Gregory M. Jones, The Coherence of Natural Inalienable
Rights, 76 UMCK L. REv. 939, 959-62 (2008) (discussing but not necessarily embracing
theories).
109. E.g., Landon W. Magnusson, Selling Ourselves into Slavery: An Originalist Defense
of Tacit Substantive Limits to the Article VAmendment Process and The Double-Entendre of
Unalienable, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 415, 416 (2010) ("For years, ['unalienable'] has been
understood to mean that there are certain rights that no government is permitted to abridge. ...
[T]he unalienability of rights also forbids people from alienating those rights on their own
through democratic processes."); Larson, supra note 33, at 709 note 31 (citing, Justice David
J. Brewer, Address at Yale Law School (1891) (specifically discussing the right to property),
quoted in Owen M. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in PHILIP J. BERGAN ET
AL., THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 59 (Federal Bar Council 1986)).
In this regard, Michael Novak plausibly concluded, "that almost every signer of the
Declaration of Independence believed that Christian moral teaching (which they understood
as aligned with Jewish moral teaching) was necessary to a republican government. The early
founders recognized that 'human history is the history of liberty' -- individual decisions of
will -- and that religion and state 'do not compete in a zero-sum game."' Candyce T. Beneke,
The Separation ofPersonal Religious Faith and Professional Identity-Is This Really Possible?
Is It Truly Desirable? 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1423, 1431 (2000) (quoting, Michael Novak, It's OK
to Put God in Political Campaigns, Houston Chron., Dec. 26, 1999, at IC).
110. See generally, Part !: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7 at Section 2. Charles
Carey and Jud Campbell, among others, argue that the concept of "unalienable Rights" had a
more limited context; but, while their argument sounds plausible, the overarching
deontological nature of natural law from which natural rights descend demonstrates that, in
effect, government simply cannot infringe rights, that is, principles of natural law cannot
properly limit principles of natural rights even if for the sake of the greater general good.. See,
infra notes 245-79 and accompanying text.
111. A. Scott Loveless, The Forgotten Founding Document: Considering the Ends of the
Law, 27 BYU J. PUB. L. 365, 368 (2013).
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b. What Is "the pursuit ofHappiness? "
A word is in order about the Founders' meaning of the right to "the
pursuit of Happiness" because, contrary to some dismissive commentary, it
"is not an empty phrase, but carries meaning for those seeking to vindicate
their rights."1 12 Indeed, "the pursuit of Happiness" captures the Founders'
belief that the natural law enforces strict and immutable moral duties. As
Prof. Douglas Kmiec explained, Blackstone devised the phrase "pursuit of
happiness" for his influential legal treatise which, "likewise indicates that the
natural law -- man's reasoned deduction of that impressed by God within the
design of human nature -- has become interwoven with the common law."113
From these propositions, Blackstone wrote:
The creator is a being, not only of infinite power, and wisdom, but also of
infinite goodness, ... For he has so intimately connected, so inseparably
interwoven the laws of eternal justice with the happiness of each
individual, that the latter cannot be attained but by observing the former;
and, ifthe former be punctually obeyed, it cannot but induce the latter. In
consequence of which mutual connection of justice and human felicity,
[God] has not perplexed the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted
rules and precepts... but has graciously reduced the rule of obedience to
this one paternal precept, "that man shall pursue his own true and
substantial happiness."'14
We see, then, a most profound and perhaps unexpected understanding:
the pursuit of happiness, while surely motivated by personal desires for
personal fulfillment, is not simply constrained by "the laws of eternal justice"
(which might well have been sufficient to link legitimate pursuit of happiness
with moral conduct). Rather, the pursuit of happiness is itself God's sole
"rule of obedience" to satisfy "the laws of eternal justice." Instead of,
"perplex[ing] the law of nature with a multitude of abstracted rules and
precepts," God -- what the Founders would call "God and Nature's God" --
coalesced natural law's command of "eternal justice" -- of moral
comportment -- into, as Blackstone expressed God's command, "man shall
112. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 380.
113. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 392 (discussing, I William Blackstone, I COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 41 (James Dewitt Andrews ed., Callaghan Co. 4th ed. 1899)
(Commentaries using terminology "pursuit of happiness")).
114. Id. at 392 note 45 (emphasis added; quoting, I William Blackstone, I COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 40-41 (James Dewitt Andrews ed., Callaghan Co. 4th ed. 1899).
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pursue his own true and substantial happiness." Prof. Albert W. Alschuler
likewise profoundly illuminated Blackstone's point, "As 'a being of infinite
wisdom,' however, God had 'inseparably interwoven the laws of eternal
justice with the happiness of each individual.' Happiness could be attained
only by observing the law of nature, and obedience to this law could not fail
to produce human happiness.""'
Hence, inherent in the "unalienable Right [of] ... the pursuit of
Happiness" is the duty to pursue one's happiness in accordance with the
natural law, meaning abiding by the natural rights that enforce moral
comportment. This is so because persons may not legitimately be happy --
be pleased with what they have made of their respective lots -- if they have
disparaged other persons by infringing on their unalienable rights. In this
regard, the link between the Declaration and natural rights stemming from
natural law remains unquestionable.
3. The Legitimate Purpose of Government and the Right to Rebel --
Along with the premise of unalienable rights, the Founders asserted a
second equally vital premise explaining the fundamental purpose and
legitimacy of Government: "That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed, ... ""6 From these two premises - the unalienability of natural
rights and the primary, legitimate governmental responsibility to safeguard
such rights - the Founders drew their principle conclusion defining the
legitimacy of revolution: "[W]henever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness." 17
115. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 493 (emphasis added; quoting, William Blackstone, 1
Commentaries *40).
116. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
17. Id. It is worth emphasizing that the Founders' prose asserting that the populace may
construct post-revolutionary government "in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness" accords only limited discretion. While there may be any
number of means and structures to choose when designing and maintaining public authority,
as the foregoing discussion shows, the Founders agreed and understood that none may disobey
Government's immutable, a priori duty to preserve "unalienable Rights." Indeed, consistent
with this writing's Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, we know from the just
quoted Blackstonian theory, "Happiness" is illegitimate unless it conforms with moral norms.
Therefore, the latitude attendant to structuring government that maximizes "Safety and
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Continuing in the style of legal argument, having presented and
explained the legal premises, the Founders then applied those premises to the
particular facts"' in the form of an extensive inventory"' verifying that, "The
history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States."l2 o Completing the argument, the Founders
explained that the Colonies are blameless, having met fully their obligations
to attempt salvaging their relationship with their Sovereign, attempts that
England utterly rebuffed.1 2 ' With the legal argument completed, the
Founders drew the inevitable legal conclusion: "That these United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are
Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be
totally dissolved ... "122
In sum, the Declaration's argument clearly and directly appeals to the
inescapable intersection of law, logic, and morality:
As is evident from Jefferson's statements in the Declaration of
Independence, natural rights are those particular claims -- assertions of
principle -- that humans not only may rightly make against government
authority, but that also form the basis upon which a just government is
established. As such, the only true, just form of government is one which
seeks "to secure these rights," which is why "[g]overnments are instituted
among Men." Indeed, the failure to secure mankind's fundamental natural
rights leads to the right to revolution -- "the Right of the People to alter or
to abolish it."' 23
The above paragraphs describing the structure and perceptions
expressed in the Declaration establish that the Founders' sentiments are
Happiness" surely cannot justify despotism - Government's most atrocious contravention of
the "Laws ofNature and Nature's God" - even if doing so makes the entire population happier
and safer than the next most popular alternative. Bayer, supra note 17, at 396403.
118. "To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
119. Id. para. 3.
120. Id. para. 2.
121. "In every stage of these Oppressions We have Petitioned for Redress in the most
humble terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A Prince
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler
of a free people." Id. para 4 (U.S. 1776).
122. Id. para. 6 (U.S. 1776).
123. Broyles, supra note 17, at 348.
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entirely deontological, patently premised on the belief that the "Rights"
which Governments are formed and entrusted to preserve are "unalienable,"
meaning a priori, immutable and untouchable. Accordingly, the Founders'
argument proclaiming the Colonies' very right to revolt, as it must be, is
premised on the wrongfulness -- the inherent immorality -- of England's
conduct - a wrongfulness so horrible, destructive, and interminable that no
affected persons reasonably would tolerate and that, indeed, they have an
obligation to escape if only to preserve their dignity as human beings. 124
Because its wrongful behavior consisted of contravening without remorse
rather than fostering the colonists' "unalienable Rights," England acted
immorally - it failed to meet its duty to its populace. Even presuming its
abuse of the Colonies was good for England, it was not right for England
because, as the Declaration explains, any government's duty - its
justification for existing - is to preserve and protect each subject's
"unalienable Rights. " Failing in its non-delegable duty, then, was England's
immoral act, severe enough to warrant the American Revolution. 125
124. "But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same
Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their
Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
It should be emphasized that this writing uses the term "affected persons" rather than
"adversely affected persons" because no less than those who suffer from the infirmities of
immoral governments, those who benefit from governmental immorality have an affirmative,
immutable moral obligation to reform the offices of government. Interestingly, often it is the
very nature of government under law which bears that moral burden, although, if course, the
reformations must emanate from the governed themselves. For example, under the Kantian
theory that should animate governmental conduct (see, infra note 125 and Part l: Originalism
and Deontology, supra, note 7, Section 3-d), a wealthy individual has no moral obligation to
expend any funds or efforts to assist the destitude so long as that wealthy individual did not
immorally cause the destitution. However, Government itself has an affirmative moral
obligation to assist the destitute at taxpayers' expense, at least to the extent it restores to such
destitute individuals the ability to attain for themselves acceptable, minimal subsistence
including food, cloathing, shelter and arguably, access to health care, to education, and to
employment opportunities. Peter Brandon Bayer, The Individual Mandate's Due Process
Legality: A Kantian Explanation, and Why It Matters, 44 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 865 (2013).
125. Importantly, this writing's proposition that understanding the constitutional meaning
of "due process" is an ethical endeavor premised on the moral theory of Immanuel Kant is not
undermined by Kant's insistence that, no matter how grave the circumstances, revolution
against an existing government is never rightful, thus always is impermissible. According to
Kant, "[1]f the ruler or regent, as the organ of the supreme power, proceeds in violation of the
laws, as in imposing taxes, recruiting soldiers and so on, contrary to the law of equality in the
distribution of political burdens, the subject can interpose complaints and objections
(gravamina) to this injustice, but not active resistance." Uncredited, Kant's Political and
Juridical Doctrine, 31 HARv. L. REv. 40, 52 (1917) (emphasis in original) (quoting, Immanuel
Kant, 1116ments mdaphisiques de la doctrine du droit [THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
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OF JUSTICE] (Part I of La m6taphisique des moeurs), at 178, J. Barni's translation, Paris,
1853.)) The logical conclusion is that, while Kant certainly embraced the structural idea of
"separation of powers," e.g., Lewis W. Beck, Kant and the Right ofRevolution, 32 J. HIST. OF
IDEAS 411, 413-17 (1971), the executive power, symbolizing the essence of government, is
immune to revolution by definition.
As if his meaning were not already clear, Kant explicated, "And least of all when the
supreme power is embodied in an individual monarch is there any justification for seizing his
person or taking away his life. The slightest attempt of this kind is high treason; and a traitor
of this sort who aims at the overthrow of his country may be punished, as a political parricide,
even with death." 31 HARv. L. REv. at 52 (citing, El6ments m6aphisiques de la doctrine du
droit at 180).
Kant's rational for his perhaps counter-intuitive proposition that no amount of official
immorality can morally justify revolution is, according to one scholar, "brief to the point of
lucidity." Beck, at 413. As explained by Prof. Beck, Kant had to be true to the logic of his
constructs. "By virtue of the ideal of the social contract, sovereignty is indivisible. A
constitution cannot have within it a positive law permitting the abrogation of the constitution;
... " Id. Therefore, rightful means to promote the Government's duty of moral comportment
eschew rebellion that would declare the present Government unlawful and, for that reason,
replace it. Beck appropriately denotes this aspect of Kant's philosophy as "formalism in
extremis" while accepting that, given his deontological bent, nothing but purity of ideas would
satisfy Kant. Id. (Indeed likewise, this writing's two-part exegesis linking Deontology and
Originalism neither brooks exceptions nor indulges anomalies based on purported pragmatism
akin to Justice Scalia's "faint-hearted" originalism. See generally, Part I: Originalism and
Deontology, supra, note 7 at Sections 2-a, b. To be viable, a theory must be unwavering and
completely consistent.) For Kant, then, despite his third Categorical Imperative admonishing
that governments must act morally by comporting with the first two Categorical Imperatives
(id. at Section 3-d-5), a constitution's promise to abide by natural law is precatory, part of its
preamble. The true purpose of a constitution is to enforce the positive law. Beck at 414.
Therefore, according to Kant, because, "Revolution abrogates positive law ... positive law and
its system condemn revolution. Revolution means a return to nature which the contract
establishing positive law renounces." Id. (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
Hence, subjects may petition Government for reforms, but regardless whether those
petitions are accepted, obedience to authority is mandatory. "For to disobey is to return to the
state of nature and leave it to chance, or Providence, whether the new government yet to be
established will be better or worse than the one which is overthrown." Id. at 415.
The foregoing might well be classified as an example of "Kant's ethics," which
progressive Kantians need not obey. Modern understandings and applications of that unique
and virtuoso philosopher's theories sound not in "Kant's ethics" -- the actual applications of
his precepts Kant himself endorsed to resolve discrete moral problems -- but rather "Kantian
ethics," "'an ethical theory formulated in the basic spirit of Kant .... ' A proponent of Kantian
ethics enthusiastically adapts Kant's broad principles to form what she believes is either a more
accurate, pertinent meta-theory or a better application of such to precise circumstances."
Bayer, supra note 17, at 347 (quoting ALLEN W. WOOD, KANTIAN ETHICS 1 (2008)); see also,
Originalism and Deontology, supra, note 7 at Section 3-c. David Richards explained the idea
neatly, "Kant's moral and political philosophy is studded with problematic casuistry to which
contemporary Kantians object sharply, often on Kantian grounds. Neo-Kantians ...
distinguish between the abstract theory and the casuistry in the interest of more fully
understanding and explicating the permanent philosophical value in the abstract theory itself."
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David A.J. Richards, Kantian Ethics and the Harm Principle: A Reply to John Finnis, 87
COLUM. L. REv. 457, 458-59 (1987) (footnote omitted).
As Prof. Richards accented, careful, properly elucidated use of Kantian ethics to
improve Kant's ethics is justifiable, not a contrivance seeking the cachet of a Kantian patina
to distort Kant's philosophy. "There may be the best of reasons, including the persecutory
intolerance of absolutist Prussia of the late eighteenth century, why even a philosopher of
Kant's stature may not have fully understood and elaborated the radical political implications
of his views." Id. at 459 (citing, L. STRAUSS, PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING 179-201
(1952)). Richards added a useful clarification,
I do not suggest ... that Kant is self-consciously concealing his true meaning, but it
is, in my judgment, plausible that the authoritarian Prussian culture in which Kant
lived and worked may have led Kant to find plausibility in arguments not, in fact,
critically defensible on the more abstract terms of his moral and political philosophy.
Kant's objection to the right to revolt is, I believe, reasonably thus understood.
Id. at 459 note 12 (citing, I. Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice at * 318-23).
Thus, although Kant himself denied the moral legitimacy even of revolts against
unremitting tyrants, Kantian ethics credibly deduces that under the extreme conditions of the
relentless immoral treatment they endured as chronicled in the Declaration, where any plea to
the tyrannical ruling government was utterly futile, the American Colonists had not simply the
right, but in fact the moral duty to liberate themselves. One might urge that George Ill had
thrust the Colonists back into the state of nature from which they had an immutable obligation
to extricate themselves. Accepting the unrelenting despotism of George III without rebelling
would have rendered the Colonists complicit in their own subjugation, thus violating what
Kant denoted as the duty of rightful honor, meaning, the moral imperative that individuals not
allow themselves to be treated immorally. Bayer, Originalism and Deontology, supra, note 7,
at notes 263-67 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty and Property
in Kant's System ofRights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 811 (2003) (quoting Immanuel Kant,
The Metaphysics of Morals, in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant--
Practical Philosophy 392 [6:236] (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797) ("Do not make
yourself a mere means for others but be at the same time an end for them."); Peter Brandon
Bayer, The Individual Mandate's Due Process Legality: A Kantian Explanation, and Why It
Matters, 44 Loy. U. CH1. L.J. 865, 903 and note 159 (2013). As I noted elsewhere, "In sum,
just as one may not use another solely as a means, neither may one deliberately sacrifice one's
dignity by allowing oneself to be used exclusively as a means. Those who allow themselves
to be literally or figuratively enslaved act as immorally as those who do the enslaving. Thus,
there is an affirmative duty--a moral imperative--not to allow oneself to be 'subordinated' by
'surrendering control of [personal freedom] to others."' Id. at 903 (footnote omitted, quoting,
Weinrib at 812).
Moreover, even if recourse to Kantian ethics were an illicit means to expound Kant's
moral philosophy, Kant provided an arguably too coy route not to justify revolutions, but
rather to explain why governments born of insurrections nonetheless must be obeyed. Perhaps
engaging in philosophical artifice, Kant urged that because even an immorally conceived
government "realizes the idea of government," such government is morally authorized to
govern regardless whether such government arose through immoral means. Kant's Political
and Juridical Doctrine, at 54. As the Harvard Law Review article's unattributed author
explicated:
"For that matter," writes the philosopher, "when a revolution has once taken place
and a new constitution is set up, the illegality of its origin and of its foundation could
not relieve the subjects from the obligation of submitting themselves, as good
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C. The Constitution and Natural Law --
1. The Constitution's Commitment to the Declaration of Independence --
As I noted in prior writings, "It is long and well established that the
Constitution's concept of legitimate government is derived from and loyal to
the Declaration of Independence."'26 After the American Revolution and the
failed attempt at governance under the Articles of Confederation,'2 7 the
citizens, to the new order of things; and they could not honestly refuse to obey the
authority which actually has possession of the reins of government" It is the
necessary and logical consequence of this idea that all authoritative power is sacred
- is divine - and that it is never within the people's rights to ask for an account of
its origin.
Id. at 554-55 (quoting, Eldments mdaphisiques de la doctrine du droit (Part I of La
m6taphisique des moeurs), at 183, J. Barni's translation, Paris, 1853).
Apparently, Kant validated his controversial and counter-intuitive proposition on the
basis that while the emergence from the state of nature to civil society is not a choice born of
prudence, but rather a moral imperative, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra, note 7
at Section 3-d-5-A; see also, e.g., Bayer at 903-07 (discussing Kant's third Categorical
Imperative), given human imperfection, it cannot be presumed that any government will ever
be the product of moral comportment. After all, "[F]rom such crooked wood as man is made
of, nothing perfectly straight can be built." Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History from
a Cosmopolitan Point of View, from KANT OF HISTORY *22-23 (L. Beck ed. 1975). Thus, Prof.
Beck explained, "That a government may have been established by an act of lawless violence
does not impugn its legal authority and validity, nor reduce its claim to allegiance. Kant is
willing to believe that all governments began with power, not with contract." Beck, supra at
415. Indeed, it is unlawful per se to inquire into the origin of a government as a means to
"impugn its authority." Id
Then, at least in a philosophical sense,
All established power then has its origin, as a fact, in violence; and it is violence,
force, which is the foundation of public law. What, therefore, does it matter whether
such and such a political power has sprung from a revolution? It is not because the
power is legitimate that obedience is due it. We must obey it because it realizes a holy
and divine idea.
Kant's Political and Juridical Doctrine, at 56.
The upshot becomes, "This principle of the irrelevancy of historical origin to judicial
validity is used to legitimize the government which is, in point of historical fact, established
as the result of insurrection." Beck, supra at 415. Accordingly, through either Kantian ethics
or Kant's interesting codicil that even illegitimately conceived government must be obeyed,
this or any writing's use of Kant' moral philosophy to inform American constitutional due
process is justifiable despite the fact that but for the American Revolution, the former British
colonists would have bene unable to ratify the Constitution.
126. Bayer, supra note 17, at 385.
127. E.g., Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory ofArticle I Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121-22 (2010) (discussing the numerous
problems with the Articles of Confederation leading to the forsaking of that charter in favor
of the U.S. Constitution).
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Framers drafted the Constitution specifically to memorialize as America's
highest law the same moral cum political theory expounded in the
Declaration to justify the Revolution. In that regard, as the Declaration's
sestercentennial approaches, the Ninth Circuit rightly noted Chief Justice
Warren Burger's perceptive and pithy comment, "The Declaration of
Independence was the promise; the Constitution was the fulfillment." 128
Adopting a different but compatible metaphor to express the same sentiment,
the Supreme Court accented twelve decades ago,
While [the] declaration of principles [within the Declaration of
Independence] may not have the force of organic law, or be made the basis
ofjudicial decision as to the limits of right and duty, and while in all cases
reference must be had to the organic law of the nation for such limits, yet
the latter is but the body and the letter ofwhich the former is the thought
and the spirit, and it is always safe to read the letter of the Constitution
in the spirit of the Declaration oflndependence.129
Although certainly not without vigorous dissenters, many respected
constitutional scholars agree. For example, Declaration of Independence
expert Douglas Kmiec avers, "The Declaration of Independence becomes the
incorporation document for the United States, articulating inviolate, self-
evident truths of natural law that the subsequent Constitution (as the by-laws
of the new corporate sovereignty, known as the United States) is intended to
observe."1 30 Numerous notable adherents to this position include Alexander
Tsesis,13 ' Phillip Bobbitt, 13 2 Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin Walsh,"' Kelly J.
128. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1031 (2010) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren Burger in Charles Alan Wright, Warren Burger: A Young Friend Remembers,
74 TEx. L. REV. 213, 219 (1995)).
129. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 159-60 (1897) (emphasis
added).
130. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 393.
131. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 375. ("The political philosophy of self-government, adopted
into the Constitution, advances the Declaration's demand that authority be used for the public
good.").
132. Philip Bobbitt, Youngstown: Pages from the Book of Disquietude, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 3, 32 (2002) ("The Declaration provides the foundation on which the unique
American theory of constitutionally limited government is constructed.").
133. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring Originalism, 105 GEO. L. J. 97,
126 (2016) ("Evidence from the Founding and early practice under the Constitution reveals
that the Constitution was designed to be, and was understood to serve as, the kind of stipulated
positive law that classical natural law theory identifies as the central case of positive law. It
was made to be a fixed and authoritative legal settlement of certain matters contributing to the
common good of a complete political community.").
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Hollowell,'3 4 Michael Lawrence,"' and, noted attorney, then-law review
editor, Dan Himmelfarb who summarized:
[T]he Declaration of Independence is more than a propaganda instrument
or legal brief, that in fact it is fundamental to a proper understanding of
the Constitution; and that abundant support for this proposition can be
found in the leading writings and debates of the Founding Era. Indeed, it
would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the most fundamental
pronouncements made in connection with the framing and ratification of
the Constitution are restatements of the principles articulated in the
second sentence of the Declaration of Independence.13 6
Some scholars go even further, urging the Declaration as a legal source
unto itself, a proposition that has not been adopted formally by the Judiciary.
Famously, and not inconsistent with the premises of this writing, Prof. Henry
V. Jaffa exhorts the, "constitutional hermeneutic ... that the Declaration is
law, and more specifically, that the Declaration is part of the Organic law of
the United States."'37 Indeed, one of our greatest founding jurist-
jurisprudents, the eminent Justice Joseph Story,1 38 implied if not actually
134. Kelly J. Hollowell, Defining A Person Under the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Constitutionally and Scientifically Based Analysis, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 67, 72 (2001-2002)
("[I]f the Declaration is viewed as a concise summation of natural law principles, then the
Declaration's second sentence is 'a sentence that might fairly be said to represent the
philosophical infrastructure of the Constitution."') (quoting Harry V. Jaffa, Slaying the
Dragon of Bad Originalism: Jaffa Answers Cooper, 1995 PUB. INT. L. REv. 209, 218 n. 20).
135. Michael Anthony Lawrence, Government as Liberty's Servant: The "Reasonable
Time, Place, and Manner" Standard of Review for All Government Restrictions on Liberty
Interests, 68 LA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) ("What the founders, framers, and many other Americans
since have shared is a common understanding that the irreducible nucleus around which all
else orbits in America is liberty. The Declaration of Independence stakes the claim, and the
Constitution issues the guarantee." (emphasis added)).
136. Dan Himmelfarb, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the
Declaration of Independence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 170-71 (1990) (quoted in Kmiec, supra note
25, at 399).
137. Patrick M. O'Neil, The Declaration as Ur-Constitution: The Bizarre Jurisprudential
Philosophy of Professor Harry V Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REv. 237, 237 (1995) (reviewing and
strongly criticizing, HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION (1994)).
138. Justice Story's influence on American law, particularly through his Commentaries, is
widely acknowledged. E.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional
Law, Ill IHARv. L. REv. 963, 1008 (1998) ("Joseph Story's and Thomas Cooley's treatises
were surely influential during the nineteenth century, ... "); Gary T. Schwartz, The Character
of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 718 note 390 (1989) ("Justice Story was
one of the most important and influential jurists of his era.") (citing, R. NEWMYER, SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 383 (1985)).
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declared as much in his Commentaries: "[firom the moment ofthe declaration
of independence, if not for most purposes at an antecedent period, the united
colonies must be considered as belonging to a nation de facto, having a
general government over it created, and acting by the general consent of the
people of all the colonies."'39 As Prof. Cosgrove explained, "Thus, the act of
independence created national citizenship, which had no basis in any
antecedent form of nationhood. Moreover, Story argued, state sovereignty
was limited by the event of independence, from which time Congress had
exclusive authority to act in a range of domestic and international spheres."l40
Interestingly, although appointed as an anti-Federalist, the thoughtful and erudite Story
soon was persuaded by Chief Justice John Marshall to alter profoundly his initial estimate of
American constitutionalism. In that regard, Marshall and Story formed a symbiotic
relationship that shaped modern constitutional interpretation -- Marshall provided the theory,
Story rendered the erudition.
Specifically, "[President James] Madison appointed Story to the bench because he was
an active Republican-Democrat and opponent of the Federalists. Upon taking his seat, Story
began his first serious study of the Constitution under the tutelage of Marshall. As a result of
this endeavor Story became converted to many of Marshall's ideas and began a long career in
jurisprudence in which he was to become a memorable figure in his own right." J. Allen
Smith, Marshall the Man John Marshall: A Life in Law. by Leonard Baker. New York:
Macmillan, 1974. Pp. x, 845, with Illustrations. $17.95, 85 YALE L.J. 454, 459 (1976) (book
review, footnote omitted). In return, as noted by eminent scholar Bernard Schwartz, "On the
Marshall Court, Story supplied the one thing the great Chief Justice lacked -- legal scholarship.
'Now, Story,' Marshall once said to his colleague, 'that is the law; you find the precedents for
it.' Story's scholarship was, indeed, prodigious. ... If Marshall disliked the labor of
investigating legal authorities to support his decisions, Story reveled in it. His opinions were
usually long and learned and relied heavily on prior cases and writers." Bernard Schwartz,
Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices, 31 TULSA L. J. 93, 98 (1995) (quoting,
EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 116 (1919)).
139. Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional
Interpretation: A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 107, 110 (1998)
(emphasis added, quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 110 (abr. ed. 1987)).
140. Id. (citing Story). One might take Story's sentiment to mean that the legal creation of
national citizenship and the attendant limits on state sovereignty derived from the very act of
declaring independence regardless of any document commemorating and justifying that act.
Id. at I10-11 ("In fact, the document, adopted by the Continental Congress two days after its
declaratory act, could not effect an independence already legally declared; it could only
explain it."). Still, as Prof. Cosgrove explicated, "there was an early tendency to collapse the
prior act of separation into the July 4 Declaration." Id. at 111 (citing GARRY WILLS, INVESTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 336-37 (1978)). To be sure, "many
courts simply assumed that the Declaration of Independence (the document) effected the legal
independence of the states." Id. (citing cases).
Additionally, akin to Joseph Story, Alexander Hamilton believed that state
governments arose through the legal force of the Declaration:
According to Hamilton, "'Our [New York's] Sovereignty and Independence
began by a Foedral Act,' the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of
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Of course, Story's approach does not necessarily mean that had the
victorious Colonists declined to premise their new Nation on one
fundamental document, necessity or convenience would have morphed the
Declaration into a de facto constitution. The United States might have
developed an "unwritten" constitutional ala Great Britain wherein the
Declaration could have attained the same function it now has as a reliable
reference informing basic national principles. Still, because both its
expression of natural rights and its legal argument premising legitimate
government upon such rights are eminently correct, the Declaration alone
surely could serve the same function that we will see is served not by the
entire Constitution, but rather by its two Due Process Clauses whose brief
texts informs us that, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."'4 '
Thus, while there undoubtedly is a counter-school of thought, Prof.
Larson seriously blunders, I think, by bluntly declaring that, "the position of
the Declaration of Independence in recent constitutional thought is one of
utter and complete irrelevance. ... For most legal academics, the Declaration
is little more than a political puff piece, or a 'propaganda manifesto, as
Independence was the fundamental document, and it reserved the treaty-making
power to the United States as a whole: 'By the Declaration of Independence which is
the fundamental constitution of every state, the United States assert their power to
levy war conclude peace and contract alliances. .. .' The state government was called
into being by the Declaration of Independence and that government had endorsed it:
'[The Declaration of Independence] is acceded to by the New York Convention who
do not pretend to authenticate the act, but only to give their approbation to it . . . .'
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REv. 455,481 (2005)
(alteration to the original) (footnote omitted) (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, I THE LAW
PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 374 (Julius Goebel, Jr. ed., 1964)).
Although not strictly asserting the Declaration as a legally enforceable source, like Story,
Hamilton was willing to accord that document a force of its own which surely, at the very least,
commends the Declaration as informing the legitimacy of subsequent American law.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This article will show that the Judiciary rightly has recognized
the Due Process Clauses as the font of rights and liberty -- the Constitution's value monism as
it were. See, infra notes 521-98 and accompanying text; and see, Bayer, Originalism and
Deontology, note 7 at Section 2-h (discussing "value monism," the principle that there is a
single, core idea bedrocking a given concept such as morality or due process. That value
monistic concept informs and defines every idea arising from the given concept). The many
provisions of the Constitution are enforceable but only insofar as they comport with the
overarching commands of the Due Process Clauses. Likewise, constitutional commands
expressing discrete rights such as "free speech" or "free exercise" of religion are themselves
enforceable but unnecessary as such particularized rights are subsets of "due process of law."
Id. Therefore, had there been no Constitution and no Due Process Clauses, the Declaration of
Independence itself would provide what the Constitution and its Due Process Clauses give us.
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Richard Hofstadter described it."l 4 2 Indeed, a brief further rejoinder is in
order. Larson attributes two related causes explaining what he takes to be
dominant hostility towards the Declaration as a source of either law or
meaning. First, he avers that "the Declaration has been tainted by judicial
decisions of dubious constitutional merit," such as Dred Scott and post-
Bellum rulings that substantially limited the reach of both constitutional and
statutory civil rights.1 43 Second, Larson smugly and unkindly asserts that,
The few academics who do emphasize the Declaration do nothing to
dispel these concerns. These scholars focus almost exclusively on the
second sentence of the Declaration, and they conclude that the
Declaration is primarily about natural law and the protection of natural
rights. ... Accordingly, the Declaration should be read in light of its
natural law origins. ... Not surprisingly, arguments of this sort have been
a resounding failure in the legal academy. ... Legal Realism has
effectively banished "natural rights" to a distant cage in Felix Cohen's
"menagerie of metaphysical monsters." Natural law has mystical
overtones that seem out of place in a modem society, and cases that have
invoked or implied natural law arguments are widely regarded as
embarrassments.'"
Prof. Larson is hardly a lone voice. 145 Indeed, one commentator implies
that modem scholarship has rendered natural law theory illicit.146
142. Larson, supra note 33, at 705 (quoting, Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians
269 (1968); and, citing, inter alia, Benno Schmidt, Interview by Lewis E. Lehrman with Benno
Schmidt, quoted in Lewis E. Lehrman, On Jaffa, Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, in
Harry v. Jaffa et al., Original Intent and the Framers of the Constitution 3, 5 (1994) )"American
constitutional law is positive law, and the Declaration of Independence has no standing in
constitutional interpretation whatsoever.")).
143. Id. at 708-711. (discussing, inter alia, Dred Scott; The Slaughterhouse Cases, I 11 U.S.
746 (1884); and the rise of Lochnerism).
144. Id at 712 (quoting, Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLuM. L. REv. 809, 829 (1935) (quoting BERTRAND RUSSELL, MYSTICISM AND
LoGic 155 (1918); footnotes omitted)).
145. Perhaps most famously, Jeremy Bentham declared essentially for all utilitarians then
and now, "Natural rights is simple nonsense ... nonsense upon stilts." JEREMY BENTHAM,
ANARcHicAL FALLACIES, 2 Works 501 (J. Bowring ed., 1843) (quoted in, Steven D. Smith,
Nonsense and Natural Law, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L. J. 583, 583 (1995).
146. "My discussion does not suggest that talk of natural law and natural rights is 'absolute
nonsense,' but only that such talk is nonsense to us. The sort of worldview within which such
talk makes sense is one that we no longer accept-- or at least that the assumptions and
restrictions of our academic culture no longer permit us to invoke. So when we speak
positively or prescriptively about "natural rights" we speak a language, so to speak, that we
have no right to speak." Smith, supra note 145, at 603-04.
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Nonetheless, the greater part of this writing's predecessor -- Part I,
Originalism and Deontology -- disproves the claims that natural law, natural
rights and deontological morality are fantasies of insipid minds or worse, the
cynical constructs of hypocritical, manipulative liars. Doubtless, a sizable
segment of legal and related scholarship smirks at arguments founded on
transcendent, neutral moral precepts. Still, as Originalism and Deontology
proves, insofar as they purport to be viable moral theories, Consequentialism
and its prime component Utilitarianism are the products of weak analysis,
corrupt purpose, or both.'4 7 Thus, infirm judicial rulings such as Dred Scott
are not wrong because they appeal in whole or part to natural law. Rather,
they are wrong because their grasp of natural law is infirm; having
misunderstood the connotations of natural law, Dred Scott and its ilk reached
the wrong legal conclusions. Indeed, this writing will conclude by extoling
the recent line of Supreme Court precedent, steeped in natural law theory,
ruling that, because it demeans their human dignity, governmental
discrimination against homosexual individuals violates "due process of
law."l48
Importantly, Prof. Larson does not claim that the Declaration is an
irrelevant document -- "a 'propaganda manifesto,' as Richard Hofstadter
described it." 49 Rather, in a long and thoughtful analysis, Larson urges, "that
the deepest principles of the Declaration are not about an individual's natural
rights against the state, but about the right of the American people to self-
government and about the formal structures that allow self-government to
flourish. When we understand the Declaration in this fashion, we can better
appreciate the Declaration's place in American law."so In support, Larson
147. Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7 at Section 2-b. To explain how individuals
might make difficult choices among various moral alternatives, Consequentialism makes
eminent good sense. However, as an explainer of what is or is not moral -- as a clarification
of what constitutes morality itself -- Consequentialism provides nothing better than a petulant
child's view of right and wrong: What I want is "right" and, therefore, "good;" what I don't
want is "wrong" and, therefore, "bad."
148. See infra, notes 864-944 and accompanying text. Therefore, Larson is simply wrong
in his crude conclusion that, "The almost exclusive emphasis that has been placed on the
Declaration's famous second paragraph has assured that the Declaration will always be seen
as, well, a bit fluffy -- fine for Fourth of July orations, but useless for any serious analysis of
legal issues." Larson, supra note 33, at 712 (footnote omitted).
149. Id at 705 (quoting, RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGESSIVE HISTORIANS 269 (1968)).
150. Id. at 783. In particular, Prof. Larson agrees with Justice Story that the Declaration
created, "an American nation ... [not] thirteen independent nations." Id. at 784. Moreover,
"the nationalist understanding of the Declaration is relevant to one of the most divisive issues
in modern constitutional law, the so-called 'sovereign immunity' of the states. A paramount
principle of the Declaration is that the people, not governments, are sovereign." Id. (footnote
[Vol. 43:1210
2017] PART I - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
claims that while, "the protection of minorities is [] a critical thread in the
fabric of American law, [such] is much more a result of the Reconstruction
Amendments than of the political ideas that animate the Declaration of
Independence.""
As this writing will show, Larson's point is not entirely wrong but it is
hugely exaggerated rendering it substantially incorrect.1 52 At this juncture,
the important point is, as the above-quoted passages evince, like many other
scholars, Larson ultimately acknowledges that the Declaration's dominance
over constitutional meaning is not only sensible, but indeed essential to any
genuine originalism."' Encapsulating many of the themes earlier stressed
herein, Harry V. Jaffa sagely urged:
omitted). However, the Declaration is not, according to Larson, a repository of individual
rights that are trumps against the political power of recalcitrant forces. "There is not one line
in the Declaration about the empowerment of minorities against popular majorities. The core
principle of the Declaration is the people's right of self-government; it is this principle that
pervades all of the charges against the King." Id. at 785 (footnote omitted).
151. Id. at 785 note 344 (discussing the protection of minorities in the declaration of
independence).
152. We may assume that during the intervening century, culminating with the devastating
Civil War, America's understanding of human rights matured from that of its founding; which
is exactly what our Founders expected and hoped. See infra, notes 280-87 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, the Reconstruction Congress made clear that it was propounding the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments primarily to fulfill the two broken promises
of the original Constitution: (1) failing to abolish slavery and (2) limiting the Bill of Rights to
constraining the federal level and not the states. See infra, notes 331-396 and accompanying
text. Therefore, the fundamental premises of the post-Bellum civil rights amendments (and
legislation predicated thereon) emanated from the very principles of natural rights set forth in
the Declaration. In that regard, as it must, the Declaration does address individual rights as
bulwarks against the political power ofcorrupt majorities, even if that particular reality went
ifnot unrecognized, unfulfilled until well after the Constitution's original ratification.
153. E.g., WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY (1987); Scorr D.
GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1995); LEONARD W. LEVY & DENNIS J. MAHONEY., THE
FRAMIG AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 54-68 (1987) (cited in Cosgrove, supra
note 139, at 124 note 106). As Prof. Cosgrove summarizes, "In Berns's scheme, the
Declaration is not itself a compact but has a privileged status as the explanation of the
unwritten original compact. This relation between the Declaration and the original contract
warrants interpreting the Constitution 'by reference to the Declaration."' Cosgrove, supra
note 139, at 129 (quoting, Berns at 11 and generally discussing Berns at 23-25). Similarly,
according to Cosgrove, Scott Gerber argues that, "the Constitution should be construed in the
tradition of the natural law philosophy 'expressed with unparalleled eloquence ... in the
Declaration of Independence.' The Constitution is the instrument designed to achieve the ends
announced by the Declaration, namely, 'to secure natural rights."' Id. (quoting, Gerber at 6-
7).
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the original intent of the founders are the moral and political principles
that guided them (their general intent), not "their personal judgment about
contingent matters." The Declaration of Independence states these
principles. Moreover, unlike other statements of the founders'
philosophy, the Declaration is a privileged authority for establishing
constitutional principles because it is "the fundamental legal instrument
attesting to the existence of the United States." As such, the Declaration
identifies and authorizes the constitutional subject; "We the people of the
United States." Hence, the Declaration is "the most fundamental
dimension of the law of the Constitution." 54
154. Id. at 125-26 (quoting, HARRY V. JAFFA., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE
CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED QUESTION 42, 23 (1994)). It is worth noting that Prof Cosgrove
remains unconvinced: "The approaches of Jaffa, Berns, and Gerber suffer from three
weaknesses. First, they fail to adequately defend an originalist method of constitutional
interpretation. Second, each has a tendency toward historical oversimplification. Third, they
all make naive assumptions about the nature of interpretation." Id. at 131. This writing cannot
agree with Prof. Cosgrove's concerns. Regarding his first critique, to borrow Cosgrove's
phrasing, this article's Part I carefully and, I believe, convincingly, "defend[s] an originalist
method." See, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 4.
About the second alleged infirmity, Cosgrove explains, "The originalism of Jaffa,
Berns, and Gerber also tends toward oversimplification in historical reconstruction. Their
common claim that the Declaration is a Lockean document obscures the complexity of
influences on not only Jefferson as drafter but on the Congress that adopted the Declaration.
They also oversimplify the history leading to the framing of the Constitution." Cosgrove at
132 (footnotes omitted). This writing's response is, essentially, history be damned Although
a fascinating study, the proper jurisprudential concern is not what impulses history,
economics, religion, vanity, or other forces may have imposed prior to 1776 and would impose
thereafter. Rather, by rightly linking via the Declaration the Constitution's meaning to the
moral imperative of natural law, the Founders expected successive generations to adopt and
to apply any newly discovered morality superior to those ethical precepts embraced by the
founding generation. See, infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text. That better morality is
Kantian which, as argued herein, rightly has been applied, albeit without attribution, by the
Supreme Court. See, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 3 (discussing
Kantian deontology) and infra, Section 6-c (discussing the Supreme Court's due process
dignity paradigm).
Prof. Cosgrove's third concern posits that any form of Originalism "requires an
implausible view of the interpretive process." Cosgrove at 135. In support, he offers, "A
famous example is the early disagreement between Madison and Jefferson over whether the
United States Supreme Court had the power under the Constitution to find an act of Congress
unconstitutional." Id. (footnote omitted). His reproach holds water if one needs to find
consensus, or even perhaps near unanimity, regarding the Declaration's and the Constitution's
meaning derived from either their respective texts, or from the Founders' themselves, or from
their particular communities, or some amalgam of those considerations. But, again, as
interesting and possibly informative as such inquiries may be, the essential task of enforcing
the Declaration through the Constitution is understanding and applying Kantian morality.
While human imperfection, particularly frailty and corruption, has and likely always will
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In sum, one need not prove that the Declaration stands as law itself; it is
sufficient to show, as a huge swath of scholarship agrees, that the Framers
adopted and adapted the Declaration's propositions, both general and
specific, as governing the Constitution and, thereby, all inferior law.
2. Judicial Recognition of the Constitution's Commitment to the
Declaration ofIndependence --
The historical record amply supports scholars' assertions of a deliberate,
inextricable link between the Declaration which espoused the Founders'
belief in natural law as the arbiter of legitimate government and the
Constitution through which the Framers enforced the Declaration's natural
law philosophy."' This means, of course, that the same theory of moral
comportment anchoring the Declaration's natural law predicates, likewise
governs the meaning and application of the Constitution in all regards.5
hinder that task, moral awareness is a matter of neutral reason. See, Originalism and
Deontology, supra note 7 at Section 2-e. Accordingly, the true and correct answer to any
constitutional problem is neither a matter of opinion, nor of competing politics. Rather,
answers derive from the Categorical Imperatives predicated on the value monism of human
dignity. Id.
155. Frederick Schauer, Why The Declaration of Independence Is Not Law -- And Why It
Could Be, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 619, 619 note 1 (2016) (citing, Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the
Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional
Interpretation?, Ill PENN ST. L. REv. 413, 419-20, 422-23, 429-31, 435-37 (2006) ("giving
examples of how the Declaration has been treated as binding positive constitutional law")).
156. Some scholars purport that the Constitution itself acknowledges the Declaration as its
source of authority and meaning. Prof. David Barton put the assertion most emphatically: "No
other conclusion logically can be reached since the Constitution directly attaches itself to the
Declaration of Independence in Article VII by declaring: 'Done in convention by the
unanimous consent of the States present the seventeenth day of September in the Year of our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty seven, and of the independence of the United
States ofAmerica the twelfth."' David Barton, A Death Struggle between Two Civilizations,
13 REGENT U. L. REv. 297, 312 (2001). (emphasis added, quoting, U.S. CONsT. art. VII); see
also, e.g., Paul M. Brodersen, Personhood and the Constitutional Puritan Covenant: an the
Federal Government Dictate ate Constitutional Definitions?, 6 LIB. U. L. REv. 379, 404
(2012); Josh Blackman, Original Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 95, 97 (2010).
By accenting as the Constitution's founding date not only the exact year-month-day it
was finalized by the Convention, but as well the number of years since the Nation's founding
-- "and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth" -- the Framers
clarified that the meaning of the Constitution derives from the American Revolution. Because
the Declaration is the moral-legal-historical-logical thesis of that Revolution, there is much
strength to Barton's argument. Granted, one might have wished for a more direct statement
in the Constitution's text. However, the Declaration's espousal of principles so clearly informs
the Constitution that referencing the Declaration implicitly through the phrase "and of the
independence of the United States of America the twelfth" arguably is more than sufficient to
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Indeed, there seems little doubt that under the domain of Originalism, the true
originalist position must be what the Supreme Court plainly expressed a
decade after the Declaration's centennial, "But the fundamental rights to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, considered as individual possessions,
are secured by those maxims of constitutional law which are the monuments
showing the victorious progress . . . in securing . . . the blessings of
civilization under the reign of just and equal laws .... A century later,
as previously quoted, such was the very avowal of Chief Justice Warren
Burger, no radical liberal, who vividly summarized this dominant norm
linking the philosophy of the Revolution to the philosophy of republican
governance: "The Declaration of Independence was the promise; the
Constitution was the fulfillment."15 8
The Chief Justice's conclusion that the Constitution is the "fulfillment"
of the Declaration's "promise" has been long recognized by the American
judiciary. No less authority than Learned Hand15 1 unflinchingly
acknowledged the obvious natural law origins of America: The Declaration
expresses the natural law theory of government; the Constitution
operationalizes the Declaration's principles as an actual government.
Specifically, Hand stated, the rights in the Bill of Rights, "were generally
regarded as embodying the same political postulates that had been
foreshadowed though not fully articulated in the exordium of the Declaration
of Independence: 'self-evident' and 'unalienable rights' with which all men
are 'endowed by their creator' and among which are 'life, liberty and pursuit
of happiness.'....". As Justice Louis Brandeis, one of America's most
comprise a textual reference acknowledging the inextricable association between the two
founding documents.
157. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see generally, Terry Brennan, Natural
Rights and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent," 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 965
(1992).
158. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1031 (2010) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren Burger as quoted by Charles Alan Wright, Warren Burger: A Young Friend
Remembers, 74 TEx. L. REv. 213, 219 (1995)).
159. Highly regarded theorist, judge on the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York from 1909-1924, and thereafter judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1924-1951 (the last three years as chief judge), "Learned
Hand is probably the most influential and famous jurist who never served on the Supreme
Court." Stewart Schiffman, Judicial Biographies: A Sampling, 39 No. 4 JUDGES' J. 38, 40
(2000).
160. Learned Hand, BILL OF RIGHTS, 1-2 (1958) (quoted in, G. Robert Blakey & Brian J.
Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and The Jurisprudence of The Federal Criminal Law, B.Y.U.
L. REv. 829, 876 note 130 (2002)).
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acclaimed lawyers, jurists, and legal theorists,16 1 likewise pr6cised thirty
years earlier, "The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of
man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect."'62
It is only relatively recently that judges have hesitated to acknowledge
that, if not law itself, the principles of the Declaration must greatly inform
the meaning of its offspring, the Constitution.'6 3 Accordingly, courts
understandably and rightly have recognized the Constitution's link to natural
law and natural rights theory. Indeed, two centuries ago, Chief Justice John
Marshall declared somewhat wryly for the Court, "there are certain great
161. Nicknamed "the People's lawyer" because of his innovative, enthusiastic legal
advocacy on behalf of laborers, indigents, radicals, criminal defendants and others often
lacking power and influence (Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as
People's Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1472 (1996) (discussing Brandeis' "series of brilliant
forays into the public realm")), Louis Dembitz Brandeis is regarded as "one of our most
brilliant and consequential legal minds." Katherine A. Helm, What Justice Brandeis Taught
Us about Conflict ofInterest, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 22 (2010). His "legacy" of legal principles,
especially in the realms of privacy and rights, still informs American law. See Generally, Hon.
Mary Murphy Schroeder, The Brandeis Legacy, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 711 (2000); Mark B.
Rotenberg, Politics, Personality and Judging: The Lessons of Brandeis and Frankfurter on
Judicial Restraint, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1182 (1983) (book review) (noting the accord
between Justices Brandeis and Holmes "in numerous cases of vital importance to the New
Deal.").
162. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added; discussing the right of individual privacy), o., Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967).
163. In fact, up until 1972, the Supreme Court quoted Justice Brandeis' Olmstead dissent
accenting the Declaration's influence on constitutional meaning. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 note 10 (1972); see also, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). In the mid-
Twentieth Century, the highly respected Justice John Marshall Harlan (the second), a strong
exponent of scrupulous judging always within the strictures of proper restraint (see, infra note
459 and accompanying text), and arguably the most influential modem judicial voice on due
process theory (see, infra notes 729-70 and accompanying text), readily quoted the Olmstead
dissent as pivotal to understanding the Due Process Clauses. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,
550 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Harlan's words, Brandeis' observation that, "The
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness" is, regarding its, "rational purposes, historical roots, and subsequent developments
... [plerhaps the most comprehensive statement of the principle of liberty underlying these
aspects of the Constitution." Id. at 549-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
State highest courts likewise continue to quote Brandeis into the Twenty-First Century.
Pennsylvania State Education Association v. Commonwealth, Department of Community and
Economic Development, 148 A.3d 142, 151-52 (Pa. 2016); People v. Weaver, 2 N.Y.3d 433,
438 (2009); In re T.R., 557 Pa. 99, 105 (1999); Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v.
Western Gas Processors, 786 P.2d 866, 872 note 10 (Wy. 1990) (dictum); Shaktman v. State,
553 So.2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1989); Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wash.2d 226, 239-40
(1982) (en banc).
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principles ofjustice, whose authority is universally acknowledged, that ought
not to be entirely disregarded."" Four decades later, Marshall's immediate
successor, the perhaps notorious Roger Brooke Taney, reflecting the
164. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87, 133 (1810). Many commentators interpret
Marshall's prose to recognize natural law's useful influence in constitutional interpretation.
E.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1170-
71 (1987). Others however, claim that, "Far too much has been made of Marshall's
remarks[.]" Christopher L. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SuP. CT. REV.
439, 467 note 19 (1996). Prof. Eisgruber suggests, "it is at least possible" that Marshall's
reference to "certain great principles ofjustice" means "the common law rules of contract,
providing that a third party purchaser for value from the holder of a voidable title secured a
good title." Id.
True, some scholars have dismissed as ephemeral Marshall's references to
transcendenct forces. For instance, "Felix Frankfurter once described early citation of natural
law as 'not much more than literary garniture' in John Marshall's opinions, and it is true that
one cannot be certain what authority weighed most heavily with him--or with any individual
judge." R. H. Helmholz, The Law ofNature and the Early History of Unenumerated Rights
in the United States, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 401, 409 (2007). However, as Prof Helholz
cunningly surmised, "But Justice Frankfurter's scoffing remark mirrors his own opinion. It
enables him to dismiss the evidence untested." Id. In fact, consistent with his compatriates
discussed supra at Section 2-a, Chief Justice Marshall spoke glowingly of natural law by
referencing, "writers on natural and national law, whose opinions have been viewed with
profound respect by the wisest men of the present, and of past ages." Ogden v. Saunders, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 347 (1827) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (quoted in Helmholz at 405 n.
23). Marshall's quote certainly is consistent with the determination of law professors Charles
D. Kelso and R. Randall Kelso that, "Justice [Anthony] Kennedy's [modern] approach mirrors
the early natural law lawyers', including Chief Justice John Marshall, who believed more in
an evolving Constitution based on enlightened reasoning about the natural law principles
placed into the Constitution by the framers and ratifiers." Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall
Kelso, Judicial Decision-Making and Judicial Review: The State of the Debate, Circa 2009,
112 W. VA. L. REV. 351, 388 (2010) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Raoul Berger, Activist
Censures ofRobert Bork, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 993, 1040 (1991) (noting that in, Sherry, Original
Sin, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 1215, 1224 (1990), "[Law professor Suzanna] Sherry cites 'John
Marshall of Marbury [v. Madison]' for 'support of natural law restraints on legislation."')
I hope I am not adding a Twenty-First Century gloss to Marshall's early Nineteenth
Century prose when I wonder, in response to Prof. Eisgruber, whether, as important as they
are, "common law rules of contract" would be, in Marshall's words, the sole "great principles
of justice" an American or English judge would have denoted. While the common law of
contracts undoubtedly has greatness in its role of enabling reliable, effective and peaceful
commerce, Marshall's stress on "justice" evinces something grander than economic
efficiency, or even the vital principle of civil society that breaches of commercial transactions
are met with legal process, not violent self-help. Rather, given Marshall's possibly off-handed
melding of natural law and common law precepts, e.g., Sherry, 54 U CHI. L. REV. at 1170-71,
even if he was referring to contract law, his referencing the "great principles ofjustice" inspires
the question: from where would contract law derive, inspire or enforce such justice? The
answer must be from natural law if we are to credit the undeniable thinking of the Founders
who authored the Declaration and the Constitution. Accordingly, I disagree with Prof.
Eisgruber's waiving away of Marshall's natural law terminology.
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dominant sentiment, 165 wrote, "There are, undoubtedly, fixed and immutable
principles of justice, sound policy, and public duty, which no State can
disregard without serious injury to the community, and to the individual
citizens who compose it."' 66 If Taney rightly is castigated, most prominently
for authoring the Court's opinion in Dred Scott,'67 often derided as the single
165. Courts long had recognized the exitance of "immutable principles of justice." E.g.,
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 245 (1796) (per Chase, J.); Sturges v. Crowninshield,
17 U.S. 122, 184 (1819) ("The constitution was intended to secure the inviolability of
contracts, according to the immutable principles of justice."); Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 29
U.S. (4 Pet) 466, 475 (1830) ("'It is an acknowledged general principle, that judgments and
decrees are binding only upon parties and privies. The reason of the rule is founded in the
immutable principles of natural justice, that no man's rights should be prejudiced by the
judgment or decree of a court, without an opportunity of defending the right.'); Mayor,
Aldermen and Inhabitants of City of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 735 (1836)
("It is a principle sanctioned as well by law as by the immutable principles of justice, that
where an individual acts in ignorance of his rights, he shall not be prejudiced by such acts.
And this rule applies at least with as much force to the acts of corporate bodies, as to those of
individuals. We will, therefore, inquire, as we are bound to do, whether, under the
circumstances of this case, the acts of the city can, justly, be considered as prejudicing the
claim which they assert."); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 598 (1839)
(M'Kinley, J., dissenting, "[C]ertain rules founded in the law of nature and the immutable
principles of justice have, for the promotion of harmony and commercial intercourse, been
adopted by the consent of civilized nations."); generally, Helmholtz, supra note 164, at 407-
08 (citing numerous sources).
166. Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 428 (1853) (per Taney,
C.J.).
167. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). Prof. Daniel Farber, for one, has not
hesitated to rebuke Taney the judge and the person:
The Taney opinion also occupies suspect moral ground. Unlike some other judges of
the time, Taney was untroubled by the moral dimensions of his judicial support for
slavery. Robert Cover's book, Justice Accused[: Antislavery and the Judicial Process
(1975)], tells the story of Northern judges forced to carry out a deeply immoral law,
the Fugitive Slave Act, by their fidelity to law. In contrast, Chief Justice Taney went
far out of his way to leap to the defense of slavery and racism. If many Northern
judges were unwilling bridegrooms of evil, Taney can only be considered an ardent
suitor.
Daniel Farber, A Fatal Loss ofBalance: Dredd Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 13, 14 (2011)
(emphasis added).
Some, however, offer a bit more charity, as in Prof. Louis Michael Seidman's analysis:
For Taney, racist views about African Americans were relevant not because
they were correct (although, at least in slightly diluted form, he thought that they
were), but because they helped interpret the original understanding of constitutional
text. ... At least on his own account, Taney scrupulously abstained from injecting his
own moral and political judgments into the decisional calculus and modestly deferred
to judgments made by the Framers.
Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph ofGay Marriage and the Failure ofConstitutional Law,
2015 Sup. CT. REV. 115, 123 (arguing that Taney's error was not that he, "departed from
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most unpardonable American judicial decision'68 -- "the worst atrocity in the
Supreme Court's history,"'69 -- other decisions show that Taney was not
completely blind to the principles of liberty emanating from the natural rights
recognized in the Declaration. As part of his prosecution of the Civil War,
[President Abraham] Lincoln had suspended the writ of habeas corpus
along the route between Washington and Philadelphia, and the army had
imprisoned a Confederate sympathizer, John Merryman, in Baltimore's
Fort McHenry ... In an opinion denying Lincoln's power to suspend
habeas corpus, Taney [acting as Circuit Justice] admonished the President
that "[t]he constitution ofthe United States is founded upon the principles
of government set forth and maintained in the Declaration of
Independence. " One such principle was civilian control of the military,
as evidenced by the Declaration's charge that George III "'had affected to
render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power."' 170
If Chief Justice Taney is a dubious advocate for immutable principles of
justice, for the purposes of this writing, he is part of a thoroughgoing
recognition among Anglo-American theorists of the persistence of natural
law and its rightful place in legal analysis.
Roughly four decades thereafter, addressing a takings issue, the highly-
regarded first Justice John Marshall Harlan cited the likewise regarded
Justice Joseph Story to express the same legal sentiment, "The requirement
that the property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
is but 'an affirmance of a great doctrine established by the common law for
the protection of private property. It is founded in natural equity, and is laid
original [constitutional] text and understanding, but because his insistence on adhering to his
reading of the text led him to ignore the huge moral issue at stake." Id. at 124).
168. Austin Allen, Rethinking Dred Scott: New Context for an Old Case, 82 CHi.-KENT L.
REV. 141, 174 note 234 (2007) (quoting, inter alia, I Bruce Ackerman, Bruce Ackerman, We
the People: Foundations 63 (1991) ("calling Dred Scott '[firom a moral point of view, ... the
single darkest stain upon the Court's checkered history"'); Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 333, 415 (1998) ("calling Dred Scott 'the most repugnant and reviled of Supreme Court
decisions"')).
169. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMM. 37, 41 (1993) (quoted in, Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott
and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMM. 271, 272 (1997)).
170. Larson, supra note 33, at 703-04 (quoting, Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152
n.3 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (emphasis added, other citations omitted).
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down as a principle of universal law. . .. ""'" Equally, at the dawn of the last
century, Cotting v. Goddard noted, "The first official action of this nation
declared the foundation of government" as the Declaration's enumeration of
'unalienable rights."'l7 2 In support, Cotting quoted the Court's admonition
of four years earlier from Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Ellisl73 which, as noted
above'74 but worth repeating, boldly but aptly explained:
While [the Declaration's] ... principles may not have the force of organic
law, or be made the basis ofjudicial decision[s] as to the limits of right[s]
and dut[ies], and while in all cases reference must be had to the organic
law of the nation for such limits, yet the latter is but the body and the letter
of which the former is the thought and the spirit, and it is always safe to
read the letter of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence.17 1
Given the accepted connection between the Declaration and the
Constitution as exemplified by Cotting and Ellis, commentator A. Scott
Loveless aptly concluded,
the Declaration was seen as having legal effect because it established the
legal philosophy on which the Constitution was based, the "foundation of
government," the philosophy that permeates every word and provides its
guiding spirit. ... In this light, perhaps the single most unconstitutional
act a government entity, including a court, could commit would be to
disregard and act inconsistent with that philosophy. Such actions would -
171. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chi., 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897) (per, Harlan, J.; quoting
2 Story, Const. § 1790) (emphasis added).
172. Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co.,183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901). That same year, the
Court affirmed, "We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a distinction
between certain natural rights enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against interference
with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own
system of jurisprudence. Of the former class are the rights ... to due process of law ... "
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901) (emphasis added); see also, Tuaua v. U.S., 788
F.3d 300, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting, Bidwell but not referencing due process); Ralpho v.
Bell, 569 F.2d 607, 619 note 70 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting Bidwell); Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) (right to keep and
bear arms, "are natural rights that pre-existed the Second Amendment.").
173. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
174. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 160.
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go against not simply a clause or phrase of the Constitution; they would
go against the core and foundation of the Constitution itself "'
These federal level acknowledgements of natural law's role in
constitutional adjudication are consistent with early post-Revolution state
cases recognizing "higher law" constitutionalism. For example, in 1789,
anticipating much modem substantive due process theory, South Carolina's
Ham v. McClaws". stated,
"is clear, that statutes passed against the plain and obvious principles of
common right, and common reason, are absolutely null and void, as far as
they are calculated to operate against those principles,' [therefore,] it was
obligated to construe the statute [in question] in a manner 'consistent with
justice, and the dictates of natural reason, though contrary to the strict
letter of the law."' 78
Such decisions are not at all surprising given that the sentiments of state
law were no different from those at the federal level:
An examination of state constitutions and accompanying declarations of
rights in existence during the Founding era reveals that the fundamental
principles those state governments were erected upon were grounded in
natural rights concepts. As these documents demonstrate, the founding
generation distinguished between natural rights and positive law,
decrying the latter when it violated the natural rights of life, liberty,
property and conscience: ... 1
176. Loveless, supra note 111, at 368 (emphasis added).
177. 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 91 (S.C. Ct. Com. PI. 1789).
178. Id. (quoted in Gedicks, supra note 31, at 629).
179. Broyles, supra note 17, at 348. Similarly, Prof. Gedicks chastised commentators who
selectively highlight cases while,
ignor[ing] the wealth of earlier precedent from the years preceding and
immediately following the 1791 ratification of the Fifth Amendment. Robin v.
Hardaway (1772), Butler v. Craig (1787), Ham v. McClaws (1789), Bowman v.
Middleton (1792), Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance (1792), Zylstra v. Corp. of
Charleston (1794), Lindsay v. Commissioners (1796), Calder v. Bull (1798), and
Marbury v. Madison (1803) all support the conclusion that judges and attorneys
during that period understood the meaning of "law" to include a fundamental
normative dimension as prescribed by classical natural law theory and higher-law
constitutionalism.
Gedicks, supra note 31, at 658 footnote omitted).
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While neither as prevalent nor as adamant, modem rulings rightly
recognize that the Constitution enforces the principles of the Declaration.'80
Very recently, for instance, citing Blackstone and other commentators as part
of an "original public meaning" approach to hold that the Second
Amendment permits individuals to openly carry firearms for self-protection,
the Ninth Circuit stated that natural law principles predating that Amendment
strongly implied the right of "open carry."' 8 ' Almost as recently, albeit
overturned by the Supreme Court, that Circuit invoked the Declaration to
bolster its order quashing those portions of President Donald J. Trump's
Proclamation 9645, sec. 2, that, inter alia, sought, "to bar over 150 million
nationals of six designated countries from entering the United States or being
issued immigrant visas that they would ordinarily be qualified to receive."' 8 2
In addition to statutorily-based infirmities underlying Trump's challenged
policy, 83 the Ninth Circuit ruled, "that the President lacks independent
constitutional authority to issue the Proclamation, as control over the entry
of aliens is a power within the exclusive province of Congress."' 84
180. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94-95 n.1 (1979) (noting that "all of [Section]
I of the Fourteenth Amendment is already within the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence" (citation omitted)); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("The
liberty preserved from deprivation without due process included the right 'generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."') (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Bd. of Regents of
State Coils. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964)
("[T]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence," as evinced in
the Constitution's Fifteenth, Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments prescribes "one person,
one vote.") (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)); Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640,
651 (1948) ("The Constitution was conceived in large part in the spirit of the Declaration of
Independence . ); see also, Tuaua v. U.S., 788 F.3d 300, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2018); Bayer,
supra note 17.
181. Young v. Hawaii, --- F.3d ---- 2018 WL 3542985 at *7 and note 8 (9th Cir. 2018).
Identically, the Seventh Circuit linked the Second Amendment to principles of natural rights
accenting that the rights to keep and bear arms, "are natural rights that pre-existed the Second
Amendment." Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 414 (7th Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted).
182. Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam; footnote
omitted),\rev., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
183. "The Proclamation, like its predecessor executive orders, relies on the premise that the
Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA'), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., vests the President with
broad powers to regulate the entry of aliens. Those powers, however, are not without limit.
We conclude that the President's issuance of the Proclamation once again exceeds the scope
of his delegated authority." Id. at 673; see id. at 683-97, rev., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018) (Ninth
Circuit's statutory analysis).
184. Id at 697 (footnote omitted). The Court clarified that it was not addressing
extraordinary powers a president might exercise during a time of "national emergency" as
Trump raised no such claim. Id. at 697 rev., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018).
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Explicating the Trump Administration's constitutional error, the Ninth
Circuit appealed to the Declaration:
Exclusive congressional authority over immigration policy also finds
support in the Declaration of Independence itself, which listed
"obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners" and "refusing to
pass [laws] to encourage their migrations hither" as among the acts of
"absolute Tyranny" of "the present King of Great Britain." The
Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As Justice [Robert]
Jackson noted in Youngstown [Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579 (1952)], "The example of such unlimited executive power that must
have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by
George Ill, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of
Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their new
Executive in his image." 343 U.S. at 641, 72 S.Ct. 863 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). This is perhaps why the Constitution vested Congress with
the power to "establish an [sic] uniform Rule of Naturalization": the
Framers knew of the evils that could result when the Executive exerts
authority over the entry of aliens, and so sought to avoid those same evils
by granting such powers to the legislative branch instead. See U.S. Const.
art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.s18
185. Id. at 698, rev., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018). As noted, the Supreme Court reversed the
Ninth Circuit. First, the Court found that, contrary to the Circuit's analysis, the Trump
Proclamation provisions at issues comport with presidential authority allowed under the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). Trump, 138 S. Ct. 2407-2415. Next, after briefly
addressing standing, the Court rejected the challengers' claims of unlawful religious animus
in violation of the First Amendment. Id at 2416-23. In particular, the Trump majority stressed
that, given the direct and indirect implications for foreign affairs, even when under the judicial
bailiwick of constitutional review, courts must be highly deferential to immigration policies
promulgated by the Executive and the Legislature. Id at 2418-20. Such is especially so when
reviewing presidential immigration policies and procedures evoking national security matters
that, given the volatility of international relations, can change suddenly and precipitously.
History and legal tradition inform that, unlike the Executive and even Congress, the Judiciary
is not well positioned to respond pointedly and swiftly to world affairs. Id. at 2419-20.
Accordingly, in most instances, a reviewing court's determination that, as therein, "the policy
is facially legitimate and bona fide, would put an end to [such] review." Id. at 2420.
Nonetheless, the Court conducted an at least mildly probing review finding that the
challenged immigration policy did not discriminate against Muslims as a class, id. at 2420-23,
a proposition strongly challenged by the dissenting justices. See, id at 2433 (Breyer, J., with
Kagan, J., dissenting) ("If this Court must decide the question without this further litigation
[on asserted facts that have not been reviewed by the trial-level court], I would, on balance,
find the evidence of antireligious bias ... a sufficient basis to set the Proclamation aside."); id
at 2435-2440 (Sotomayor, J., with Ginsberg, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, what began as a
policy explicitly 'calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
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Thus, the familial connection between the Declaration and the
Constitution remains, as it should and must, part of our American
jurisprudence. Justices as diverse as John Paul Stevens and Clarence
Thomas1 8 6 recognize the Declaration demarcates the meaning and application
of the Constitution."' Indeed, nearly thirty years ago, Justice Thomas,
arguably the Declaration's most ardent promoter among the Judiciary,"
boldly but aptly discerned the elevated, unique status of the Declaration as
the prime arbiter of constitutional meaning: "[T]he Constitution is a logical
extension of the principals of the Declaration of Independence . . . . The
States' has since morphed into a 'Proclamation' putatively based on national-security
concerns. But this new window dressing cannot conceal an unassailable fact: the words of the
President and his advisers create the strong perception that the Proclamation is contaminated
by impermissible discriminatory animus against Islam and its followers." Id at 2440).
Possibly, Trump calls into question the Ninth Circuit's claim that separation of powers
bestows, "Exclusive congressional authority over immigration policy ... " Id. 878 F.3d at 698.
However, as noted, the Supreme Court found that the President's policies were authorized
under the broad discretion accorded by the INA; thus, there was no occasion to inquire whether
the Constitution's Article II in-and-of-itself would support Trump's immigration policy absent
statutory authorization. Compare, id at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[INA] Section
I 182(f) does not set forth any judicially enforceable limits that constrain the President. ... Nor
could it, since the President has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.")
(citations omitted).
Regardless, there is nothing in the Supreme Court's reversal to challenge the Ninth
Circuit's proposition that constitutional meaning is informed by the text and spirit of the
Declaration. Indeed, nowhere does the Supreme Court mention the Declaration which is
unsurprising given that it found the Trump policy proper under the INA and it limited its
review of the challengers' constitutional claims to the issue of anti-Muslim animus vel non.--
186. Fully consistent with this article's premises (see, Sections 2, 4), as the Justice himself
wrote, "The proper way to interpret the Civil War amendments is as extensions of the promise
of the original Constitution which in turn was intended to fulfill the promise of the
Declaration." Clarence Thomas, Toward a "Plain Reading" of the Constitution -- The
Declaration ofIndependence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 How. L.J. 983, 994 (1987).
187. Bayer, supra note 17, at 386 note 548:
See, e.g., Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2334 (2009)
(Stevens, J., with Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("The liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause is not a creation of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, our Nation has long
recognized that the liberty safeguarded by the Constitution has far deeper roots.")
(citing The Declaration of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776)); Adarand Constructors
Inc., v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he principle of
inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution" is linked to the
unalienable rights recognized in the Declaration); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 238 (1990) (Stevens, J., with Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
188. "Justice Clarence Thomas ... is perhaps the contemporary champion of the values of
the Declaration." Trapp, supra note 63, at 843; see also, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Natural Law
and Justice Thomas, 12 Regent L. Rev. 471 1999-2000); Kirk A. Kennedy, Reaffirming the
Natural Law Jurisprudence ofJustice Clarence Thomas, 9 REGENT L. REv. 33 (1997).
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higher-law background of the American Constitution ... provides the only
firm basis for a just, wise, and constitutional decision."1 89
In a seemingly different yet, upon reflection, actually similar vein,
"conservative" textualist Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
accented that the Constitution ought not be interpreted in ways that frustrate
the principles of the Revolution as commemorated in the Declaration.
Lamenting the majority's ruling that states must treat same-sex marriages
equally with opposite-sex marriages, Scalia urged, "This practice of
constitutional revision by an unelected committee of nine, always
accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People
of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of
Independence and won in the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern
themselves.""' While, with scant exceptions, this writing does not agree
with how Justices Thomas and Scalia would enforce the Declaration's natural
law precepts, it agrees with Thomas', Scalia's, and Stevens' general
admonition that the Constitution's meaning is informed by the Declaration's
moral-legal philosophy.1 91
189. Clarence Thomas, The Higher Law Background ofthe Privileges or Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 63, 64, 68 (1989) (emphasis
added; quoted in Trapp, supra note 63, at 844). Interestingly and perhaps alarmingly, while
consistent in his view as evinced by his judicial opinions and articles, "During the confirmation
hearings on his appointment to the Supreme Court, however, Thomas virtually denied that he
was committed to a natural law approach to constitutional decision-making." Cosgrove, supra
note 139, atl60 note 328 (1998) (citing, Scott D. Gerber, The Jurisprudence of Clarence
Thomas, 8 J.L. & POL'Y 107, 112 (1991)).
190. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., with Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
191. Likewise, Congress understood (and, one hopes, still understands) that the Declaration
should be regarded, indeed enforced, as, if not law, establishing essential principles of
legitimate governance that inform law and other official actions. Prof. David Barton explained
through examples, "the admission of territories as States into the United States was often
predicated on an assurance by the State that its constitution would violate neither the
Constitution nor the Declaration." David Barton, The Image and the Reality, Thomas
Jefferson and the First Amendment, 17 Notre Dame J.L. ETHICS & PUB. Pot'Y 399, 451 (2003)
(citations omitted); David Barton, "A Death Struggle between Two Civilizations," 13 REGENT
L. REV. 297, 313 (2000-2001) (quoting, 13 The Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations,
of the United States of America 33 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1866), "Furthermore, the
admission of territories as States into the Union was often predicated on an assurance by the
State that the State's '(C)onstitution, when formed, shall be republican, and not repugnant to
the (C)onstitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of Independence .
For instance, the Ninth Circuit recently stated, "The Alaska Constitution was ratified
by Alaska's voters and approved by Congress, which found it to be 'republican in form and in
conformity with the Constitution of the United States and the principles of the Declaration of
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3. The Framer's Recognition of the Constitution's Commitment to the
Declaration ofIndependence --
The foregoing agreement among courts, Congress and scholars stem, as
one would expect, from an inquiry into Originalism. Understandably
consistent with the incorporation of natural law into the Declaration of
Independence,' 92 The Framers and their contemporaries well understood that
the Declaration does not merely inspire, but as well expresses the
Constitution's meaning. "[I]t seems clear that the deliberations at
Philadelphia presupposed widespread acceptance of the political theory of
the Declaration. It seems clear, in particular, that the delegates agreed that
the end of legitimate government is the safeguarding of rights."' 93 James
Madison, for example, explicitly stated regarding the republican form of
government proposed in the Constitution, that, "It is evident that no other
form would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with
the fundamental principles of the Revolution; ... "194 As it is the document
clarifying "the fundamental principles of the Revolution," Madison must
have meant only a republic "would be reconcilable with" the Declaration.
"Indeed, urging the ratification of the Constitution, [Madison in] Federalist
No. 43 applied the very reasoning of the Declaration, underscoring 'the
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety
and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim,
and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed." 95 Similarly, as
recounted by Prof. Kmiec, "In a letter to Jefferson ... Madison recommended
the Declaration as the first of the 'best guides' to the 'distinctive principles'
of our government."1 96
Independence."' Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Alaska
Statehood Act, Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 1, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (1958)); see also, e.g., Larson v.
Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 131 P.3d 892, 900-01 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting) (discussing Enabling Act, ch. 180, sec. 4, 25 Stat. 676 (1889), which admitted the
State of Washington to the United States).
192. See, supra Section 2-b.
193. Himmelfarb, supra note 136, at 177.
194. The Federalist No. 39, at 181-82 (James Madison) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003) (emphasis
added).
195. Bayer, supra note 17, at 387-88 (quoting, The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison)
(Terrence Ball ed., 2003)).
196. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 395 (quoting, Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 218, 222 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1910)).
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Granted, in further 1825 correspondence, responding to Jefferson's
assertion that legal studies texts should compile,
the writings on government by Algernon Sidney and John Locke, the
Declaration of Independence, The Federalist, and the Virginia
Resolutions of 1799, Madison opined that Sidney and Locke, are
"admirably calculated to impress on young minds the right of Nations to
establish their own Governments, and to inspire a love of free ones; but
afford no aid in guarding our Republican Charters against constructive
violations." And the Declaration of Independence, said Madison, "falls
nearly under a like observation." That is, it too affords "no aid in guarding
our Republican Charters against constructive violations." 97
Prof. Cooper plausibly concluded, "Thus, the Declaration, according to
Madison, provides little if any protection against misconstructions of the
Constitution. This is, to put it charitably, a very odd way of saying that the
Declaration embodies constitutional principles even more authoritatively
than does the Constitution itself."' 98 True enough; still the prior Madison
quotes unequivocally link the Constitution's purpose and meaning to the
"fundamental principles of the Revolution," reference approvingly, "the
transcendent law of nature and of nature's God," and endorse, "Declaration
as the first of the 'best guides' to the 'distinctive principles' of our
government." Madison, a scholar and a theorist, knew that the philosophical
principles of the Declaration are both cognizable and translatable to practical
applications such as those which would be generated by constitutional
controversies. This writing is satisfied that "The Father of the
Constitution"'9 understood that the Declaration's precepts, if not its text, can
and should inform constitutional analysis.200
197. Charles J. Cooper, Harry Jaffa's Bad Originalism, 1994 PuB. INT. L. REV. 189, 200
(1994) (citations not provided).
198. Id. (citations not provided by Prof. Cooper or the editors).
199. I. Brant, JAMES MADISON, FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1800 (1950); see also,
e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Carey, 740 F.3d 507, 515 note 3 (9th Cir. 2014)
(Smith, J., with five judges, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, thus referring to
Madison).
200. Prof. Cooper makes an interesting rebuttal, that Madison's and Jefferson's references
to "Government" was not to the Constitution alone, but rather, "'government' in its larger
sense, of which the Constitution is a part but not the whole. ... [Given the context, o]bviously,
the ... 'the principles of government' are not confined to those on which the Constitution was
based, and indeed include some which are quite incompatible with the Constitution." Cooper,
supra note 197, at 201-20. To this, Cooper adds that Madison expressly referenced The
Federalist, "as the most authentic exposition of the text of the federal Constitution, as
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Furthermore, we arguably ask too much of even the great Madison and
his contemporaries by wondering why one or more might enthusiastically
espouse the principles of the Declaration while, regarding some particular
albeit significant controversy, not cite its text as a primary or secondary
source. Busy individuals cannot be expected to mention every conceivable
source especially when direct authority is plentiful enough. Moreover,
Madison's theories of speech and press, although profound, were not
premised on a full-fledged paradigm recognizing that any government
understood by the Body which prepared & the Authority which accepted it." Id. at 201
(citations not provided). Cooper offered that as Madison knew how to designate a proper
constitutional arbiter when he wished to, Madison's categorizing The Federalist but not the
Declaration as constitutionally authoritative proves that he did not ascribe such authority to
the latter. Id. at 201-02.
Moreover, asserting that Madison rejected the idea that unwritten law was incorporated
into the Constitution, id. at 204 n. 27, Prof. Cooper accented that in his thorough and brilliant
argument in the "Virginia Report" challenging the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
Acts, Madison applied a large assortment of authority from, inter alia, the Constitution's text,
the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, The Federalist, "--in short, 'everything from
which aid [could] be derived,' in Chief Justice Marshall's famous phrase. He did not mention
the Declaration." Id. at 204 (citations not provided Prof. Cooper or the editors).
This writing cannot account for why the meticulous Madison did not reference the
Declaration, but it notes that the full scope of Madison's argument, premised on textual
references, particularly the First Amendment, accents "Enlightenment philosophy,"
specifically, "a government created by the Constitution, under which, 'The people, not the
government, possess the absolute sovereignty."' Joseph Russomanno, The "Central
Meaning" and Path Dependence: The Madison-Meiklejohn-Brennan Nexus, 20 COMM. L. &
POL'Y. 117 127 (2015) (quoting, James Madison, [Virginia] Resolutions of 1798, in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISION 386 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). Madison's specific reference to
the First Amendment is in id. at 328). Sedition legislation, Madison argued, might be apt for
a monarchy, but not for the anti-monarchical principles of American government where "the
right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among
the people thereon, [] has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other
right." Russomanno at 126 (quoting, Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (citing 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 553-54 (1876)); see also, e.g., William T.
Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 91, 126 (1984) ("... Madison first established that seditious libel, while perhaps
appropriate to a nation (such as England) governed by a hereditary monarchy and by a
legislature that was also largely hereditary, was contrary to the genius of the United States
government, ... ").
These arguments comport with Madison's earlier quoted respect for the principles of
the Declaration. Perhaps Madison thought quoting the Declaration unnecessary given the
more direct legal sources he employed, sources that themselves referenced the spirit of the
Declaration and, in some instances, the Declaration itself. Indeed, bringing that document into
the fray might have been more confusing and distracting than informative. By contrast, given
the post-Nineteenth Century turns in American jurisprudence, reaffirming the Declaration's
primacy is essential to understanding constitutional rights -- that is, "due process of law."
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ordained by the will of the people must protect individual rights against the
illegitimate will of the people. As David A. Anderson explained,
Madison's 1789 speech [presenting his proposed constitutional
amendments to the first Congress] contains hints of a rather sophisticated
understanding of the dangers of majoritarianism.
[I]n a Government modified like this of the United States, the great
danger lies rather in the abuse of the community than in the
legislative body.... [It] is not found in either the executive or
legislative departments of Government, but in the body of the
people, operating by the majority against the minority.
Although he made no claim that his amendments would provide a legally
effective barrier against the power of the community, he suggested that
they would at least engender some degree of public opinion in favor of
protecting individual rights against the majority. 201
As Anderson aptly informs, even if they did not so realize at the
founding, the amendments Madison and the other Framers espoused and saw
ratified actually mustfunction as "a legally effective barrier against the power
of the community." Thus, when interpreting their wills and acts, we
commonly ascribe to the Founders neither full wisdom nor complete
comprehension. Rather, we consider what they did to be a beginning, or
perhaps a continuation, but emphatically not the end. If Madison, or any of
the Founders, did not explicitly state that the Declaration's text is either a
primary or secondary source,202 that sentiment nonetheless is explicit from
what they repeatedly wrote, spoke, and did. From that, we can and have
discerned a more sophisticated and proper use of the Declaration as text and
201. David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REv. 455, 532-33
(1983) (quoting, I THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
454-55 (1789) (J. Gales ed. 1834)).
202. A "primary source" is enforceable law such as "the constitution, codes, and statutes."
Six Flags, Inc. v. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 565 F.3d 948,954 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing,
See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir.2007)). By contrast, a
"secondary source" is commentary, scholarship, analysis, or other proposed explications of
one or more primary sources, but not itself legally enforceable. Classic secondary sources
include treatises, books, law review articles, monographs, and legislative history. Jonathan
Peters, Institutionalizing Press Relations at the Supreme Court: The Origins of the Public
Information Office, 79 Mo. L. REV. 985, 988 (2014).
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commentary -- a use promoted by this writing's paradigm of Deontological
Originalism.20 3
Turning to the family of the Declaration's ardent proponent, John
Adams, his son, John Quincy Adams, who would become America's sixth
president, smartly stated, "The Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution of the United States are parts of one consistent whole, founded
upon one and the same theory of government . . . ."2 Similarly, John
Adams' second cousin, noted patriot and provocateur Samuel Adams,
accented that the Declaration speaks not only for the Nation, but as well for
the constituent States, "This declaration of Independence was received and
ratified by all the States in the Union and has never been disannulled."205 In
fact, as the research of one scholar confirmed, not only proponents, but as
well, "even those who refused to sign [the Constitution] judged the
Constitution by the standards of the Declaration."206
Based on this litany, I have not budged from the conclusion I drew in
earlier writings. Further research has only fortified my conviction that,
Surely, for all the realpolitik and compromises of principle confirmed by
historians that explain the final document, the Constitutional Convention
nonetheless hoped to create the foundation that could not immediately,
but ultimately would, kindle full faith with the Declaration's philosophy.
In light of these precedents, Prof. Larson correctly concluded, "the
Declaration was ... the declaration of one American people declaring the
existence of one American nation. It is therefore entirely appropriate to
date the legal existence of the American nation from July 4, 1776 .. . .
203. Co-author of The Federalist Alexander Hamilton presents an interesting parenthesis.
Although not an advocate for representative government, during the Constitutional
Convention, Hamilton did express support for the concept of natural rights. As Dan
Himmlefarb recounted:
Throughout the Convention Hamilton voiced his dissatisfaction with popular
government. ... Nevertheless, Hamilton "professed himself to be as zealous an
advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing a martyr
to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible." Thus Hamilton,
in agreement with the Declaration, recognized that the popular form of government
is not the only one capable ofsecuring rights.
Himmelfarb, supra note 136, at 178 (emphasis added; quoting, I THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION 1787, at 424 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937).
204. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, THE JUBILEE OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISCOURSE 40 (1839).
205. SAMUEL ADAMS, ADDRESS TO THE LEGISLATURE OF MASSACHUSETTS (Jan. 17, 1794),
in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 357 (Harry Alonzo Cushing ed., 1968) (1908).
206. Himmelfarb, supra note 136, at 178.
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The American nation preceded .. . the Constitution, which 'perfected'
that nation." 207
Or, as Scott Douglas Gerber rightly and concisely concluded, "The
natural-rights principles embodied in the Declaration are not 'above' or
'beyond' the Constitution; they are at the heart of the Constitution."2 08 True,
some critics still maintain that the Constitution's Framers lost their way,
forsaking the imperatives of deontological morality they so eloquently
proclaimed in the Declaration. Even were that so, as shortly will be shown,
the Reconstruction Congress revived such slumbering national commitment
to natural law by enacting and attaining ratification of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Those amendments, and the
resurgence of rights they eventually generated through the 1900s and into the
Twenty-First Century have brought us significantly closer to the promise of
Government constrained by and dedicated to the promotion of deontological
morality. Still, while actual pre-Civil War enforcement surely was
unsatisfactory, the original Framers deliberately and knowingly evoked in
their proposed Constitution the moral precepts of the Declaration, including
the equality of "all Men." Critics such as Orville Burton exaggerate history,
therefore, by stating, "'Equality' was memorialized in the Declaration of
Independence, the United States's mission statement, but not the
Constitution, the country's rule book. Lincoln revolutionized personal
freedom in the United States by assuring that the law protected it. Lincoln
essentially inserted the Declaration of Independence into the Constitution." 209
Equal protection of the laws always was part of the Constitution's
deontology. Tragically, it took the Civil War and its aftermath to give that
truth meaningful life.
207. Bayer, supra note 17, at 387 (quoting, Larson, supra note 33, at 702). As Prof. Epstein
similarly concluded, "The variety of opinions and disagreements of 1787-1788 did not call
into question the fundamental political principles asserted in the Declaration of
Independence." DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION:
CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 78 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990).
208. ScoTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 3 (1995); see also, e.g., Trapp, supra
note 63, at 838 ("There is ample evidence that the principles of the Declaration are an
acceptable or even a preferred means of interpreting the Constitution.").
209. Orville Vernon Burton, The Creation and Destruction of the Fourteenth Amendment
During the Long Civil War, 79 LA. L. REv. 189, 195 (2018). Doubtless, principles of equality
derived from due process liberty took meaningful hold only after the ratification of the post-
Bellum Amendments. But, it was the Founders who formalized the basic principles in the
Declaration and the Framers who made those principles the basis of the Constitution.
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111. THE FRAMERS' UNDERSTANDING OF NATURAL LAW AS A MORAL
CONSTRUCT --
A. The Meaning ofNatural Law Is Grounded in Morality --
The foregoing established that the Founders legitimized the American
Revolution on the natural law principles set forth in the Declaration of
Independence that define legitimate government. Moreover, the Framers
and, thereafter, the courts and commentators, understood that the
Constitution's primary function is to enforce the natural law precepts of the
Declaration. Before turning to the identical sentiments of the Reconstruction
Congress that completed, at least in a formal sense, the moral project the
Founders began by applying the Declaration's natural law mandates to the
States, this is an apt juncture to explicate that the original Founders (and
thus the Reconstruction Congress) fully appreciated that the underlying and
operative principle ofnatural law is morality; therefore, they enthusiastically
accepted and unapologetically embraced moral comportment as the highest
American law. Accordingly, Deontological Originalism alone accurately
depicts the Constitution's intended and proper meaning.
Prof. Loveless rightly captured the core precept, "All law rests on some
fundamental deontology or moral philosophy, some idea of right and wrong,
what we might term the objectives or 'ends' of the law."2 10 In this regard
seven decades ago, respected conservative attorney and law professor
Clarence E. Manion confirmed, "The fact is that the Declaration is the best
possible condensation of natural law[, which underlies] common law
doctrines as they were developed and expounded in England and America for
hundreds of years prior to the American Revolution."2 1' Specifically, the
Founders grounded the American Revolution, and the Reconstruction
Congress equally based the Reconstruction Amendments, on three interlaced
beliefs: (1) that morality is a priori, (2) that moral duties inure from the
natural rights inherent in natural law,212 and, (3) that Government is
legitimate only so long as it protects and otherwise conforms with the
immutable moral standards that animate natural rights. Thus, to resolve
210. Loveless, supra note 111, at 368.
211. Clarence E. Manion, The Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, 35 A.B.A J.
461, 462 (1949).
212. Carey, supra note 22, at 58 ("[N]atural rights, which can be understood as portions of
natural liberty, were bounded or confined by the natural law") (citing Hamburger, supra note
28, at 956).
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significant constitutional issues, reviewing courts must engage in moral
reasoning, there is no other methodology.
As we learned in this article's Part I discussing Deontology, 2 13 natural
rights inure not because of any given individual's arguable merit, attainment,
or virtuous behavior. Rather, "people by reason of their humanity possessed
natural rights which could not be abridged by positive law. American
constitutional and bill of rights models were constructed at a time when the
natural law school ofjudicial thought was highly influential."214
Yet, the meaning of natural law "is not uncontroversial;" 215 ditto for
natural rights.2 16 Indeed, scholars decry the tendency to simplify and thus
distort subtle principles into "bumper sticker versions of natural law often
bandied about in constitutional discussion" evincing "constitutional scholars'
seeming lack of interest in going beyond familiar slogans[.]" 2 17 This writing
proceeds duly mindful to avoid that perhaps tempting pitfall.
Theorists largely agree that, consistent with its inherent deontological
grounding, the "law" of natural law is not predicated on convenience, order,
economics, politics or other practical concerns that are the proper realms of
"positive law," that is, the specific, identifiable texts of laws such as statutes,
regulations and judicial opinions. 2 18 Rather, put perhaps in its simplest yet
213. See Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, Sections 2-a, f (addressing the
immutability of moral requisites and explain why the duty to abide by such requisites
superceedes all else); Section 3-d-1, 3 (explaining Kant's argument that morality is
deontological and immutable, therefore, every individual owes to all others a duty of moral
comportment regardless whether such others violate their moral duties); see also Carey, supra
note 22, at 58 (Kant's explanation why, rather than being earned, rights inure to individuals
because of their status as Human Beings).
214. Siegan, supra note 42, at 421-22. Likewise, Prof. George recounted:
Most modern commentators agree that the American founders were firm believers in
natural law and sought to craft a constitution that would conform to its requirements,
as they understood them, and embody its basic principles for the design of a just
political order. The framers of the Constitution sought to create institutions and
procedures that would afford respect and protection to those basic rights ("natural
rights") that people possess, not as privileges or opportunities granted by the state,
but as principles ofnatural law which it is the moral duty ofthe state to respect and
protect.
George, supra note 41, at 2269-70 (emphasis added).
215. Andrd LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations ofthe Debate Over Originalism, 7 WASH.
U. JuR. REv. 263, 289 (2015) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., George, supra note 41, at 2269.
216. Bayer, supra note 17, at 337.
217. Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 133, at 118.
218. Hans Kelsen, Law, State, and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, 57 YALE L.J. 377,
385 (1948) stated the classic definition,
"Positive" law means that a law is created by acts of human beings which take place
in time and space, in contradistinction to natural law, which is supposed to originate
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most expedient pr6cis, applying now familiar propositions among
Enlightenment philosopherS 219 including the highly respected John Locke,
through their capacities to reason, persons "possess[] the mental faculty to
discover moral truths in the law of nature."220
Accordingly, and of utmost importance, natural law, "equates law and
morality. "221 Natural law is about the abiding, transcendent moral precepts
that apply equally to all human beings, setting ethical limits on how each
person interacts with all other persons. Consistent with this article's earlier
exploration of Deontology, "Natural law, in a nutshell, assumes that just as
there is a physical reality to the universe, there is also a moral one. This
moral reality can be perceived by the reasonably functioning human mind,
and when it is grasped, the mind will encourage the will to act
accordingly." 22 2 Likely, the reader already has anticipated that this definition
is exactly what "Thomas Jefferson appeals to [in the Declaration of
Independence as] 'the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God' in justifying the
American Revolution."2 23 This actuality leads to an essential point worth re-
emphasizing: while some might hastily assume that natural rights, in their
in another way. Consequently, the question of what is the positive law, the law of a
certain country or the law in a concrete case, is the question of a law-creating act
which has taken place at a certain time and within a certain space. The answer to this
question does not depend on the feelings of the answering subjects; it can be verified
by objectively ascertainable facts, ...
219. Cecil L. Eubanks, Subject and Substance: Hegel on Modernity, 6 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
129, 130 (2005) ("The philosophical underpinnings of modernity can be found in -the
Enlightenment faith in reason and the human capacity to apprehend the immutable laws of
nature"); see also Libby Adler, The Dignity of Sex, 17 ULCA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 10 (2008)
("[Diuring the Enlightenment, the universality of the capacity for reason as a basis for dignity
displaced the pre-Enlightenment commitment to rank and hierarchy").
220. Kang, supra note 35, at 306 (emphasis added; discussing JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF GovERNMENT, 271-72 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690)).
Underscoring the logical link to Deontology, natural law is discerned, "by demonstrating
rational conclusions from sound premises. ... [Accordingly,] natural law is discovered by the
individual through rational inquiry and it can be taught by others through rational instruction."
Kmiec, supra note 25, at 385-86 (citing, MORTMER ADLER, THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL LAW
PHILOSOPHY, IN I NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 82 (Alfred Scanlan ed., 1947)); see
also, e.g., Bayer, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, f (Deontology);
3-d-1, 2 (Kantian perspective).
221. Matthew D. Adler, Interpretive Contestation and Legal Correctness, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1115, 1125 (2012) (emphasis added).
222. See Kmiec, supra note 25, at 385 (citing, JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE
TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITIONS 327-28 (1960)); see also,
e.g., Bayer, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, f (Deontology); 3-d-
1, 2 (Kantian perspective).
223. George, supra note 41, at 226; see supra notes 96-113 and accompanying text.
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capacity as rights, comprise the moral components of natural law (therefore,
all other aspects of natural law are not moral imparatives), in fact, natural law
itself is a moral construct. Consequently, all classifications or categories of
natural law, certainly including natural rights, must comport with
deontological morality, as must natural law as a whole.
Given that moral comportment is the highest duty of human beings,
natural law, then, is a reservoir ensuring that all subordinate laws -- the
positive laws --, each promoting different human needs or goals, obey the
absolute duty of moral comportment. As Prof. LeDuc ardently defined it,
"natural law asserts that law is based upon, derived from, and legitimated by
the requirements of morality that are themselves conceived as instrumental
for securing or enhancing human flourishing."22 4 Consistent with the link
between the Declaration and the Constitution, Pojanowski and Walsh
likewise equate natural law with the goal of, in LeDuc's phrasing, "human
flourishing" 225 which generates, "a moral need for positive law -- law brought
into being by human choice or act." 2 26 Whether by divine intervention or
fortunate happenstance, natural law preexists Humanity, arising from the
innate order of all things. Because it is not humanly created yet constrains as
a moral imperative human behavior, natural law compels us to respond "Yes"
224. LeDuc, supra note 215, at 289. Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 133, at 18-19 (quoting
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTs 351 (2d ed. 2011)) ("The classical natural
law tradition we draw on concerns 'the requirements of practical reasonableness in relation to
the good of human beings who, because they live in community with one another, are
confronted with problems ofjustice and rights, of authority, law, and obligation"').
As emphasized in Originalism and Deontology, this basic principle likewise is part of
Immanuel Kant's framework, a framework, this article argues, that best fulfills the Founders'
quest for the moral truth that is envisioned by the declaration and enforced by the Constitution.
See, Id. supra note 7, Section 3.
225.
[T]hinking about human law begins with the recognition that there are certain
goods that persons and communities can achieve only by having authoritative legal
institutions. To flourish, persons and communities need to be able to protect the
peace, coordinate their activities, and cooperate on shared projects to promote the
common good. Law is not the only social institution that helps persons and
communities develop their potentialities, but it can do things that solitary persons and
other institutions cannot, at least in a group of any size and complexity.
Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 133, at 20.
226. Id. at 19-20 (citations omitted) ("We are interested in middle-range questions about
why the natural law [objective morality and considerations ofjustice within a reasonably wide
range of theories] requires human communities to develop legal systems and, given those
reasons, how persons should respond to those legal norms"). Although Pojanowski and Walsh
do not cite his work, more than his predecessors, Kant explained that, just as forming a social
order itself, societal enactment of positive law is a moral imperative, not simply a convenience.
See Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 3-d-5.
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to Prof. Kmiec's expression of the enduring inquiry, "Is law more than a mere
assertion of power? ... We yearn to believe that law has an independent
reality. Indeed, we colloquially talk this way all the time."22 7 Given the proof
of Deontology, we understand that law undeniably "has an independent
reality, " and that independent reality integrally includes moral
comportment.
Accordingly, the Founders must have rejected, as today likewise we
must reject, jurisprudence that would separate law and morals, such as
Positivism's assertion that, regardless of its moral exactitude, 22 8 law is
authentic,229 (1) if it is derived from those offices or instrumentalities a given
society designates competent to make law,230 (2) if it conforms with the type
of law the given office is competent to make, 23 1 (3) if it is made consistent
with the proper procedures of the particular office,232 and, (4) if it is
sufficiently clear that reasonable persons intended to be regulated understand
what is required of them.23 3 These four requisites, possibly five as supra note
227. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 383.
228. Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 133, at 104 (footnote omitted) ("[L]egal positivism,
... claims that identifying 'the law' is a matter of identifying social facts, not moral
evaluation").
229. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (3d. ed. 2012) (elaborating on classic
statements of Positivism); see also H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REv. 593 (1958) (elaborating on classic statements of Positivism).
230. For instance, although it may be profoundly influential on persons' beliefs and
behaviors, religious doctrine is not positive law because, in America, organized religion is not
an office of Government authorized to make law. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as
applied by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a Massachusetts statute
allowing a church to veto liquor license applications of establishments within 500 feet of the
particular church).
231. For example, Congress cannot regulate purely intrastate commerce because, while
expressly authorized to regulate interstate commerce, like authority to regulate intrastate
commerce that does not genuinely affect interstate commerce is not among Congress'
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995); United States v. Gordon, 272 Fed. Appx. 674, 675 (10th Cir. 2008).
232. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (explaining that a bill must attain a majority of votes from
both the House of Representative and Senate to be a validly enacted law).
233. Although the Constitution does not require that any given law be perfectly defined in
every regard for every applicable instance, such law at least must be sufficiently precise so
that persons of reasonable capacity generally understand what is or is not lawful conduct. E.g.,
Welch v. United States., 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261-62 (2016) ("The void-for-vagueness doctrine
prohibits the government from imposing sanctions 'under a criminal law so vague that it fails
to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement."' Id at 1262 (quoting, Johnson v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2556) (2015)).
One might urge a fifth element that, even when legitimized by meeting the proper
formalities of enactment, the given law must be enforced not perfectly, but, considering the
23 5
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233 mentions, might be apt, but only so long as the law at issue is moral.
Therefore, Positivism, the assertion of positive law, "is the specification of
the more general, or conceptual requirements of natural law. Functionally,
positive law chooses ... specifications that instantiates the conceptual
command of natural law." 234
Thus, because natural law is predicated on morality and positive law
actualizes concretely the natural law, to be legitimate, positive law must be
moral. In that regard, Profs. Pojanowski and Walsh nicely explained that,
"the primary function of natural law is not to supplement positive-law
reasoning. It is to underwrite the moral obligation of interpreters [and
lawmakers] to treat the enacted Constitution [which enforces the natural law]
as positive law."2 35
Such was not lost on the Founders. As earlier quoted, Alexander
Hamilton equally averred that positive laws implement but do not establish
natural law: "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among
old parchments or musty records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in
the whole volume of human nature, by the Hand of the Divinity itself, and
totality of relevant circumstances, sufficiently to evince that the Government trule deems that
law to be law. Under that codicil, "Enforcement is legal prohibition, and lack of enforcement
is legal permission. The contrary view, that enforcement policy is fundamentally different
from 'law,' rests on a formalistic definition of law which has been largely discarded since the
realist revolution of a half century ago." Ashutosh Bhagwat, Three-Branch Monte, 72 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 157, 176 (1996). Cf, Julia Pugliese, Don't Ask--Don't Tell: The Secret Practice
ofPhysician-Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1297-99 (1993) (discussing the lack of
enforcement of penal laws forbidding "assisted suicide"). Indeed, the courts recognize an
understandably difficult to prove "defense of desuetude require[ing] a long period of
nonenforcement, at least a decade, but probably longer." Urska Velikonja, Accountability for
Nonenforcement, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1549, 1560 (2018) (footnote omitted).
234. LeDuc, supra note 215, at 289. Pojanowski and Walsh similarly explained:
Even where the natural law speaks clearly, the positive law must fill in details that
are under-determined by reason. By 'under-determination,' we mean that the natural
law provides a framework within which people can make reasoned choices, and
bounds beyond which they ought not choose, but no precise algorithm for making
such choices. Right reason, in short, does not precisely determine the right answer
in all places for all purposes. To take a simple example, even ifthe moral law requires
a human law against murder, it does not speak directly or categorically about every
element of the crime, degrees of culpability, available excuses and justifications, and
particular penalties.
Pojanowski and Walsh, supra note 133, at 121 (footnotes omitted.)
235. Id. at 99 (So long as it is loyal to the moral precepts of natural law, "the positive content
of our Constitution is sufficiently just to merit our moral obligation to its authority").
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can never be erased or obscured by mortal power." 236 Similarly, Thomas
Paine extolled the American Revolution as a "moral" construct.23 7 Certainly,
even a cursory review of Jefferson's defense of Revolution in the Declaration
of Independence23 8 reveals that, "Like Jefferson, natural law theorists
postulate a necessary connection between law and morality to make the law
credible."2 39 Member of both the Continental Congress and the
Constitutional Convention, Justice James Wilson as well "made clear the
dependence of positive law on natural law: 'Human law must rest its
authority, ultimately, upon the authority of that law, which is divine."'240 To
offer additional instances of philosophers influential on the Founders, Cicero
(shortly before the birth of Jesus) and Blackstone (roughly eighteen centuries
after Cicero) likewise believed, "that positive law is only genuinely law
insofar as it comports with certain moral principles."24 1
The foregoing validates the two significant truths discussed above.
First, albeit very general in its most abstract sense, natural law can be reduced
to text and, thus, comprises the highest ranking positive law, as in the case of
our Constitution, complete with enforceable, substantive meaning. 24 2
Identically, natural law's principles, albeit expansive, are understandable
and, thus, can be actualized into more specific positive law. Second, by
applying and effectuating natural law via subordinate laws of greater
specificity (such as criminal laws, civil rights laws, and property laws),
positive law must conform with the moral requirement attendant to natural
law; thus, law and morals are inseparable. 2 43  Indeed, "as [philosopher
236. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 188
(1967) (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED 122 (Harold C. Syrett et al.
eds., 1961)).
237. PANGLE, supra note 70, at 10.
238. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
239. Omar Swatz, Codifying the Law of Slavery in North Carolina: Positive Law and the
Slave Persona, 29 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 285, 289 (2004) (footnote omitted).).
240. Charles L. Barzun, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1075
(2004) (quoting JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 93 (James DeWitt Andrews
ed., Chicago, Callaghan and Company 1896).
241. Frederick Schauer, On the Utility of Religious Toleration, 10 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 479,
482 (2016); see also, supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text discussing Blackstone and
the "pursuit of happiness."
242. Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 133, at 100 (identifying the Constitution as positive
law that enforces natural law).
243. Id. at 99 ("[Tlhe primary function of natural law is not to supplement positive-law
reasoning. It is to underwrite the moral obligation of interpreters [and lawmakers] to treat the
enacted Constitution [which enforces the natural law] as positive law.. .the positive content of
our Constitution is sufficiently just to merit our moral obligation to its authority").
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Mortimer] Adler instructed: '[p]ositive law without a foundation in natural
law is purely arbitrary. It needs the natural law to make it rational. But
natural law without positive law is ineffective for the purposes of enforcing
justice and keeping peace."' 244
B. The Nature ofNatural Rights -- Are Natural Rights Truly "Unalienable"
or Are They Subordinate to a Higher Natural Law? --
As earlier discussed, the Founders expressed in the Declaration of
Independence that Humankind is, "endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness."2 45 Given its singular prominence in that most important of
sentences from the Declaration, the Founders apparently (and rightly)
believed that "unalienable Rights" surpass among all the gifts or benefits
arising from the natural order of things that both preexisted and generated
Humanity.2 46 For that reason, a cadre of lawmakers or nation builders "could
no more rewrite these laws of nature than they could the laws of physics." 247
Understandably, the exact extent and nature of these rights has
generated much discussion. Commentators have wondered why the
Founders did not provide a more complete list given their assertion that "Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" are "among" but not the entirety of
"unalienable Rights." Similarly, analysts inquire why the Founders did not
expound the applicable rights, but only denoted them by their names. The
pragmatics of their project surely guided the Founders' decisions not to
elucidate within the Declaration the theoretical foundations of natural rights
more than to name the most prominent. The Founders did not try to write
either a treatise on legal philosophy nor a law review-like article on the
244. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 386 (quoting MORTIMER ADLER, THE DOCTRINE OF NATURAL
LAW PI-LOSOPHY 83 (Alfred Scanlan ed., 1947)).
245. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see supra notes 91-125 and
accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the Declaration's text).
246. Sherry, supra note 164, at 1170-71.
247. Id. at 1132 (quoting Silas Downer, A Discourse at the Dedication ofthe Tree of Liberty
(1768)); see supra notes 91-125 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the
Declaration's text). Commentators agree with Prof. Sherry's embracing of Downer's
assessment of natural rights' immutability. James Lanshe, Morality and the Rule of Law in
American Jurisprudence, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 1, 12 (2009) (quoting Sherry); Jerry
E. Norton, Liberty: A Human Right, or A Citizen Right, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 565, 567 note 12
(2005) (same); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free
Speech: The First Amendment As an Instrument ofFederalism, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 48 note
199(1999) (same).
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intersection of political and moral theory. As earlier stressed, their goal was
to present in careful, coherent prose the legal argument to justify rebellion --
a legal brief in effect.24 8 While they ultimately included in the Declaration's
third paragraph a lengthy list of specific grievances against the British Crown
that may be interpreted as demarcating specific rights, 24 9 and certainly their
other writings provide insights into the Founders' beliefs regarding natural
rights emanating from natural law, 250 attempting to itemize "unalienable
Rights" would have been divisive, distracting and, indeed, futile, especially
as part of a succinct legal document such as the Declaration or the
Constitution.25 1
248. See supra text accompanying notes 91-97.
249. E.g., G. Edward White, Revisiting the Ideas ofthe Founding, 77 U. CINCI. L. REv. 969,
983 (2009) ("Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, in the course of listing grievances the
Americans had with the king, was implicitly suggesting that some of those grievances were
connected to the violation of particular liberties"); Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in
the Development ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L. J. 21, 36 (1990) ("The list of
grievances in the Declaration of Independence is interesting in that it is actually a negative
statement of rights, fundamental values, and commitments."); Carey, supra note 22, at 65 ("It
may be inferred that the drafters accepted the natural law's mandate for due process that would
serve to curb arbitrary and capricious government. Many of the specific grievances listed in
the Declaration relate directly to breaches in due process as it had come to be understood in
the common law").
250. For instance, "In the [celebrated] debates with Senator [Stephen] Douglas [of Illinois],
Lincoln recalled Jefferson and repeatedly defined liberty as follows: 'I believe each individual
is naturally entitled to do as he pleases with himself and the fruit of his labor, so far as it in no
wise interferes with any other man's rights."' Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers:
Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1305, 1332 (1985) (quoting,
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to H.L. Pierce and others (Apr. 6, 1859) in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:
His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 394 (R. Basler ed. 1946)). Prof. Nichol, then, proposes in detail
a Jeffersonian understanding of Enlightenment-style liberal liberty suitable for modem times.
Similarly, regarding John Adams, "and his contemporaries, civil and political liberty did not
allow individuals to demand privileges, rights, or government recognition from the
Commonwealth, rather liberty meant "[slelf-direction or [s]elf-government" Wendy
Herdlein, Something Old, Something New: Does the Massachusetts Constitution Provide for
Same-Sex "Marriage"?, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 137, 159 (2002). In particular, "Richard Price,
in his 1776 Boston publication, Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, set forth an
understanding of liberty adopted by John Adams, noting that moral, religious, physical and
civil liberty have 'one general idea, that runs through them all ... the idea of Self-direction."'
Id. at 159-60 (citing inter alia, RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL
LIBERTY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES F GOVERNMENT,
AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA, 2-3 (1776)) and 4 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, 401, 403 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) ("As the society governs itself, it is free,
according to the definition of Dr. Price.")
251. James Iredell, Marcus I, NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Feb. 20, 1787, reprinted in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 168 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) ("All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf
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Importantly, as vital as they are, we now understand that "unalienable
Rights" are not independent, but rather, derive from natural law. As Prof.
Carey explained, "[T]he Declaration points to the significant role and
function of the natural law in political thinking both before and during the
founding period. At its core is the understanding that natural rights are
discrete portions of a natural liberty which, in turn, is modified, limited, or
conditioned by the natural law."252 Accordingly, one line of scholarship
questions whether the Declaration's term "unalienable" truly means what it
appears to mean: natural rights simply are not subject to either modification
or abridgement. Carey, for example, argues that, as a practical actuality,
"unalienable" natural rights always were perceived as alienable due to their
subservience to natural law:
Simply put ... all natural rights, both alienable and unalienable, are
bounded, regulated, or controlled by the natural law. In other words, it
was understood that these rights inherently embodied or contained within
them the restrictions and caveats of the natural law. Obscenity, slander,
and defamation, for instance, were not part of the right of freedom of
speech. Likewise, individual actions or behavior contrary to the natural
law were not regarded as part of liberty. Viewed in this manner,
unalienable rights could be subject to regulation or control by society
through positive law in accordance with the natural law -- for example,
in order to preserve or advance the general welfare.253
If, as it appears, Prof. Carey's analysis is true, "[Such] analysis leaves
scholars to wonder in what meaningful sense unalienable rights are
down to Vattel, have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor in the aggregate
of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people"). It is
worth noting in passing that although an ardent supporter of the proposed Constitution -- "At
North Carolina's first ratification convention, Iredell quickly became the 'acknowledged
leader for ratification"' -- as one of this Nation's first Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
"In [a] dissent, which resonates even to this day, Justice Iredell authored the first Supreme
Court opinion rejecting the use of 'natural law' in striking down a legislative act." Oyez,
James Iredell, https://www.oyez.org/justices/jamesiredell(accessed, August 1, 2018). This
writing, however, disagrees with Justice Iredell insofar as he would have rejected the use of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (he died prior to the enactment and ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment) to apply a natural law principle of "fundamental fairness" that
could invalidate acts of Congress.
252. Carey, supra note 22, at 67 (emphasis added).
253. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
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unalienable." 254 In response, he offered the "corporate" understanding of the
term "unalienable Rights,"
[T]he "unalienable rights" asserted in the document are those that
belong to the people in their corporate or collective capacity. As such,
these rights are unalienable in the sense [that] ... they cannot be parted
with (i.e., transferred to another people), nor can they be controlled or
regulated by another people. In this account, it is critical to note that once
the government was established, these rights ("life, " "liberty, " "pursuit
of happiness") lost their unalienable status. A majority, or whatever
sovereign power there would be, in keeping with the natural law, could
regulate these rights as they related to individuals, in order to promote the
well-being of society. 255
In sum, according to Prof. Carey, government cannot alienate --
abandon or diminish -- natural rights either by technically purging them from
the positive law or by subcontracting to a foreign entity the authority to
enforce natural rights on behalf of Americans. Nonetheless, consistent with
their natural law origins, according to Carey, American Government can
enforce a classic Utilitarian approach to "promote the well-being of society"
by establishing positive laws that recognize when natural law limits the
latitude of natural rights. The corporate understanding, then, "reduces
unalienable rights to their essence by way of emphasizing that they constitute
no barrier or hindrance to society pursuing the common good."256
Prof. Cary's analysis is consistent with the general argument urging that
the Founders believed, and believed rightly, that, in the words of scholar Jud
Campbell, "most retained natural rights were individual rights that could be
collectively defined and controlled."2 57 Similarly, almost as though
anticipating this writing, noted historian Patrick J. Charles charges that, by
failing to understand exactly pivotal terms "[i]n the context of eighteenth-
century constitutionalism," analysts wrongly use the Founders' exhortation
of "liberty," "happiness," and "rights," to "proclaim[] that the Declaration
stands for individual natural rights or a presumption of liberty under the guise
254. Id.
255. Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 62.
257. Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMM.
85, 98 (2017); see also, e.g., Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127
YALE L. J. 246, 264-80 (2017).
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of originalism in order to restore a constitution that never existed."25 8 In his
long, thoughtful article, Mr. Charles concludes that at the time of the
founding, "liberty and happiness were not personal or individual guarantees,
but conditions that only a virtuous society and public spirit could achieve.
True liberty is tough to obtain, rare to find, and has to be earned. To put it
another way, the dichotomy between personal and collective liberty that we
imagine today is not eighteenth-century liberty." 25 9
Consistent with that framework, historian Charles continues, "liberty"
derived from natural rights included the perfect freedom of the state of nature,
a freedom that, moving into civil society, natural law must constrain through
positive law prescribing "rules of conduct" for the good of all, and punishing
those who disobey.2 6 Accordingly, in post-Revolution America, "In the
words of Judge George Thatcher, laws based upon the consent of the people
were presumed valid 'on the presumption that they will produce the degree
of happiness before-mentioned."' 261' That "happiness" derives from, as
expressed by America's fourth Vice-President, George Clinton,
The first and most essential support of republican government [which] is
the virtue of the people. Constitutions may be formed; institutions may
be established on the most liberal, just and philanthropic principles; and
all in vain-if the morals of the people be corrupt; if self-interest
predominate[s] over the love of country, and vice and licentiousness usurp
the place of religion. 262
Charles undoubtedly is correct in his conclusions that, "if one actually
reads the different state ratifying debates, the constitutional link between
preserving liberty and happiness and the Constitution's text and structure
becomes blatantly apparent. The question repeatedly asked and answered
among the different state delegates was, 'Did the proposed text and structure
258. Patrick J. Charles, Restoring "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness" in Our
Constitutional Jurisprudence: An Exercise in Legal History, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
457, 524 (2011).
259. Id at 524 (discussing BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 368-76 (1967) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 524-25 (discussing WILLIAM ASHHURST, CHARGE DELIVERED TO THE GRAND
JURY IN MIDDLESEX, (Nov. 19, 1792), in 43 CHARGES TO THE GRAND JURY 1689-1803, at 447-
48 (Georges Lamoine ed., 1992)).
261. Id at 526 (quoting, Hon. George Thacher, Scribble Scrabble, CUMBERLAND GAZETTE
(Portland), Mar. 23, 1787, at 4).
262. Id at 527 (quoting GEORGE CLINTON, AN ORATION, DELIVERED ON THE FOURTH OF
JULY 1798, at 9 (New York, M.L. & W.A. Davis 1798)).
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of the federal Constitution ensure the happiness of the people?"'26 3 And,
certainly, Vice-President Clinton correctly surmised that a corrupt polity can,
and almost certainly will, thwart a nation's moral comportment.
However, ignoring the plain text of the Declaration, Carey's,
Campbell's, and Charles' fundamental mistake, sounding in the
consequentialist error, is their presumption that to promote societal
"happiness," individual fundamental rights per se are abrogable "in
furtherance of the common good." It is in response to even accurate historical
critique that, before relating how the Founders linked this nation's formative
documents with the enforcement and preservation of moral imperatives, this
writing first proves that morality itself is deontological, not consequentialist.
As we now appreciate, morality is not predicated on fostering outcomes to
attain some person's or some group's notion of "the greater good." Rather,
morality comprises principles and attendant duties to assure that human
conduct -- individual, group-wide, or, societal -- comports with what is
"right" (although, of course, one hopes that the right fortuitously furthers
good -- happy -- outcomes). 265 Deontological morality engenders natural law
from which are discerned natural -- unalienable -- rights. Because, as earlier
discussed, modern social orders enforce natural law and resulting natural
rights through positive law, that positive law must be moral which, in turn,
means that it may only promote the "greater" or "common" good in ways
consistent with what is right. The good does not trump the right; instead,
what is right dominates what is good. Accordingly, natural law, subservient
to morality, cannot derive natural rights that foster the good above the
right. 266
263. Id. at 531 (footnote omitted).
264. As noted in Part I of this article, the consequentialist error presumes that morality is
humanly created rather than a priori, transcendent and immutable; and, therefore, further
mistakenly presumes that rights are malleable, capable of reformulation to promote not a
priori, immutable moral duties, but rather, the selfish preferences of those in power, often
sincerely purported to foster the "greater good." See generally, Originalism and Deontology,
supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, d.
265. Id. at Section 2. Section 3 proposes that the moral philosophy of Enlightenment
philosopher Immanuel Kant best describes the rudimentary workings of deontological
morality.
266. See, infra notes 210-79 and accompanying text; see also Originalism and Deontology,
supra note 7, at Sections 2-a-cl.
For instance, to borrow one of Prof. Cary's examples, assuming that such is the correct
meaning, excluding slander from First Amendment protection does not narrow the
"unalienable right" of "free speech" for the public good. Rather, "free speech" never included
a right to commit slander even though slander technically is defamation arising from spoken
words. The natural right of speech does not per se immunize anything and everything that
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Indeed, as has just been demonstrated and of great importance to this
writing's concept of Deontological Originalism, the Founders accepted the
Enlightenment principle of natural law -- not simply the subset "natural
right," but rather, natural law in its entirety -- as a moral force, constraining
positive law, and generating discrete natural rights each of which inure not to
greater society, but to all persons individually. Natural rights must accord
with and enforce deontological morality not because they are a special
subclass of natural law concerned with morality, but because, as part of the
realm of natural law, natural rights must abide by natural law's greatest
requisite that, as earlier quoted from Prof. LeDuc, "natural law asserts that
law is based upon, derived from, and legitimated by the requirements of
morality that are themselves conceived as instrumental for securing or
enhancing human flourishing." 267
Thus, the Declaration affirms, "We hold these Truths to be self-evident,
that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their CREATOR
with certain unalienable Rights, ... "268 There is no mention of either
Humankind's society, or Humankind's capacity to form societies. Rather,
the Founders accented with capitalization the singular importance of the
designated noun "Men." 269 It is only later in the document that the Founders
addressed social orders: "That to secure these Rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed, ... ,270 According to the text, "unalienable Rights" belong to
individuals, who bring those rights with them into Society. True, the
Declaration further states that the people may establish new, "Government
... on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." 27 1 But, as earlier
explained, that discretion cannot be exercised in abrogation of "unalienable
Rights" for such is the very definition of tyranny. 272 Therefore, however it
is exercised for the purported greater good, positive law can neither distort
happens to be spoken, thus in need of natural law abridging due to overreach, any more than
the natural right to liberty ever included the liberty to commit homicide or the natural right
designated "the pursuit of happiness" ever meant that anyone freely and without consequence
may do anything, at any time, in any place, to any person.
267. LeDuc, supra note 215, at 289. Pojanowski & Walsh, supra note 133, at 18-19 (quoting
JOHN FINNis, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 351 (2d ed. 2011)). See, supra notes 210-
44 and accompanying text (natural law is premised upon and enforces moral requisites).
268. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
269. See, supra note 33.
270. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
271. Id.
272. See, supra notes 116-25.
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nor ignore natural law's moral mandate by revoking the moral imperatives of
natural rights.2 73
Importantly, as shortly detailed, the Founders exhorted successive
generations not to follow blindly the Founders' precepts, but rather to seek
and, if found, apply a greater understanding of moral and other relevant
principles than the Founders themselves knew.274 Accordingly, even if Prof.
Cary's analysis correctly describes the sentiments of some, most, or even all
of the Founders, those sentiments have been nullified by our better
understanding of the morality inherent in natural law and specifically
enforced by natural rights -- the morality described by Deontological
Originalism.
In fact, Prof. Carey admits as much by explicating his theory with a most
revealing codicil,
The major safeguard against arbitrariness with regard to the regulation of
rights was due process, which was established by positive laws and which
also conformed with the natural law. ... In keeping with its purpose, the
theory underlying the arguments of the Declaration does not in any way
enshrine individual rights in the sense they are generally understood
today. It may be inferred that the drafters accepted the natural law's
mandate for due process that would serve to curb arbitrary and
capricious government.275
Carey is correct that, pursuant to consistent constitutional law, the
preservation of rights in American law stems from and, in fact, is completely
bounded by the due process clauses of the Constitution and that "natural
law's mandate for due process ... curb[s] arbitrary and capricious
government." 2 76  Perhaps unknowingly, Carey has fully adopted the
principles of Deontological Originalism. Although he claims that, "In
273. True, one can find instances where, for instance, some among the Founders urged that
rights and their moral imperatives must give way to a sufficiently grave threat to national peace
and security. "Thomas Jefferson, for instance, opined, "[t]o lose our country by a scrupulous
adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all
those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means." Bayer,
supra note 17, at 291 note 12 (quoting, Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept.
20, 1810), in l IThe Works of Thomas Jefferson, 146 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., Fed. ed. 1905)).
Assuming Jefferson's reference to "written law" subsumes natural rights as well as positive
law, the short but apt retort is: Jefferson was wrong, as my article referenced supra at note 17
strives to prove.
274. See, infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
275. Carey, supra note 22, at 60, 64-65 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
276. See infra 600-10 and accompanying text.
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keeping with its purpose, the theory underlying the arguments of the
Declaration does not in any way enshrine individual rights in the sense they
are generally understood today", Carey nonetheless admits in the very same
paragraph that the Framers intended constitutional due process to proscribe
"arbitrary and capricious government." Proscribing "arbitrary and capricious
government" is exactly what "due process of law" rightly has come to
mean.277 Because "arbitrary and capricious" is a moral determination,27 8
resolving any given due process issue cannot be based on the concept of
virtue -- happiness -- that Carey, Campbell and Charles say undergirded the
original meaning of the Declaration. Rather, for keep faith with the
Founders, we must understand "unalienable Rights" in fact to be
"unalienable" -- not modiflable for the "greater good" even if believed to
advance civic "virtue " -- regardless whether the Founders and the
Reconstruction Congress would have agreed. Indeed, given what the
Founders saw as their Divine origin, it is worth recalling Prof. Sherry's stark
but apt admonition that lawmakers and nation builders "could no more
rewrite these laws of nature than they could the laws of physics."279
Therefore, natural rights emanating from natural law, which is given as a gift
to Humanity from a generous and compassionate deity or force of Nature,
cannot be amended and altered for the purported "public good," because to
do so would be to impugn the perfection that is inherent in Nature or Divinity.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Sherry, supra note 164, at 1132; see also, e.g., Jerry E. Norton, Liberty: A Human
Right, or a Citizen Right, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 565, 566 (2005) (quoting Sherry). As one
commentator explained:
Furthermore, the notion of fundamental rights (rights that could never be delegated
or relinquished, even voluntarily) also impacted American thought about
constitutionalism. Fundamental rights were inalienably bestowed upon humanity by
God and were rights "which no creature can give, or hath a right to take away."
Legislators could "no more rewrite these laws of nature than they could the laws of
physics." Thus, natural rights were conceived of as possessing the same law-like
status, and by implication as having a similarly compelling "scientific" style of
justification, as the laws governing the behaviour of physical bodies. To these
concepts, the Founding Fathers added a third idea: "the constitution as a charter or
form of government."
James Lanshe, Morality and the Rule of Law in American Jurisprudence, 11 RUTGERS' J. OF
L. & RELIGION 1, 12 (2009) (quoting Sherry at 1130, 1132).
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C. Like Good "Parents, " The Framers Hoped and Expected their
Descendants to Do Better --
At this juncture, it is necessary to reiterate an important touchstone
stressed by the Supreme Court:
The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own times.
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom
in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future generations a
charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its
meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's
central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must
be addressed.280
The Court correctly gleaned the intent of the Founders who, as I
accented nearly a decade ago,
knew that their noble motives were entwined with their "love of fame,"
personal ambition and vanity. They also recognized that, due to their
frailty and imperfect wisdom, their political-moral philosophy was neither
complete nor correct in all regards. Consequently, ... we must take the
Founders' expression ... not to be the last word, but instead as part of
ongoing deliberation of that subject. Like the Constitution, we may
appreciate the Declaration not only in its own context, but as the
wellspring of principles, understood profoundly, yet only partially by the
Founders. Indeed, they hoped that subsequent generations would attain
an ever-fuller understanding, even if elucidation invalidated customs and
beliefs that they either did not recognize as immoral or so recognized but
280. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598 (states must treat same-sex marriages the same as
opposite-sex marriages). A decade earlier, the Court likewise admonished,
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or
the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-579 (2003) (states may not criminalize acts of
homosexual intercourse performed in private by consenting adults).
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nonetheless, for political, pragmatic or other purportedly appropriate
reasons, refused to abandon. 281
Perhaps most significantly, James Madison, frequently denoted the
"father of the Constitution," 282 stressed that, "the leaders of the revolution . .
. pursued a new and . . . noble course. . . . They reared the fabrics of
governments which have no model on the face of the globe. They formed the
design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to
improve and perpetuate."2 83 A bit earlier in that essay, Madison expressed
the sentiment as a rhetorical question:
Is it not the glory of the people of America, that whilst they have paid a
decent regard to the opinions of former times and other nations, they have
not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for custom, or for names, to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowledge of their
own situation, and the lessons of their own experience? 284
281. Bayer, supra note 17, at 343 (quoting PAUL A. RAHE, FAME, FOUNDERS, AND THE IDEA
OF FOUNDING IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, IN THE NOBLEST MINDS 25 (Peter McNamara ed.,
Rowman & Littlefield Pubs., Inc. 1999)).
282. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 n.7 (1997)
(citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193, n.9 (1994)); Board of Trustees
of U. of Ill. v. United States, 20 C.C.P.A. 134, 147 (U.S. Ct. Cust. & Pat. App. 1932).
283. THE FEDERALISTNo. 14,88-89 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan Univ.
Press 1961) (emphasis added). As one leading scholar explained, "This passage is especially
noteworthy because it completes the first major section of The Federalist." Akhil Reed Amar,
Architexture, 77 IND. L. J. 671, 673 n.13 (2002). Likewise finding The Federalist No. 14
significant, respected constitutional jurisprudent Sanford Levinson called Madison's
sentiment, "my favorite passage in all of the Federalist Papers," and castigates "us today," the
scholars and officials "who have not learned that all-important lesson from the generation of
the Founders." Sanford Levinson, Reconsidering the Modern Hanoverian Kings, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 63, 70 (2013).
For whatever it is worth, I agree. Despite the clear lesson the influential Madison
expressed for himself and his colleagues, a Westlaw search conducted on August 17, 2018,
revealed that only I and Profs. Levinson and Amar have quoted in any law review articles that
portion of The Federalist No. 14. More distressingly, it has not been referenced by any
American court, federal or state.
284. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, supra note 283, at 88. Unlike his bold assertion that the
Founders, "formed the design of a great Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their
successors to improve and perpetuate," Madison's less demanding and less radical observation
that Americans, "have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity" enjoys a bit more citation,
thirty-five articles as of my Westlaw search, February 27, 2018, (although many of them are
Levinson's, Amar's and mine), but again, no judicial opinions reference Federalist No. 14.
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Indeed, shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration,
Madison wrote to Jefferson, "And I indulge a confidence that sufficient
evidence will find its way to another generation, to ensure, after we are gone,
whatever of justice may be withheld whilst we are here." 285 In a like vein,
employing his characteristically abrupt, self-assured style, Jefferson ridiculed
the notion that, "one generation of men has the right to bind another," bluntly
concluding, "but that between society and society, or generation and
generation there is no municipal obligation, no umpire but the law of
nature."286 Surely Jefferson, who valued imagination and intellectualism,
expected future theorists, free from the "bind" of past generations, to improve
upon the Founders' understanding of "the law of nature," for he certainly
would have scant patience for intellectual lethargy.
Present at the drafting of both the Constitution and the Declaration,
future associate justice of the Supreme Court James Wilson similarly hoped
that the Founders' descendants would come to appreciate the transcendent
principles of governance more profoundly than did the Founders themselves.
Morals are undoubtedly capable of being carried to a much higher degree
of excellence than the sciences, excellent as they are. Hence we may
infer, that the law of nature, though immutable in its principles, will be
progressive in its operations and effects. . . . In every period of his
existence, the law, which the divine wisdom has approved for man, will
not only be fitted, to the contemporary degree, but will be calculated to
produce, in future, a still higher degree of perfection. 2 87
These testimonies, while entirely obvious, are compellingly important.
They are obvious because, to borrow Justice Wilson's phrasing, believing in
"the law of nature, ... immutable in its principles," the Founders could neither
ethically expect nor honorably hope that their successors would simply
mimic their moral precepts. Rather, they had to trust that their inheritors
would continue Humanity's pursuit of moral truth regardless whether
discerning ever more exact deontological canons would supplant doctrines
285. John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria's Vision: The Enlightenment, America's Death
Penalty, and the Abolition Movement, 4 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y. 195, 321 n.906 (2009)
(quoting LETTER FROM JAMES MADISON TO THOMAS JEFFERSON (Feb. 24, 1826)).
286. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 1 THE REPUBLIC
OF LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JAMES MADISON 1776-
1826, 631-32 (James Morton Smith ed., 1995) (emphasis added).
287. Bessler, supra note 285, at 321 n.907 (quoting James Wilson, Of the Law of Nature,
in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 525 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds.,
2007)).
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favored by the Founders and their compatriots. That is why, as we will
shortly discover, in perfect compliance with their original intent,
Deontological Originalism can, indeed must, understand and enforce the
Constitution by improving the Founders' Enlightenment moral philosophy to
encompass Kantian morality.
IV. THE DEONTOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RECONSTRUCTION
AMENDMENTS.
A. The Reconstruction Congress Completed the Unfinished Constitution of
the Founders --
This writing's preceding sections accent that the Founders promised in
the Declaration a nation governed by the principles of natural rights, a
promise they fulfilled partially by replacing the Articles of Confederation
with the United States Constitution.28 8 Never before had any nation builders
attempted to codify and obtain popular ratification of289 the very structure of
a nation's government through a single formative, controlling document
conceived to constrain that government's power by requiring mandatory
obedience to the "unalienable Rights" "endowed" upon Humankind from
"Nature and Nature's God."290 The remarkable uniqueness of the
288. See, supra Section 2, notes 17-209 and accompanying text.
289. As Justice Clarence Thomas, among many others, has admired,
In order to protect against government tyranny, yet at the same time create a
government based on consent, the framers of our Constitution engaged in an
unprecedented exercise in popular lawmaking. Rising above ordinary politics, the
framers of our Constitution toiled for months in the summer heat of Philadelphia, not
to establish a government, but to draft a proposal for government, which they then
submitted for consideration to the people, who met through their representatives in
state ratifying conventions specially convened for the purpose of deliberating on the
proposed form of government. Our Federal Constitution was adopted only after an
elevated process of popular lawmaking: A constitutional convention called for the
explicit purpose of amending the existing Articles of Confederation; submission of
the proposed constitution to the people for ratification; and ultimate ratification by a
super-majority of the people, meeting in state ratifying conventions.
Remarks of the Honorable Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, Why Federalism Matters, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 232-33 (2000).
290. The Framers, "demonstrated the value of checks and balances on power with their
unprecedented federal constitution." David C. Hendrickson, International Law and Universal
Empire: A View from the Eighteenth Century, 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 307, 307 (2005)
(citing, DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING
(2003)). Likewise, a recent law review note accented, "In establishing the federal
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Constitution, then, is vouchsafing not simply liberty, but morality itself even
at the cost of optimal governmental efficiency and efficacy, and, as I have
argued elsewhere, even at the cost of jeopardizing the very security of the
Nation. 29 1 As the late federal appellate judge Stephen Reinhardt succinctly
underscored, "The Constitution is an unprecedented achievement." 29 2
However, despite their "unprecedented" Constitution of 1787 and its
Bill of Rights added in 1791, the Founders failed to fulfill the promise of
moral governance in two significant regards. Both aspects oftheir unfulfilled
promise arose from the Founders' unwillingness to enforce fully the natural
rights principles of the Declaration into the original Constitution. First, the
Founders permitted slavery to continue as a lawful institution although the
immorality of that practice was widely acknowledged.293 Second, to augment
the recently ratified Constitution, the Framers proposed and promoted the
Bill of Rights enumerating many of the "unalienable Rights" alluded to in the
Declaration, including what we will learn is the "value monism" 294 of natural
rights, "due process of law." 295 As initially ratified, however, the Bill of
Rights addressed and constrained only the conduct of the Federal
Government, and, thus, by its own force, was inapplicable to both the States
and their respective local governments. In this way, the Declaration's
assertion that Government must abide by and enforce "unalienable Rights"
originally was not constitutionally mandated against the States through the
Bill of Rights.296 Such was the original Framers' second broken promise, a
serious deficiency that the Reconstruction Congress rectified through what
government, the Founders had no real precedent or experience to guide their actions. The
United States Constitution established a unique form of government." John Rogers, The
Defense of Marriage Act (Doma) and California's Struggle with Same-Sex Marriage, 23
REGENT L. REV. 97, 106 (2011) (note) (citing, JOSEPH J. ELLIS, FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE
REVOLUTION GENERATION 6-11 (2000)).
291. See, Bayer, supra note 17 (explaining why moral obedience under the Constitution
must dominate even the most urgent concerns of national security and preservation of society).
292. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Life to Death: Our Constitution and How It Grows, 44 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 391, 411 (2010).
293. E.g., Britney Beal-Elder, Meaning and Development Behind American Law, Law in
America: A Short History. By Lawrence M Friedman, 80 DENv. U. L. REv. 717, [text and
notes 12-23, no page numbers] (2003) (book review discussing how custom and economics
prompted the colonial tolerance, indeed support of slavery despite its immorality)
294. As explained in Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-h, value
monism denotes the single prime or paradigmatic concept that unifies a body of theory and
from which sub-tenets arise.
295. See, infra notes 521-98 and accompanying text.
296. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-50 (1833).
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are often referred to as the Reconstruction Amendments, 297 specifically, the
Thirteenth Amendment proscribing "slavery and involuntary servitude," 2 9 8
the Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting racial discrimination in voting, 29 9 and
most particularly, the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription that states and
localities may not violate "due process of law.""oo As part of its justification,
the Reconstruction Congress expressly referenced the Declaration 301 as the
pivotal source for those hugely significant amendments. 302
297. "The Amendment[s] grew out of investigations into the conditions in the South in the
aftermath of the Civil War." Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and The Fourteenth Amendment:
Into the Black Hole of Constitutional Law, 89 Cun-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1049 (2014).
298. "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (1866).
299. "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV (1870).
300. That amendment reads in pertinent part, "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 1 (1868).
301. See supra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
302. Noted constitutional scholar Akhil Reed Amar, among many others, "sees the
Reconstruction Amendments ... as a fundamental alteration of the original Constitution,
something that eliminated the fatal vices of the original Constitution and propelled the modem
nation toward its more egalitarian, populist, democratic character." Symposium on America's
Constitution: A Biography, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 31, 34 (2008) (remarks of Prof. William M.
Wiecek discussing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY).
Accordingly, it is hardly overstatement to urge that, "The Reconstruction Amendments are the
most important amendments to the U.S. Constitution since the Bill of Rights of 1791.... The
Reconstruction Amendments were the expression of the greatest struggle of the American
people since the founding to remember and recover the narrative thread of their story of
themselves as a people constituted by their revolutionary constitutionalism." Kenneth S.
Tollett, Sr., The Fate of Minority-Based Institutions After Fordice: An Essay, 13 REV. LITIG.
447, 485 (1994) (quoting, DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 17 (1993)); see also,
e.g., Mehrdad Payandeh, Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to the United
States Constitution, 25 BYU J. PuB. L. 87, 88 (2011) ("The Civil War resulted in the
Reconstruction Amendments, arguably the most important transformation of U.S.
constitutional law in the nineteenth century.).
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There was some hope,303 quixotic as it turned out," that from the death
and devastation of the Civil War straightaway would arise a more just Nation
whose citizens, if not in harmony, at least in civility would work together to
heal their wounds and better their lives, especially those of the newly freed
slaves. Yet, we all recall from high school and college history classes that
the immediate post-Bellum years known as "Reconstruction"30 5 were marked
by renewed violence, unalloyed bigotry, bitterness in all quarters, and
resistance to change.306 As Prof. Finkelman explained,
To the great shock of northerners, defeated Confederates did not simply
lay down their arms, accept the end of slavery, and move forward towards
reconstructing the former Confederate states on a biracial and egalitarian
basis. Instead, the nation witnessed massive violence in the South
directed at blacks, U.S. army soldiers, white southern unionists, and
northern whites who had moved to the South after the War. Newly elected
303. "Immediately after the Civil War, there seemed to be a glimmer of hope that African
Americans would enjoy the fruits of liberalism and escape the burdens of racism." Michael
W. Combs and Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: A Cultural,
Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective, 47 How. L. J. 627, 635 (2004).
304. Id. ("But the political gains of African Americans were not widespread, ... "); see also,
e.g., David L. Abney, Constitutional Interpretation: Moving towards a Jurisprudence of
Common Sense, 67 TEMPLE L. REV. 931, 942 note 53 (1994) ("The hopes of African
Americans were only briefly fulfilled after the Civil War.").
305. Julie M. Spanbauer, Kimel and Garrett: Another Example of the Court Undervaluing
Individual Sovereignty and Settled Expectations, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 793 note 34 (2003)
(quoting, GARY A. DONALDSON, THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN
CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, V. (2000)):
The period immediately following the Civil War until as late as 1877, is known as
the First Reconstruction:
"It was a plan designed by the federal government to bring the defeated South back
into the Union, and through legislation, manage and regulate race relations in the Old
Confederacy. Instead, Reconstruction became the basis of a social upheaval and a
national political realignment, aspects of which could still be felt in the social and
political fiber of the nation well into the second half of the next century. For the
newly freed slaves, supposedly a primary benefactor of federal legislation in this
period, post-Civil War Reconstruction was a dismal failure."
306. Tom 1. Romero II, Wringing Rights Out of the Mountains: Colorado's Centennial
Constitution and the Ambivalent Promise of Human Rights and Social Equality, 69 ALB. L.
REV. 569, 569 note 3 (2006) (discussing, ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1988):
The period following the Civil War, known as Reconstruction, is perhaps one of the
most contentious and troublesome eras in American history. As federal
administrative, political, and military forces attempted to reshape Southern society
while bringing its citizenry back into the national fold, Southern "redeemers" resisted
at almost every turn, and in often violent and extralegal ways, thwarted efforts to
reconstruct Southern society along more egalitarian and industrial lines.
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southern state legislatures passed numerous laws, collectively known as
black codes, which were designed prevent black political activity and
economic success. Across the defeated Confederacy new local and state
governments and white terrorists did everything they could to reverse the
outcome of the Civil War.307
It soon was apparent that nothing but significant Federal intervention
would refurbish a society and culture that extolled the principles of the
Declaration but had allowed slavery and similar affronts against natural rights
to flourish. As is customarily American, those changes took the form of
law,30 s a series of Congressional civil rights acts plus the Reconstruction
Amendments. While Prof. Robert A. Burt's conclusion is true that, "the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were the fulfillment of the
generalized promise of the American Revolution,"o30  those words do not
convey fully the profundity and impact of the Reconstruction Amendments
on American governmental and legal philosophy. Indeed, many historians
and legal scholars agree that the Amendments amount figuratively to a
second American revolution,31 0 or, put a bit more mildly, achieved a
fundamental re-shifting of governmental power from allowing the States to
307. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1049 (footnotes omitted; reviewing, WILLIAM E.
NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
(1988)).
308. Early observer of American morays Alexis De Toqueville famously remarked in his
highly-regarded book, DEMCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., George
Lawrence trans., 1966) (1835) (as quoted in Paul E. McGreal, Review Essay of Louis Michael
Seidman & Mark V. Tushnet, Remnants ofBelief Contemporary Constitutional Issues, 30 IND.
L. REv. 693, 702 (1997)),
There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later
turn into a judicial one. Consequently the language of everyday party-political
controversy has to be borrowed from legal phraseology and conceptions. As most
public men are or have been lawyers, they apply their legal habits and turn of mind
to the conduct of affairs. Juries make all classes familiar with this. So legal language
is pretty well adopted into common speech; the spirit of the law, born within schools
and courts, spreads little by little beyond them; it infiltrates through society right
down to the lowest ranks, till finally the whole people have contracted some of the
ways and tastes of a magistrate.
309. Robert A. Burt, Overruling Dred Scott: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 WIDENER
L. J. 73, 78 (2007).
310. "When the North won the Civil War, a second American Revolution succeeded."
Christian C. Day, Resisting Serfdom: Making the Market Work in a Great Republic, 25 IND.
L. REV. 799, 818 note 83 (1991) (citing, JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOL AND THE
SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1990)); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton
Helper's Book, The Impending Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning
ofthe First Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1113, 1172 (1993)).
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abide by the principles of the Declaration at their respective discretions, to
designating the Federal Government supreme enforcer against state and local
governments infringements of that document's "unalienable Rights"
precepts.311  As enforcer of the Reconstruction Amendments,31 2 thus the
highest arbiter of "due process of law," the Federal Government gained what
it lacked under the original Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the authority
to superintend the States' compliance with the primary stricture of
government: protection of the "unalienable Rights" recognized in the
Declaration and enforced by the Constitution. Prof. Christian C. Day
explained, "The states' rights, antifederalist, Southern vision of the republic
was defeated. The new union was stronger and more centralized. Political
and economic power gravitated toward the federal government never to
return to the states or the people. Federal power was employed to enfranchise
and liberate the former slaves." 1 In the words of Senator Jacob Howard
when introducing a revised draft of what would become the Fourteenth
Amendment's section 1, "The great object of th[e] amendment[s] is,
therefore, to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to
respect these great fundamental guarantees."314
It is important to stress that, while the changes wrought were
deliberately massive, the Reconstruction Congress did not seek to utterly
upend the Constitutional system. Whether out of respect for the founding
theory, in light of pragmatic politics, or likely both, as Historian Michael Les
311. Prof. Amar offered additional and complimentary explanations. Reconstruction
shifted the Bill of Rights' from its original emphasis which sought to promote majoritarian
forces by, inter alia, deploying States as bulwarks against federal tyranny, particularly
prosecuting federal officials for misuse of their federal offices for their own personal
enrichment. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS-CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, Xiii
(Yale U. Press 1998). As originally understood, the Bill of Rights strove,
To minimize such self-dealing ... [by] protect[ing] the ability of local governments
to monitor and deter federal abuse, ensure that ordinary citizens would participate in
the federal administration of justice through various jury provisions, and preserved
the transcendent sovereign right of the majority of the people themselves to alter or
abolish government and thereby pronounce the last word on constitutional questions.
Id.
312. Congress is authorized to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's anti-slavery mandate,
the Fifteenth Amendment's proscription against racial discrimination in voting, and the
entirety of the Fourteenth Amendment including its requirement that States abide by the
strictures of "due process" and "equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, sec.
2 (1866); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, sec. 5 (1868); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, sec. 2 (1870).
But, of course, any such congressional enforcement is itself subject to judicial review under
the Bill of Rights, particularly the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
313. Day, supra note 310, at 818.
314. 39th Cong. Globe, 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (Remarks of Senator Howard, R. Mich).
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Benedict explained, Congress strove to cure the infirmities of the antebellum
system within familiar Federalism thereby preserving the States as
meaningful political entities regarding property, contract, criminal, and
similar legal genres traditionally within their domain."' In sum, "If the Civil
War was the second American Revolution, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments gave birth to a transformed Constitution and Bill of Rights."3 16
While, as Prof. Benedict cautioned, basic Federalism remained, States could
no longer ignore with impunity their natural law duties described in the
Declaration because, under the Fourteenth Amendment, America at last
attained what the Framers should have established seventy-five years earlier:
the administration of natural rights codified under a Bill of Rights or its
equivalent, applicable to all governmental levels including States and
localities, but ultimately enforced by the Federal Government.
315. Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections
on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108
YALE L.J. 2011, 2030 (1999) (symposium edition; footnote omitted):
No historian familiar with the legal position of African Americans before the Civil
War can deny that Reconstruction radically altered it. And giving the federal
government the power to intervene to protect civil and political rights where the state
infringed them, or possibly when it failed to assure them, would have worked a
fundamental change in the federal system. But the fact is that Republicans agonized
over the choices they had to make between preserving federalism and protecting black
rights. Faced with the choice, they opted to protect rights, but they did so in such a
way as to preserve as much as possible of the traditional, state-centered system.
Refusing to transfer primary responsibility for ordinary protection of the law from the
states to the federal government, they mandated essentially that such protection be
provided by the states equally, regardless of race.
316. Curtis, supra note 310, at 1172. By contrast, historian Herman Belz has "argu[ed] that
the Civil War established the continuity of the first revolution rather than displacing the first
revolution." Andrew W. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed Citizen
Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. L. REV. 709,
726 note 93 (1999) (discussing, Herman Belz, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND
EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA 1-15 (1998)). Both propositions, I think, are true,
therefore the revolution imagery is apt Certainly, as this article accents, the Reconstruction
Amendments continued the original Revolution by compelling the States, under federal
oversight, to abide by "due process of law." However, to accomplish that, the former
sovereignty of states had to be substantially reduced by bringing States under the direct natural
rights command of the Constitution, with compliance not left to the self-enforced integrity of
the States themselves, but now to the federal level. In that regard, the continuation of the
American Revolution required, in essence, a governmental restructuring that amounted to a
second revolution.
And, of course, the terrible Civil War itself was a revolution that justly failed for the
South but promoted a shifting of powers from the States to the central government that can be
called nothing less that revolutionary.
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1. The Framers of the Reconstruction Amendments Embraced the
Deontology of the Constitution's Original Framers --
Asjust emphasized, the Reconstruction Congress fulfilled the Founders'
fundamental promises by instilling into the Civil War Amendments the
deontological moral principles of natural law that the Founders memorialized
in the Declaration and codified into the Constitution as purely federal
mandates. Therefore, Prof. Kmiec properly concluded, "[T]he founding
generation of the original Constitution and the one existent in 1868, at the
time of the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment, could not envision us
individually or collectively answering ... questions [concerning
'controversial implied rights'] ... without reference to natural law."317 In
particular, the Reconstruction Congress understood and embraced the
principle that, as earlier discussed, "The Declaration of Independence was
the promise; the Constitution was the fulfillment."318 Thus, constitutional
expert Alexander Tsesis determined, "The Abolitionists' sentiments were
shared by many in Congress, who understood the Reconstruction
317. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 385 (bracketed quote at 383). No commentator should be
unmindful of Prof. Finkelman's admonition, applicable to all similar analyses, but a particular
pitfall of Fourteenth Amendment inquiries:
Lawyers and judges have often used -- or more likely misused -- history to reach a.
certain conclusion without any regard for nuance, complexity, or even the very real
possibility that there is no certainty about the intentions of those who wrote the
Amendment. Those who think that history will offer them a Rosetta Stone to
understand the Fourteenth Amendment are unlikely to be successful in their quest.
Some scholars and lawyers have sought a "true" and certain original meaning of the
Amendment, often with a self-conscious political agenda to undermine integration,
affirmative action, and even substantive racial fairness. ... [Rather,] research shows
the complexity of the debates and the impossibility of answering many of the modem
questions that swirl around the Fourteenth Amendment."
Finkelman, supra note 297, at 128 (footnotes omitted).
Aware of Finkelman's meaningful warning, I still join researchers who have concluded
that, as with the history of the Declaration's adoption in 1776, the frequency and intensity of
contemporaneous statements of the pivotal actors, coupled with the thoughtful commentaries
of knowledgeable scholars, provide a reliable basis to aver that, like the Founders, the
Reconstruction Congress believed in and sought to enforce the Declaration's principles of
"unalienable Rights." (Indeed, to respect Prof. Finkelman's caution, this article's length
results from compiling primary and secondary sources to convince readers that any assertions
herein are supported.)
318. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1031 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Chief Justice Warren Burger as quoted by Charles Alan Wright, Warren Burger: A Young
Friend Remembers, 74 TEx. L. REv. 213, 219 (1995)).
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Amendments to incorporate the Declaration's fundamental principle of equal
inalienable rights."319 Prof. Kimiec identically surmised,
Overall, the founders established a written Constitution as law that was to
be informed by natural law embodied in the Declaration. The founding
generations of 1787 and 1868 had no intention of displacing the
fundamental natural-law principles in the Declaration or the
understanding of human nature reflected in the common law tradition that
preceded the ratification of the Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 20
Equally, the highly-regarded scholar Frank Michelman recently wrote,
"In the 38th and 39th Congresses, numerous members made reference to the
Declaration-text as a guide to the work of preparing constitutional
amendments for submission to the states. Members might go so far as to say
or imply that the amendments were designed to fulfill a pledge or carry out a
project ofjustice set going by the Declaration."3 2 ' Two decades earlier, Dean
Robert G. Reinstein likewise accented, "The consistency of the references to
and reliance upon the Declaration ... is remarkable. ... What is perhaps more
remarkable than the number of Republicans in both houses who expressed
one or both of these propositions is the singular fact that not one Republican
member denied, disputed or questioned either proposition." 3 2 2
Again, primary sources verify the conclusions of researchers.
Massachusetts's fiery, influential Sen. Charles Sumner3 23 unequivocally
319. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 392 ("Republican leaders, especially those in the Radical
Republican camp, believed the Declaration 'must be heeded,' having been 'whispered into the
ears of this nation since first we pronounced life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to be the
inalienable rights of all men"'); Id. at 394 (quoting Rep. James F. Wilson (R. Iowa) CONG.
GLOBE, 38TH CONG., Ist Sess. 1202 (1864)).
320. Kmiec, supra note 25, at 399, n.71 (arguing positivism jurisprudentially flawed
because it detaches legal rules from historical and political background).
321. Frank 1. Michelman, The Ghost of The Declaration Present: The Legal Force of the
Declaration ofIndependence Regarding Acts of Congress, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 575, 589 (2016)
(citing Tsesis, supra note 24, at 392-97); see also, Daniel Farber, Historical Versus Iconic
Meaning: The Declaration, the Constitution, and the Interpreter's Dilemma, 89 S. CAL. L.
REV. 457, 467 (2016).
322. Robert G. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence,
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 361, 388-89 (1993).
323. Charles Sumner, W1KIPEDIA (2017), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CharlesSumner
(last visited Jul 23, 2017):
Charles Sumner was an American politician and United States Senator from
Massachusetts. As an academic lawyer and a powerful orator, Sumner was the leader
of the anti-slavery forces in Massachusetts and a leader of the Radical Republicans
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asserted, "First comes the Declaration of Independence, the illuminated
initial letter of our history .... Here is the national heart, the national soul, the
national will, the national voice, which must inspire our interpretation of the
Constitution, and enter into and diffuse itself through all the national
legislation." 324  Of great significance, Sumner extolled the overriding
importance of the Declaration, averring that without it, there would be no
meaningful Constitution. "[T]he Declaration has a supremacy grander than
that of the Constitution, more sacred and inviolable, for it gives the law to the
Constitution itself." 3 25  As Prof. Trapp explained, "For Sumner, the
Constitution merely 'supplied the machinery' whereby the 'great rights' of
the Declaration were 'maintained."'
3 26
It followed logically that the Constitution can only be understood in
light of the meaning of the Declaration. In Sen. Sumner's words:
Sir, I insist that the Constitution must be interpreted by the Declaration.
I insist that the Declaration is of equal and coordinate authority with the
Constitution itself I know, sir, the ground on which I stand. I need no
volume of law, no dog eared book, no cases to sustain me.... And now,
in the U.S. Senate during the American Civil War working to destroy the
Confederacy, free all the slaves, and keep on good terms with Europe. During
Reconstruction, he fought to minimize the power of the ex-Confederates and
guarantee equal rights to the freedmen.
Sumner is equally renown for being "caned" in the Senate Chamber by Rep. Preston Brooks
(D. S. Car.) on May 22, 1856. Brooks became incensed by Sumner's May 19th speech in
favor of admitting Kansas as a "free state," wherein the often-acerbic abolitionist described
Sen. Stephen Douglas (D. 11.) as a "noise-some, squat, and nameless animal ... not a proper
model for an American senator." A second the prime trigger for Rep. Brook's attack was
Sumner's further diatribe against Brook's home-state legislative colleague, Sen. Andrew
Butler (D. S. Car.). Sumner pronounced that Butler had taken "a mistress ... who, though
ugly to others, is always lovely to him; though polluted in the sight of the world, is chaste in
his sight ... I mean, the harlot, Slavery."). The Caning of Senator Charles Sumner,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/
TheCaningof SenatorCharles Sumner.htm (last visited Jul 23, 2017) (citing DAVID
HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1970); DAVID M.
POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861(1976)).
In the words of the clich6, the beating left Sumner literally "bloodied but unbowed"
as, after a period of convalescence, he continued his successful career in the Senate. His
assailant was not so fortunate. "Surviving a House censure resolution, Brooks resigned, was
immediately reelected, and soon thereafter died at age 37." Id.
324. Sandefur, supra note 23, at 508 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 36TH CONG., 1st Sess. 2602
(1860))
325. Trapp, supra note 63, at 840 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 2d Sess. 825 (1860))
326. Id. (quoting, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 611 (Alfred Avins, ed.,
1967)).
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sir, I am prepared to insist that, whenever you are considering the
Constitution, so far as it concerns human rights, you must bring it always
to that great touch-stone; the two must go together, and the Constitution
can never be interpreted in any way inconsistent with the Declaration.
Show me any words in the Constitution applicable to human rights, and I
invoke at once the great truths of the Declaration as the absolute guide in
determining their meaning. 327
Identically, "Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire called on his
fellow citizens to 'wake up to the meaning of the sublime truths' that the
nation's 'fathers uttered years ago and which have slumbered dead letters
upon the pages of our Constitution, of our Declaration ofIndependence, and
of our history."' 328 Invoking the Declaration, Sen. James W. Nye of Nevada
joined his colleagues by noting that Congress has "'necessary and proper"'
authority to "restrain the respective states from infracting" both enumerated
and unenumerated "natural and personal rights."3 29 Likewise suggesting the
Declaration, Michigan's Francis William Kellogg exclaimed that Congress
must see to the enforcement of "rights which are inalienable."330
327. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 597
(Alfred Avins, ed., 1967)).
It is no surprise that this writing emphasizes the participation of Sumner and other
influential "Radical Republican" leaders. Granted, "As modem historians have demonstrated,
the Republican majority in the Thirty-Ninth Congress was dominated not by radicals like
Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner but by a coalition of moderates and conservatives,
many of whom were former Jacksonian Democrats." Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection,
Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REv. 245, 269-70 (1997). Nonetheless,
the Radical Republicans provide not just vivid but compelling analysis of the early post-
Bellum amendments and civil rights laws. Indeed, Rep. Stevens is recognized as then "the
most influential member of the House of Representatives." Bret Boyce, The Magic Mirror of
"Original Meaning": Recent Approaches to the Fourteenth Amendment, 66 ME. L. REV. 29,
43 n.87 (2013).
328. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 392 (emphasis added) (quoting, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., Ist
Sess. 1443 (1864) (statement of Sen. John P. Hale)). Similarly, "'Our ancestors,' asserted
Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri, had paved the way to civil war by hypocritically
preserving their own 'inalienable right of liberty unto all men,' and 'came to refuse it to others'
under the guise of expedience." Id. (quoting, Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1461 (1864)
(statement of Sen. John B. Henderson)).
329. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John
Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329, 433 note 59
(2011) (quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1072 (remarks of Mr. Nye)).
330. Alexander Tsesis, The Problem of Confederate Symbols: A Thirteenth Amendment
Approach, 75 TEMPLE L. REV. 561 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1st Sess. 2954
(1864)).
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2. The Reconstruction Congress Specifically Sought to Rectify the Original
Framers' Two Broken Promises --
Consistent with, indeed arguably compelled by their embrace of the
Declaration as the Constitution's voice and conscience, through their
legislation and proposed constitutional amendments, the Reconstruction
Congress expressly sought to realize the earlier mentioned two fundamental
promises that the original Founders failed to fulfill: (1) the Constitution did
not explicitly prohibit slavery and (2) failing to bring the States under the
umbrella of the natural rights protections emanating from the Bill of Rights.
a. Abolishing Slavery --
That prior to the Thirteenth Amendment, the enslavement of human
beings for profit was not clearly and completely unlawful has always been
considered one of the Framers most coldblooded concessions to the
realpolitik of replacing the feeble Articles of Confederation with a
constitution establishing a viable federal government strong enough to
govern a new and growing nation. As Prof. Amar explained crisply, "The
original Constitution had been tainted by its open compromise with slavery,
"331
Doubtless, "the negotiations (and compromise) which allowed slavery
to continue for a future generation in American constitutional processes were
immoral compromises (as many of the founders agreed at the time) ...
because they continued an inhumane and cruel regime, which affected those
who were not themselves part of the negotiating and compromising." 332
Nonetheless, as ubiquitous school lessons aver, absent those compromises,
the Founders neither would have obtained the Continental Congress'
unanimous assent to adopt the Declaration of Independence, nor would have
secured the Constitution's ratification after the post-Revolution experience
with weak governance under the Articles of Confederation. Thus, the classic
explanation holds that, "Scholars have defended the Founders' willingness to
compromise with slave forces as a necessary choice among evils, with the
greater evil being disunion. Such a disunion would have created a Southern
nation firmly committed to racial slavery and unencumbered by [the]
331. AMAR, supra note 311, at 190.
332. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Variable Morality of Constitutional (and Other)
Compromises: A Comment on Sanford Levinson's Compromise and Constitutionalism, 38
PEPP. L. REv. 903, 906 (2011).
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abolitionist feeling in the North."33 3 If the initial price of attaining a nation
ostensibly dedicated to natural rights was to compromise substantially
morality's most fundamental moral principles, the Founders hoped and
expected that, "[their] revolutionary ideals [would] serve[] as a challenge to
future generations to improve upon the Constitution's flawed commitment to
social justice." 3 34
These historical interpretations surely are interesting and informative,
but, perhaps not as pertinent as they might initially seem regarding the moral
bonafides of America's governing documents. Whatever may have been the
combination of motives and perceptions -- noble, ignoble, or neutral -- that
culminated in the Declaration, the original Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, 335 the Founders did verify as morally binding the philosophical
principles of good and right governance in the Declaration's explicit text. 6
The Declaration establishes the correct rules even if the original
Constitution's Framers, for good or bad reasons, appallingly cheated in
1787 and 1791. Accordingly, while during the Civil War, Representative
William B. Kelley of Pennsylvania rightly stated, "the founders had
333. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1283, 1311 (2000) (footnote omitted).
334. Hon. Stephen Reinhardt, The Role ofSocial Justice in Judging Cases, I U. ST. THOMAS
L. J. 18, 21 (2003); Jason A. Adkins, Lincoln's Constitution Revisited, 39 N. KY. L. REv. 211,
230 (2009) (symposium issue) ("Because the Founders knew there would be no Union without
at least some recognition of slavery, they made a provision for it in the Constitution, but put it
on the road to ultimate extinction. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, which excluded slavery
from the new Northwest Territories, makes this point abundantly clear").
Several critics, by contrast, have challenged the conventional explanation as too pat.
They claim that the Founders, in fact, were bigoted, believing in the natural supremacy of the
"White" race, of men, of European Enlightenment culture, and, of Protestantism, therefore,
perhaps, not as adverse to the practice of enslaving Africans as we would like to believe. E.g.,
David Hodas, The Laws ofScience, Constitutional Law, and the Rule ofLaw, 22 WIDENER L.
REv. 135, 154-55 (2016) (discussing Jefferson); Cynthia Elaine Tompkins, Title VII at 50: The
Landmark Law Has Significantly Impacted Relationships in the Workplace and Society, But
Title VII Has Not Reached Its True Potential, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 693, 706 (2015)
(discussing George Washington).
335. Larson, supra note 33, at 704 (discussing some historians' preferences to view the
Founders "as honest racists, not hypocrites").
336. The Reconstruction Congress understood that, in the words of one researcher, perhaps
it is better, "not to condemn the founders for their weaknesses and failings, but to search in
their hearts for clues to our own. We must work with the ideological tools they left us. More
importantly, we must take responsibility for the choices they made and hope for the courage
to take responsibility for our own choices." Tania Tetlow, The Founders and Slavery: A Crisis
of Conscience, 3 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 46 (2001).
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'compromised with wrong' at the Constitutional Convention,"3 37 seeking to
overcome that compromise, echoing the general sentiments of his colleagues,
Representative Isaac N. Arnold of Illinois did not advocate abandoning the
founding. Rather, Kelley, "sensibly called for 'incorporating into our organic
law the glorious prohibition of slavery' directly from the Declaration.""'
Fully and deliberately consistent with the spirit of the Declaration, the bills
proposing the respective Reconstruction amendments, then, "clearly derived
from America as a nation and proclaimed freedom, not slavery."3 39
It is not startling, then, that recounting the deontological sentiments of
the Reconstruction Congress, Prof. Reinstein noted, "Throughout their
deliberations, the Republicans reiterated the theme that the Founders had
omitted the Declaration's principles from the Constitution because of slavery,
and that those principles must now become the supreme law of the land."340
For instance,
In his first speech in the 39th Congress, before any legislation was
introduced, [Pennsylvania's] Thaddeus Stevens, the Republican leader in
the House, said that the duty of that Congress was to complete the
Constitution as the Founders would have done but for slavery:
"Our fathers repudiated the whole doctrine of the legal superiority of
families or races, and proclaimed the equality of men before the law.
Upon that they created a revolution and built the Republic. They were
prevented by slavery from perfecting the superstructure whose foundation
they had thus broadly laid. For the sake of the Union they consented to
wait, but never relinquished the idea of its final completion. The time to
which they looked forward with anxiety has come. It is our duty to
complete their work."341
Likewise, the dour Stevens, whose assessment of Reconstruction was
that the Union should act as a conqueror, inaugurating a "radical
337. Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.S. DAVIS L. REv. 1773, 1807 (2006) (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 38TH CONG., Ist Sess. 2983 (1864) (statement of Rep. William B. Kelley (R. PA.)).
338. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 393 (quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2989
(1864) (statement of Rep. Isaac N. Arnold (R. IL.)).
339. AMAR, supra note 311, at 190.
340. Reinstein, supra note 322, at 387 (footnote omitted).
341. Id. at 385 (quoting, CONG. GLOBE., 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 74 (1866) (remarks of Rep.
Stevens (R. PA.)).
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reorganization of southern institutions, habits, and manners," 342 Stated, "Our
fathers had been compelled to postpone the principles of their great
Declaration and wait for their full establishment till a more propitious time.
That time ought to be present now." 343
Hardly surprisingly, Congress recognized slavery as a most horrific
violation of the "unalienable Rights" championed in the Declaration. To
offer a few more instances, Illinois' Ebon Clark Ingersoll stated poetically,
"I believe that the black man has certain inalienable rights, which are as
sacred in the sight of Heaven as those of any other race. I believe he has a
right to live, and live in a state of freedom. He has a right to breathe the free
air and enjoy God's free sunshine. ... "34 Likewise invoking higher law,
Ohio's John Sherman, perhaps most noted for the antitrust act that still bears
his name, opined,
It seems to me that when we legislate on this subject we should secure to
the freedmen of the Southern States certain rights, naming them, defining
precisely what they should be. . . . We should secure to these freedmen
the right to acquire and hold property, to enjoy the fruits of their own
labor, to be protected in their homes and family, the right to be educated,
and to go and come at pleasure. These are among the natural rights of
free men.345
In this vein, Prof. Tsesis recounted Speaker Schuyler Colfax's
invocation of the "enduring justice" stemming from the "inalienable rights"
set forth in "our Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence,"
The Thirty-Ninth Congress opened in 1865 with a statement by Schuyler
Colfax, the incoming Speaker of the House of Representatives [and future
Vice-President under President Grant]. Given shortly after Congress
passed the proposed Thirteenth Amendment and before the introduction
of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, the statement was indicative of
how Congress planned to use the Thirteenth Amendment for
Reconstruction. Colfax told the House:
342. Id. at 386.
343. Id. (quoting, CONG. GLOBE., 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459 (1866)).
344. Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 437, 475 (1989) (emphasis added; quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2990
(1864) (remarks of Rep. Ingersol (R. IL.)).
345. Id. (emphasis added; quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 42 (1866)
(remarks of Sen. Sherman (R. OH.)).
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"[l]t is yours to mature and enact legislation which,... shall establish [state
governments] anew on such a basis of enduring justice as will guarantee
all necessary safeguards to the people, and afford what our Magna Charta,
the Declaration of Independence, proclaims is the chief object of
government--protection of all men in their inalienable rights."34 6
The Republicans repeatedly emphasized the link between abolishing
slavery and the principles of the Declaration. Indiana's Rep. Godlove S. Orth
described the proposed Thirteenth Amendment as "a practical application of
that self-evident truth," of the Declaration "'that [all men] are endowed by
their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these, are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness."347 Similarly, Prof. Tsesis reported,
"Representative Francis W. Kellogg of Michigan traced the sources of the
proposed amendment to the Declaration and to the Preamble of the
Constitution's requirement that government promote the general welfare and
secure liberty."3 48 And, New York's Rep. Thomas T. Davis melodiously
extolled the linkage between liberty and American governance, "Liberty, that
civil and religious liberty which was so clearly beautifully defined in the
Declaration of Independence .... African slavery, was regarded as temporary
in its character .... Our fathers predicted that the time would soon come when
the interests of the country would demand that slavery should pass away."349
Moreover, leading observers of the Reconstruction Congress recognized
the need to vindicate the Declaration from the gutter of slavery. As a prime
instance, "The great philosopher John Stuart Mill wrote a letter from England
to a friend calling for ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
necessity 'to break altogether the power of the slaveholding caste' as
necessary for 'the opening words of the Declaration of Independence' to no
longer be 'a reproach to the nation founded by its authors."'350
I have tested the reader's patience with this lengthy rendition to assuage
any doubts that, like the original Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment
346. Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & The Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B. C. L. REv. 307, 326-27 (2004) (quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist
Sess. 5 (1865) (remarks of Rep. Colfax (R. IN.)).
347. Id. at 327 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865) (remarks ofRep.
Orth (R. IN.).
348. Id. (discussing, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 2954-55 (1864) (remarks of
Rep. Kellogg (R. MI.)).
349. Id. at 327-28 (quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1864) (remaprks
of Rep. Davis (R. NY.)).
350. THE LATER LETTERS OF JOHN STUART MILLS 1849-1873 at 393-94 (Francis E. Mineka
& Dwight N Lindley eds. 1972).
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was understood to protect "natural, inalienable and civil rights""' as
commemorated in the Declaration of Independence. 352
b. Applying the Declaration's Natural Rights Theory to the States --
Was More than Equal Protection Intended? --
In addition to rectifying the Founders' betrayal of the Declaration
through declining to outlaw slavery, the Reconstruction Congress enacted its
civil rights statutes and proposed constitutional amendments, especially the
Fourteenth Amendment, to correct the Founders' second infidelity to the
principles of moral government: failure to make the States and their
respective local governments subject to the Declaration's natural rights
theory particularly as propounded by the Bill of Rights. Importantly,
Congress did not propose measures that explicitly applied the Bill of Rights
as an entirety onto the States.353 Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment, inter
alia, forbids states and their political subdivisions from denying "persons"
within their respective jurisdictions "due process of law," "equal protection
of the laws" and other basic safeguards that, as we will see, emanate from the
theory of natural rights espoused in the Declaration of Independence.
Concurrently, as earlier emphasized, the Fourteenth Amendment
changed the balance of Federalism, by withdrawing the freedom from
Federal oversight that the States formerly had enjoyed. Specifically, Section
Five of the Amendment authorizes Congress to enact legislation compelling
states to comply with that Amendment's various provisions, most notably
351. Jacobusten Broek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CAL. L. REv. 171, 200
(1951).
352. Tsesis, supra note 24, at 370 (emphasis added):
The original Constitution contained clauses, which protected the institution of
slavery, that were irreconcilable with the moral commitments the nation undertook at
independence. The Reconstruction Amendments were meant to set the country aright
by formally incorporating the Declaration's principle of representative governance
into the Constitution. That principle had been foundational to the nation's ethos from
its founding in 1776, but by protecting slavery, the 1787 Constitution violated the
Declaration's mandate that government secure liberal equality for the common good.
The Reconstruction Amendments were a major step forward because they
empowered Congress to enact legislation conducive to a society of free and equal
individuals.
353. See Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 484 (8th Cir. 2010) ("The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, however, applies only to the federal government");
Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that Sixth Amendment read
alone applies only to federal prosecutions); see infra, notes 565-87 and accompanying text.
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"due process of law." 354 Moreover, based on fundamental principles of
American judicial review of the Constitution," the federal judiciary is
empowered to review actions of both the States and their respective localities
to assure compliance with "due process" and related principles. 35 6
The Fourteenth Amendment's sweeping restructuring of political
power, making the federal not state level dominant, inspires an intriguing
quandary: While the Due Process Clause has become the modem centerpiece
for civil rights enforcement,357 contrary to what one might expect, Congress,
"devoted comparatively little time and energy to this clause when debating
the Amendment."3 5 Profs. Chapman and McConnell offer one reason why
Congress' debate was perhaps surprisingly scant: the courts had delineated
in some detail a definition of "due process," thus, the meaning of the
proposed Due Process Clauses' basic substantive content was not a focus of
Congressional concern.
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to ensure that all persons would
enjoy the same civil liberties against the states that whites had previously
enjoyed against the federal government. There was not much debate
about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
presumably because it had a well-defined legal meaning. Except that it
applied to the states instead of the federal government, it was lifted
entirely from the Fifth Amendment. ...
[Indeed,] Fourteenth Amendment due process was understood to mean
nothing different than what due process and[, derived from Magna Carta,]
the law of the land had meant up to that point. ... Because it applied to all
354. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
355. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803).
356. Bailey v. City of Port Huron, 507 F.3d 364, 367 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting "due process
of law ... has [not only] the procedural component that these words suggest, but it also has
been construed to have 'a substantive component,' ... that [effectively has] incorporate[d]
most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights ... and that protects other 'fundamental rights and
liberties' that are not expressly mentioned in the Bill of Rights." (citations omitted)).
357. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1022 (explaining the axiomatic proposition that the Due
Process Clause along with the Equal Protection Clause, "have led to almost all civil rights
litigation and all cases incorporating the Bill of Rights to the states); see also, infra notes 521-
98 and accompanying text.
358. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1022-23; see also John Marquez Ludin, The Law of
Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1137, 1182 (1999).
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persons, the effect was to make the treatment of black citizens the same
as the treatment of whites.3 5 9
Additionally, comparative legislative silence apparently was inspired
partially by Congress' overarching worry that, ironically, the South might
enjoy greater representation in Congress after the Civil War than before.
Specifically, African-American citizens henceforth would be counted not as
respectively three-fifths of a person pursuant to the original Constitution, but
as full persons for representation in the House of Representatives. Therefore,
if southern states could manipulate suffrage laws to deprive or limit minority
voting while still enjoying greater representation based on population counts,
the post-Bellum South, although defeated, could wield unseemly and
corrosive national political power. Better, then, not to stress that potential
political actuality in prolonged debates. 36 0
Moreover, the issue was never whether, as a matter of moral and
political philosophy, the natural rights propositions of the Declaration
constrained the States as well as the Federal level. The States recognized
their immutable duties to respect "unalienable Rights," but, in the ante-
Bellum era, honored that duty mostly in the breach. Consequently, Prof.
Amar informatively emphasizes that at the time of the Reconstruction
Congress, States did not boldly deny the natural rights philosophy of the
Declaration, rather, while according such rights formal recognition, States
felt free to flout them as they saw fit:
With few exceptions, most notably the grand-jury rules ... the substance
of the federal [proposals] rights and freedoms did not greatly diverge from
rights already formally protected under state laws and state constitutions.
359. Nathan S. Chapman and Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 Yale L. J. 1672, 1777-78 (2012) (emphasis added; citing, Amar, supra note 311,
at 171 n.* (1998)). "This is why Representative John Bingham, when asked what he believed
due process entailed, responded that 'the courts have settled that long ago, and the gentleman
can go and read their decisions."' Id at 1777 (quoting, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1089 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham (R. OH.)). As similarly explained by journalist Jeffrey
Rosen, the Fourteenth Amendment,
guarantee[s] to all citizens a limited set of absolute civil rights. These rights were unclear at
the margins, but not in broad relief. They were widely understood to include the common law
rights guaranteed in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, such as the right to make and enforce
contracts, the right to sue and be sued, and the right to inherit property, as well as (and this is
more controversial) the rights guaranteed in the first eight amendments to the Constitution.
Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U.L. REV. 791, 792 (1996).
360. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1020-21.
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True, the slavery experience led many states to betray their own
constitutional safeguards of speech, press, personal security, and the like,
but the principles themselves were deeply etched in both the popular and
legal mind.3 6 1
Thus, perceiving a need to actualize the Declaration's promise upon
States that, although acknowledging natural law's rightness, chose to ignore
it, Finkelman, among others, confirms, "the authors of the [Fourteenth]
Amendment and its leading supporters believed [it] would make ... the
'immortal bill of rights' applicable to the states."3 62 Verifying the analysis of
Profs. Amar and Finkelman is Ohio Congressman John Bingham's
observation that eleven states,
had failed to enforce [the Bill of Rights] and thereby rendered it "a mere
dead letter." Bingham, however, found it "absolutely essential to the
safety of the people that it should be enforced" and therefore asked for
"the additional grant of power" ultimately contained in section 1, noting
that those who "who oppose[d] this amendment" were simply "oppos[ing]
the grant of power to enforce the bill of rights." 6
Equally, Thaddeus Stevens stated regarding the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment,
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that
every one of these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some form
or other, in our Declaration or organic law. But the Constitution limits
only the action of Congress, and is not a limitation on the States. . . .
Some answer, 'Your civil rights bill secures the same things.' That is
361. AMAR, supra note 311, at 205.
362. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1027.
363. WILLIAM E. NELSON, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPAL TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 117 (1988) (quoting, Cong. Globe, 39th Congress, 1st Sess. 1090 (1866)
(remarks of Rep. Bingham (R. OH.)); see generally Michael Les Benedict, Moments of
Change: Transformation in American Constitutionalism, 108 YALE L.J. 2022 (2011) ("When
one studies Bingham carefully one learns that many of his utterances cannot be accepted as
serious propositions"); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Father of the 14th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 17, 2003), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/the-father-of-the-14th-
amendment/? r=0 (Moreover, in a recent opinion piece, PROF. GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA,
AMERICAN FOUNDING SON: JOHN BINGHAM AND THE INVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, noting that Rep. Bingham, "took the lead in framing the 14th Amendment of the
Constitution, ... More than any man except Abraham Lincoln, John Bingham was responsible
for establishing what the Civil War meant for America's future.").
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partly true, but a law is repealable by a majority .... This amendment
once adopted cannot be annulled without two thirds of Congress.3 "
Thus, consistent with this article's position, champions and foes of the
Fourteenth Amendment at both the State and Federal levels understood that
the Constitution enforces the natural law principles expressed in the
Declaration. Whatever States' actual pre-Bellum laws, customs and practices
might have been, both the Amendment's supporters and opponents did not
seriously dispute the well-established abstract duty of Government both state
and federal to respect fundamental rights. As the foregoing summary of the
Congressional debates reveals, albeit three-quarters of a century after the
ratification of the Bill of Rights, compelling the States via a constitutional
amendment to respect natural rights (plus the proscription against slavery)
would at last fulfill the principles of the American Revolution. Moreover,
even if opposed on the basis of either abstract moral theory, practical politics,
or both, the defeated and essentially disarmed South was in no position to
quibble.3 65
Therefore, the relevant legislative history stresses two interrelated
pivotal themes. First, the proposed Fourteenth Amendment would require as
a constitutional mandate that States actually comply with the natural rights
theory of the Declaration, principles that the States had never disputed, but
equally had hardly respected. Second, such compliance would effectively
mean that States must enforce the Bill of Rights, as least insofar as it
enumerates a litany ofunalienable rights. Thus, one powerful reason debates
surrounding the Due Process Clause seem unexpectedly short and lacking in
rancor is that States did not have to be compelled to enact natural rights
protections, for, indeed, they already had done so in substantial measure.
Rather, the important matter was mandating nondiscriminatory enforcement
which no longer would depend on States' good faith. Instead, the Federal
level became the States' superior through the simple but bravura expedient
364. THE SELECTED PAPERS OF THADDEUS STEVENS VOLUME 2: APRIL 1865-AUGUST 1868
at 134 (Beverly Wilson Palmer & Holly Byers Ochoa eds., 1998) (quoting, CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459(1866) (emphasis added) (remarks of Rep. Stevens (R. PA.)).
365. Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections
on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and The Transformation of the American Constitution, 108
YALE L.J. 2021, 2029 (1999) ("It was once a historical axiom that Reconstruction had been
imposed on the South by radical extremists, led by the vengeful Representative Thaddeus
Stevens and the fanatical Senator Charles Sumner. In the 1960s and 1970s, historians
debunked that idea, absolving Stevens and Sumner of the canards and demonstrating that
centrists ... exercised greater influence.").
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that, "the [Fourteenth] Amendment protect[s] everyone in the United States
from arbitrary and capricious abuses by their state governments."36 6 As Prof.
Amar cunningly summarized, under the circumstances and given the
realities, "Democratic critics of the [fourteenth] amendment [] had much
easier targets than section 1. Who wants to campaign against the Bill of
Rights?"3 67
The brevity of Congressional attention, then, reflects some apparent
national consensus about due process in general but, as Prof. Benedict
stresses, a conspicuous yet understandable lack of details regarding how "due
process of law" in particular, and natural rights emanating from the
Declaration in general, might be enforced on a case-by-case basis. While
"due process of law's" meaning certainly was relevant, undistracted by
minutiae, the Reconstruction Congress and the general public concentrated
on what were then more pressing concerns, specifically, restoration of the
Union, 3 68 rendering national citizenship paramount over state citizenship, 36 9
and enfranchising the recently freed slaves which, "in the [quixotic] words
of the Chicago Tribune, would 'terminate forever the long disturbance of the
public peace over the civil and political status of the black man."' 370 Indeed,
Congress' deliberations over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment
concentrated predominately on matters other than exhaustive due process
theory. "Most of the debates in Congress were about the other sections of
the Amendment, dealing with post-Civil War representation, the
disfranchisement of former Confederate leaders, and post-Civil War debt."
In light of these overarching concerns, details elucidating what "due
process of law" actually means and who would so determine were secondary:
The initial Republican program, of which the Fourteenth Amendment was
the centerpiece, had been designed primarily to accomplish the restoration
366. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1034. This, as we will soon learn, is exactly what
modem due process jurisprudence demands. See infra notes 600-10 and accompanying text.
367. AMAR, supra note 311, at 205.
368. Benedict, supra note 315, at 2026 ("[Vjoters were not energized, however, over the
specific content of the Fourteenth Amendment, but over the general issue of how quickly and
under what conditions to restore the Union. As Stephen A. Hurlbut, a leading southern Illinois
politician and later congressman, reported to Thaddeus Stevens as the Thirty-Ninth Congress
organized in December 1865, 'The people care little for Constitutional hair splitting as to the
legal status of rebeldom & its communities. They care much as regards their admission to
political power in their existing frame of mind & prejudices').
369. Id at 2025.
370. Id (quoting, The Suffrage Amendment, Chi. Trib., Mar. 2, 1869, at 2).
371. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1022-23.
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of the Union. Its delegation of power to the federal government to protect
civil rights was merely a vague promise, particularly shaky in light of the
federal government's traditional impotence in protecting the rights of
racial minorities. It was a promise made precisely because the first
Republican program left black Southerners without political power in
their states. 372
Therefore, that the actual debates might have been remarkably brief
(especially as contrasted with how, in fact, the Due Process Clause eventually
changed the face of American law) does not diminish the actuality that the
Fourteenth Amendment enforces the Declaration of Independence's scheme
of natural law. Nonetheless, some theorists maintain that Congress did not
intend to mandate onto the States either the letter or the spirit of the Bill of
Rights. These critics deny that, as earlier quoted, Congress sought to, "ensure
that all persons would enjoy the same civil liberties against the states that
whites had previously enjoyed against the federal government.""
In particular, Prof. William E. Nelson opined that historians remain
"puzzl[ed]" because at the time of ratification, not only the former
Confederacy, but likewise several Northern states that had declined to
enforce their Bill of Rights equivalents were assured that the Fourteenth
Amendment essentially would have no effect on them.3 74  Only such
assurances, Nelson surmised, would explain why, "those states undertook
ratification of the amendment without objecting to or even discussing the
impact that the application of the Bill of Rights would have on their criminal
process, and after ratification they made no changes to their criminal law."
Because, according to this theory, the ratifying states either correctly
assumed the Fourteenth Amendment would not apply the Bill of Rights or
they were deliberately misinformed, enforcing the Bill of Rights in letter or
spirit cannot be that amendment's function. 376 Rather, Congress meant that
the Amendment's section 1 would impose equal treatment, thus the States
need not enforce the panoply of natural right, but, regarding those rights they
372. Benedict, supra note 315, at 2024, 2026 ("The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
simply never took advantage of the many opportunities they had to specify its precise
boundaries. Their purpose was not to provide future judges with clear guidelines for its
application but, in Nelson's words again, "to reaffirm the lay public's longstanding rhetorical
commitment to general principles of equality, individual rights, and local self-rule.")
373. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 359, at 1777-78.
374. NELSON, supra note 363, at 118.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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chose to recognize, States could not limit enforcement to Caucasians.
Congress,' and by implication the courts', enforcement power would lie
chiefly in assuring non-discrimination, not in creating or enforcing
substantive rights.377
Prof. Nelson's argument is clever, but unconvincing. Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, of course, includes an Equal Protection Clause
alongside the Due Process Clause. As later will be detailed, the former
technically is surplusage because "equal protection" is a sub-set of "due
process" liberty.37 But, the presence of an explicit Equal Protection Clause
is helpful to counter Nelson's logic. Courts rightly have reasoned that the
Equal Protection Clause does not imply that the Due Process Clause merely
constitutes a prohibition against discrimination, but rather, the very opposite:
that non-discrimination -- "equal protection" -- is an essential component of,
but scarcely the fullness of "due process of law." 379 Prof. Nelson's contention
reduces the Due Process Clause into simply a second equal protection clause,
rendering the former needless because the Fourteenth Amendment's text
already has an equal protection component. This confounds Congress' actual
intent to assure that by including an Equal Protection Clause, courts and other
enforcers understand that due process embraces but is not limited to equal
protection.3" The presence of both clauses fosters Congress' belief that equal
protection is subsumed by, but does not itself subsume due process. Rather,
aware of the likely recalcitrance of obedience by the former Confederacy, the
Equal Protection Clause stands as a pointed reminder that the Fourteenth
Amendment's anti-discrimination function is a pivotal adjunct to "due
process of law."
377. Id. at 118-19 ("By understanding section one as an equality guarantee, the puzzle of
how Congress could simultaneously have power to enforce the Bill of Rights and not have
power to impose a specific provision of the Bill on a state is resolved").
378. See infra notes 570-82 and accompanying text.
379. E.g., Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
234 (1979) (noting that Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "forbids the Federal
Government to deny equal protection of the laws"); Ingram v. Faruque, 728 F.3d 1239, 1243
(10th Cir. 2013); see generally Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
380. See generally Bayer, supra note 17 (noting that, as we will learn, in addition to "equal
protection," "due process of law" comprises numerous substantive and procedural components
including essentially every right set forth in the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and many "unenumerated" rights such as a multi-faceted right to privacy and a right to travel.
This is because, with rare exception, both the specific enumerations within the Bill of Rights
and various unenumerated rights constitute essential aspects of what the Judiciary denotes as
"ordered liberty," what the Founders called in the Declaration, "unalienable Rights"). See infra
notes 565-87 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, given Congress' above-established esteem for the
Declaration, and notwithstanding the pressures of Reconstruction politics, it
seems counterintuitive at best that Congress thought America endured the
approximately 620,000 Union and Confederate combined Civil War military
deaths,38 1 and roughly 476,000 wounded 38 2 plus the catastrophic quantum of
damaged and destroyed property, simply to assure nondiscriminatory
administering of such "unalienable Rights" as each state, including those of
the former Confederacy, respectively deemed fit to protect. The Declaration
promises that any and all offices of Government must abide by and foster
"unalienable Rights," which, of course, is the very meaning of unalienability.
The only way to fulfill the broken promise of the pre-Bellum Constitution,
then, is to require States to apply the Declaration's moral-political
philosophy, not to adulterate that philosophy by allowing the States to violate
persons' natural rights so long as such violations are racially neutral.
Possibly, under Prof. Nelson's logic, Congress simply assumed that,
after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, faced with federal
enforcement, the States would fully promote the Bill of Rights for all, rather
than deprive White persons of integral rights simply to indulge denying the
same to Black persons. Intuitively, there seems little to gain by depriving
rights to others at the cost of depriving those same rights to yourself and your
associates. Yet, given the pronounced economic, social, and financial
advantages that much of the White race enjoyed (and continues to enjoy),383
it is entirely plausible to posit a system in which all are officially denied some
fundamental rights if, based on practical experience, the burden of such
denials falls more heavily on minority individuals and the poor than on the
White gentry. * Moreover, southern leaders might have reasonably
381. See History: Civil War Causalities, http://www.civilwar.org/education/civil-war-
casualties.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2017).
382. Id.
383. E.g., James Jennings, Globalization and Race Hierarchy in the United States, 15 NEW
ENG. J. PUB POL'Y 19, 26 (2000):
Even when class factors are controlled, there is strong evidence of racial hierarchy in
the United States. This means that even poor whites in a context of racial hierarchy
are much better off than poor blacks; working-class whites as well as middle-class
whites are much better off and enjoy a higher status than their black counterparts.
Other illustrations of racial hierarchy include the fact that female-headed white
families are significantly better off than female-headed black families; the poverty
rate for black families headed by a married couple is usually twice the rate of that for
white families headed by a married couple; and unemployment rates for blacks are
generally higher than those of whites with comparable levels of education.
384. For instance, enacted by former Confederate States shortly after the end of the Civil
War, the "Black Codes" imposed a disabling series of limitations and burdens upon the newly
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anticipated that federal enforcement would be sporadic at best once the
jubilation of the victorious North quelled and the taste for expensive,
extensive civil rights enforcement dissipated. An eventual lack of Northern
will could enable subtle or even blatant racial discriminatory enforcement
despite the technical presence of the Equal Protection Clause. The combined
authority, however, of both an Equal Protection and a Due Process Clause,
with the latter broadly enforcing "unalienable Rights" in all regards, might
serve as a greater deterrent to non-compliance. Accordingly, the argument is
weak that because states are unlikely to disadvantage White persons so that
they can disadvantage Black persons, the proposed Due Process Clause
merely reiterates the companion Equal Protection Clause.
In further response to Prof. Nelson's claim, it bears emphasizing yet
again that advocates of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
repeatedly and emphatically extolled the merits of both the Bill of Rights and
the Declaration's natural rights thesis. Congress did not simply debate anti-
discrimination principles; rather, it re-explored and re-affirmed the Founders'
basic philosophy of government under the Declaration and the original
Constitution. Concluding that Congress only sought to assure equality
should states volitionally deign to enforce natural rights in whole or part
renders much of the Fourteenth Amendment's enactment history puff, not
substance -- low homage indeed to commemorate the aftermath of a civil war
that nearly destroyed the Nation3 8 5 -- a civil war fought substantially in the
name of anti-slavery natural rights. The better understanding is that
Congress' copious, persistent and emphatic acclamations exalting botivthe
Bill of Rights and the Declaration's natural rights philosophy sensibly
confirms the Fourteenth Amendment's affirmative power to direct
recalcitrant states to abide by all Bill of Rights' provisions that address
"unalienable Rights" (plus such rights as are not recounted in the
Constitution's first eight amendments). Anything less obviates the above-
freed slaves. While many portions of those Codes were explicitly based on race, others were
drafted in a "facially neutral" fashion, intended to cause harm predominately on African
Americans but without expressly singling out that class. Indeed, in large part, Congress
enacted the Reconstruction Amendments and much civil rights legislation to overturn the
Black Codes, otherwise known as Jim Crow laws. E.g., General Building Contractors Ass'n.
v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1982); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race
Neutrality, and Voting Rights 51 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1431 (2002) (noting that the classic
"racially neutral" example within the Black Codes were perhaps grandfather clauses "that
guarantee the right to vote to citizens whose grandfathers had been eligible to vote while
placing additional voting qualifications on other citizens").
385. See, supra notes 381-82 and accompanying text.
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quoted Congressional history extolling natural rights as the very premise of
legitimate government by making abidance thereof a matter of States'
discretion. Therefore, Prof. Nelson erroneously conflates "due process"
solely with anti-discrimination theory. Rather, "due process" prohibits
government from denying fundamental rights of which anti-discrimination is
an important subpart, but only a subpart.
Similarly, Prof. Amar rightly criticizes the distinguished theorist
Charles Fairman's assertion that the Reconstruction Congress could not have
intended a plan as radical as incorporating the Bill of Rights onto the states
because Congress never clarified that exact position in roughly those words.
Fairman posits that nothing so fundamental and new would have been treated
with "silence" either by the Congress proposing it or by the States upon which
the new order would apply. Of course, this writing's entire present
subsection has recounted how fervently and consistently the Reconstruction
Congress affirmed that one function of the proposed amendments was to
bring the States under the natural rights structures commemorated in the Bill
of Rights.3 86 Even if that recital were not enough, Prof. Amar cogently notes
that "Fairman wisely avoided [the] outlandish claim" that "section I was
utterly meaningless, imposing no obligations whatsoever on states, ... "387
Rather and of huge significance, "Fairman ... argu[ed] instead that section 1
simply required fundamental fairness and ordered liberty."3 88 Amar artfully
accented in response that if Congress was "silent" about incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, it was no less "silent" that Section 1 imposes the "fundamental
fairness and ordered liberty" Fairman aptly believes arises under the
Fourteenth Amendment.38 9
While Amar is correct regarding that important but technical point, I
emphasized the word "simply" in Prof. Fairman's quoted assertion because,
perhaps unintentionally, he used that word ironically. Requiring that states
act in conformance with "fundamental fairness" may be "simple" in the sense
of obviousness: respecting "fundamental fairness" clearly is what states must
do. But, respecting "fundamental fairness" is not "simple" in the sense of
being banal, because "fundamental fairness" is the very essence of what it
means to abide by "unalienable Rights."390 Indeed, this article agrees with
judicial holdings that the Fourteenth Amendment does not per se
386. See, supra notes 353-73 and accompanying text.
387. AMAR, supra note 311, at 199.
388. Id. (emphasis added).
389. Id.
390. See infra notes 611-23 and accompanying text.
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"incorporate" the Bill of Rights onto the States, but rather, recognizes, as
does the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, that Government must
respect fundamental natural rights.39 1  Accordingly, even if Fairman
correctly claimed that "section 1 simply required fundamental fairness and
ordered liberty, " that is precisely what it means to mandate upon the States
the Declaration's promise that Government will vouchsafe individuals'
"unalienable Rights."
In sum, as Profs. Farber and Muench stated, "The fourteenth amendment
was intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher law by
empowering the national government to protect the natural rights of its
citizens."3 92  The Reconstruction Congress advanced the Fourteenth
Amendment to realize what the Founders could not or would not: no less than
the Federal level, the states and their respective localities must enforce the
moral precepts of the Declaration.
It is of utmost significance, then, that the Reconstruction Congress
enacted the Fourteenth Amendment to complete the promise of the
Declaration, that is, in the words of Rep. Bingham, enforce "law in its highest
sense:"
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no
matter beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what
disastrous conflict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been
cloven down, no matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter
how ignorant, shall be deprived of life or liberty or property without due
process of law -- law in its highest sense, that law which is the perfection
ofhuman reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact justice; that justice
which requires that every man shall have his right; that justice which is
the highest duty ofnations as it is the imperishable attribute ofthe God of
nations.""'
Moreover, as the Reconstruction Congress fully knew, unlike its
proposed "privileges and immunities clause" that, by its express text, would
apply only to American "citizens," the proposed "due process clause's" use
391. See infra notes 551-87 and accompanying text.
392. Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 CONST. CMT. 235, 236 (1984).
393. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.
J. 408, 480 (2010) (quoting, CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1094 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. Bingham (R. OH.)); see also Siegan, supra note 42, at 446 (describing Rep. Bingham's
natural law bent for the provisions of§ I of the 14th. Amendment).
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of the term "persons" promises the Fourteenth Amendment's universal
application to all those under the jurisdiction of the United States regardless
of citizenship.394 Indeed, addressing the breadth of the term "person" in the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Representative "Bingham successfully
argued that the [Civil Rights Act] 1866 Act's restriction of rights to only
'citizens' did not go far enough in rejecting the status-based, feudal ideas of
the Old World. The 1866 Act 'commit [ed] the terrible enormity of
distinguishing here in the laws in respect to life, liberty, and property between
the citizen and the stranger."'
395
The force of evidence instructs that the Reconstruction Congress
undeniably envisioned the Fourteenth Amendment not simply as related to,
but, albeit three-quarters of a century thereafter, the true formal legal
achievement of the Constitution's original enforcement of the Declaration,
including the abrogation of slavery and bringing the States under the ambit
of natural rights, including but not limited to the Bill of Rights. As Rep.
Bingham enthused:
The great men who made [the Fifth Amendment] ... abolished the narrow
and limited phrase of the old Magna Charta of five hundred years ago,
which gave the protection of the laws only to 'free men' and inserted in
its stead the more comprehensive words, 'no person,' . . . Thus, in respect
to life and liberty and property, the people by their Constitution declared
the equality of all men.""
394. Robert A. Burt, Overruling Dred Scott: The Case for Same-Sex Marriage, 17 WIDENER
L.J. 73, 77 (2007) ("The draftsmen made clear that by explicitly speaking of the rights of
'people' rather than 'freed slaves"' or 'black people,' the Fourteenth Amendment intended to
generalize for all political relations the lessons drawn from the abolition of slavery").
395. Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those
Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private
Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51, 99 (2009) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., I st
Sess. 1292 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham (R. OH.)).
Rep. Bingham explicated, the Constitution protects all persons "[n]o matter upon what spot
on the earth's surface they were born; no matter whether an Asiatic or African, a European or
an American sun first burned upon them; no matter whether citizens or strangers; no matter
whether rich or poor." Id. at 99 n. 230 (quoting, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638
(1862) (remarks of Rep. Bingham (R. OH.))); see also, id Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess.
83 (1861) (Rep. Bingham) ("The Constitution has the same care for the rights of the stranger
within your gates as for the rights of the citizen."); Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 266
(1863) (Rep. Bingham) (Constitution "is no respecter of persons [and] declares that the poor
and the rich, the citizen and the stranger within your gates, are alike sacred before the sublime
majesty of its laws").
396. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1292 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham (R. OH.)).
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V. MODERN DUE PROCESS AND KANTIAN DEONTOLOGY --
A. The Supreme Court's Two Competing Paradigms of Constitutional
Rights --
This writing's previous sections have shown that a central tenet of the
American Revolution was the Founders' deeply rooted and sincere belief that
governance must be grounded in the deontological morality of natural rights
derived from natural law -- principles they expounded into the Declaration of
Independence. 3 97  Thereafter, to fulfill "the promise of the American
Revolution," the Founders actualized the Declaration's philosophy into the
Constitution, ordaining moral comportment by all offices and levels of
Government as this Nation's highest law, a most remarkable first principle
of governance.398 Despite the addition of the Bill of Rights only four years
after its original ratification in 1789, two severe infirmities plagued
fulfillment of the Constitution's formal promise to enforce the Declaration. 3W
The first was the Constitution's failure to outlaw slavery. The second was
that the Constitution's transformation of deontological moral theory into
supreme positive law, the Bill of Rights, applied only at Federal level, leaving
397. Of equal importance, this article has demonstrated that the Founders were absolutely
correct to espouse natural rights as the foundation of legitimate government. The earlier Part
I established the bona fides of Deontology -- the principle that immutable, a prior morality
exists. See, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2 (correctness of
Deontology) and 3 (correctness of Kantian morality). Such is the foundation of natural rights
under natural law. See, supra notes 210-79 and accompanying text.
398. E.g., Louis Henkin, Revolutions and Constitutions, 49 LA. L. REv. 1023, 1023 (1989);
see also, supra notes 126-209 and accompanying text.
399. Kevin W. Saunders, Privacy and Social Contract: A Defense ofJudicial Activism in
Privacy Cases, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 811, 843 (1991); see also PHILLTP BOBBITr, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 5-7 (1982). 1 say "formal" because, of course, no matter
how adamantly and unequivocally its text promises liberty and freedom, the success of any
charter of government is no better than the will of the governed to enforce those promises.
Absent the charter's text, the governed have imperfect guidance; therefore, the text is vital.
But, absent the will, the text remains only words. For example, Prof. Paulsen lamented
Congress' seeming unwillingness to explicate the meaning and operation of its impeachment
power, perhaps allowing that important authority, "gradually to recede into irrelevance ...
[evincing] that Congress lacks the will to make a serious part of the Constitution's plan of
checks and balances." Michael Stokes Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency
After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1337, 1401-02 (1999).
There is apparent popular consensus that the national dedication to the constitution
remains strong. "The commitment to the Constitution is widely shared in our political culture.
When the Constitution and democracy conflict, most often people accept the Constitution as
overriding their will." Saunders at 843.
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the states legally (although certainly not morally) free to ignore the
Declaration's natural rights philosophy. It was almost a century after the
American Revolution, in the immediate aftermath of the devastating Civil
War, that the Thirteenth Amendment banning slavery and the Fourteenth
Amendment, particularly its Due Process Clause, at last mandated onto states
and localities the Constitution's implementation of the Declaration. In that
way, "the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were the fulfillment of the
generalized promise of the American Revolution." 00
This writing now confronts the modern judiciary's partial mutiny
against the deontology of the Constitution -- a revolt championed, ironically,
by many jurists and commentators who proudly and loudly declare
themselves "originalists." I say "partial" because incongruously, current
constitutional jurisprudence is torn between two distinct and essentially
incompatible paradigms defining constitutional rights emanating from the
Due Process Clauses, particularly "substantive due process."o One, which
may be called the dignity paradigm, espouses that Government violates the
tenets of due process when it impugns human dignity. The dignity paradigm
unabashedly inquires whether the challenged governmental action is moral,
with morality defined as remaining faithful to principles of human dignity.
Accordingly, if the contested action is moral -- if it does not offend human
dignity -- it is constitutional. 40 2 The Court has premised recent rulings such
as Windsor v. US. and Obergefell v. Hodges on its dignity paradigm,
concluding therein that treating same-sex marriages differently from
opposite-sex marriages offends the innate dignity of same-sex couples
themselves and of their children. 403 Although relevant decisions never so
400. Burt, supra note 394, at 78.
401. Thomas J, Jipping, Informed Consent to Abortion: A Refinement, 38 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 329, 335 n.21 (1988); Katherine Watson, When Substantive Due Process Meets Equal
Protection: Reconciling Obergefell and Glucksberg, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 245 (2017);
Kristen McIntyre, A Prisoner's Right to Access DNA Evidence to Prove His Innocence: Post-
Osborne Options, 17 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 565, 585 (2011).
402. While it began to employ the dignity paradigm most directly and explicitly near the
turn of the last century, the Supreme Court has referenced dignity to define constitutional
rights since the Constitution's ratification. E.g., Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in
Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 743 (2006); Rex D.
Glensey, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 65, 85 (2011) ("At least as
dignity pertains to the Constitution, the Supreme Court has, albeit scantily, developed certain
narratives based on human dignity as it pertains to certain constitutional rights"); Edwin Baker,
Outcome Equality and Equality ofRespect: The Substantive Content ofEqual Protection, 131
U. PA. L. REV. 933, 938 (1983).
403. Specifically, pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Windsor v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) overturned section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
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admit, the concept of dignity courts use essentially and rightly is Kantian, or
so this writing will argue.404 Moreover, this article maintains that the dignity
paradigm comports with proper originalism -- Deontological Originalism --
by faithfully and properly fulfilling the Constitution's highest duty: to
enforce the natural rights principles of Declaration of Independence.
During the last hundred years, however, courts, supported by many
commentators, have openly disparaged the once widely accepted paradigm
of natural rights grounded in moral theory, offering in its place a bland, often
imprecise empirical review of history and culture to discern what, over the
course of decades, the American people (or some segment) popularly
recognize to be "deeply rooted" principles of liberty. That empirical
approach essentially is uncritical, most often reporting and applying, but
rarely questioning and judging the "deeply rooted" liberty principles it
discerns.40 5 The empiricism of what may be called the deeply rooted
principles paradigm, then, is unconcerned with, indeed scorns what so
genuinely excited the Founders: discerning and safeguarding through
Government the moral principles that emanate from the natural order of
existence. Although 2010's McDonald, v. City of Chicago, Ill. declared that
the deeply rooted principles paradigm governs substantive due process
analysis, 40 as Windsor and Obergefell, both issued after McDonald show,
("DOMA"), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (current version at I U.S.C. § 7 (2018), Congress' statute
banning the Federal Government from officially recognizing same-sex marriages lawfully
performed in states then permitting such nuptials). Two years later, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135
S. Ct. 2584 (2015) held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that states must accord same-sex marriages the same legal status as they do opposite-sex
marriages.
404. See, infra notes 971-1020 and accompanying text (explicating Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675 and Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584).
405. See, e.g., Stephen G. Calabresi, Sarah E. Agudo & Kathryn L. Dore, State Bills of
Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights are Really Deeply Rooted in American
History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REv. 1451, 1459-63 (2012) (discussing empirical
methods); Stephen G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State
Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment was Ratified in 1868: What Rights are Deeply
Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REv. 7, 18-22 (2008) (discussing the
empirical methods to discern whether a given purported right is or was "deeply rooted" in
American legal tradition).
406. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (explaining that the
Second Amendment is a fundamental right); see also Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d
597, 608 (6th Cir. 2015) and Peruta v. County of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.
2014).
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the Court continues to retain both paradigms, applying in any particular
litigation the one that can command at least five of the nine justices. 407
407. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 763-68; see also Obergefell, 133 S. Ct. at 2595-97; Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,633 (1996) (findingthatthe government may not unconditionally limit
solely to "rational basis" review challenges to laws regulating homosexual individuals as a
class); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599-604 (2003) (ruling that the government may not
criminalize homosexual sexual conduct performed in private between two consenting adults).
All four opinions were authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy who, more than any other
justice, has written explicitly about the dignity paradigm, although, as discussed at Section 6-
c-6, the Court has yet to clarify in depth the meaning of pivotal concepts such as "human
dignity." Therefore, this writing's supposition that the dignity paradigm essentially enforces
Kantian ethics as constitutional law derives from analyses of the facts, holdings, and rationales
of the relevant opinions rather than from any explicit declarations therein.
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy was part of the McDonald majority that asserted the
dominance of the "deeply rooted" paradigm. Therefore, from the perspective of practical
Supreme Court politics, until only months ago of this writing, it appeared that whether the
dignity paradigm or the deeply rooted principles standard applies depended on which coalition
of four justices Justice Kennedy joined to form at least a bare majority to decide a given case.
E.g., Erwin Chemerinski, The Roberts Court and Criminal Procedure at Age Five, 43 TEXAS
TECH L. REV. 13, 13 (2010) (as of late June, 2010, "in the area of criminal procedure, like in
all areas, [the Supreme Court] is the Anthony Kennedy Court."); Jonathan H. Adler, Getting
the Roberts Court Right: A Response to Chemerinski, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 983, 1008-1011
(2008) (responding to Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L.
REV. 947 (2008), Adler concluded that perhaps the term "Kennedy Court" is an overstatement,
still, based on voting patterns, "even as his influence waned, Justice Kennedy remained a
pivotal justice." Id. at 1009); Lisa K. Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's Move Away from a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional
Interpretation, 30 N. CA. CEN. L. REV. 25, 25 (2007) ("With the retirement of Sandra Day
O'Connor, there has been an increased recognition of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's key role
as the remaining centrist, or swing voter, on the Court."; (footnote omitted)).
As his vigorous dissents show, see infra notes 971-1020 and accompanying text
(discussing the "homosexual rights" cases), the late Justice Antonin Scalia was always a
reliable vote against the dignity paradigm. On April 7, 2017, the Hon. Neil Gorsuch, formerly
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, was confirmed by the Senate to
assume the seat Scalia relinquished upon his sudden death. Although it may be too early for
reliable analysis, based on his dissenting opinion in Pavan v. Smith, Justice Gorsuch agrees
with his immediate predecessor. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S.Ct. 2075, 2079-2080 (2017) (per
curiam) (Gorsuch, J., with Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting from Pavan's ruling that if state
birth certificates set forth the names of male spouses of birthmothers, then that state may not
refuse to issue birth certificates setting forth the name of "female spouse[s]" of the
birthmothers). Arguably then, regarding "due process of law" issues, Gorsuch's appointment
to replace Scalia did not change but rather maintained the seeming balance of four justices
supporting the dignity paradigm, four justices supporting the deeply rooted principles
standard, and Justice Kennedy providing the critical fifth vote.
That balance is now in question because on June 27,2018, Justice Kennedy announced
his retirement effective July 31st. E.g., Ariane de Vogue, Justice Anthony Kennedy To Retire
from Supreme Court, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/politics/anthony-kennedy-
retires/index.html (June 27, 2018) (accessed, August 2, 2018). Shortly after Kennedy's
announcement, on October 6, 2018, after an extraordinarily contentious and partisan-saturated
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As explained below, because the deeply rooted principles standard is
contrary to the overarching intent of both the Framers and the Reconstruction
Congress, it confounds Originalism. Rather, the correct standard is the
dignity paradigm because it comports with Deontological Originalism -- it
fulfills the Framers' intent, both circa 1787-1791 and 1868, that the
Constitution must enforce the natural rights moral philosophy of the
Declaration of Independence pursuant to the best available moral theory.
B. Why the Constitution Must Recognize Substantive Due Process --
As found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the constitutional
term "due process of law" might be read to address only legal procedures --
"process." Nonetheless, it is long settled that due process further includes a
substantive component, logically denoted as "substantive due process."408
While certainly relevant to procedural matters, it is over the meaning and
application of substantive due process that the warring extant Supreme Court
doctrines, the dignity paradigm and deeply rooted principles, each seek
dominion. Given what is at stake, it is perhaps not surprising that within
American constitutionally law, no other concept is as pivotal to the
Constitution's very meaning, purpose, and legitimacy, and yet is as bitterly
contentious as is substantive due process. Indeed, amid the numerous
provocative canons and principles derived from our Constitution, none are
confirmation hearing, the Senate confirmed President Trump's nominee to fill Justice
Kennedy's seat, Hon. Brett Kavanaugh, formerly United States Circuit Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. A highly respected attorney and
judge, Kavanaugh is considered to be extremely "conservative," thus, as a general matter,
likely to vote with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito and Gorsuch, especially
regarding matters of constitutional law. E.g., David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski, And
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, There Is No Liberal Case for Brett Kavanaugh, L.A. Times, August
1, 2018, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-grewal-kapczynski-kohlerhausmann-
20180801-story.html#(accessed, August 2, 2018). One probable upshot of the elevation of
Justice (formerly Judge) Kavanaugh is that the Court might no longer apply, indeed could
altogether repudiate the theory of "human dignity" as a legitimate standard to assess the
constitutionality of governmental conduct. That is, the Court may reaffirm not simply in
words but in actuality McDonald's declaration that the Constitution recognizes only the deeply
rooted principles approach (at least until there is, if ever, another personnel shift resulting in
a "liberal" majority willing to apply the dignity paradigm).
408. "If text and history are inconclusive on this point, our precedent leaves no doubt: It has
been 'settled' for well over a century that the Due Process Clause 'applies to matters of
substantive law as well as to matters of procedure."' McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561
U.S. 742, 863 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), see also, id. at 753-766 (majority opinion discussing
the history of substantive due process).
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more controversial than substantive due process, as courts 409 and
commentators agree. 4 10 Correspondingly, "It is difficult to imagine a more
maligned constitutional doctrine than 'substantive due process."'
4 1 1
Naysayers have and continue to castigate substantive due process as "a legal
fiction,'"412 as a judicially created lie,4 13  as "incoherent,' 1 14  as
contradictory,4 15 as lacking any principled constitutional basis,4 16 as
409. United States v. Fortney, 357 F.3d 818, 821 (note 4) (8th Cir. 2004) (discussing
substantive due process as a "controversial inquiry"); see also Pena v. Mattox, 84 F.3d 894,
898 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing substantive due process as a "controversial and oft-abused
doctrine"); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Browner, 848 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. 111. 1994)
("[T]he controversial and complex concept of 'substantive due process' remains nebulous").
410. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through
Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REv. 519, 521 (2008) ("Substantive due process is one
of the most confusing and most controversial areas of constitutional law"); see also Kermit
Roosevelt, The Indivisible Constitution, 25 CONST. COMMENT 321, 326 (2009) ("[Tlhe
enterprise of substantive due process [is] perhaps the invisible Constitution's most contentious
project "); see also Stephen L. Mikochik, Self-Restraint and Substantive Due Process, 27
QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 817, 817 (2009) ("Substantive due process is among the most contentious
areas of constitutional law").
411. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 588.
412. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring);
accord Adam Lamparello & Charles E. Maclean, It's the People's Constitution, Stupid: Two
Liberals Pay Tribute to Antonin Scalia's Legacy, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 281, 289-90 (2014) ("In
the last fifty years, the path to judicial supremacy has been a messy one indeed, paved with
legal fictions such as substantive due process").
413. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
31 (1990) (substantive due process is, "momentous sham" that "has been used countless times
since by judges who want to write their personal beliefs into a document").
414. Nat'l Aero. & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 162 (2011) (Scalia, J., with
Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I shall not fill the U.S. Reports with further
explanation of the incoherence of the Court's 'substantive due process' doctrine in its many
manifestations"). Similarly, noted scholar Charles L. Black castigated that substantive due
process, follows no sound methods of interpretation (how could it, given the nature of the
phrase itself?) and is therefore neither reliably invocable in cases that come up, nor
forecastable in result by anything much but a guess. This kind of non-standard is not good
enough for a systematic equity of human rights. It everlastingly will not do; it is infra
dignitatem, it leaks in the front and leaks in the back. CHARLEs L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH
OF FREEDOM 3 (1997) (quoted in Niles, supra note 28, at 136).
415. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L. REV.
63, 63 (2006) ("Substantive due process is in serious disarray, with the Supreme Court
simultaneously embracing two, and perhaps three, competing and inconsistent theories of
decision making"); see also John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional
Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) ("[S]ubstantive due process is not just an error but a
contradiction in terms").
416. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 812 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("This Court's substantive
due process framework fails to account for both the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the history that led to its adoption, filling that gap with a jurisprudence devoid of a guiding
principle").
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"oxymoronic,"417 as "idiotic," 4 1 8 as clearly wrong,4 19 and, perhaps most
charitably, difficult to define.4 20
Because, as will be shown, substantive due process is the quintessence
of the Constitution, it behooves this work to undertake a rather detailed
review of that doctrine's origin and importance to explain why "due process
of law," both substantive and procedural, exemplifies Deontological
Originalism via the dignity paradigm rather than the deeply rooted principles
approach. Such a thorough examination is appropriate because nothing less
than the meaning ofAmerican liberty itself depends on which paradigm the
judiciary rightly applies.
1. Substantive Due Process' Core Definition --
What, then, is this doctrine which numerous legal experts condemned in-
most ardent and unkind terms as brutishly and irredeemably corrupt, yet has.
become the Constitution's most paradigmatic concept -- its value monism4 21
-- thus, the essence of that charter's predominant duty to vindicate the
Declaration of Independence? We can begin with the not surprising
observation that, "Substantive due process is often defined but rarely with
precision."4 22 Yet, substantive due process' basic premises are clear and,
given our understanding of Deontology, familiar enough to be reduced to a
417. CHARLESL. BLACK, JR., ANEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 3 (1997) ("This paradoxical, even
oxymoronic phrase -- 'substantive due process' -- has been inflated into a patched and leaky
tire on which precariously rides the load of some substantive human rights not named in the
Constitution").
418. Antonin Scalia, A Look Back-] 994 William 0. Douglas Lecture Series Transcript, 51
GONZ. L. REv. 583, 584 (2016) ("Think about that-substantive due process-it's idiotic...").
419. See generally Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1557 (2004) ("Lawrence is a paragon of the most
anticonstitutional branch of constitutional law: substantive due process").
420. See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because
guideposts for responsible decision making in this unchartered area are scarce and open-
ended").
421. See generally, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-h (value
monism is the concept or idea from which, in a given field, all other concepts and ideas derive).
422. Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 31 CONST. COMM. 253, 257
(2016); see also Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L. J.
1313, 1342 (2016) (discussing the fact that scholars have concluded, despite its nearly two-
hundred-year persistence and "deep historical roots," that "The Supreme Court has never
clearly defined the contours of the doctrine of substantive due process. ... [Rather,] the Court
has treated it as a gap-filler to be applied when procedural due process fails to adequately
protect against [deprivations of] individual liberty") (footnote omitted)).
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relatively short definition: "The substantive due process doctrine can be
defined as 'the body of law produced by the courts as they employ the due
process clauses to review government action on its merits."'4 23 That is, while
a matter of procedural due process discerns whether the legal process -- the
applicable procedures -- employed to enforce challenged "government
action" comport with principles of due process, a question of substantive due
process inquires whether the substance -- the purposes, standards, and
outcomes -- of challenged "government action" comport with principles of
due process. Accordingly, "due process of law" comprises fundamental, that
is unalienable, rights that not only comprehend procedural matters, but as
well "substantive" liberty interests. 424
As the Supreme Court has explained, substantive due process "forbids
the government to infringe certain 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored
423. J. Nicholas Murosko, Communicable Diseases and the Right to Re-Enter the United
States, 24 WM. & MARY BILL. RTS. J. 913, 933 (2016) (quoting, Michael J. Phillips, The
Substantive Due Process Rights of College and University Faculty, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 567, 569
(1991)).
424. A classic example of a fundamental procedural right is the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of legal counsel in criminal prosecutions, a right that the courts deem "essential to
a fair trial." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (discussing, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)). Similarly, "A criminal defendant's right to present a defense is essential
to a fair trial." United States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1214 (10th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Portillos, 714 F. App'x 889, 893 (10th Cir. 2017). An archetypal substantive due process
right is the First Amendment protection of free speech. E.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (public school system may not compel unwilling students
to engage in a formal ceremony saluting the American Flag, nor to participate in daily recital
of The Pledge of Allegiance). A seemingly different instance of a substantive right protected
by "due process of law" is the "fundamental right of privacy in one's sexual life." Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2008).
This writing notes in passing that the very familiar texts of both the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments ensure that no person under the jurisdiction of any governmental
entity of the United States will, "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; ... " For the sake of simplicity, this writing refers to deprivations of "liberty" as the
emblam of all possible Due Process Clauses violations. And, indeed, while judicial decisions
may draw disctinctions, we understand substantive "due process liberty" to encompass more
than instances of imprisonment or similar governmental measures restricting against their wills
the ability of persons to move about physically. Rather, as we will see, substantive and
procedural due process combined covers every issue arising under the Constitution's DFue
Process Clauses.
Therefore, claims of deprivation of "life" or "property" without "due process of law"
actually are species of "liberty" deprivation claims. Consequently, limiting discussion to "due
process liberty" does not actually exclude isues addressing "life" and "property" under "due
process of law."
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to serve a compelling state interest."4 25 Thus, as noted, governmental conduct
may offend "due process of law" by employing infirm means, that is,
illegitimate process or procedure, even if the ends are legitimate. 42 6
Likewise, although the means to enforce legislation or other governmental
policies and practices may be constitutional, substantive due process,
"protects individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." 427 Accordingly,
accomplishing, in Prof. Phillips' words, a "review" of "government action on
its merits'A 28 requires determining whether the particular challenged action
offends at least one right sufficiently fundamental to be covered under the
Due Process Clauses. If so, the tested "government action" is
unconstitutional; if not, the conduct is constitutional, thus, lawful.
Assuming that the Constitution indeed recognizes claims of substantive
due process, the palpable difficulty becomes, to borrow Prof. Phillip's
phrasing, how does the Judiciary conduct such a "review" of, "government
action on its merits"? 429 That is, how do courts and other reviewing bodies
ascertain the nature and extent of any applicable rights, and then determine
whether the challenged action comports with the strictures of such applicable
rights? As accented above, this writing insists that the dignity paradigm
425. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations omitted, emphasis in original); see
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770
F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Flores); see also Kitchen v. Herbert, 775 F.3d 1193,
1218 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Seegmiller v. LaVerkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir.
2008); see also Russ v. Watts, 414 F.3d 783, 789 (7th Cir. 2005) (discussing Flores and
Glucksberg).
426. For instance, while the goal of arresting criminals surely is legitimate, unreasonable
searches conducted in the hope of discovering evidence sufficient to premise an arrest (and
subsequent indictment and conviction) violate individuals' fundamental right of privacy.
Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures
comprises a fundamental constitutional right. E.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of
San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
427. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (quoting, Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
428. While the very purpose of this writing is to discern a general definition of fundamental
- unalienable -- rights, the Supreme Court per Justice Robert Jackson, offered a celebrated
and useful shorthand during the height of World War II: fundamental constitutional rights,
"withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond
the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by
the courts." West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (public school
system may not compel unwilling students to participate in daily recital of The Pledge of
Allegiance).
429. See, supra note 423.
287
THURGOOD M4RSHALL LAW REVIEW
rather than the deeply rooted principles standard provides the correct
analytical criteria.
To perform due process analysis, the courts ascertain a core of rights --
"liberty interests" -- that cannot be infringed to advance governmental
policies unless justified by sufficiently overarching needs. 43 0  I note in
passing that pursuant to deontological morality, Idemonstrated in an earlier
work that there is no compelling governmental interest, including national
security concerns, more urgent than enforcing liberty under the Due Process
Clauses.431 Accordingly, the precept of Kantian ethics that "justice [must]
be done even if the world should perish,"4 32 means that the United States
must be willing to face destruction rather than violate due process, a
proposition in which I fully believe but which has no resonance with either
courts or the overwhelming bulk of commentators. Because my project
herein is to validate Deontological Originalism, this writing does not
challenge the Judiciary's proposition that necessity may trump liberty,
although, when properly understood, constitutional morality debunks that
presumption.
Setting forth complaints commonly mustered against substantive due
process, two scholars recently insisted,
"Due process of law" is the oldest phrase and the oldest idea in our
Constitution, but it may be the most unrecognizable in modem
interpretation. Due process was not at all about judicial creation of
fundamental rights outside the reach of legislative amendment, and only
secondarily about notice and the opportunity to be heard. Fundamentally,
it was about securing the rule of law. It ensured that the executive would
not be able unilaterally to deprive persons within the nation of their rights
of life, liberty, or property except as provided by common law or statute
and as adjudicated by independent judicial bodies, and that legislatures
430. Michael J. Philips, The Substantive Due Process Rights of College and University
Faculty, 28 AM. Bus. L. J. 567, 569 (1991) (discussing, MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 117 (1982)). As the Second Circuit recently summarized,
"A constitutional violation only occurs when the individual's interest in privacy outweighs the
government's interest in breaching it." Hancock v. Cty. of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir.
2018).
431. See, Bayer, supra note 17.
432. IMMANUEL KANT, TOWARD PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS,
PEACE, AND HISTORY 102 n.16 (Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006).
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would not be able to step beyond their properly legislative roles of
enacting general rules for governance of future behavior. 43 3
Thus, according to Profs. Chapman and McConnell, the Due Process
Clauses exist to preserve "separation of powers.'A 34 That is, "Legislative acts
violated due process not because they were unreasonable or in violation of
higher law, but because they exercised judicial power or abrogated common
law procedural protections. These applications of due process to the
legislature were based on common law principles about the nature of
legislation as distinguished from judicial acts (not "natural law" as that term
is commonly used), ... ':35 Consequently, they assert, "It is ironic that the
courts, starting in the late nineteenth century, seized upon this principle to
subvert the separation of powers by giving themselves a super-legislative
power to change rather than interpret and enforce the law.'A 36
Importantly, Chapman and McConnell's project is not to deny that
somewhere in the Constitution may lie one or more provisions that alone -or
in combination function as now does substantive due process. Rather, their
claim is that the Due Process Clauses are not that source, should such a source
exist.4 37 In support, their fascinating and meticulously researched article
concludes that, with but two exceptions which themselves are
"controversial," prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Every
known application of the principle of due process involved the deprivation of
433. Chapman and McConnell, supra note 359, at 1807.
434. "Due process both undergirded and gained its definition from the emerging separation
of powers first in Britain and then in America." Id.
435. Id. at 1677. Explicating their historical research and conclusions, the two authors urge,
The distinctive aspect of modem "substantive due process," in contrast, is its
treatment of natural liberty as inviolate, even as against prospective and general laws
passed by the legislature and enforced by means of impeccable procedures. No
significant court decision, legal argument, or commentary prior to the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, let alone the Fifth, so much as hinted that due process
embodies these features. With two controversial exceptions [], antebellum courts did
not assert the power to declare that individuals "should have" certain rights that
legislatures had denied to everyone.
Id. at 1679-80
436. Id. at 1807.
437. "We emphasize that our argument here is confined only to the Due Process Clauses,
and only to their original meaning. Our argument is not based on any jurisprudential
skepticism about the desirability of judicially enforceable unenumerated rights as a general
matter, but solely on the historic understanding of 'due process.' We take no position here on
whether other provisions of the Constitution, such as the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, empower courts to engage in practices
akin to substantive due process ... " Id. at 1680.
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rights (usually property rights; there are far fewer liberty cases) that had their
source in positive law, whether in a written constitution, a statute, or the
common law.'A3 8
The Chapman-McConnell critique is powerful. But, the Deontological
Originalism proposed herein harkens to the quintessence of the moral-
political theory that the Founders and the Reconstruction Congress rightly
understood to legitimize both the American Revolution and the Constitution
now governing the nation that Revolution produced. As has been shown,439
its true founding document, the Declaration of Independence, grounds the
United States (as must any rightful nation) in deontological morality. The
commands of the Declaration are correct and supersede other understandings
or habits that might have been prevalent, but confounded the moral precepts
that legitimize American government. The Constitution formalizes -- sets
the positive law -- to enforce the Declaration's natural rights precepts.440
Therefore, contrary to Chapman and McConnell's assertion, substantive
due process emanates from the "positive law ... written in [our]
constitution,"A 1 because the Due Process Clauses are extant in the texts of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Granted, those texts are sparse,
providing little explicit guidance;442 but, their few words are amenable to
some textual analysis.44 3 More importantly, as Chapman and McConnell's
438. Id.
439. See, text accompanying supra notes 126-209.
440. That fulfilling the Constitution's rightful relationship to the Declaration's edicts might
have taken decades -- or centuries -- does not imply that the link between law and morality is
illicit. Rather, the fact that nearly two and a half centuries after its founding, despite
undeniable and truly remarkable progress, the United States still strives to enforce fully the
Declaration's principles simply confirms what logic and experience generally instruct: due to
corruption, imperfect understanding, or likely a combination of both, identifying the correct
paradigm does not assure that from the first, or even with considerable passage of time, the
paradigm will be duly and fully understood, much less completely enforced.
441. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 359, at 1680.
442. "The Due Process Clause is tucked into a compound sentence without a proper subject.
The Fifth Amendment is silent about whom it prohibits from depriving rights 'without due
process of law.' The passive voice suggests that the Amendment is not limited as to 'who,'
but only as to 'what.' Just as importantly, the Constitution nowhere defines 'due process of
law."' Id. at 1721.
443. Indeed, Chapman and McConnell include textual evaluation in their article. For
example, they argue, "The Clause says that no one may be deprived of the relevant set of rights
'without due process of law.' That surely means persons may be deprived of those rights if
due process of law has been accorded. The words chosen would be a very odd way of
communicating the idea that the rights mentioned are inalienable." Id. at 1725 (footnote
omitted). While their assertion is aptly debunked by Justice John Marshall Harlan's more
persuasive reading, see, text accompanying infra notes 459-72, we see that, despite the
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very project evinces, the meaning of the Due Process Clauses' admittedly
meagre prose can and should be informed by history -- a history confirming,
as argued below, that the Constitution protects all "unalienable Rights"
whether enumerated therein or not. It is consistent enough with their origins,
as demonstrated next, to conclude that the Due Process Clauses are the
enumeration of the Constitution's protection of unenumerated rights.44
2. Substantive Due Process' Disreputable Birth and Childhood --
Part of its controversial nature derives from the unfortunate fact that
substantive due process first reared itself in American law to defend slavery,
an ignoble debut to be sure. Specifically, the premiere substantive due
process decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford," overturned that portion of The
Missouri Compromise" declaring slaves who enter free territory to no
longer be the enslaved property of their "masters." The Dred Scott Court
wrote, "And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had
committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the
name of due process of law." 7
The brutality of that inauspicious beginning was compounded during
the early-Twentieth Century when substantive due process became the
underpinning of the Supreme Court's now discredited doctrine known as
Lochnerism. Lochner v. New York"8 controversially ruled, "The general
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the [substantive]
liberty of the individual protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] 14th
clauses' very brief and incomplete texts, Chapman and McConnell do not begrudge the Due
Process Clauses at least a modicum of textual meaning.
444. Therefore, contrary to Chapman and McConnell's assertion, echoing the sentiment of
most critics of substantive due process, that the courts have "giv[en] themselves a super-
legislative power," (supra note 359, at 1807), because the Judiciary is the proper interpreter
of the Due Process Clauses, (see, text accompanying infra notes 799-863), it is the courts'
integral duty, free from the inherent politics of the legislative and executive branches, to
identify and to safeguard such unenumerated rights as the other government branches,
knowingly or inadvertently, have contravened.
445. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
446. Missouri Enabling Act, ch. 22, § 8, 3 Stat. 548 (1820) (admitting Missouri into the
Union as a "slave state").
447. Scott, 60 U.S. at 450; see also, supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text (discussing
critical disapproval of Scott).
448. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), abrogated by West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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Amendment .... The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty
protected by this amendment."' 9  Pursuant to Lochner's proposition that
freedom to contract emanates from substantive due process, the Supreme
Court overturned numerous beneficent state laws regulating certain
employment terms and conditions to help laborers considered unduly
exploited by management.4 50 Moreover, in related decisions, the Court
invalidated similarly motivated acts of Congress arguing that regulating
working conditions is the province of state governments, therefore,
Congress' "Commerce Clause" authority cannot reach what was then
interpreted to be essentially intrastate business conduct related to the
manufacturing of goods and services.' Whether based, as some
commentators argue, on the justices' personal belief in laissez-faire
economics, 45 2 or on their honest belief that a general "right to contract" is
449. Id. at 53; see Whole Women's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("During the Lochner era, the Court considered the right to contract
and other economic liberties to be fundamental requirements of due process of law"); see also
Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1362 (1 th Cir. 2011)
(Murphy, J., dissenting in part) (summarizing the "bygone" Lochner era as a period where
"substantive due process was more broadly interpreted as also encompassing and protecting
the right, liberty, or freedom of contract"), rev'd in part, aff'd in part by Nat'1 Fed'n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
450. See, e.g., Barry Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes ofLochnerism, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 881, 896-924 (2005) (recounting cases).
451. See generally, William W. Buzbee & Robert Schapiro, Unidimensional Federalism:
Power and Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1210-
16 (2003); Christina E. Coleman, The Future ofthe Federalism Revolution: Gonzales v. Raich
and the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L. J. 803, 816 (note 75) (2006)
(discussing "the pre-1937 [commerce] cases distinguishing production and manufacturing
from commerce) (citing, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 822 (3d ed.
1999)). Simply put, "The pre-1937 Court followed the principle that the Commerce Clause
vests power in Congress to regulate activities that directly affect interstate commerce (such as
the rates charged by railroads on intrastate lines), but that the Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to regulate activities that indirectly affect interstate commerce (such as the
employment of child labor)." Wilson Huhn, Constitutionality of The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act Under the Commerce Clause and The Necessary and Proper Clause, 2 J.
LEG. MED. 139, 150 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (citing Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918) (striking down federal law prohibiting child labor on ground that law exceeds
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause)).
452. Laissez-faire economics refers to the theory that, as a general matter, markets and other
such aspects of economies ought not be subject to governmental regulations, even for altruistic
purposes. See generally Kevin S. Marshall, Product Disparagement Under the Sherman Act,
Its Nurturing and Injurious Effects to Competition, and the Tension Between Jurisprudential
Economics and Microeconomics, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 231, 238-39 (2006) (explaining
that the rationale against official regulation is predicated on the perfect competition model,
which is "the assumption that all market participants are rational, with rational action being
defined by the principle ofutility-profit maximization. Any act of consumption or production
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among the unenumerated fundamental rights arising under the
Constitution,45 3  Lochnerism erroneously forbade454  State actors from
regulating the "free market" of contracts absent some formidable
countervailing interest.455
Famously, in the midst of the Great Depression, the 1937 Supreme
Court reversed what some claim to have been its purported laissez-faire
partiality by upholding state regulation under the Tenth Amendment (and
similar Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause) that formerly
seemed condemned to legal oblivion by Lochnerism regarding state laws, and
by a miserly understanding of "interstate commerce" regarding acts of
that fails to maximize the utility or profit of an individual or firm is considered to be irrational
economic behavior").
453. Cushman, supra note 450, at 998-99 (offering the plausible viewpoint that numerous
perspectives informed the justices who joined the Court's Lochner-based rulings). Actually,
it is hard to imagine that even the most ardent anit-Lochner proponents would deny that the
Constitution implies a fundamental right to contract as part of private transactions. While of
the highest improbability, should Congress, a State, or some locality actually adopt legislation
prohibiting any and all private contractual transactions, the obvious and immediate means to
quash such law would be to argue that such a law is arbitrary and devoid of validating public
purpose, a proposition recognized consistently by the Judiciary. E.g., National R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 472 (1985) ("To prevail on a
claim that federal economic legislation unconstitutionally impairs a private contractual right,
... The party asserting a Fifth Amendment due process violation must overcome a presumption
of constitutionality and establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way."); Erotic Serv. Provider Legal Educ. & Research Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 459
(9th Cir.), amended, 881 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2018), "The fundamental right to make contracts
is guaranteed by the Constitution, which forbids the government from arbitrarily depriving
persons of liberty, including the liberty to earn a living and keep the fruits of one's labor. See,
e.g., Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 228, 105 S.Ct. 2557, 86 L.Ed.2d 130 (1985) ("It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business, or profession he may choose."(quoting Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 121-22, 9
S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889))).
454. Whole Women's Health, 136 S.Ct. at 2328 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Court in
1937 repudiated Lochner's foundations").
455. For instance, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), distinguishing Lochner,
unanimously upheld Oregon's statute prohibiting manufacturers from compelling their female
employees to work more than ten hours per workday. In an opinion now notorious for its
chauvinism, the Court stated that, "history discloses the fact that woman has always been
dependent upon man," due essentially to women's inherent weaknesses coupled with the
unique physical and societal demands of Motherhood. Id. at 421. Accordingly,
"Differentiated by these matters from the other sex, [womanhood] is properly placed in a class
by herself, and legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like
legislation is not necessary for men, and could not be sustained. It is impossible to close one's
eyes to the fact that she still looks to her brother and depends upon him." Id at 422.
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Congress.45 6 Some commentators still too casually describe the fall of
Lochnerism as essentially the death of substantive due process, when, in fact,
that doctrine has never been more alive.45 7 In actuality, the Supreme Court's
error, "was not its philosophy that the due process clauses contain implicit
substantive as well procedural meanings ... Rather, [Dred Scott's and]
Lochner's foundational premise remains the Constitution's prevailing
paradigm: the Due Process Clauses invalidate all arbitrary or unreasonable
federal, state and local governmental conduct.""
If the birth and adolescence of substantive due process were dubious,
not promising a particularly upright maturation, like a petulant child who
upon attaining her majority unexpectedly blossoms into selfless decency, the
adulthood of substantive due process has culminated in the Obergefell-
Windsor line of precedent evincing the nobility and profundity Dred Scott
and Lochner lacked: adopting Kantian morality as the paradigm of "due
process of law."
456. Herbert Hovencamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme
Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 2213, 2214 n.5 (1996)
("Beginning in 1937, the courts accommodated ['Progressive neoclassical'] views with a
much more benign attitude toward regulation"). Indeed, Lochner itself was abrogated by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
457. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L. J.
215, 217-18 (1987) (During the late 1930s into the 1940s, "in line with prevailing political
sentiments... the Court rapidly eliminated substantive due process as a serious ground of
constitutional challenge. The first life of substantive due process was at an end.") (footnotes
omitted). The "second life," according to Conkle and other scholars, began in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Supreme Court applied the implied and
unenumerated right of personal privacy-arising under substantive due process-to invalidate
state laws prohibiting married couples from obtaining contraception. Id. at 219-221
(discussing Griswold and its progeny). Similarly, Prof. James E. Fleming opined that, "In
1937, ... the constitutional revolution wrought by the New Deal ... officially repudiated the
Lochner Era, marking the first death of substantive due process." James E. Fleming, Fidelity,
Basic Liberties, and the Specter of Lochner, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 147, 149 (1999)
(footnote citing authorities omitted).
The purported "second death" of substantive due process derives from the Supreme
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 478 U.S. 186 (1986) upholding states' authority to
criminal homosexual "sodomy." See generally, Conkle at 221-41. Bowers, however, was
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), decided adecade after Bowers, showing
that the Supreme Court had never abandoned substantive due process to vindicate fundamental
rights under the Constitution. See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (states may not
purely on the basis of their status single out a class of homosexual individuals for adverse legal
treatment). See, infra Section 6-c-6 (discussing the "homosexual rights" cases and the dignity
paradigm).
458. Bayer, supra note 17, at 877 n.42. See also, text accompanying infra notes 600-10.
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3. The Textual Proof of Substantive Due Process --
Despite its just described imperfect past and although some judges and
scholars still resist its existence, nearly sixty years ago, making a purely
textual argument expounding on the logic and power of the Due Process
Clauses, in what is known as his "Poe dissent," the second Justice John
Marshall Harlan explicated succinctly why the concept "due process of law"
must include a substantive component.45 9 In fact, as we shortly will see, more
459. Harlan often is referred to as the "second Justice Harlan" because his grandfather, Hon.
John Marshall Harlan, was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from 1877 until his
death in 1911, an astonishing 34 years, to date the sixth longest tenure ofany justice. The first
Justice Harlan is perhaps best remembered as "the great dissenter," for his acclaimed dissents
in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 33-63 (1889) (Harlan, J., dissenting), Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), o., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652-54 (1895) (Harlan,
J., dissenting from ruling that Federal income taxt is unconstitutional and expressing his
concurrence in Justice White's dissenting opinion); and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
65-74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (while the Due Process Clauses have substantive content,
a right of contract as described by the Majority, is not among those rights), abrogated by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
While perhaps not as brisk in tone and judicial demeanor as his forebare, the "second
Justice Harlan" maintained the illustriousness ofhis grandfather. Courtley yet forceful, quietly
dynamic, erudite and imaginative, the online source Oyez astutely encapsulated the uniqueness
of Harlan as a Supreme Court justice:
John Marshall Harlan 11 was a conservative icon of the U.S. Supreme Court who
practiced a unique form of jurisprudence combining judicial restraint and
activism. ... Justice Harlan's jurisprudence, while conservative, is perhaps best
described as a balance between textualism and support for evolving constitutional
principles. He adamantly opposed strict textualism, but found that the original
intent of the Constitution could be supplemented by measuring the social impact
of judicial decisions. Ultimately, he believed in a limited federal judiciary and
favored the political process as the best realm for addressing and remedying public
issues.
Oyez, Body Politic -- The Supreme Court and Abortion Law,
https://www.oyez.org/justices/john mharlan2 (visited, January 30, 2019).
The hallmarks of Harlan's judicial tenure were integrity, dignity, and mettle. In the
words of his former law clerk, Hon. Henry J. Friendly (a judge on the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, as was Harlan prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court), "[T]here has never been
a Justice of the Supreme Court who has so consistently maintained a high quality of
performance or, despite differences in views, has enjoyed such nearly uniform respect from
his colleagues, the inferior bench, the bar, and the academy." Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice
Harlan, as Seen by a Friend and Judge ofan Inferior Court, 85 HARv. L. REv. 382, 384 (1971).
See also Hon. Robert H. Henry, Living Our Traditions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 673, 680 (2011)
(Judge Henry noted, "Today, Justice Harlan is remembered for his marvelously crafted
opinions, his consistent and principled judicial conservatism, and his patrician traditionalism
that was, at the same time, remarkably sensitive to other views.") (footnote omitted).
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than any other single jurist, the second Justice Harlan provided scholars and
practitioners with the single most complete abstract theory of "due process
of law."460 The dignity paradigm is, I believe, the natural progeny of
Harlan's Poe dissent although Harlan likely would not have applied his Poe
standards as has the Supreme Court through the dignity paradigm.
Interestingly, even before his elevation from judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the "conservative" Harlan set a formidable, forceful new
standard for Supreme Court justices. Nominated by President Eisenhower in 1955 to fill the
seat of Justice Robert Jackson who has died suddenly that January, some members of the
Senate were concerned that Harlan would foster the Warren Court "liberalism" that only
months earlier had produced Brown v. Board of Education. Id. Then-Judge Harlan accepted
the Judiciary Committee's request to testify regarding his, "judicial philosophy. This had never
been done before, but it set a precedent for every future Supreme Court nomination." Id. As
SCOTUSbIog notes,
Although we think of nominees' testimony as the centerpiece of the confirmation
process, for most of the country's history, Supreme Court nominees did not testify
publicly. Justice Harlan Fiske Stone appeared before the committee in 1925 to
address allegations related to a political scandal, and Justices Felix Frankfurter
(1939) and Robert Jackson (1941) also testified. But it was not until 1955, with the
nomination of John Marshall Harlan, that the current practice of routine
appearances began.
Carolyn Shapiro, Putting Supreme Court confirmation hearings in context, SCOTUSblog,
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/putting-supreme-court-confirmation-hearings-in-
context/(visited, January 30, 2019).
However one may feel about the discrete opinions he wrote or joined, John Marshall
Harlan II was a jurist of utmost integrity and learning -- a cautious theorist who, recognizing
the dynamism inherent in constitutional law, was not afraid to perform the work his judicial
job titles suggested. He understood his job was to judge in order to do justice.
460. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See, text
accompanying infra notes 729-70.
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Purported "textualists'A61 such as Justice Antonin Scalia claim that the
Due Process Clauses cannot cover anything but procedural law.462 Typical
of Justice Scalia's critique is his assertion that,
By [their] inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clauses] guaranteef]
only process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken;
even life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions
require -- notably, a validly enacted law and a fair trial. To say otherwise
is to abandon textualism, and to render democratically adopted texts mere
springboards for judicial lawmaking. 6 3
461. "Properly understood, textualism means that in resolving ambiguity, interpreters
should give precedence to semantic context (evidence about the way reasonable people use
words) rather than policy context (evidence about the way reasonable people would solve
problems). Purposivists claim [by contrast] that this approach is backwards. There is no
reason, they assert, to believe that legislators vote on the basis of semantic minutiae." John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 70, 110 (2006).
Similarly, Prof Paulsen stated,
Written textualism means giving the text its objective and public meaning. The
document's instruction to look to the document--"this Constitution"--commands an
internal perspective, forbidding external, private assignments of meaning. The fact,
that the document specifies the document as the sole source of binding authority also
implies the exclusivity of the text. It precludes treating any "thing" external to the
text as authoritative. Thus, it is not anyone's "intent," outside the document, that
governs, but the meaning of the language inside the document: that is, the objective
meaning of the words, according to the usual rules of language as they would have
been employed by a hypothetical objective observer (that old friendly ghost of the
law, the "reasonable man") at the time. ...
Written textualism also implies that the meaning of the text is fixed. It is fixed
not only as against private assignments of meaning, but as against shifting
understandings of words and phrases over time--that is, it is fixed as against sudden
or gradual anachronistic readings of its words. The meaning of the text is fixed at a
point in time.
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
103 Nw. L. REv. 857, 920 (2009).
462. See Timothy C. McDonnell, Justice Scalia's Fourth Amendment: Text, Context,
Clarity, and Occasional Faint-Hearted Originalism, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 175, 181 (2015)
(discussing the theory of interpretation known as textualism, according to Justice Scalia, "the
textualist 'begins and ends with what the text says and fairly implies.' Put differently, "the
text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed"').
463. ANTONIN ScAuA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 24-
25 (1997) (emphasis added).
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Accordingly, "Due process textualists, ... argue that the plain language
of the Due Process Clauses precludes substantive due process. ... [This is
because] as John Harrison simply restated, 'Process means procedure."'4 64
In a stunning, indeed dazzling rebuke of such textualist arguments,
accenting in particular the Supreme Court's Late-Nineteenth Century's
Hurtado v. California, 465 Justice Harlan's celebrated dissenting opinion in
Poe v. Ullman466 expounded,
Were due process merely a procedural safeguard it would fail to reach
those situations where the deprivation of life, liberty or property was
accomplished by legislation which by operating in the future could, given
even the fairest possible procedure in application to individuals,
nevertheless destroy the enjoyment of all three. ... Thus the guaranties of
due process ... have in this country "become bulwarks also against
arbitrary legislation.""
Harlan's argument rebukes Scalia and his followers not by renouncing
textualism itself, but by noting that text can be subject to more than one
cogent interpretation with context and lucidity helping to determine the best
464. Stephen Durden, Partial Textualism, 41 U. OF MEMPHIS L. REV. 1, 46 (2010) (citing
Paul E. McGreal, There is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional
Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2393, 2440 (2001) and quoting John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493, 538 (1997)).
465. Hurtado v. People of State of Cal., I10 U.S. 516 (1884).
466. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The eminent
constitutional law scholar Laurence Tribe acclaimed Justice Harlan's Poe dissent as, "justly
famous." Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM
16, 16 (2015); see also, Paul Benjamin Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight from
Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 15, 23 (1993). Likewise, Harlan's
dissent properly has been denoted "influential," "important," and, "seminal." See e.g., John
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REv. 493, 502
(1997) ("influential"); Roy Lucas, New Historical Insights on the Curious Case ofBaird v.
Eisenstadt, 9 ROGER WILMS. U. L. REV. 9, 27 (note 69) (2003) ("important"); Courtney G.
Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage, 97 B.U.L. REv. 425, 461 (2017)
("seminal"); see also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., The Legacy ofGriswold, 16 OHIoN. U. L. REV.
511, 521 (1989) ("seminal").
467. Poe, 367 U.S. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 532). That
"due process of law" proscribes arbitrary or capricious governmental actions remains the basic
understanding of the two Due process Clauses. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) ("[T]he guaranties of due process ... considered as procedural
safeguards 'against executive usurpation and tyranny,' have in this country 'become bulwarks
also against arbitrary legislation"); see also Poe, 367 U.S. at 497 (majority opinion) (quoting
Hurtado, I 10 U.S. at 532); infra, Section 5-e-1, 2 (discussing the meaning of "arbitrary or
capricious").
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among plausible meanings, an interpretive norm Justice Scalia himself freely
and frequently acknowledged.468 Granted the word "process" in the phrase
"due process of law" subsumes procedure; but, as Justice Harlan astutely
declaimed, within the context of the Due Process Clauses, "process" need not
and does not mean only or exclusively procedure. Rather, any given
substantive law creates a process, meaning conduct that governmental actors
either cannot do,46 9 or must do,470 or may do based on reasonable exercise of
468.
The meaning of statutory terms, according to Justice Scalia, is to be understood in
light of context as well as ordinary usage. Justice Scalia may be referring here to the
internal context, that is, how a term is used within the text. ... [As well,] Justice Scalia
may be referring to external contexts, that is, where the statute fits in a larger picture
that includes legislative history, policy considerations, institutional arrangements,
and facts about the world. ... The legal context or surrounding body of law is also
relevant to the meaning of a statute in Justice Scalia's view.
Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 407 (1994) (note) (footnotes omitted).
Karkkainen avers that such references to "context" are, "inconsistent with a purely
textualist approach to statutory interpretation." Id. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia rightly
believed that context informs texts, McDonnell, supra note 419, at 181 (discussing ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 24 (1997) and
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS
33 (2012)); see also, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) (per Scalia, J.; citation
omitted), a proposition fully consistent with Justice Harlan's textual proofthat the Due Process
Clauses encompass substantive as well as procedural aspects.
469. To illustrate with one classic instance of substantive due process, the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment applies to the States pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004); see infra, notes
565-87 and accompanying text detailing substantive due process "incorporation" of almost the
Bill of Right's entirety. Thus, states may not violate that portion of the First Amendment.
For example, in Chabad of Southern Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of
Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 434-36 and note 3 (6th Cir. 2004), the Sixth Circuit correctly ruled
that a city ordinance prohibiting holiday displays on municipal property that fail to "appeal[|
to the widest of audiences" violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
proscribing controversial and offensive speech. Of course, that law's infirmity was not based
on "due process of law" defined as legal procedures such as faulty rules of either civil
procedure or administrative adjudication that might be used to criminally or civilly enjoin
purported violators. Rules of civil or criminal procedure -- adjudicative and administrative --
enforcing Cincinnati's ban on unpopular speech likely are perfectly constitutional in and of
themselves. Rather, the unconstitutionality arose from the ordinance's substantive limitation
proscribing all but the most popular holiday-related displays on public property during the
"holiday season."
470. Most germane for this writing is that the federal and state levels must treat same-sex
marriages equally with opposite-sex marriages. U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013);
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); and, see infra, notes 971-1020 and
accompanying text.
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governmental discretion.4 71 Accordingly, "due process of law" certainly
requires that legal procedures, such as official investigations, litigation, and,
administrative review, do not unconstitutionally deprive individuals of "life,
liberty and property." Simultaneously, "due process of law" requires that
substantive laws are constitutional only if such laws' processes -- that which
government specifically authorizes or proscribes -- do not unconstitutionally
deprive individuals of "life, liberty and property." In this way, Justice
Harlan's impeccable logic explains how the constitutional text itself denotes
substantive due process.47 2
C. Substantive Due Process'Natural Law and Historical Origins --
This writing now moves to the inevitable melding of Justice Harlan's
textual explanation of why "due process of law" must include "substantive"
constitutional law with the natural law principles that, as earlier sections of
this article have shown, inform the meaning and application of all
constitutional rights.4 73 In that regard, Justice Harlan's reliance on the
Supreme Court's 1884 Hurtado v. California opinion is particularly important
because as one leading treatise explains, Hurtado (which will be discussed in
detail shortly)47 4 is a prime example that, "Much of both civil and criminal
procedure is rooted in natural law." 475  Similarly, Prof. Albert Alschuler
noted,
This writing notes in passing the interesting point that any constitutional prescription,
such as government must treat opposite-sex and same-sex marriages equally, may be expressed
as constitutional proscriptions, such as government may not treat same-sex marriages
differently from opposite-sex marriages. That interchangeability, of course, only underscores
Justice Harlan's wisdom that the term "due process of law" subsumes not only legal
procedures, but legal process that takes the form of substantive law constraining or
commanding certain governmental conduct. See, Bayer, supra note 125, at 894 note 118
(explaining, "But negative versus positive essentially is a distinction without a difference
because negative duties naturally take on positive aspects and vice-versa." (citation omitted)).
471. E.g., City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (city
may set reasonable zoning restrictions on "group homes;" however, imposing unique,
burdensome requirements for zoning permit to establish a group home for non-violent,
mentally challenged individuals was an unreasonable abuse of City's discretion and, thus,
violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
472. "The text of the Due Process Clause thus imposes nothing less than an obligation to
give substantive content to the words 'liberty' and 'due process of law."' Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 764 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). See also, Andrew T. Hyman,
The Little Word Due, 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 47-48 (2005).
473. See, supra notes 12-209, 288-396 and accompanying text.
474. See infra notes 514-20 and accompanying text.
475. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION § 2:11 (3rd ed.).
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The view of due process advanced in [decisions such as] Hurtado v.
California ... had a "natural law" bent. ... The Court's view was tolerant
of diversity and experimentation but insisted that law must adhere at its
core to immutable principles of human dignity. The due process clause
empowered the judiciary to articulate these principles and to treat
legislation that offended them as unconstitutional. 4 76
Consistent with Justice Harlan's argument, and in agreement with Prof.
Alschuler's analysis, Prof. Frederick Gedicks' discussion elucidating the
extraordinary significance of substantive due process' natural law genesis is
worth quoting at length. Echoing Harlan's textual logic, Gedicks concluded:
The argument for an exclusively procedural understanding of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause implicitly projects an anachronistic
positivist meaning onto the term "law" in the crucial phrase "due process
of law." In this positivist understanding, a "law" is any legislative or other
governmental act that has satisfied the rule of recognition; in other words,
any such act that effects a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
necessarily comports with the due process of law because the act that
effects the deprivation has satisfied the formal requirements for
lawmaking. Under this reading, Congress complies with the Due Process
Clause -- that is, it satisfies the "due process of law" in depriving a person
of life, liberty, or property - so long as it accomplishes the deprivation by
means of a congressional act passed in accordance with the lawmaking
provisions of Article 1 of the Constitution.
By contrast, classical natural law theory has long assigned normative as
well as positivist content to the definition of "law." To fall within the
meaning of "law" in the classical view [of Cicero, Augustine and
Aquinas], a legislative or other governmental act required more than mere
positivist compliance with the rule of recognition; it also needed to be
just.4 77
476. Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv. 510, 522 (1986) (emphasis added).
477. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 642 (emphasis added). Responding in their thoughtful and
provocative article, Chapman and McConnell do not agree that, according to the Founders and
their society, "laws made by Congress that did not conform to natural law were not really law.
To be sure, [the Founders and] some early American jurists held to a version of the law of
nature as a universal moral code made known by conscience, reason, and even scripture, but
there is little evidence that any Americans in the late eighteenth century thought the law of
nature trumped the enacted [] law of a political society." Chapman and McConnell, supra
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Despite the foregoing textual cum logical argument that absent
substantive content informed by natural law, the Due Process Clauses cannot
protect liberty, there remains a lively and fascinating scholarship averring
that, as a matter not of text but of history and historical intent, "due process
of law" covers only procedural matters. For instance, Ryan C. Williams
avers that the leading Revolutionary War-era treatises -- Lord Edward Coke,
Justice Joseph Story, Chancellor James Kent, Judge Henry St. George
Tucker, and William Rawle -- "were remarkably uniform in attributing to the
Due Process Clause an exclusively procedural meaning, ... "478 Similarly,
Prof. Edward S. Corey steadfastly maintains that, "no one at the time of the
framing and adoption of the Constitution had any idea that this clause did
note 359, at 1725. Interesting, at 1725 note 235, as illustrations of "some early American
jurists," these authors first cite the English jurisprudent William Blackstone whose influence
on the Founders was enormous (see, text accompanying infra note 487), and next mention the
American jurist James Wilson who, as already noted, was signatory to both the Declaration
and the Constitution, and a respected judge who would be elevated to the Supreme Court.
Thus, despite their attempt to dismiss such writings, Chapman and McConnell cite not authors
of small repute, but two among the most respected and regarded in Colonial and early post-
Revolutionary America.
Moreover, consistent with the sources Chapman and McConnell found cite-worthy,
this writing has shown that Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison and Adams likewise agree that
natural law is superior to all other law. See, text accompanying supra notes 58-90. Indeed,
such is the very message of this nation's founding document, the Declaration of Independence.
See, text accompanying supra notes 98-125. Accordingly, even though it did not become a
prominent, formalized constitutional doctrine until after the Civil War, substantive due process
as a natural law trump of lower law that infringes on "unalienable Rights" comports with the
predominate moral-political philosophy upon which the United States was founded.
Chapman and McConnell's anti-natural law posture is undermined further by their
concluding argument on that matter: "Indeed, Article VI [of the Constitution] defines 'the
supreme Law of the Land' in purely positivist terms: the Constitution, acts of Congress, and
treaties are 'law.' While the law of nations and reserved (but unenumerated) individual rights
are acknowledged in the text of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the Supremacy Clause
implies that they are subordinate to the 'supreme Law of the Land,' which was entirely
positive." Chapman and McConnell at 1726. However, those authors neglect to quote Article
VI which reads in relevant part, "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; ... " U.S. CONsT. Art. VI.
Granted, Article VI's term "This Constitution" technically references positive law in that, by
definition, the Constitution is a written text. But that text, as Chapman and McConnell
acknowledge in the above-quote, contains within both its original body and the Bill of Rights,
"reserved (but unenumerated) individual rights." Because those rights must reference natural
law for their meanings, Art VI embraces natural law constraints on positive law.
Moreover, and perhaps more cogently, the Due Process Clauses themselves are
positive if pithy law. As those Clauses enforce the Declaration of Independence, again natural
law morality becomes the touchstone for constitutional meaning.
478. Williams, supra note 301, at 453.
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more than consecrate a method of procedure against accused persons, and the
modern doctrine of due process of law. . .could never have been laid down
except in defiance of history." 4 79
Understandably, regardless of natural law theory, whether as a matter of
historical intent "due process of law" covers only procedural matters harkens
back to the origin of "due process" in American legal thought. Because a
brief review elucidates Deontological Originalism's influence on due process
under the Constitution, this article turns to that aspect of American legal
history.
1. How America's Due Process Clauses Conform with and Difer from
Magna Carta --
As one would expect, any discussion of due process' origin begins with,
"the Magna Carta, England's Great Charter of Liberties."480 Interestingly,
"The more than five dozen clauses in the Magna Carta follow no discernible
plan of organization. Many of the provisions are concerned with
[contemporarily irrelevant] 'feudal incidents' -- the incidental rights of lords
arising from feudalism's hierarchical organization of status relationships."48 1
Nonetheless, as Prof. Johnson accents, "Magna Carta's text reflects many
concerns that are still central today. Considering that eight centuries have
passed, and that there are profound differences between the Feudal Age and
the Digital Age, these commonalities ... suggest that the ancient Magna Carta
and modern jurisprudence were 'cut from the same cloth."' 4 82 Specifically
and poetically, Johnson explained, "Like a blazing light piercing the
medieval darkness, the Magna Carta illuminated the importance of legal
principles, fair procedures, proportional punishment, official accountability,
and respect for human dignity."48 3 Indeed, Prof. Johnson concluded strongly
but likely without hyperbole that, "What's in the Magna Carta is the
beginning of modem legal thought." 48
Premised, then, on concepts of dignity, Magna Carta is a fit initiation
for what became known in America as "due process of law," both substantive
and procedural. Indeed, scholars agree that the Due Process Clauses derived
479. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 118-19 (1934).
480. Vincent R. Johnson, The Magna Carta and the Beginning ofModern Legal Thought,
85 Miss. L. J. 621, 622 (2016) (citing, J.C. Holt, MAGNA CARTA (3rd ed. 2015)).
481. Id. at 623.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 622-23 (emphasis added).
484. Id at 622.
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from Magna Carta's Chapter 39, its "law of the land" provision.48 As the
early exponent of American Law, Chancellor James Kent urged, "The words
by the law of the land, as used in magna carta ... are understood to mean due
process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men;
and thus, says [renown English jurisprudent] Lord [Edward] Coke, is the true
sense and exposition of those words."48 6 Scholars confirm Kent's central
conclusion that the highly influential Lord Coke4 87 considered the terms "law
of the land" and "due process of law" to be virtually synonymous,4 88
although, how the latter term derived from the former remains strangely
shrouded.4 89
485. "The ancestry of the due process clause is universally traced to ... the Magna Carta,
which was signed by King John and his rebellious barons on the field of Runnymede in June
1215. [Chapter 39 of which] reads [in part] as follows: 'No freeman shall be taken or and
imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon
him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or and the law of the land."'
Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wisc. L. REV. 941, 948-49 (footnotes
omitted).
486. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 13 (New York: Clayton & Van
Norden, 2d ed., 1832) (citations omitted).
487. As one source put it, "[T]he American Revolution was a lawyers' revolution to enforce
Lord Coke's theory of the invalidity of Acts of Parliament in derogation of the common and
right and of the rights of Englishmen.... The views of Coke .. . were adopted not merely by
patriotic leaders like John Adams, Samuel Adams and James Otis, but by Colonial legislatures,
colonial and town conventions, and innumerable town meetings during a long series of years
prior to 1776." Ryan Patrick Alford, The Rule of Law at the Crossroads: Consequences of
Targeted Killing of Citizens, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1203, 1244 (2011) (quoting N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n, Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting 238, 249 (1915)). See also, U.S. v.
Morgan, 51 F.3d 1105, 1112 (2d Cir. 1995) ("The two English common law commentators
who most influenced colonial American jurisprudence were Sir Edward Coke and Sir William
Blackstone."); but see Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten"
Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 421, 424-27 (1991) (noting, inter alia, that Coke's natural
law theory was one among many that influenced the Founders and their society and may not
have been the predominate theory regarding the nature and scope ofjudicial review).
488. Riggs, supra note 485, at 958-59, 992-95; Williams, supra note 301, at 44546.
489. Id. at 445 (footnote omitted); see also Gedicks, supra note 31, at 641 (footnote omitted)
("Although [Madison's] proposed amendment underwent significant changes before it was
reported out to the states and ratified, there is no record of any discussion of the Due Process
Clause itself in any of the ensuing reports or debates of the proposed amendments"); see also
Riggs, supra note 485, at 947 ("The legislative history of the 1791 due process clause is
especially sterile"); see also Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary ofLochner v. New
York, 72 TENN L. REV. 455, 478 (2005) (legislative history); see also, James W. Ely, Jr., The
Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16
CONST. COMMENT 315, 325 (1999) (legislative history is "remarkably skimpy"). But see, infra
text accompanying notes 496-520 explaining that Madison employed the term "due process"
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Many writers still insist that Magna Carta's Chapter 39 delineates only
procedural not substantive rights against the Crown;4 90 therefore, "due
process," Chapter 39's offspring, should be identically limited. While
procedural protections doubtless figure prominently in Chapter 39,491 the
weight of scholarship holds that, as Prof. James W. Ely concluded,
Given the paucity of debate over the Bill of Rights and the meaning of
due process in the 1790s, historical inquiry cannot reveal with certainty
the scope of the due process clause in the minds of the framers and
ratifiers. Nonetheless, I fail to see how American statesmen accustomed
to viewing due process through the lens of Coke and Blackstone could
have failed to understand due process as encompassing substantive as
well as procedural terms.492
In support of the foregoing conclusion, Prof. Riggs offered that although
procedural safeguards occupied much of Coke's analysis, he as well
understood "law of the land" to include both proscribing monopolies and
forbidding the Sovereign, absent an act of Parliament, from imposing
banishment or exile upon English subjects. From this, Riggs surmised,
Since both of these limitations upon government (primarily the king) are
substantive, not procedural, the conclusion is inescapable that Coke's
concept of the 'law of the land' was not narrowly limited to procedural
in part to verify that, unlike Maga Carta's Law of the Land provision, the Due Process Clause
would apply to legislative as well as executive actions.
490. See Williams, supra note 301, at 453.
491.
Chapter 39 was important at the time of its origin as a proscription against arbitrary
action by the king, who in the past had sometimes seized the property of his subjects
or caused them to be exiled, outlawed, imprisoned, killed or subjected to other
disabilities, without the benefit of any legal process. It rested on the central principle
that penalties should be imposed only after "the deliberate judgment of a competent
court of law." Most commentators agree that chapter 39 was meant to be a guarantee
of minimal fairness by providing judgment before execution of penalty.
Riggs, supra note 485, at 949-50 (quoting W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA 381 (2d ed. 1914)).
492. Ely, supra note 489, at 326-27 (1999); see also, e.g., Riggs, supra note 485, at 999
("The specific inquiry ofthis study is whether the due process clause had substantive as well
as procedural content in 1791. The short answer to that question is only slightly equivocal:
'Yes, it probably did'").
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safeguards. ... [W]hen it suited his purposes, he also used the 'law of the
land' to convey a broader meaning, even in the context of chapter 39.493
Understandably mindful of its English derivation, scholarly
commentary49 4 agrees with the highly respected constitutional expert
Laurence Tribe:
[T]he historical evidence points strongly toward the conclusion that, at
least by 1868 even if not in 1791, any state legislature voting to ratify a
constitutional rule banning government deprivations of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law" would have understood that ban as
having substantive as well as procedural content, given that era's premise
that, to qualify as "law," an enactment would have to meet substantive
requirements of rationality, non-oppressiveness, and evenhandedness.4 95
In addition to questioning the bona fides of substantive due process
itself, some researchers continue to espouse that, even if due process has
substantive content, under its Magna Carta origin, courts are authorized only
493. Id. at 960. Citing, inter alia, Prof. Riggs and discussing Blackstone, Prof. Jeffrey
Shaman identically accented,
In particular, Blackstone maintained that Chapter 39 provided substantive
protection for the rights of property owners. ... Whether Blackstone, like Coke,
thought that "the law of the land" and "due process of law" were equivalent is a matter
of pure conjecture, but there is considerable indication that both jurists believed that
the former phrase encompassed both substantive and procedural safeguards.
Jeffrey M. Shaman, On the 100th Anniversary of Lochner v. New York, 72 TENN L. REv. 455,
478 (2005) (citing, inter alia, I William Blackstone, Commentaries *138-39).
In further support, Riggs accented two English precedents wherein the "Law of the
Land" provision proscribed not procedures but the substantive penalties imposed by the
challenged laws. Specifically, Clark's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 152 (1596) (Ct. Comm. Pleas) held
that a municipality may impose forfeiture but not imprisonment as a penalty for failure to pay
certain assessments; and, Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (1616) (King's Bench) ruled that
an incorporated city, therein Plymouth, cannot disenfranchise -- revoke municipal citizenship
-- for purported slander. Riggs, supra note 485, at 960-61; see also, id. at 961-963 (additional
examples supporting the conclusion that Magna Carta always applied to substantive as well as
procedural issues).
494. "Because the barons had wanted to circumscribe specific arbitrary actions of the King,
Magna Carta contained sixty-three chapters comprised of a series of substantive provisions
that regulated everything from the rights of widows and wards to levels of taxation. Similar
to more recent notions of substantive due process, many of the substantive provisions of
Magna Carta protected either property or family." Jane Rutheford, The Myth of Due Process,
72 Bos. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)).
495. Laurence Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1297, n.247 (1995).
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to invalidate executive, not legislative abuses.496 If so, the Judiciary's
competence to enforce the natural law originalism of the Due Process Clauses
would be severely limited as the bulk of substantive due process litigation
challenges legislative enactments. Indeed, no less an authority than William
Blackstone understood Magna Carta not to constrain Parliament.4 97 Initially,
Blackstone's conclusion was not unanimously shared by scholars of English
law. In particular, based on his opinion in the significant early-Seventeenth
Century precedent Dr. Bonham 's Case, much learned comment surmises that
Lord Coke apparently accepted judicial review voiding legislative acts that
are contrary to "Common right and reason."4 98 Scholars accent that Coke
496. As Prof. Riggs noted,
[B]y general agreement, the expression 'law of the land,' in the current usage of that
day, was broad enough to include substantive as well as procedural law. ... This, of
course, is a far cry from today's substantive due process as a limit upon actions of the
legislature. ... [However,] [tihe Magna Carta ... was intended as a limit upon the
king. Chapter 39 was not directed to his 'legislative' functions, if they could be
distinguished, ...
Riggs, supra note 485, at 952-53 (footnote to numerous citations omitted).
497. Id. at 972, 1001 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 161); see also,
Shaman, supra note 449, at 478 (citing, inter alia, I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
* 138-39)
498. 8 REP. 113b, 77 ENG. REP. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610) ("And it appeareth in our Books, that
in many Cases, the Common Law doth controll Acts of Parliament, and somtimes shall
adjudge them to be void: for when an Act of Parliament is against Common right and reason,
or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and adjudge
such act to be void"). But see, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Bonham's Case, Judicial Review, and the
Law ofNature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 337 (2009) (footnote omitted):
The third point required to understand what Bonham's Case stood for in its time is that
judicial review, at least in the modem American sense of the term, was not a part of
the law of nature. Despite their unstinted praise for the immutable laws of nature and
despite their emphatic statements that all statutes and grants must conform to the law
of nature to pass the test of validity, for jurists versed in the law of nature it did not
follow that judges had the final word. Judges could not "strike down" statutes simply
because the statutes violated the tenets of natural law.
Still, Prof. Helmholz noted that, although extraordinarily rare as compared with the
somewhat more common, but still infrequent modem Ameerican instances of judicial
invalidation of legislative actions based on fundamental rights, judicial nullification of acts of
Parliament was at least atheoretical possibility. "Some laws, it is true, no judge might enforce-
- a statute directly contrary to the Word of God, for example. But that was a rare situation, one
not raised by Bonham's Case. In ordinary litigation, judges were subordinate officers in a
commonwealth. They were not vouchsafed a right to nullify the considered acts of their
governors. The right to weigh the merits of any statute belonged to the sovereign. Even the
errors of the prince were normally to be obeyed as if they were law." Id (footnotes omitted).
For example, "[l]f a statute enacted 'that no one shall give alms to any object in never so
necessitous a condition, such an Act is void."' Id at 337 n.60 (quoting, William Noy (1792,
ch. 1)).
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continued to espouse, and notable authority embraced, that principle:
"Coke's dictum, that judges could void government acts contrary to
fundamental common law, is evident in other decisions he authored, and was
affirmed by his immediate successor on Common Pleas, and by the Chief
Justice of King's Bench nearly a century later." 499
Nonetheless, "During the century following England's Glorious
Revolution in 1688, parliamentary supremacy replaced Coke's
understanding that due process and higher law checked royal and
parliamentary encroachments on substantive liberties."5" Therefore,
appealing to Chapter 39 in support of substantive due process restricting
legislative prerogatives is ambivalent at best, and perhaps erroneous.
Nonetheless, accepting that Chapter 39 applies only to the Sovereign or
its equivalent only underscores how America during its colonial years and
into the Revolution departed from that particular aspect of English precedent.
While English law surely influenced much American legal tradition,"o1
Accordingly, given that Government must vouchsafe the "unalienable Rights"
emanating from "Nature and Nature's God," judicial authority to nullify governmental
conduct, including statutes that infringe on such "Rights" has an undeniable English
provenance.
499. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 603 (citations omitted).
500. Id. at 611. Indeed, Coke himself planted the seeds of reappraisal by urging that, "the
power and jurisdiction of the Parliament ... is so transcendent and absolute ... that it cannot be
confined either for causes or persons within any bounds." Helen K. Michael, The Role of
Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial
Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights?, 69 N.C.L. REv. 421, 425 (1991) (quoting, 4
Coke Institutes 39 (1644), quoted in George P. Smith 1l, Dr. Bonham's Case and the Modern
Significance of Lord Coke's Influence, 41 WASH. L. REv. 297, 310 (1955)).
501. Interestingly,
The power of English law was greater in the mid-I9th century than it was with the
Revolutionary generation ...
There was no love of English cases for their own sake in []urist and treatise-
writer Justice Joseph] Story's research, nor in Kent's or Hamilton's. Story
had few reported American cases to refer to, a deficiency his own reporting
sought to diminish. Furthermore, the industrial age, which Hamilton in the
1790's had tried so hard to incubate, came swiftly to America after the
Embargo of 1808. England and its law had been compelled to deal with the
Industrial Revolution for half a century by that date; and it was Lord
Ellenborough, prominent during English industrialization, whom American
chauvinism could not keep out of the decisions of 19th-century American
judges, not the great English jurists of the 17th and 18th centuries. Also, in
the first half of the 19th century, American judges were ranging over much
legal literature, including the English decisions. Even though they were the
"legal elite" rather than average lawyers, this reading had widespread
significance. The members of this curious elite were very important in
forming American law, especially the precedent of court opinion, whatever
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colonial elaborations on law in general as well as the pivotal matter of
legitimate governmental authority often differed from British antecedents,5 0 2
hardly surprising given England's subjugation of the Colonies that ultimately
inspired the American Revolution. Indeed, the historical divergences
between young America and old England explain not only why the United
States from the first embraced substantive due process as a constraint against
all levels of government, but, equally importantly, how America justified
substantive due process under natural law.503 In this regard Prof. Levy
highlighted, "The traditions that gave shape and substance to the Bill of
Rights has English roots, but a unique American experience colored that
shape and experience."5 04 Although English law understood Magna Carter
primarily to limit the prerogatives of the Crown,o5 the experience of the
American Colonies with the tyranny of George III and Parliament inspired
early post-Revolution state constitutions to enshrine principles of natural
law506 applicable against all offices of Government. Thus, while it would
defy law and history in England, the Colonies were developing theories of
constitutional limitations against legislatures -- "higher level
democratic theorizing might have been saying about law being an emanation
of the people's voice.
Earl Finbar Murphy, A Legal History for America, 26 STAN. L. REV. 701, 704 (1974)
(reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 1973).
502. "Thus, as Julius Goebel long ago observed, the Englishmen who came to [Colonial]
America brought with them more of the other kinds of English law than they did of the
common law; early American law owed more to the custom of London than to the common-
law of England." Murphy, supra note 501, at 702 (citing, Julius Goebel, King's Law and Local
Custom in Seventeenth Century New England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931)).
503. As Prof. Murphy generally noted about early post-Revolution America, "Americans
responded innovatively to the needs of their environment. ... There was scant imitation of
English provisions in the laws of this period that dealt with matters of everyday concern.
Where commercial activity and the holding of property were concerned, the American
legislator was not confined to parliamentary or common law precedent." Id. at 702-03.
504. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS I (Yale U. Press 1999). That
unique experience arose because "Americans were the freest people, ... " Id. at 2. In particular,
"Freedom was mainly the product of New World conditions, the English legal inheritance, and
skipping a feudal stage. ... [America] was unencumbered by oppressions associated with an
ancient regime -- a rigid class system dominated by a reactionary and hereditary aristocracy,
arbitrary government by despotic kings, and a single established church extirpating dissent."
Id.
505. Riggs, supra note 485, at 1001.
506. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 640.
507. Earl M. Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment Concepts in the Antebellum Era, 32 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 305, 317-318 (1988) (explaining that in the antebellum era, a "substantial number
of states," as well as antislavery advocates, "imbued their [constitutions'] respective due
process clauses with a substantive content").
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constitutionalism" -- that they effectuated after the Revolution,' 08 including
adapting and revising Magna Carta principles.509
Accordingly, despite the sparseness of legislative history, Profs.
Chapman and McConnell concluded that, "circumstances strongly suggest
that [pivotal constitutional author and advocate James] Madison deliberately
chose to employ the phrase 'due process of law' instead of the Magna Charta
formula of 'law of the land."' 510 By so doing, "Madison avoided foreclosing
the possibility of applying the Due Process Clause against Congress [which
508. Riggs, supra note 485, at 1001. "The entire system of separation of powers responds
to the legislative omnipotence that the framers sought to avoid." Martin H. Redish and
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and The Values of Procedural Due
Process, 95 YALE L. J. 455, 461 (1986). Similarly, Prof. Gedicks noted, "Higher-law
constitutionalism, however, was received and adapted by the American colonies in their
revolutionary struggle with Britain. Parliamentary supremacy slowly displaced higher-law
constitutionalism during the eighteenth century in Britain, but not in America, thereby framing
the constitutional conflict that led to the American Revolution and, ultimately, to the American
Constitution and Bill of Rights." Gedicks, supra note 31, at 611-12.
509. Indeed, there are some notable similarities between the emergence and development
of American constitutional doctrine and the development of Magna Carta itself. The passage
of time saw,
the final and complete emergence of Magna Carta from its feudal chrysalis.
Nor did Magna Carta develop solely along one dimension. As the range of
classes and interests brought under its protection widened, its quality as higher Law
binding in some sense upon government in all its phases steadily strengthened until
it becomes possible to look upon it in the fourteenth century as something very like a
written constitution in the modern understanding.
Corwin, supra note 479, at 177.
As Prof. Corwin explicated regarding the American experience,
The eventual role, indeed, of Magna Carta in the history of American
constitutional theory is due immediately to its revival at the opening of the
seventeenth century, largely by Sir Edward Coke. The tradition which Coke revived
was, however, by no means his own invention; it referred back to and was to a great
extent substantiated by an earlier period in the history of this famous document -
famous especially because it was a document and so gave definite, tangible
embodiment to the notion of higher law.
From the first, Magna Carta evinced elements of growth, and it was fortunately
cast into a milieu favoring growth. For one thing, its original form was not that of an
enactment, but of a compact. ... Far more important is it that certain of the Charter's
clauses, like those of the Fourteenth Amendment six hundred and fifty years later,
were drawn in terms that did not confine their application to the immediate issues in
hand or to the interests therein involved; while to match this feature of the document
itself came the early discovery by the baronage that the successful maintenance of the
Charter against the monarch demanded the cooperation of all classes and so the
participation by all classes in its benefits.
Id. at 175-76 (emphasis added).
510. Chapman and McConnell, supra note 359, at 1723.
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likewise] was [likewise influential advocate Alexander] Hamilton's analysis
of the significance of 'due process' in the New York bill of rights." 
5 1 1
While the sources discussed above confirm as a matter of history, the
uniquely American endeavor to constrain not only the Executive but also the
Legislative branch, importantly for this writing, Prof. Gedicks explained
why, as a matter of moral philosophy, the natural law origins -- the
Deontological Originalism -- of the American Revolution and the ratification
of the Constitution reject Blackstone's view that the legitimacy of legislative
enactments is judicially unreviewable:
The classical natural law tradition was still vibrant in late eighteenth-
century America, when the Fifth Amendment was drafted and ratified, and
the term "law" had not yet acquired the almost entirely positivist
connotation that it carries today. To call a legislative act a "law" during
that era did not mean that the act merely satisfied constitutional
requirements for lawmaking, but rather signified that it conformed to
substantive limitations on legislative power represented by natural and
customary rights. Legislative acts that violated these limitations would
not have been considered "laws," even when they satisfied the
constitutional requirements for lawmaking.5 12
Turning to precedent, shortly before the Civil War, Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. unequivocally held that due process "is a
restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of
the government."51 3 Building on Murray's Lessee, the Supreme Court's
pivotal 1884 Hurtado opinion 514 reached exactly the same conclusion
511. Id. at 1724 (footnote omitted); see also, Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character
ofLaw-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study ofthe Distortions and Evasions ofFraming-Era
Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 239, 408 (2002) ("Madison
substituted the phrase 'due process of law' for the more traditional 'law of the land' in the
proto-fifth amendment precisely to avoid the kind of claim of legislative omnipotence that
later appeared ... ").
Furthermore, employing the term "due process" would obviate any conflict or
confusion with the term "supreme law of the land" used in the Constitution's Article IV.
Chapman and McConnell, supra note 359, at 1723; see also, e.g., Andrew T. Bodoh, Liberty
Is Not Loco-Motion: Obergefell and the Originalists' Due Process Fallacy, 40 CAMPBELL L.
REv. 481, 529 n.186 (2018).
512. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 644 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
513. Den Ex Dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855).
514. "Hurtado often is described as the launching pad for the flexible, evolving conception
of due process that later came to dominate the application of due process in both its procedural
and substantive context. Indeed, it even has been described as the Supreme Court case that
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regarding how Magna Carta should inform a nation where, unlike England,
both the central government and the individual states memorialized natural
rights into written, dominant constitutions.515  That aspect of Hurtado is
worth quoting fully:
The actual and practical security for English liberty against legislative
tyranny was the power of a free public opinion represented by the
commons. In this country written constitutions were deemed essential to
protect the rights and liberties of the people against the encroachments
of power delegated to their governments, and the provisions of Magna
Charta were incorporated into bills ofrights. They were limitations upon
all the powers ofgovernment, legislative as well as executive andjudicial.
It necessarily happened, therefore, that as these broad and general maxims
of liberty and justice held in our system a different place and performed a
different function from their position and office in English constitutional
history and law, they would receive and justify a corresponding and more
comprehensive interpretation. Applied in England only as guards against
executive usurpation and tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also
against arbitrary legislation; but in that application, as it would be
incongruous to measure and restrict them by the ancient customary
English law, they must be held to guaranty, not particular forms of
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and
property.5 16
'made judges [through the due process clause] censors over what was 'fundamental' in a
judicial procedure."' Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure:
The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis L.J. 303, 346 (2001)
(footnote omitted; quoting, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 1789-1888, at 368 (1985)).
515. Ruling that criminal indictment by a grand jury is not a requisite of "due process of
law," Hurtado was, "The first case to reach the Supreme Court in which the meaning of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was a controlling issue ... " Joseph G.
Cook, I CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 3D § 2:3. Applying the federal Bill of
Rights in state criminal prosecutions-Theories of interpretation-The independent content
approach, I CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 3D § 2:3 (3d ed.).
516. Hurtado v. California, 100 U.S. at 531-32 (emphasis added). Over a century later,
substantive due process nay-sayer Justice Antonin Scalia observed, "Not until Hurtado ... ,
however, did the Court significantly elaborate upon the historical test for due process advanced
in Murray's Lessee." Pacific Mutual Life In. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 31 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in thejudgment). Whatever may have been the reason for the Court's four-decade
silence is immaterial to the facts that Hurtado does reaffirm Murray's Lessee 's doctrine and
that both precedents correctly differentiated the American from the British experience even if
the latter's laws, particularly Magna Carta, influenced to some degree the latter's melding of
natural law and constitutional authority.
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In sum, the unique American perspective, predicated on the natural law
principles of the Declaration of Independence, instructs that any law from
any governmental office that fails to, "conform[] to substantive limitations
on legislative power represented by natural and customary rights""' is
illegitimate under the Constitution. Hurtado's apt historical assessment,5 18
consistent with the bulk of scholarly commentary, confirms Deontological
Originalism. That is, the Framers, the Reconstruction Congress, and, the
citizenry they served understood "due process of law" to have both
procedural and substantive content, derived from the moral precepts of
natural law, applicable to constrain the actions of legislatures as well as
executives and judiciaries.519 As Prof. Gedicks summarized, "On balance,
the historical evidence shows that one widespread understanding of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 1791 included judicial recognition
and enforcement of unenumerated natural and customary rights against
congressional action."5 20
517. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 644.
518. Hurtado has been recognized by some, albeit scant, contemporary Supreme Court
precedent. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992) (citing
Hurtado as discussed in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
519. Predictably, Justice Scalia disparaged Hurtado, averring that the Court, "provided
scant guidance. It merely suggested that due process could be assessed in such cases by
reference to "those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions," Haslip, 499 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment,
quoting, Hurtado, 100 U.S., at 535). However, as explicated infra at notes 899-923 and
accompanying text, Kantian morality, applied under the Supreme Court's dignity paradigm of
due process, provides more than an ample basis to discern and to apply the natural law
standards this Nation ratified as supreme law in the Constitution.
520. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 669. Similarly, Ryan C. Williams determined the
ambivalence of scholarship in toto.,
Modem scholars who have surveyed the pre-Civil War case law for themselves have
almost uniformly concluded that support for substantive due process in the
antebellum era was far stronger than [most prominent] Lochner-era critics of the
doctrine had acknowledged. But despite such modem reevaluations, the notion that
substantive due process is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment continues to enjoy relatively widespread support.
Williams, supra note 301, at 460 (footnotes omitted); see also, id. at 495, 500.
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D. Due Process Is the Value Monism of the Constitution's Moral
Imperatives --
Although perhaps it was not clearly destined to so become,5 2 1 "due
process of law," both substantive and procedural, has become the
Constitution's value monism.5 22 That is, true to its Magna Carta origin, due
process is the singular, formative concept from which the entire panoply of
constitutional fundamental rights derives. Particularly in the Bill of Rights,
the Constitution lists several discrete rights, each of which apparently
assumes equal merit and authority with the others. But, in fact, decades of
precedent hold that all constitutional issues involving rights -- each and every
matter that in any manner raises a question of constitutional rights -- actually
is an issue of "due process of law." Indeed, there is no issue, dispute or
matter arising under and concerning constitutional rights -- including
separation ofgovernmentalpowers -- that is not ultimately a question of "due
process of law. "
While at first not a source of much judicial comment,5 23 "Since the turn
of the [twentieth] century ... due process has come into its own as a great
bulwark of individual rights."5 24 For instance, a half-century ago, In re Gault
declared, "Due process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact
which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise."525 Gault's estimation comports with one leading
treatise's apt summary of due process' depth and breadth, "It has been stated
that no other phrase known to the American and English law comprehends
so much that which is basically vital in the protection of human rights and
the redress of human wrongs as the phrase 'due process of law."'526 Although
521. E.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-And-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten
Common-Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and The Original Understanding of "Due
Process ofLaw," 77 Miss. L. J. 1, 195 (2007) (discussing the Reconstruction Court's emphasis
on "privileges and immunities").
522. See generally, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-h (defining
value monism in detail).
523. "The fifth amendment due process clause was seldom litigated during the early decades
of the republic and was not authoritatively construed until 1855. Even when the fourteenth
amendment made due process applicable to the states in 1868, its potential as a limitation upon
governmental action only gradually became apparent." Riggs, supra note 485, at 941 (citing,
inter alia, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855)).
524. Id.
525. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967).
526. 16B AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 947 (2011) (citation omitted).
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a popular view depicts due process as a "negative" protection,527 that is,
proscribing what cannot be done, Justice Felix Frankfurter, whose
commentaries provide much of due process' modem basis,5 28 rightly
understood that at its core, the Due Process Clause must have an affirmative
as well as a negative aspect because due process itself evinces nothing less
than, "ultimate decency in a civilized society."529
Granted, the full meaning of "due process" may not have been
discernable from the debates in which that clause became part of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.53' Paul Finkelman, for example, noted,
"Virtually all supporters of the [Fourteenth] Amendment agreed that it would
protect the 'civil rights' of blacks and everyone else, but ... they did not
necessarily agree on the substantive content of civil rights, equal protection,
or even due process.""' Yet, no formal explications from 1791 or 1868 were
needed for, as the Supreme Court has recognized for over twelve decades,
consistent with its natural rights-deontological origins, due process,
particularly its liberty component, is "a principle of natural equity,
recognized by all temperate and civilized governments, from a deep and
universal sense of its justice . . "53 Indeed, the Supreme Court
acknowledged three-quarters of century after Chi. B. & Q. R Co.,
527. As I noted in a different context,
negative versus positive [rights] essentially is a distinction without a difference
because negative duties naturally take on positive aspects and vice-versa. See [Van
de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009)] ("After all, a plaintiff can often
transform a positive into a negative duty simply by reframing the pleadings...."
(citation omitted)). For instance, [pursuant to federal civil rights statutes,] the
arguably negative duty not to discriminate means that bigoted employers, labor
unions, workers, hotel managers, restaurateurs, merchants, and customers (among
others) will have to hire, serve, work alongside, deal with, and otherwise associate
with persons who, absent mandating legislation, such bigots would disregard. The
positive-negative duties distinction, then, offers little ...
Bayer, supra note 17, at 894 note 118.
528. See infra notes 687-728 and accompanying text.
529. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), o. in part,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
530. "The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment sheds little light on how the
term 'due process of law' was understood in 1868, because the Amendment was presented and
debated largely in terms of the 'privileges and immunities of citizens." Thomas Y. Davies,
Correcting Search-And-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-Law Warrantless Arrest
Standards and The Original Understanding of "Due Process ofLaw," 77 Miss. L. J. 1, 195
(2007); see also, supra notes 358-60 and accompanying text.
531. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1026 (footnote omitted).
532. Chi. B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897) (holding that due process
enjoins States from taking private property without just compensation).
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"'Liberty' and 'property' are broad and majestic terms. They are among the
'(g)reat (constitutional) concepts ... purposely left to gather meaning from
experience. . . . (T)hey relate to the whole domain of social and economic
fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too well that only a
stagnant society remains unchanged.'"
33
Based on the breadth the Supreme Court has accorded them, the Due
Process Clauses essentially now subsume whatever panoply of specific
fundamental rights might have emanated from other constitutional provisions
such as the Ninth Amendment,5 3 4 and the privileges and immunities
clauses.s"' That thousands of pages of official reporters and scholarly
533. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (quoting, National Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); See also, e.g.,
Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (1 th Cir. 1989) (quoting Roth);
Little v. City of North Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1986) (same); Banks v. Bock, 700
F.2d 292, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1983) (quoting Tidewater Transfer Co.); Mazaleski v. Treusdell,
562 F.2d 701, 711 note 25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (same).
534. "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONsT. amend. [X.
The dominance of the Due Process Clauses does not make the Ninth Amendment
surplusage nor, as Judge Robert Bork unkindly and inaptly described, render that Amendment
an "ink blot." Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1989)
(statement of Robert H. Bork, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit). For instance, one budding scholar offered that, "courts should use the
Ninth Amendment to supplement the substantive due process analysis in evaluating
unenumerated rights" that are important but are not "fundamental," and, thus, do not emanate
from the due process clauses. Joseph F. Cadlec, Employing the Ninth Amendment to
Supplement Substantive Due Process: Recognizing the History of the Ninth Amendment and
the Existence of Nonfundamental Unenumerated Rights, 48 B.C. L. REv. 387, 413 (2007)
(note).
Taking a similar tack, during his confirmation hearing, then-Judge (later-Justice)
Anthony Kennedy, "expressed the view that the Ninth Amendment was designed to protect
the states' ability to confer rights beyond those enumerated in the Bill of Rights." Phoebe A.
Haddon, An Essay on the Ninth Amendment: Interpretation for the New World Order, 2 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 93, 100 note 45 (1992) (citing, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ANTHONY M. KENNEDY TO BE AN ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, S. Exec. Rep. No. 113, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1988)).
535. The Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2, states in part, "the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." Similarly, Section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; ... "
Of course, the above-quoted Privileges and Immunities Clause could not "fit the bill"
as the Constitution's natural law value monism because, their very texts applies only to
"citizens." E.g., Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1039. Consequently, that clause would accord
non-citizens subject to United States jurisdiction no rights at all, a proposition that is untenable
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publications are filled with thoughtful critiques against according due process
such an all-encompassing character is interesting but extraneous to the point
of this article which is, given its purpose to effectuate the Declaration of
Independence, somewhere explicit in the Constitution must be a provision, or
combined provisions, guaranteeing that no facet of American government
may impinge on natural rights derived from natural law. Pursuant to its
Magna Carta provenance, the Due Process Clauses were if not an obvious
choice, certainly a fitting choice to house the Constitution's value monism of
fundamental fairness.
1. The Need for Constitutional Value Monism --
That the Constitution must contain some value monistic source is
obvious and easily proved. As has been shown, the theory of deontological
natural rights undergirding the Constitution requires that all subordinate
moral precepts must derive from one paradigmatic idea. That is why moral
precepts can never conflict, rather, they always harmonize.536 Consistent
with value monism, the logical admonition of one of the Supreme Court's
most perceptive minds, Justice Robert Jackson,5 37 observed that, "We cannot
under natural rights theory. For example, there can be no doubt that American government
would act immorally by arresting a lawfully present foreign visitor and summarily execute
her. Thus, the use of the term "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment was not happenstance.
"[q~t is clear from the Congressional debates and those in the state legislatures that the framers
of the Amendment believed the Amendment protected everyone in the United States from
arbitrary and capricious abuses by their state governments." Id. at 1033-34.
536. See generally, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-h (defining
value monism in detail). Thus, while earnestly arguing that there are correct moral resolutions
for each moral dilemma, Prof Markovits wrongly avers as essential, at least in American
constitutional law, "that arguments of moral principle proceed by balancing the effects of the
choice under consideration on the rights-related interests of all relevant moral-rights holders.
In this respect, arguments of moral principle differ from the types of balancing arguments that
some courts have employed in that the courts in question have engaged either in utilitarian
balancing or in some other non-liberal type of balancing." See Richard S. Markovits,
Legitimate Legal Argument and Internally-Right Answers to Legal-Rights Questions, 74 CHI-
KENT L. REv. 415, 425 (1999) (emphasis added). As stressed herein, under deontological
morality, rights -- moral precepts -- coexist; that is, where one begins, others end. Rights do
not balance in the sense of sometimes being weightier -- more pronounced -- and sometimes
less, that is, subordinate to other rights.
537. Robert Houghwout Jackson is considered to have been one of the sharpest intellects
ever to sit on the Court, often regarded as "brilliant." Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional
Humility, 76 U. CINCl. L. REv. 23, 45 (2007). Indeed, spouting one of his well-known "back-
handed compliments," former Harvard Law School professor Justice Felix Frankfurter
remarked to his judicial colleague Jackson, who would be the last justice to have earned his
law license through legal apprenticeship rather than by obtaining a law degree, "'If you had
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give some constitutional rights a preferred position without relegating others
to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without thereby establishing
seconds."5 38 That is because, by definition, neutral principles explain how to
choose among competing rights; thus, there can be no doubt which right
would prevail in the relevant instance: the one that unbiased reason reveals. 39
The vital point is that because from the perspective of unbiased reason the
outcome was never in doubt, the rights at issue never actually conflicted --
neutral reason discerns the boundaries between the relevant rights. Until the
boundaries were determined, one hopes correctly, by the appropriate
reviewer, herein the Judiciary, the rights appeared to conflict because the
parties did not know with certainty what the boundaries actually were.540 The
Judiciary's duty then, is not deciding which right it preferred -- which would
have been the applicable analysis had the rights actually clashed -- but rather,
the duty is discerning two things: first the boundaries of each right and,
second, within which boundary the given facts actually reside.
The courts, then, must have some mechanism to resolve disputes when
rights seemingly clash. As an example, one might consider Marsh v. State of
Alabama which ruled that a "company town" owned and managed by a
private corporation but otherwise evincing, "all the characteristics of any
gone to the Harvard Law School, there would have been no stopping you."' Id. (quoting,
MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKURTER, IN THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 177 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 1994)). See, infra notes 688-91 and accompanying
text for additional discussion of Justice Frankfurter's feistiness and how it affected his tenure
on the Supreme Court.
538. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment does not set forth rights inferior to others in the Bill of Rights).
539. See, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2. Human frailty might
prevent any given person from performing unbiased reasoning well enough to discern the
correct answer to a particular dilemma; but, the fact remains that neutral reason, properly
performed, would yield the one and only correct resolution.
540. For instance, if Smith asserts Right X, but Jones maintains that Smith's construction
of Right X unduly interferes with her exercise of Right Y, the resolution cannot be that both
X and Y are rights, but, in some instances, one right predominates over the other. Rather,
assuming both truly are rights, X and Y coexist under the value monism of "due process of
law." Therefore, if the reviewing court correctly rules in favor of Jones, it is because, in fact,
contrary to Smith's assertion, Right X never reached as far as Smith claimed. It is not that
Right X, in the given case, is subordinate to Right Y; it is that Jones proved that her exercise
of Right Y did not erroneously attempt to enlarge Right Y by intruding into Right X. The
ruling neither expanded nor contracted either Right X or Right Y. Rather, the ruling, assuming
it is correct, identified the parameters of each right to discern that Jones was properly
exercising Right Y, while Smith was improperly exercising Right X.
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other American town,"5 41 could not prohibit peaceful dissemination of
religious literature on public sidewalks.542 Purporting to compare the
competing interests, Marsh concluded, "When we balance the Constitutional
rights of owners of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of
press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of the fact that the
latter occupy a preferred position."5 43  Accenting as it does the First
Amendment's purported "preferred position," one might conclude that under
the Constitution, free speech and expression rights trump property rights.
However, twenty-six years later, Lloyd Corporation, Ltd. v. Tanner held
that the owners of a large shopping mall in Portland, Oregon,'" lawfully
prohibited distributions of handbills that are unrelated to commercial
activities of the mall.54 5 Tanner distinguished Marsh accenting that as owner
of the entire town, the corporation in Marsh acted akin to town government,
literally regulating all the streets, sidewalks and byways. By contrast,
because the mall in Tanner was surrounded by public streets through which
patrons access the mall and over which the mall exercised no dominion, 5 46
"Handbills may be distributed conveniently to pedestrians, and also to
occupants of automobiles, from these public sidewalks and streets. Indeed,
respondents moved to these public areas and continued distribution of their
handbills after being requested to leave the interior malls."54 7
Due to the fact variances as contrasted with Marsh, the Tanner Court
concluded, "It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to
require [the mall owners] to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights
under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication
exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without
541. "In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the
public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping
center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation." 326 U.S.
501, 503 (1946).
542. The town enforced its anti-leafletting policy arresting and demanding the prosecution
of Petitioner Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, for violating Title 14, Section 426 of the 1940
Alabama Code, an anti-trespass criminal statute. Id. at 503.
543. Id at 509.
544. "Some of the stores open directly on the outside public sidewalks, but most open on
the interior privately owned malls. Some stores open on both. There are no public streets or
public sidewalks within the building complex, which is enclosed and entirely covered except
for the landscaped portions of some of the interior malls."
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 553 (1972).
545. The Court rejected the broad assertion that, "since the Center is open to the public, the
private owner cannot enforce a restriction against handbilling on the premises." Id. at 564.
546. Id. at 566-67.
547. Id. at 567.
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significantly enhancing the asserted right of free speech.", 4 8 In Tanner, then,
the private property interests of the mall owners trumped the speech interests
of the would-be leafletters.
Based on their highly-particularized facts, the constitutional
compatibility of Marsh and Tanner is discernable, although the latter
declined to explicate that compatibility in meaningful detail.54 9 While not
specifically identified in either opinion, Marsh's and Tanner's harmony must
stem from some principle more rudimentary than either "property rights" or
"speech rights." That is, some additional and predominating concept must
explain the coherence that required speech rights to prevail in Marsh but
allowed property rights to triumph in Tanner. As we now understand from
the characteristics of deontological morality, fundamental rights cannot
conflict, for if they did, there would be no unbiased method to discern which
of the conflicting rights should prevail; such a decision would be entirely
consequentialist. So, the arguably unspoken premise in Marsh and Turner is
that an overarching precept allowed the Court to discern that the "company
town's" proscription violated the right of speech regardless of any
purportedly countervailing property rights, while the private mall's similar
proscription did not violate speech because of actual, not merely asserted,
countervailing property rights. To make those determinations, however,
required understanding both what each right entails and how they harmonize.
Those harmonizing principles must derive from concepts informed by, but
ultimately beyond the specific right of speech and specific right of
property. 550
548. Id.
549. The Tanner Court did not clarify why the mall owners' interests predominate,
especially as, given the many activities that take place in a mall, peaceful leafletting need not
be intrusive. Even if it was right that leafletting outside the mall imposed little costs on the
leafletters, the Court did not clarify why "it would be an unwarranted infringement on property
rights," id. at 567, to require the mall owners to indulge the leafletters to the same extent they
indulge others who are engaging in non-commercial activities, such as reading the newspaper
or conversing with each other while walking from store-to-store. Accordingly, theorists need
to discern from Tanner and Marsh what is not fully explicated: why the fact that leafletters
could use the adjoining sidewalks means that a publicly assessable mall need not permit
peaceful, non-disruptive First Amendment activity such as leafletting.
550. Perhaps, most obviously, the privately owned and operated shopping mall in Tanner
did not exercise the quasi-governmental powers of the "company town" in Marsh. Thus, the
First Amendment simply was inapplicable in Tanner because that Amendment only constrains
official, not private conduct. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S.Ct. 2618, 2628 note 4 (2014); Stanko v.
Bosselman Enterprises, No. 17-1810, 2018 WL 3525311, at *2 (8th Cir. July 23, 2018)
(discussing Quinn). Accordingly, the leafletters wrongly averred that their speech rights were
implicated at all.
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2. Due Process Is the Constitution's Value Monism --
Had they looked for it, the Marsh and Tanner Courts would have found
the applicable overarching principle in the Constitution's due process
clauses."' During the mid-1940s, Justice Frankfurter explained the
constitutional logic in response to his colleague Justice Hugo Black's
argument that the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment have no independent content, but rather, only encompass the
specific rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights.552 Applying a textualist
Applying the principles of Deontological Originalism, the company town in Marsh
impugned the dignity of its inhabitants by, in essence, cutting off entirely the fundamental
right of leafletting as a means to communicate ideas and information. While there are other
means to disseminate such ideas and information, the company town's leafletting ban was
irrational in that no inhabitant rationally would tolerate that limitation on speech and
expression. The town in Marsh, then, used a constitutionally illegitimate means, and thus
treated its residents merely as means to some likely illegitimate end such as quashing
dissention against town management.
By contrast, the private mall owners in Tanner did not impugn the dignity of either its
patrons or the would-be leafletters by proscribing leafletting. First, the important legal
standard reveals that, as a private entity not exercising the quasi-governmental power of a
"company town," the mall's policies are not subject to review under the Constitution.
However, even if the Due Process Clauses applied, it is not a necessary function of a private
business mall to allow political activity in its passageways. The purpose of malls is to allow
patrons easy access to numerous and varied businesses. Even if that function is not interrupted
by peaceful leafletting, prohibiting that practice does not assault the innate dignity of either
patrons or protesters who have no objectively valid expectation that a private mall comprised
of commercial businesses open to the general public will be, as well, a place of political
activity.
551. While neither Tanner nor Marsh used the exact terms, the unspoken value monistic
concept must sound in the ban against "arbitrary and capricious" governmental conduct which
emanates from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See infra
notes 600-10 and accompanying text. See, supra note 550 explaining the reasons why the ban
on leafletting was arbitrary and capricious in Marsh but not in Tanner.
552. As Justice Black defended his counterintuitive conclusion, "My study of the historical
events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who
sponsored and favored, as well as those who opposed its submission and passage, persuades
me that one of the chief objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first section,
separately, and as a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights,
applicable to the states." Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting), o. in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). Along with a lengthy historical
analysis of precedents, Justice Black argued that anything more would require, "Conceding
the possibility that this Court is now wise enough to improve on the Bill of Rights by
substituting natural law concepts for the Bill of Rights." Id. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting). But,
as we now appreciate, see, supra Sections 2-4, that is exactly what the Founders and the
Reconstruction Congress realized interpreters of the Constitution, herein the courts, must do:
understand and apply natural law. See, infra, Section 6-b explaining why that duty inures to
the Judiciary. Contrary to Justice Black's assertion, doing so is not "improv[ing] on the Bill
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approach, Frankfurter replied by reminding that the Fifth Amendment
consists of several specific, discrete rights plus the pivotal general guarantee
of "due process of law."s3 Accordingly, Justice Black's assertion that "due
process of law" only includes the Bill of Right's express provisions renders
the Fifth Amendment's explicit term "due process of law" devoid of
meaning, thus merely surplusage -- excess, repetitive language that would be
unwarranted in the most mundane set of regulations, much less in the charter
of American government.55 4  After all, if "due process" only covers
"enumerated rights," that is, only relates to provisions already expressly
specified in the Bill of Rights' text, then the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause adds nothing -- implicates no unenumerated rights to enforce -- and,
thus, is superfluous. If "due process" infers nothing textually unexpressed,
then that clause is unnecessary because, by definition, the fully expressed
rights in the Bill of Rights' text are explicit, thus obvious. Accordingly,
simple logic -- reason -- informs that the Due Process Clause serves a vital
function: to alert interested parties that the Bill of Rights covers more than
its express terms comprehend.5 55
of Rights," but rather, discerning through unbiased reason how the natural law applies in any
given case.
553. The Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger;
nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
554. Understandably, as a general matter, judicial review presumes that all words and
phrases in statutes, ordinances, documents and other sources have unique although possible
similar meanings. Therefore, courts presume that any term under review is not surplusage
unless there is no plausible alternative conclusion. E.g., Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568
U.S. 371, 385 (2013). However, on rare occasions, there may be "no plausible alternative
conclusion." That is why, "While it is generally presumed that statutes do not contain
surplusage, instances of surplusage are not unknown." Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of
Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 note 1 (2006).
555. As Justice Frankfurter explained, "Not to attribute to due process of law an
independent function but to consider it a shorthand statement of other specific clauses in [the
Bill of Rights] is to charge those who secured the adoption of this Amendment with
meretricious redundancy by indifference to a phrase - 'due process of law '- which was one
of the great instruments in the very arsenal of constitutionalfreedom which the Bill of Rights
was to protect and strengthen. ... " Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415-16 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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Indeed, steeped in the philosophy of natural law, the Framers understood
that almost certainly they would be unable to capture every discrete natural
right even within the numerous provisions that ultimately comprised their
Bill of Rights. Along such lines, during the initial drafting of Constitution
two-and-a-quarter centuries ago, in response to the urging of "Anti-
Federalist" forces, the Federalists, likewise staunch believers in natural
rights, employed a value monistic argument against a Bill of Rights or similar
inventory within the proposed constitutional drafts. "The Federalists ...
maintained that an enumeration of natural and customary rights was
unnecessary, because the Constitution nowhere delegated to the national
government any power to infringe upon such rights."55 6 In fact, as the
former-Colonists, now the United States' first generation, fully agreed with
the Declaration of Independence's natural rights principles,5 ' "The
Federalist defense of the Philadelphia Convention's near-complete failure to
protect such rights in the 1787 Constitution reflected the higher-law belief
It is perhaps ironic, therefore, as shortly this article will argue, that based on formal,
positive constitutional law, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause technically
is surplusage because while it has unique aspects other forms of "due process" do not, equal
protection is but one category -- one example -- of due process. See infra notes 570-82 and
accompanying text. Indeed, and of even deeper irony, as explained infra at notes 565-78 and
accompanying text, because the concept "due process of law" essentially encompasses,
constains, and subsumes all of the more specific, enumerated rights within the Bill of Rights,
every one of those explicit rights technically is surplusage. That is because, had the Bill of
Rights consisted solely of its Due Process Clause, thus no other more exact rights had been
enumerated within the Bill of Rights, via judicial review, that Due Process Clause alone would
be sufficient to trigger the natural law/natural rights inquiry that must disclose, inter alia, the
First Amendment, the Second Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and all other fundamental
rights set forth within the Bill of Rights. Identically, amendments or discrete rights within
amendments that, through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, courts have
applied upon States and localities.
Nonetheless, regardless of the extraordinary surplusage, as soon will be explained,
sound policy and logical reasons inspired the the Framers to include a discrete Due Process
Clause among the many slightly more specific rights set forth in the Fifth Amendment.
556. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 635 (citing as examples, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 84 578-79 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see, e.g., James Wilson's Speech at a
Public Meeting (Oct. 6, 1787), in I THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 63-64 (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993); Remarks of Thomas McKean, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Nov. 28,
1787), in 2 THE B[LL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTRY HISTORY 641, 643 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1971); Remarks of James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 641,63346; Remarks of James Iredell, North
Carolina Convention Debates (July 29, 1788), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 641, 945, 949-51. Id. at 635 note 272.).
557. See supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
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that such rights were enforceable against federal and state government action
independent of any constitutional enumeration or writing.""'
Moreover, there was some fear that any attempt to enumerate rights
would be treacherous because the list, bound to be incomplete, possibly
might be perceived to limit the Constitution's coverage only to that imperfect
inventory.5 59 In this light, James Iredell, later to sit as an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, writing as Marcus, asked, "who would undertake to recite
all the state and individual rights not relinquished by the new
Constitution?", 6 o
Federalist opponents of any bill of rights bowed not so much to the
philosophy of the Anti-Federalists, but to political pressure. "The Anti-
Federalists won the bill-of-rights battle, although the Federalists won the
ratification war." 561 Pragmatics aside, it is hardly incongruous that to assure
558. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 640 (footnotes omitted). Likewise, Terry Brennan
explained, "Natural rights were not incorporated in the text of the Constitution because, as
Federalist friends ofthe Constitution repeatedly observed, natural rights did not require textual
recognition. Far from being accepted by the Founders, the notion that a national government
could somehow confer the rights of nature by annexing amendments was condemned as a
'glaring absurdity."' Terry Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original
"Original Intent," 15 HARV. J.L.& PUB. POL'Y 965, 993-94 (1992) (quoting, "Mariot," MASS.
CENTINEL, Jan. 2, 1788, at 124; other citations omitted); see generally id. at 993-97 (quoting
and discussing original sources).
559. "During the ratifying debates, Federalists assured skeptical Anti-Federalists that
retained rights were not defined by enumeration because natural rights could not be effectively
enumerated." Id. at 998. See also, Gedicks, supra note 31, at 635-36 (Federalists, "argued
that an enumeration of rights and liberties against the national government would supply a
dangerous basis for recognizing unenumerated governmental powers. They argued that
delegates could not possibly enumerate all of the rights and liberties individuals held and that
those that were not enumerated would be presumed to have been ceded to the national
government or not to exist at all." (footnotes omitted)).
Likewise, future Supreme Court Associate Justice James Wilson -- Declaration of
Independence signatory, proponent of the proposed Constitution, but, opponent of amending
the newly ratified charter with a Bill ofRights -- opined, "All the political writers, from Grotius
and Puffendorf down to Vattel, have treated on this subject; but in no one of those books, nor
in the aggregate of them all, can you find a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the
people .... " James Wilson, 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 454 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1888) (quoted in Brennan,
supra note 558, at 998).
560. "Marcus" (James Iredell), NORFOLK & PORTSMOUTH J., Feb. 20, 1787, reprinted
in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 168 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986) (quoted in Brennan, supra note 158, at 999).
561. Gedicks, supra note 31, at 639. As Prof. Gedicks detailed, "In Massachusetts, New
York, and Virginia, three states whose approval was essential for organization of a viable
national government, a majority opposed ratification without a bill of rights. The necessary
majority in these states was obtained only after pro-ratification forces promised amendment
of the Constitution to include a bill of rights once the post-ratification national government
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it always remains faithful to the Declaration, as part of any inventory of
specific rights, the Constitution would include some overarching instruction
recognizing and preserving the entirety of the Declaration's natural rights
specific and unspecified principles which, as it turned out, is the value
monism found in the combined Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Given the foregoing, Justice Frankfurter aptly deflated Justice Black's
interpretation that, had it been adopted by the Court, would have actualized
the Federalists' fears by rendering the Bill of Rights an incomplete protector
of natural rights. 562 Under Black's approach, the Bill of Rights might well
be more dangerous than beneficial by allowing Government to run roughshod
over any natural right that, through contrivance or inadvertence, had been
omitted from the text. 56 3 In such cases, courts either would either declare the
was organized. Even so, the ratification margins were dangerously narrow." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
562. Exposing his renown prickly side (see infra notes 688-91 and accompanying text),
Justice Frankfurter further remarked that,
Between the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution and
the beginning of the present membership of the Court - a period of 70 years - the
scope of that Amendment was passed upon by 43 judges. Of all these judges, only
one, who may respectfully be called an eccentric exception, ever indicated the belief
that the Fourteenth Amendment was a shorthand summary of the first eight
Amendments theretofore limiting only the Federal Government, and that due process
incorporated those eight Amendments Adamson, 332 U.S at 62 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
563. A retort that omissions might be fixed through constitutional amendment is not cogent.
The rights protected by the Constitution emanate from natural law and, thus, must be protected
and abided by Government. Amending the Constitution, by contrast, is a difficult procedure,
as the Framers seemingly intended. "The U.S. Constitution ... is difficult to amend because
the procedures in Article V for amending the Constitution are so onerous. The Constitution
thus has a low amendment rate: only seventeen amendments in more than 200 years." F.E.
Guerra-Pujol, Godel's Loophole, 41 CAP. U. L. REv. 637, 656-57 (2013) (citing, Ernest A.
Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A Research Agenda,
10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 399 (2008) and Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional
Amendment, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 355, 369 (1994)).
Moreover, amending the Constitution is profoundly political. Recognizing, "the
interplay of polity and legal principle which is the basis of our constitutional System," many
contend that "on the subject of amending the Constitution: 'the Constitution is basically a
political, not ajudicial, document, and its continuation or rejection (in whole or in part) should
partake of the same flavor."' Samuel H. Hofstadter, Constitutional Law by Morris D.
Forkosch. Brooklyn, N. Y.: The Foundation Press, 1963. Pp. xxi, 541. $7.50, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 795, 796 (1964) (quoting, Forkosch at 93). (Similarly, "The writing and amending of
state constitutions has been of a distinctively populist and political nature." Randy J. Holland,
State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 989, 1005 (1996)). Indeed, it
took decades of anger and violence culminating with the devastating Civil War before the
Constitution's two pivotal infirmities -- legalizing slavery and failing to require States to abide
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Constitution unable to perform its primary function of vouchsafing the full
panoply of fundamental rights, or, knowingly would distort the meaning of
enumerated rights' texts to ameliorate, although artificially, gaps in
coverage.m
As next elucidated, indeed decades of precedent have verified that the
Due Process Clauses comprise the Constitution's value monism in that "due
process of law" has become the very definition of fundamental rights and,
accordingly, those clauses are now the repository of all fundamental
constitutional rights, enumerated or unenumerated. Put slightly differently,
whether specified in the constitutional text or not, rights are fundamental only
if they emanate from the meaning of "due process of law."
a. Enumerated and Unenumerated Rights under the Due Process
Clauses --
To illustrate the foregoing assertion first with enumerated rights, due
process' stance as the Constitution's value monism is confirmed by what is
known as the "selective incorporation" theory, as I encapsulated in an earlier
writing:
[I]t is axiomatic constitutional law that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not fully incorporate - that is, it does not per
by the strictures of natural rights -- were cured by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Thus, the respective drafters wisely incorporated the value monism of "due
process of law" into the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, thereby assuring that, in the hope
they are willing and able, the courts will rectify omissions of natural rights, rather than making
the amending process the sole route to vindicate unenumerated rights. See, infra sec. 6-b
addressing why the Judiciary is competent and proper to discern such unenumerated rights.
564. In Frankfurter's words, "A construction which gives to due process no independent
function but turns it into a summary of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights ... leads
inevitably to a warped construction of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to bring within
their scope conduct clearly condemned by due process but not easily fitting into the pigeon-
holes of the specific provisions." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 415-16 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In addition to the positions of Justices Frankfurter and Black, Justices Murphy and
Rutledge, by contrast, argued that, given their position of prominence through inclusion in the
Bill of Rights, every listed right therein, all such "specific guarantees ... should be carried
over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment [thus applicable to the States]."
Adamson, 332 U.S at 124 (Murphy, J., with Rutledge, J., dissenting). However, as well, there
may be unenumerated -- unwritten -- rights so fundamental that they too are cognizable and
enforceable as highest law under the Due Process Clauses. Id.
As explained next in the text, the Frankfurter position, rather than the Black or the
Murphy-Rutledge positions, rightly has prevailed.
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se mandate onto the states - the rights set forth in the Bill of Rights.
Rather, through a right-by-right review, the judiciary has applied to the
States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment those provisions of the Bill
of Rights that derive from the American "scheme of ordered liberty and
system of justice." In other words, due process requires states and
localities to respect those rights essential to the very legitimacy of
governmental conduct.'
"Selective incorporation" tells us that, contrary to the view of Justices
Murphy and Rutledge's Adamson concurrence, 566 the due process clauses do
not unthinkingly encompass every right set forth in the first eight
amendments. Rather, those enumerated rights judicially determined to be
part of "the American 'scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice'
constrain, via due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, States'
regulatory discretion.
As a result of this right-by-right evaluation known as 'selective
incorporation,' every discrete liberty under the Bill of Rights has been
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause except the Sixth Amendment's right to a unanimous jury verdict,
the Fifth Amendment's requirement of indictment by a grand jury and the
right to ajury trial under the Seventh Amendment.567
Along with selective incorporation, the doctrine of unenumerated
fundamental rights evinces the inherent significance of "due process of law."
From that the natural rights concepts inhernet in "due process," we may
discern those fundamental rights extant in natural law but unlisted within our
national charter's text. For instance, the Constitution's Sixth Amendment
contains an express "confrontation clause" explicitly permitting criminal
defendants to confront, through cross-examination and related means,
witnesses who the Government calls to testify.568 But, the Constitution does
not contain a counterpart allowing criminal defendants directly to summon
witnesses and to submit physical evidence in their own defense. Surely
allowing defendants the fundamental right to rebut evidence brought against
565. Bayer, supra note 17, at 395 (emphasis added; quoting, McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 763-64 (2010)).
566. See, supra note 564.
567. Bayer, supra note 17, at 395 (citing, McDonald, 651 U.S. at 763-65 and notes 12-13).
568. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; ... " U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
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them but depriving them the equally vital opportunity to produce their own
exculpatory evidence would be an arbitrary and capricious infringement on
the right to defend in a criminal action as there is no legitimate reason to deny
a criminal defendant that integral aspect of preparing a defense. Therefore,
the unsurprising rule is that such a right is inherent in the meaning of "due
process" even though it is nowhere explicit in the Constitution's text.5 69
A perhaps even more powerful example is that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause implies an "equal protection" aspect identical to the
Equal Protection Clause expressly set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Specifically, over sixty years ago, Boiling v. Sharpe..o held that public
schools in the District of Columbia cannot practice mandatory racial
segregation of students. Bolling is the companion case to Brown v. Board of
Education 7 1 which, overturning the "separate but equal" doctrine, likewise
ruled that state-run public schools may not mandate racially separate
curricula and facilities. Technically, the constitutional infirmity in Brown
was that racially separate public schools violate the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court famously explained, "To separate
[students] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."572
While the Court applied the identical rationale in Bolling, the
constitutional dilemma was that, unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth
Amendment, upon which suits against federal entities such as the District of
Columbia may be brought,573  contains no express equal protection
component. However, as has been accented, both amendments contain an
569. E.g., Bedoya v. Couglin, 91 F.3d 349, 352 (2d Cir. 1996) ("An inmate has a due
process right to summon witnesses in his defense at a prison disciplinary hearing, provided
facility officials do not determine that this would in any way threaten institutional safety or
correctional goals. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566, ... (1974)."). Accordingly, even
if the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation evinced the Framers' implicit intent to allow
only confronting, thus depriving criminal defendants of the right produce their own in-court
evidence (and presumably it does not), such corrupt intent would be thwarted by the natural
rights force of the Due Process Clauses.
570. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
571. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
572. Id. at 494.
573. The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government, of which the District of
Columbia is a part, while the Fourteenth Amendment applies to state government and
localities. See, e.g., S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympics Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542
n.21 (1987); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.9 (1985); Patchak v. Jewell, 828
F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Truong v. Hassan, 829 F.3d 627, 630-31 and note 4 (8th Cir.
2016).
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express and identically worded Due Process Clause. Within a remarkably
short three-page opinion, the Bolling Court unanimously determined that the
meaning of "due process of law" is broad enough to include the same
principles covered by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Extressing the sublime and crucial precept in rather understated prose the
Court concluded, "the concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually
exclusive."574 Accordingly, a violation of equal protection essentially states
an identical claim sounding in due process, because "discrimination may be
so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."5 75
Importantly, despite what its critics claim, Bolling is not devoid of
theory.5 76 Bolling is not a conclusory statement linking equal protection to
due process to avoid the surely embarrassing situation that, because the Fifth
574. 347 U.S. at 499.
575. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499. Roughly three decades earlier, speaking for the court, Chief
Justice Taft wrote, "The [equal protection] clause is associated in the [fourteenth] amendment
with the due process clause and it is customary to consider them together. It may be that they
overlap, that a violation of one may involve at times the violation of the other, but the spheres
of the protection they offer are not coterminous." Traux v. Raich 257 U.S. 312, 331-32 (1921)
(per Taft, C.J.). Predecessors to Traux had intimated, arguably reluctantly, that the Fifth
Amendment's due process component invalidates Congressional acts based on arbitrary
classifications, but no more so than does the Fourteenth Amendment addressing comparable
state claims. David E. Bernstein, Bolling, Equal Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia,
93 GEo. L. J. 1253, 1265 (2005) (citing, inter alia, District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S.
138, 150 (1909) ('prohibition cannot be stricter or more extensive' than the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause upon the states, and this law would be valid
if enacted by a state."). Early treatise authors likewise believed that because it proscribes
irrational discrimination, "due process contain[s] an equal protection component." Id. at 1267
(discussing, HANNIS TAYLOR, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
297 (1917); CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT 408, 418-19 (1922); and, Oliver H. Dean, The Law ofthe Land, 48 AM. L. REV.
641, 668 (1914)).
Of course, as will be discussed, the appropriate limit on governmental acts under Fifth
or Fourteenth Amendment due process is precisely and properly what those early cases and
commentaries speculated: that the challenged governmental classification is unconstitutional
only if objectively the classification was "arbitrary or capricious," not simply questionable
policy or inefficient. See, infra text accompanying notes 600-10. Thus, Bolling was not
wholly unanticipated by the courts, although importantly it clarified that indeed due process
is not "associated" with, nor does it "overlap," but rather actually subsumes equal protection.
576. Raoul Berger, Activist Censures ofRobert Bork, 85 NW U. L. REV. 993, 1015 (1991)
(an equal protection aspect within the Fifth Amendment is "quite untenable;" quoted in David
Bernstein, supra note 575,_ at 6; see also, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 158, 166 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (concurring in
the judgment); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual
Elite, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 767, 774 (1998)).
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Amendment contains no express Equal Protection Clause, absent an act of
Congress or an appropriate constitutional amendment, unlike the then-48
states, the District of Columbia (and impliedly any United States territory or
possession) may mandate officially racially discriminatory public facilities
and services, including schools.577 A careful reading of Bolling's scant three
pages shows that the Court did not impose a de facto constitutional
amendment by recognizing an equal protection component within the Fifth
Amendment. Rather, "While dicta in Bolling state that the concept of due
process overlaps to some extent with the concept of equal protection, the
ultimate holding of the Court is based on the traditional due process concern
that the government not engage in arbitrary deprivations of liberty."5 78
Indeed, Prof. Lawrence Lessig smartly accented that, "What is significant
about the actual opinion ... is not that the Court found an 'equal protection
component' to the Due Process Clause. No such 'component' was ever
'found."'5 7 9 Rather, the Bolling Court rightly recognized a liberty interest
that minority children (and white children as well) 8 have in avoiding the
577. Bernstein, supra note 575, at 3; cf, Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed
Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395, 409 (1995) ("describing the
'embarrassing textual gap' with which defenders of Bolling must reckon") (quotation from,
Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 977 note 7 (2004)).
Indeed, one might plausibly presume that, had Bolling reluctantly upheld the District
of Columbia's discriminatory school system on the technical grounds that the Bill of Rights
contains no explicit equal protection clause, Congress and the States, likely in record time and
with few if any nay-sayers, would have enacted and ratified an amendment placing an equal
protection clause into the the Constitution, likely within the Fifth Amendment. Supporters of
Brown would have endorsed such an amendment to end the injustice of constitutional
federally-managed school districts. Opponents of Brown conceivably would support the
amendment if, for no other reason, out of spite based on the supposition that because Brown
likely would not be overturned in some future case, it makes no sense to allow the Federal
level to discriminate when States may not.
578. Bernstein, supra note 575, at 3 (emphasis added).
579. Id. (quoting, Lessig, supra note 577, at 409).
580. U.S. v. School Dist. 151 of Cook County, Ill., 301 F.Supp. 201, 206 (N.D. Ill. 1969),
mod. on other grnds., 432 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1970) ("Conversely, segregation harms the white
as well as the black student. Just as racial isolation tends to cripple a black child by inducing
a feeling of inferiority, it inflates the white child with a false belief in his superiority."); Hart
v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21, 383 F. Supp. 699, 731 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The negative impact of racially segregated schools is not
confined exclusively to Black students. White children may also react to racial isolation in
ways harmful to themselves."); cf., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10
(1972) (The Fair Housing Act of 1968,42 U.S.C. sec. 3610(a), recognizes as cognizable, "the
alleged injury to existing tenants by exclusion of minority persons from the apartment complex
[resulting in] the loss of important benefits from interracial associations. ... [T]he proponents
of the legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects of discrimination had
an interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suffered.") (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g.,
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psychological, societal and other related affronts inflicted by racially
segregated public schools, injuries "not justified by any valid police power
rationale." 8' Understandably, Bolling's determination that due process
subsumes "equal protection," remains good law.5 82
To summarize, under "selective incorporation," principles of "due
process of law" have applied to the States the vast majority, but not all of
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, its presence within the
Bill of Rights strongly implies, but does not per se establish that any given
enumerated right is fundamental enough to be a natural right with which,
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, States must abide. Conversely, the
doctrine of unenumerated rights means that the realm of natural rights is not
limited to rights, such as those in the First and Fourth Amendments, both
explicitly set forth in the Bill of Rights and deemed "fundamental" under due
process doctrine. Thus, oddly but inescapably, apt due process jurisprudence
has rendered the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
superfluous, an idea that should pique the textualist in us all. Indeed, adding
to the pique, pursuant to the just-discussed doctrine of "selective
incorporation," virtually all enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights are
surplusage because even if they had not been cataloged therein, those rights'
Coleman Realty v. Havens, 455 U.S. 363, 377 (1982) (same); McCardell v. U.S. Dept. of
H.U.D., 794 F.3d 510, 517-18 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); Palmer v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 356
F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2004) (same; declining to address if a similar claim is cognizable in a
private workforce under The Fair Employment Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e, et seq.).
581. Bernstein, supra note 575, at 6. Thus, although otherwise correct, the recent
Obergefell opinion misunderstood the relationship by stating, "The Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth
independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may
rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each may be
instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other." Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
Similarly, even the acute Prof. Laurence Tribe misidentified the interrelationship of due
process and equal protection as a "legal double helix." Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal
Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749 (2011) (discussing, Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v.
Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1893,
1898 (2004)).
Rightly linking the concepts under the rubric of "dignity," in response to Tribe, Prof
Yoshino aptly concluded, "Too much emphasis has been placed on the formal distinction
between the equality claims made under the equal protection guarantees and the liberty claims
made under the due process or other guarantees. In practice, the Court does not abide by this
distinction." Id at 749.
582. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. lqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 675 (2009); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,
234 (1979) (noting that Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "forbids the Federal
Government to deny equal protection of the laws" (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted)); Ingram v. Faruque, 728 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2013).
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fundamental character is discernable through neutral reason. Accordingly,
substantive and procedural due process would discern and apply those
unenumerated rights pursuant to the Due Process Clauses' moral authority to
enforce the Declaration of Independence's "unalienable Rights" doctrine.
Thus, in theory, the Framers and Reconstruction Congress need not have
listed any rights in the Bill of Rights or in the Reconstruction Amendments
save "due process of law." 583
583. See, supra note 555. As a seemingly disgruntled Prof. Dan T. Coenen opined, "If the
concept of due process embodied all of what is Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, ...
one wonders why that amendment itself contains both a Due Process and an Equal Protection
Clause. ... Such a result, it might well be said, offends traditional text-driven canons of
construction and thus must be highly structural in nature." Dan T. Coenen, Institutional
Arrangements and Individual Rights: A Comment on Professor Tribe's Critique ofthe Modern
Court's Treatment of Constitutional Liberty, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 1159, 1205 note 133 (2001)
(discussing, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995)).
Despite the concerns of theorists such as Coenen, our inner (or outer) textualist must
remain disgruntled because all selectively incorporated enumerated rights' status as
surplusage, including "equal protection of the laws," is inexorable given that due process is
the value monism unifying all more specific constitutional rights, enumerated or
unenumerated. Thus, aside from roughly four enumerated rights either deemed non-
fundamental or as yet un-litigated (see, supra notes 566-67 and accompanying text),
everything else -- the First, Second, Fourth, and most of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments -- are redundant because, even if they were not enumerated, the principles of
"due process of law" would reveal them to us. Presumably, the Thirteenth Amendment also
is surplusage as there are few violations of innate morality more heinous than slavery. Yes,
the textualist within us, regardless of its prominence, must have fits; but aggravation cannot
change the immutable rules of "Nature and Nature's God."
Moreover, in answer to Coenen inquiry, that so much of our Constitution technically
is redundant hardly means that enumerating those rights is a useless gesture -- a waste of
valuable textual space. Enumeration starkly reminds us that reason, often prodded by
experience, already has identified certain rights as fundamental, thereby relieving us of the
burden of teasing them out of the abstract principles of due process. Two prominent scholars
agree, "The Framers specifically enumerated protections that they regarded as especially
important, and then added a catch-all. It is impossible to give 'due process of law' its historical
meaning and avoid redundancy." Chapman and McConnell, supra note 359, at 1718. Profs.
Chapman and McConnell explicated their conclusion, "The Constitution and Bill of Rights
are shot through with prohibitions that some Founders thought to be redundant with
enumerated powers or prohibitions. Furthermore, there is no historical evidence that the
Founders believed that the antiredundancy canon of interpretation should be determinative.
To the contrary, the Framers no less than contemporary constitutional lawyers wrapped their
arguments in as many constitutional provisions as possible." Id. at 1721.
Comparably, we often enfold and compare the general and the specific because each
can inform the other; the specific offers clues how to understand the general, while
simultaneously, the general provides analytical tools to comprehend the specific. Such
reminds us of the venerable canon of statutory construction, "noscitur a sociis - 'a word is
known by the company it keeps' - provides that words grouped together should be given
related meaning." Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted); see
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Nevertheless, as the second Justice John Marshall Harlan correctly
explained, "selective incorporation" coupled with the doctrine of
unenumerated rights evinces that, "due process is a discrete concept which
subsists as an independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness, more
general and inclusive than the specific prohibitions" in the Bill of Rights.5 *
"Indeed, when originally interpreted under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Liberty Clause, principles such as free speech were applied to restrict state
action not through an incorporation doctrine, but as derivations of the very
notion of liberty itself.""'5 Accordingly and worth re-emphasizing, while the
first eight amendments certainly are instructive, afthe Constitution contained
no mention of rights other than its due process clauses -- ifits language were
utterly silent except to guarantee "due process of law" -- appeals to reason,
informed but not determined by history and experience, would tease from that
scant and bare text almost every aspect of the Bill ofRights along with rights.
unidentified in the Constitution's prose." There is no conclusion to be
drawn other than "due process" is the Constitution's value monism because
also, McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2368 (2016); Magee v. Coca-Cola
Refreshments USA, Inc., 833 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55, 199
L. Ed. 2d 18 (2017) Similarly, "A related canon, ejusdem generis, ... appl[ies] ... when
interpreting general terms at the end of a list of more specific ones. In such a case, 'the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by
the preceding specific words."' Rizo, 887 F.3d. at 462 (quoting, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 114-15 (2001) (quoting 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (1991) (additional citation omitted)); see
also, Magee, 833 F. 3d at 534.
Thus, canons such as noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis suggest that the general
precepts of due process not only disclose unenumerated rights, but also enable us to explicate
the meaning of specific rights such as free speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Comparably, understanding specific rights should
provide insights that, through inductive logic, help us better apprehend the abstract principles
of due process itself.
584. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
585. Bayer, supra note 17, at 395 (citing, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 & n.9 (2010)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); id.
at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting)); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1964) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). Such is essentially what so-called "selective incorporation" is and does.
586. As I explicated a few years ago, "Consequently, adept jurists and other officials would
have discerned as specific constituents of due process discrete rights such as equal protection,
free speech, religious liberty, criminal defense counsel, freedom from self-incrimination and
freedom from unreasonable police conduct, even if such rights were not set forth explicitly in
specific portions of our Constitution." Bayer, supra note 17, at 395.
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we now understand that from the right of "due process of law," all other
fundamental constitutional rights, express or implied, emanate.587
b. Due Process as Separation of Powers and Federalism --
The Due Process Clauses' value monism is further evidenced by judicial
recognition that due process governs not only fundamental rights themselves,
but other pivotal sections of the Constitution such as the Commerce Clause188
which, as part of both Federalism and "separation of powers," preserve the
liberty vouchsafed by "due process of law." Yes, courts regularly understand
Congress's commerce authority in terms of economic pragmatism, rather
than as an expression of natural law.5 89 "Nonetheless, practical commercial
reality is not, and correctly never has been, sufficient to explicate entirely
Congress's commerce regulating authority. As Chief Justice Marshall
explained in Gibbons v. Ogden nearly 200 years ago, 'This power, like all
587. As noted, the courts have identified a very small number of rights set forth in the Bill
of Rights, thus binding on the Federal level, but not on the States because they are not
"fundamental." Specifically excepted are, "the Sixth Amendment's right to a unanimous jury
verdict, the Fifth Amendment's requirement of indictment by a grand jury and the right to a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment." Id. (citing, McDonald, 651 U.S. at 763-65 and
notes 12-13).
Under Deontological Originalism, those exceptions are sound only if, according to
Kantian morality, deprivation of these purportedly non-fundamental rights does not offend the
innate dignity of individuals by treating such individuals merely as means and not
simultaneously as ends. See generally, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at
Sections 2 and 3. Otherwise, those precedents must be reversed as the Court has done on
occasion in different contexts. E.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (Sixth Amendment's
right to counsel is not applicable to the States in misdemeanor prosecutions), o., Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Fifth
Amendment's right against self-incrimination is not applicable to the States), o. in relevant
part, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
588. E.g., Sec'y of Agric. v. Cent. Roig Ref Co., 338 U.S. 604, 616 (1950) ("[N]ot even
resort to the Commerce Clause can defy the standards of due process."); accord, e.g., United
States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that due process applies to
extraterritorial application of U.S. law), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1343 (2007); United States v.
Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 477 (5th Cir. 1976).
589. Justice Holmes, for example, offered, "[C]ommerce among the States is not a technical
legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Swift & Co. v. U.S.,
96 U.S. 375, 398 (1905); see also, e.g., N. Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946)
("Congress is not bound by technical legal conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely
practical matter. To deal with it effectively, Congress must be able to act in terms of economic
and financial realities." (citation omitted)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1, 41-42 (1937) ("[I]nterstate commerce itself is a practical conception."); Narbona v. Gold
Coast Beverage Distributors, Inc, 2014 WL 11906594 *5 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting, Swift &
Co.).
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others vested in Congress, ... acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution"'
5 90
Consistent with Chief Justice Marshall's understanding, at the turn of
the Twentieth Century, the Supreme Court, speaking through the first Justice
Harlan, reiterated, "[T]he power of Congress to regulate commerce among
the states, although plenary, cannot be deemed arbitrary, since it is subject to
such limitations or restrictions as are prescribed by the Constitution. This
power, therefore, may not be exercised so as to infringe rights secured or
protected by that instrument. "591 Therefore, while Congress'
unconstitutional use of the Commerce Clause habitually is deemed a
violation of the authority of state governmentS 592 under the Tenth
Amendment,593 in fact, as the Court repeatedly emphasizes, the authority of
state governments exists not to aggrandize the states as entities. Rather, the
axiomatic theory holds that the division of governmental power between
states and the federal level, coupled with the separation of governmental
functions -- legislative, executive and judicial -- at the federal levels (a
practice adopted uniformly by the States), forestalls tyranny by ensuring that
no office or level can exercise dominant control by assuming the full panoply
of governmental functions.594
590. Bayer, supra note 124, at 880 (quoting, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196
(1824)).
591. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1903) (emphasis added).
592. E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) (discussing
that the police power is a power reserved for the states and not the federal government).
593. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend
X.
594. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 1546-47 (2016). As the Supreme Court of
Washington aptly and emphatically reaffirmed, "Separation of powers created a clear division
of functions among each branch of government, and the power to interfere with the exercise
of another's functions was very limited. The doctrine recognizes that each branch of
government has its own appropriate sphere of activity. It ensures that the fundamental
functions of each branch remain inviolate." Hale v. Wellpinit School Dist. No. 49, 165 Wash.
2d 494, 504 (2009) (citations omitted).
The classic theory avers that because their authority and power derive from their
separate status, each office and level of government jealously guards its particular authority
from invasions -- deliberate or inadvertent -- by the others. Yet, because only by functioning
together can they form a workable whole, each office and level must cooperate even as they
preserve their separate identities. As the Court has accented, "Separation-of-powers principles
are vindicated, not disserved, by measured cooperation between the two political branches of
the Government, each contributing to a lawful objective through its own processes." Loving
v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 773 (1996); see also, e.g., Hale, 165 Wash.2d, at 504 ("However,
separation of powers 'does not depend on the branches of government being hermetically
sealed off from one another.' It recognizes that the separate branches must remain partially
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In this way, the possibility of autocracy is minimized if not completely
obviated for government offices and levels cannot meld into one dictatorial
entity. Therefore, the principle of divided powers allows courts comfortably
to assert that, "Federalism secures the freedom of the individual."' 9 Indeed,
as though enforcing Kant's third categorical imperative that Government
exists to protect human dignity and, therefore, must comport itself morally,5 96
the Supreme Court has unequivocally clarified that under the Constitution,
organs of government, including States, are not ends in themselves, but
rather means to preserve the goal of liberty.597
Because "liberty" interests are fostered by constitutional separation of
powers, it follows that, like discrete fundamental rights, the due process
clauses alone, absent specific provisions, denote some systemic, mandatory
estrangement of governmental functions into disconnected offices sufficient
to preserve liberty. Thus, if the Constitution had no governmental structure
at all, the due process clauses would require the creation of a system that
fulfills the liberty interests of separation of powers, although the actual form
could be somewhat different from that set forth in our Constitution.5 98
E. The Meaning ofDue Process --
We now understand that "due process of law" is accepted as the
Constitution's value monism, that is, were there nothing but a due process
clause, interpretation thereof would comprehend some system of separated
intertwined in order to 'maintain an effective system of checks and balances, as well as an
effective government."') (quoting, Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wash.2d 129, 135 (1994)).
595. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011). See also, Dept. of Transportation v.
Assoc. of Am. Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1233 (2015); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483-
84 (2011) (noting that the separation of powers protects the individual in addition to protecting
each branch of government from intrusion by other branches). As Justices Clarence Thomas
and Antonin Scalia summarized, "The Framers believed that the division of powers between
the Federal Government and the States would protect individual liberty." U.S. v. Kebodeaux,
570 U.S. 387, 420 (2013) (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., dissenting).
596. See generally, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 3-d-5.
597. "The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States
or state governments as abstract political entities. ... To the contrary, the Constitution divides
authority between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals." New York
v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); see also, e.g., LaRoque v. Holder, 650 F.3d 777, 792 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (quoting, New York v. U.S.).
598. See generally, Bayer, supra note 124, at 879-884. As a practical matter, almost
certainly any system discerned from the sense of "due process" would include a legislature,
an executive and a judiciary. But, their exact parameters might not comport on "all fours"
with what our Constitution explicitly provides.
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powers augmented by fundamental rights, all to protect "liberty." We have
reached the point of defining the exact meaning of due process, a definition
this writing argues, that to date has best been captured by the dignity
paradigm. Fittingly, over a century ago, the Supreme Court expressed the
rudimentary nature of due process, "The fundamental guarantee of due
process is absolute and not merely relative. . . . [T]he constitutional
safeguard as to due process [is] at all times dominant and controlling where
the Constitution is applicable."5 99 Thus, "due process" in its most abstract
and fundamental essence must likewise be the meaning of "unalienable
Rights" under the Declaration of Independence. The next step, then, is
explaining what "due process of law" specifically means.
1. Due Process Protects Individuals from "Arbitrary" Governmental
Conduct --
Expressing the essence of liberty, the Supreme Court fairly recently
reaffirmed in Sacramento County v. Lewis600 that substantive and procedural
due process prevent exactly what the Declaration addressed: tyranny.
Specifically, Lewis stressed that "due process of law" forbids government
from "abusing its power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression," 601
a proposition keenly followed by the judiciary.60 2  The Lewis Court
summarized that proposition with a familiar legal term, "Since the time of
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the
concept to be protection against arbitrary action ... We have emphasized
time and again that '[t]he touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual against arbitrary action of government, ... "'603 Lewis embraced
599. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909); see also, United States
v. Smith, 480 F.2d 664, 668-69 note 9 (5th Cir. 1973).
600. County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
601. Id. at 846 (quoting, Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)), abrogated
on other grounds, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), Saucier receded from in Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)).
602. E.g., Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir. 2015); Hatfield v. O'Neill, 534 Fed.
Appx. 383, 844 (Ith Cir. 2013); Raab v. Blakey, 370 Fed. Appx. 303, 309 (3rd Cir. 2010).
603. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836 (emphasis added; quoting, Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
558 (1974)). The Louisiana Supreme Court expressed that well-accepted standard succinctly:
"Substantive due process may be broadly defined as the constitutional guaranty that no person
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty, or property. The essence of substantive due
process is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action." Babineaux v. Judiciary
Commission, 341 So.2d 396, 400 (La. 1976) (emphasis added; citing, Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); 16 Am. Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, s 550,
p. 946).
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the nascent Supreme Court's two-centuries-old interpretation of Magna
Carta, expressed but three decades after ratification of the Bill of Rights,
"[A]fter volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good
sense of mankind has at last settled down to this: that they were intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and
distributive justice. " Verifying its link to the meaning of due process,
Lewis explained that, pursuant to the above-quoted passage from Okely,
"Since the time of our early explanations of due process, we have understood
the core of the concept to be protection against arbitrary action ... "605
Regarding the post-Bellum Amendments, uninterrupted precedent of
both the Supreme Court` and lower federal courts,607 identically confirm the
objective of the Reconstruction Congress and ratifying states that, "the
[Fourteenth] Amendment['s Due Process Clause] protected everyone in the
United States from arbitrary and capricious abuses by their state
governments."a8
Conceptually, there can be no greater protection from official
misconduct because those broad categories -- "arbitrary and capricious
abuses" -- subsume every conceivable governmental malfeasance serious
enough to evoke a sense of tyranny.69 Nothing is larger in the Constitution
604. Bank of Columbia v. Okely 17 U.S. (4. Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (emphasis added).
The Court's conclusion in Okely has been reaffirmed and remains good law as of this writing.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-46; Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986) (quoting Okely);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (same).
605. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845-46
606. Due process is, "'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331-32 (1986) (quoting Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884) (quoting Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) ("The touchstone
of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (procedural due process, "protect[s] against arbitrary
deprivation of property").
607. E.g., Uschock v. Pennsylvania, 2018 WL 834247 (Mem) at *1 (3rd Cir. 2018) (per
curiam); Hancock v. County of Rensselaer, 882 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2018); Livengood v. Bureau
of Prisons, 503 Fed. Appx. 104, at **4 (3rd Cir. 2012); Harron v. Town of Franklin, 660 F.3d
531, 535 (1st Cir. 2011); Green v. Post, 574 F.2d 1294, 1302 (10th Cir. 2009); Hawkins v.
Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 784 (8th Cir. 2003); Nix v. Franklin County School District, 311
F.3d 1373, 376 (11th Cir. 2002); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d
82, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
608. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1034.
609. An apt set of definitions is found in J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of Equal
Protection: Willowbrook and the New Non-Arbitrariness Standard, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIV.
RTs. L.J. 263, 293 note 11 (2001),
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-- no idea more encompassing -- than that which by its own significance, with
nothing else to enable it, enforces the natural law principles of the Declaration
of Independence by "protect[ing] everyone in the United States from
arbitrary and capricious abuses by their [] governments."610
2. Governmental Action Is "Arbitrary or Capricious" IfIt Is Immoral, that
Is, Lacking "Fundamental Fairness" --
Importantly, as mandated by its deontological origins, courts grant that
determining whether a challenged governmental action is arbitrary or
capricious, in fact, constitutes a moral judgment. As Prof. Richard Worf
summarized, "due process or equal protection contexts . . . embody
deontological concepts of fairness and morality." 6 " This makes perfect sense
Arbitrary is defined as "without adequate determining principle ... [or] fixed or
arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, ... decisive
but unreasoned." [see United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.14 (1946).]
Capricious is defined as "apt to change suddenly, freakish; whimsical; humorsome."
Id. See also Bruno's[, Inc. v. U.S.], 624 F.2d [592,] 594 [5th Cir. 1980] (stating that
arbitrary and capricious means either "unwarranted in law" or "without justification
in fact."); Dynalectron Corp. v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1987)
(noting that one indicia of arbitrary and capricious conduct is "subjective bad faith").
See Chaudron v. Pasquotank County Dep't of Soc. Serv., No. 84-1-CIV-2, 177
(E.D.N.C. 1985). In jury instructions in Chaudron, the court defined arbitrary as-,
"subject to one's own prejudices." Capricious was defined as "whimsical, fickle, or
trifling." Trivial was defined as "unsubstantial, insignificant, or trifling." See also
Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte, 658 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (defining arbitrary
as a decision reached "without adequate determining principle or was unreasoned").
In several public employee discharge cases, the Claims Court employed the arbitrary
and capricious test. See, e.g., Crocker v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 568, 572-73,
n.12 (Ct. Cl. 1955) ("Arbitrary has been defined as 'fixed or done capriciously or at
pleasure; without adequate determining principle ... depending on the will alone ...
capriciously."'); Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 128 (Ct. Cl. 1948)
(stating that the court equates arbitrary and capricious with bad faith or "so grossly
erroneous as to imply bad faith").
610. Finkelman, supra note 297, at 1034. While Prof. Finkelman's discussion concerns the
effects of the Fourteenth Amendment, we know that Congress enacted and promoted the
ratification of that amendment's Due Process Clause to complete what was begun when the
nation adopted the Fifth Amendment whose Due Process Clause applies to the Federal level.
See, supra notes 331-396 and accompanying text. Therefore, the two due process clauses
combined protect all those under the jurisdiction of the United States "from arbitrary and
capricious abuses by their [] governments."
611. Richard C. Worf, The Case for Rational Basis Review of General Suspicionless
Searches and Seizures, 23 TouRo L. REv. 93, 119 (2007); see also, e.g., Aya Gruber, Righting
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because the constitutional fault of arbitrary or capricious conduct is not that
it is bad policy (which may not be so), nor that it is inefficient (which likewise
may not be so), but that it is wrongful -- arbitrary or capricious conduct
might promote the good, but it contravenes the right. Indeed, one prime
axiom of due process jurisprudence familiar to every lawyer and law student
is that reviewing courts, "begin, of course, with the presumption that the
challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not the concern of the courts; if a
challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained
... 612 That perspective, well over a century old, 1 is encapsulated by the
popular phrasing, although, "evidence ... may cast some doubt on the
wisdom of the statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the Due Process
Clause does not empower the judiciary 'to sit as a 'superlegislature to weigh
the wisdom of legislation' . . .."614
Victim Wrongs: Responding to Philosophical Criticisms of the Nonspecific Victim Liability
Defense, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 433, 457 (2004) (fairness and due process are deontological
concepts); Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2087, 2093 (2001); Timothy P. Terrell, Turmoil at the
Normative Core ofLawyering: Uncomfortable Lessons from the "Metaethics" ofLegal Ethics,
49 EMORY L.J. 87, 105 (2000) (due process is deontological because it mandates, "structural
values that must be respected in and of themselves, . .. regardless of the social results any
particular instance might produce. . .").
612. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457
U.S. 957, 973 (1982) ("Our view of the wisdom of a state constitutional provision may not
color our task of constitutional adjudication."); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 589 (1982)
("A belief that an Act of Congress may be inequitable or unwise is of course an insufficient
basis on which to conclude that it is unconstitutional."); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 449 U.S. 456, 469 (1981) ("it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom
and utility of legislation." Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729, 83 S.Ct. 1028, 1030, 10
L.Ed.2d 93 (1963).").
613. "But our duty is to apply the law-not to make it. If this statute be unwise or unjust
the remedial power lies with the Legislature of the State, and not with this Court." Leffingwell
v. Warren, 67 U.S. 599, 606 (1862).
614. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124 (1978) (quoting, Ferguson
v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (citation omitted). Granted, sometimes courts express
the concept as, "Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred from the Fifth,
equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices." F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (emphasis added); see
also, e.g., Seepersad v. Sessions, 892 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2018); ACRA Turf Club, LLC v.
Zanzuccki, 724 F. App'x 102, 110 (3d Cir. 2018). With respect, the inclusion of the concept
"fairness" is offhand, reflexive, and fundamentally incorrect. Understandably, courts wish to
underscore the inappropriateness of upholding or rejecting constitutional challenges based not
on objective constitutional premises, but rather on judges' subjective assessments of the merits
or demerits of the challenged governmental action's worth. In that regard, perhaps writing
hastily, courts may deem evaluating "fairness" to be synonymous with judging the societal
value of governmental policy.
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Instead, nearly seven decades ago, as though anticipating the Court's
formal expression of dignity as due process' paradigmatic meaning, Justice
Felix Frankfurter intrepidly and enthusiastically declared:
It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due
process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair
and right and just.61
Constitutional law as expressions of morality could be nothing else and
nothing less because, as we now know, the Constitution exists to enforce the
natural rights principles of the Declaration.6 16 Those principles, in turn,
derive from natural law which itself is a moral construct. 6 1 7 Accordingly and
rightly, the courts have understood due process' prohibition against
arbitrary and capricious governmental conduct to be a moral command,
therefore, resolving due process disputes requires moral determinations
based, understandably, on a working knowledge of what actually comprises
moral comportment. Despite some resistance past and present, 618 the courts
However, as next discussed, the Judiciary firmly and aptly has explained that official
conduct violates the Due Process Clauses if the conduct offends principles of "fundamental
fairness." Consistent with Deontological Originalism, fundamental fairness does not involve
judging the wisdom, efficiency, or prudence of challenged governmental actions. Rather,
properly understood and applied, fundamental fairness inquires whether the challenged actions
impugn the dignity of adversely affected persons. If yes, the actions are unconstitutional.
Thus, assessing fundamental fairness is a matter of moral evaluation premised on unbiased
reason, not subjective appraisal of any given policy's usefulness.
615. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), abrogated on other grounds, Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
616. See, supra notes 126-209 and accompanying text.
617. See, supra notes 210-279 and accompanying text.
618. For example, contrary to it general jurisprudence, roughly one-hundred-thirty years
ago, the Supreme Court opined:
If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and
their enforcement be attended with the observance of those general rules which our
system of jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the harshness,
injustice, and oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. ... It is hardly necessary to say
that the hardship, impolicy, or injustice of state laws is not necessarily an objection
to their constitutional validity; and that the remedy for evils of that character is to be
sought from state legislatures.
Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1885); see also, e.g., Fallbrook Irr.
Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 157 (1896) (citations omitted) ("It never was intended that the
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hold that, because the Due Process Clauses forbid Government from acting
arbitrarily or capriciously, to fulfill that immutable moral duty,
governmental conduct must comport with 'fundamental fairness. "619 That
is, to be constitutional, government conduct need not be efficient, nor well-
considered, nor smart; rather, it must be fair, a principle constantly repeated
court should, as the effect of the [fourteenth] amendment, be transformed into a court of
appeal, where all decisions of state courts involving merely questions of general justice and
equitable considerations in the taking of property should be submitted to this court for its
determination."); French v. Barber Asphalt Pay. Co., 181 U.S. 324, 328-29 (1901); Davidson
v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. (6 Otto) 97, 103 (1877).
More recently, three justices angrily and inaptly asserted, "a Justice's commission does
not confer any special moral, philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing
those perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of 'due process."' Obergefell, 135 S.
CL at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
619. E.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, N. C., 452 U.S. 18,
24-25 (1981) (due process, "expresses the requirement of 'fundamental fairness,' a
requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its importance is lofty."); Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) ("The standard, after all, is that of fairness as required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton,
362 U.S. 234, 246 (1960) (citation and footnote omitted) ("Due process cannot create or
enlarge power. ... It has to do, as taught by the Government's own cases, with the denial of
that 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.' Betts v. Brady, 1942,
316 U.S. 455, 462, [o., Gideon v. Wainwright, U.S. (1963)]"); accord., U.S. v. Russell, 11
U.S. 423, 432 (1973).
As one treatise accented, the concept of constitutional fundamental fairness predates
the Civil War:
The fundamental fairness doctrine was not adopted as the reigning interpretation of
due process until after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the Supreme
Court found itself applying due process to actions of state governments. However,
many commentators have found the roots of that doctrine in several prominent state
and federal rulings rendered over the period extending from the adoption of the Bill
of Rights to the end of the Civil War.
I LaFave, Israel, King, Kerra, Crim. Proc. § 2.4(a) (4th ed.), CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I
December 2017 Update, Part 1. Introduction and Overview, Chapter 2. The
Constitutionalization of Criminal Procedure, § 2.4(c) The pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases,
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/1986034aa9cf3 1 dc8c42al69332e61fD/View/FullText
.html?originationContext-documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageltem&contextData=
%28sc.Category%29 (accessed, Feb. 28, 2018) (footnotes omitted).
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by the both Supreme Court620 and lower courts.6 2 1 The appellation
fundamental fairness nicely encapsulates the anti-arbitrariness foundation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for, as earlier discussed, Justice Felix
Frankfurter, an apostle of judicial restraint,622 boldly but aptly declared that
due process is nothing less than, "ultimate decency in a civilized society."6 23
3. Discerning Rights under the Due Process Clauses Is an Exercise in
Deontological Moral Reasoning --
Let us now combine the foregoing aspects of due process analysis to
forge one basic metatheory. As we now know, this Nation ratified the
Constitution, including its post-Bellum amendments, to enforce as America's
highest law the Declaration of Independence's philosophy that government
620. "In construing that Amendment, we have held that it imposes minimum standards of
fairness on the States, ... " Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 269 (2008); see also, e.g.,
Snyder v. Com. of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 117 (1934) (per Cardozo, J.), o. in part, Maloy
v. Hogan, 78 U.S. 1 (1964) ("Due process of law requires that the proceedings shall be fair,
but fairness is a relative, not an absolute, concept. It is fairness with reference to particular
conditions or particular results."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (per
Cardozo, J.), o. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 884 (1969).
621. E.g., Williamson v. Parker, 2017 WL 2986898 at *2 (10th Cir. 2017); Joy Pipe, USA
v. ISMT Ltd., 2017 WL 3080901 at *8 (5th Cir. 2017); Dang. v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., Fla.,
856 F.3d 842, 850 (.11th Cir. 2017); Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 539 (7th Cir. 2015)
(the constitutional protections that individuals may sue to enforce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
"vindicate rights of fundamental fairness"); U.S. v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1172 (7th
Cir. 2015) (regarding, "knowing and voluntary waiver of one's [Sixth Amendment] right to an
attorney ... the due process framework ... is a flexible framework that is focused on the
fundamental fairness of the hearing ... [evincing] that the defendant made a knowing and
voluntary choice to proceed without counsel."); In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14, 33 (1st Cir. 2015)
("Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires fundamental fairness in [criminal] trials");
U.S. v. Woods, 764 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (that a codefendant's
guilty plea is not admissible evidence of another defendant's guilt "is grounded in notions of
fundamental fairness and due process ... "); U.S. v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014)
("Plea agreements ... are negotiated, executed, approved, and enforced in the context of a
criminal prosecution that affords the defendant a due process right to fundamental fairness,
..."); United States v. $87,118.00 in U.S. Currency, 95 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir.1996) (quoted
in, U.S. v. Jimenez-Bencevi, _ F.3d _, 2015 WL 3486658 at *6 (1st Cir. 2015), although
contractual, "ordinary contract principles" must not be applied to immunity agreements in
ways that "violate the defendant's rights to fundamental fairness under the Due Process
Clause.")
622. Courts, "must adopt the thinking of Mister Justice Frankfurter, the archpriest of
judicial restraint, ... " Boysen v. Treadway Inn of Lake Harmony, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 96, 98 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
623. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), o. in part,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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is legitimate only so long as it protects and preserves those "unalienable
Rights" extant in the natural order of existence -- derived from "God and
Nature's God." 6 24 The natural law principles underlying such natural rights,
in turn, sound in deontological moral ideology, that is, Government's duty to
enforce unalienable -- fundamental -- rights is a moral duty; therefore,
morality tells us what are and are not constitutional rights.
a. The Supreme Court's Early Post-Civil War Due Process Rulings --
Asjust discussed, building on admittedly scant pre-Bellum precedent, 625
and in response to the Reconstruction Amendments, the Supreme Court set
forth the core principle that "due process of law" proscribes "arbitrary or
capricious" governmental conduct, meaning, governmental actions that deny
"fundamental fairness." The "fundamental fairness" principle remains, as it
should, controlling constitutional law.626 Based on its natural law genesis,
the Court recognized well over a century ago, as it must, the applicable
deontological premise: that due process protects rights arising from "a
principle of natural equity, recognized by all temperate and civilized
governments, from a deep and universal sense of its justice. "627 In that way,
the 1897 Court reiterated its observation of just three years earlier in its
pivotal Hurtado opinion,6 28 that due process encompasses "those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.'629
Hurtado's phrasing, easily comports with the Constitution's
overarching purpose to enforce the natural rights principles of the Declaration
of Independence, a principle expressly reaffirmed by the ratification of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. One year after Hurtado, the Court in
Holden v. Hardy stated the proposition unequivocally,
This court has never attempted to define with precision the words "due
process of law" ... It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable
624. See, supra Section 2.
625. See, supra notes 604-05 and accompanying text.
626. See, supra notes 611-23 and accompanying text.
627. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238 (1897) (due process prohibits
a State from taking private property without just compensation) (emphasis added).
628. See, supra notes 514-20 and accompanying text (Hurtado's explanation that the
Constitution recognizes substantive due process and that substantive due process constrains
the legislative as well as the executive branches).
629. Hurtado, I10 U.S. at 535.
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principles of justice, which inhere in the very idea of free government,
which no member of the Union may disregard ... Recognizing the
difficulty in defining with exactness the phrase "due process of law," it is
certain that these words imply a conformity with natural and inherent
principles ofjustice, ... 630
1908's Twining v. New Jersey631 reaffirmed Holden and other precedent
through prose that capture fully and freely the meaning of the Constitution as
enforcer of the natural law cum fundamental rights philosophy preserved by
the Due Process Clauses:
'This court has never attempted to define with precision the words 'due
process of law.' . . . It is sufficient to say that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
which no member of the Union may disregard.' Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.
630. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1898) (emphasis added) (Utah law limiting
working day in smelting plants to eight hours does not violate the Constitution) (quoted by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 22 (1964)); see also, Cole v. Trammell, 755 F.3d 1142, 152-53
(10th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Pogamy, 465 F.2d 72, 77 note 7 (3rd Cir. 1972); U.S. v. Schaffer,
433 F.2d 928, 930 (5th Cir. 1970).
Of course, the Constitution does not constrain the states and the federal level to adopt
only those procedures and to recognize only such discrete and specific rights as were
understood at the time of the Declaration. As Holden explicated,
[W]hile the cardinal principles ofjustice are immutable, the methods by which justice
is administered are subject to constant fluctuation, and that the constitution of the
United States, which is necessarily and to a large extent inflexible, and exceedingly
difficult of amendment, should not be so construed as to deprive the states of the
power to so amend their laws as to make them conform to the wishes of the citizens,
as they may deem best for the public welfare, without bringing them into conflict with
the supreme law of the land.
169 U.S. at 387 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 528 (same).
Thus, the confines of immutable legal rights recognize flexibility in application so long
as such neither abrogates or otherwise infringes fundamental rights for,
There is nothing in Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public right
and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all systems and of every age; and,
as it was the characteristic principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from
every fountain ofjustice, we are not to assume that the sources of its supply have
been exhausted.
Holden, 169 U.S. at 388-89.
The Holden Court offered as a prime example what may be identified under today's
vernacular as the innate dignity of women. "Married women have been emancipated from the
control of their husbands, and placed upon a practical equality with them, with respect to the
acquisition, possession, and transmission of property." Id. at 386.
631. 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (right against self-incrimination is not applicable to the states via
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), o., Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
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S. 366, 389, 42 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, 387 [1898]. 'The
same words refer to that law of the land in each state, which derives its
authority from the inherent and reserved powers of the state, exerted
within the limits of those fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' Re
Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 34 L. ed. 519, 524, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 930,
934 [1890]. 'The limit of the full control which the state has in the
proceedings of its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, is subject only
to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of
fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of
the Federal Constitution.' West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 263, 48 L.
ed. 965, 969, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 650, 652 [1904, o. in pt., Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965)].632
Such then is Deontological Originalism: the meta-principle
commanding that, as recognized by the Declaration of Independence and
enforced by the Constitution, although wide and long, the parameters of
governmental innovation must abide by the "natural and inherent principles
ofjustice, " referred to as well as the "immutable principles ofjustice, " or as
"those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions, " or simply as 'fundamental rights, "
all of which are transcendent, a priori moral precepts of natural rights,
derived from natural law, that protect all persons under the jurisdiction of
the United States.
A particularly humane and profound statement of the foregoing
constitutional morality is the nearly century-old Meyer v. Nebraska,6 33
arguably the Supreme Court's "first right-to-privacy case, thus an
important example of substantive due process' connection to the moral
precepts of natural rights. Authored ironically by Justice James Clark
McReynolds, renown as perhaps the single most prejudiced and unpleasant
person ever to hold a Supreme Court justiceship,6 M3 Meyer explicitly and
632. Id. at 101-02. Twenty-four years later, appealing to those "immutable principles of
justice" denoted by the due process clauses, the Court ruled that denial of counsel in a capital
case violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).
633. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (statute proscribing the teaching of non-
ancient foreign languages to students who had not completed the eighth grade violates the
substantive due process rights of teachers and parents).
634. Wilson R. Huhn, Abraham Lincoln's Influence on the Modern Supreme Court's
Understanding of Liberty and Equality, 36 OK. CITY L. REv. 555, 582 (2011).
635. Prof. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse described the acerbic McReynolds as, "the
reactionary Associate Justice, a legendary bigot who hated Germans, Catholics, and Jews, and
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yet authored the famous icons of liberal toleration." Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns
the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1002
(1992). McReynolds was remarkably intelligent, well-educated, and, "blessed with a physical
beauty that made him strangely attractive even to those who had reason to hate him." Id. at
1081 (footnote omitted). Although apparently highly charismatic, McReynolds was
extraordinarily prejudiced, intolerant and generally nasty in demeanor, attitude and nature. Id.
McReynolds, "referred derisively to Jews as 'Hebrews' or the 'orient,' to women lawyers as
the 'female,' [and,] to Blacks as 'darkeys.' ... He thought Blacks 'ignorant, superstitious,
immoral, ... improvident, lazy,' 'unfit' for politics, and 'unworthy" of equality."' Id. (citations
omitted).
McReynolds did not hide his derision from his "Jewish colleagues, [Justices Louis]
Brandeis and [Benjamin] Cardozo, refusing to shake hands, turning his back on them in
conference, disdaining their writings, and explaining, 'that for four thousand years the Lord
tried to make something out of Hebrews, then gave it up as impossible and turned them out to
prey on mankind in general - like fleas on the dog for example."' Id. at 1082 (quoting,
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNo C. SCHMIDT, JR., THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, IX.
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE
GOVERNMENT 1910-1921, at 354 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley N. Katz eds., 1984) (quoting
reprints from a "return to Holmes in a case [Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 (1920)] in which
Holmes and Brandeis were dissenting")). Among his many insults to Brandeis, McReynolds
would leave the conference whenever Brandeis discussed a pending case. In 1924, an
exasperated Chief Justice Taft cancelled the annual Court photograph of the nine justices due
to McReynolds' refusal to participate because, based on seniority rankings, he would be seated
next to Brandeis. Louise Weinberg, The McReynolds Mystery Solved, 89 DENVER U. L. REV.
133, 14142 (2011) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, McReynolds refused to, "attend [Justice
Felix] Frankfurter's robing ceremonies ('My God, another Jew on the Court!') in 1939."
Jordan S. Rubin, The Interpretation of Umpires' Dreams: Testing Supreme Court Nominees'
Racial Biases, 13 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 147, 160 note 68 (2012) (quoting, Henry J.
Abraham, Justices, Presidents, and Senators: A History of U.S. Supreme Court Appointments
from Washington to Bush 11 140 (5th ed., 2008) (citations omitted)).
McReynolds (sadly like the present occupant of the Oval Office) took cruel pleasure
in peppering his criticisms of persons with crass insults. "In ... emotional remarks from the
bench, Justice McReynolds compared [then-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt] to Nero ... "
Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2009). Indeed,
McReynolds, "especially hated Roosevelt and vowed [erroneously as it turned out], 'I'll never
resign as long as that crippled son-of-a-bitch is in the White House."' Richard K. Neumann,
Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L.
QUARTERLY 161, 244 (2007) (quoting, WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 121 (1995)).
McReynolds' non-Jewish colleagues were fair game as well. For instance, "During the
Harding Administration, Justice [John Hessin] Clarke expressed a desire to resign partly
because 'McReynolds had made life on the Court almost unbearable for him by his incessant
insolence and personal insults."' Neumann at 244 (quoting, DAVID J. DANELSK, A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE Is APPOINTED 42 (1964)).
McReynolds did not limit his renowned unpleasantness solely to tormenting his peers,
individuals who, if they wished, had the authority and station to confront him. Stories are
legion regarding his fondness for simply being horrid to all and sundry, often indulging "petty
cruelties." Laura Krugman Ray, Justices at Home: Three Supreme Court Memoirs, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 2103, 2110 (2003). For instance, fresh from Harvard Law School, young John Knox,
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candidly linked substantive due process with the Declaration's philosophy
extolling the right to "the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 636
Striking a Nebraska law banning the teaching of non-ancient foreign
languages in schools, 6 37 the Court underscored its rationale by again evoking
the spirit of the Declaration, noting that the pursuit of education is essential,
inter alia, to the "happiness of mankind ."63  Famously, two terms after
McReynolds' "secretary" -- law clerk -- for the momentous 1936-37 Supreme Court Term,
later recounted that he was, "thrilled when McReynolds, leaving town for the weekend, asks
him to draft an opinion. On his return, McReynolds makes no mention ofthe draft, the product
of long hours of hard work, except to deposit it gently in his wastebasket after observing to
his clerk that '[w]e will now start writing the opinion as it should be written!' Id. at 2110-11
(quoting, JOHN KNox, THE FORGOTTEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KNox: A YEAR IN THE LIFE OF A
SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR's WASHINGTON (Dennis J. Hutchinson & David J. Garrow
eds., 2002)). That episode of McReynolds' cruelty is particularly ironic given his reputation
for being especially, "lazy in his opinion writing." Laura Krugman Ray, America Meets the
Justices: Explaining the Supreme Court to the General Reader, 72 TENN. L. REv. 573, 588
(2005) (quoting, DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 222 (1936)).
It is piteous but hardly surprising that, "No Justice attended McReynolds' funeral,
although several went to the funeral of his messenger [Harry Parker], an African-American
who for many years had suffered with great dignity through McReynolds' racist tirades."
Neumann at 244 (citing, DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
AT THE END 112 (1999)). Prof. Woodhouse seems justified indeed to classify McReynolds as,
"the most bigoted, vitriolic, and intolerant individual ever to have sat on the Supreme Court,
Woodhouse at 1081. There is merit, then, to the claim that McReynolds is, "[tihe
Supreme Court's greatest human tragedy." Ray at 588 (quoting, DREW PEARSON & ROBERT S.
ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN 222 (1936)).
636.
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, ... [w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint
but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring
up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit ofhappiness by free men.
Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
637. Today, of course, such a prohibition seems extraordinarily peculiar, an unjustified and
harmful impediment to educating future adults in the modern world. As a matter of historical
fact, Nebraska's ban "had origins in both World War I-inspired nativism and Progressive
efforts to use the educational system to homogenize the population, [and] was a precursor to
efforts to entirely ban private schooling." David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern
Liberalism: Louis D. Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 2029, 2043 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
638. Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. at 400 (quoting, Northwest Territory Ordinance of 787, 1
STAT. 50).
Justice Holmes dissented in the companion case to Meyer averring that Nebraska's
restriction against teaching any foreign language is at least reasonable because, "Youth is the
time when familiarity with a language is established and if there are section [sic] in the State
where a child would hear only Polish or French or German spoken at home I am not prepared
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Meyer, Pierce v. Society ofSisters, likewise authored by Justice McReynolds,
struck an Oregon law prohibiting private school education of children from
ages eight through 16-years-old. 639 Logically, Pierce cited Meyer as its main
precedent to castigate the prohibition against private schooling as "arbitrary,
unreasonable, and unlawful interference with [the rights of parents and
guardians]."6 More profoundly, the Pierce Court accented that, despite its
authority to set reasonable standards of education and safety, Oregon failed
to treat its children with due regard for their young personhoods:
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.
to say that it is unreasonable to provide that in his early years he shall hear and speak only
English at school." Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Iowa statute forbidding the
teaching of German in schools unconstitutional) (Holmes, J., with Sutherland, J., concurring
in the Bartels holding but dissenting from the holding in Meyer v. Nebraska).
Even for a jurist as willing as was Holmes to accord states the widest possible
legislative discretion, his logic is odd in that foreign language instruction seems obviously
linked to educating youth in the increasingly modernized post-World War I era. Especially as
all other courses would be taught in English, a portion of classroom time dedicated to teaching
a modem foreign language hardly seems to jeopardize a state's goal of inculcating English as
the primary tongue of its minor citizenry. Regardless, Holmes was true to the logic of his
Meyer dissent, noting that while a blanket ban on non-classical languages may be rational,
Iowa's singling out for exclusion only German is constitutionally irrational as it lacks any of
the merits of Nebraska's complete ban and has no separate virtues to otherwise support it.
Accordingly, Holmes, "agree[d] with the Court as to the special proviso against the German
language contained in the [Iowa] statute ... " Id at 413 (Holmes, J., with Sutherland, J.,
dissenting).
639. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
640. Id. at 536.
641. Id. at 535 (emphasis added). Unlike Meyer, Pierce was unanimous, with Justices
Holmes and Sutherland this time joining the Court's opinion.
Two years thereafter, again by the pen of Justice McReynolds, citing Meyer and
Pierce, the Court struck under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the then-territory
of Hawaii's statute prohibiting "foreign language schools," meaning secular schools that do
not conduct their courses in either English or Hawaiian, unless such schools obtained special
permits which required both annual renewals and the payment of annual fees. Farrington v.
Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927). While not expanding on Meyer's earlier theory linking
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The foregoing opinions, particularly Meyer's unashamedly enthusiastic
recognition that natural rights under the Declaration informs constitutional
law,642 have not gone either unnoticed or unremarked upon by today's
judiciary. Predictably, Justice Antonin Scalia, with Chief Justice John
Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, impugned Meyer as "repudiated"
"dicta," an example of how "this Court has at times indulged a propensity for
substantive due process to the pursuit of happiness guaranteed by the Declaration, the
Farrington Court noted, "Enforcement of the act probably would destroy most, if not all
[foreign language schools]; and, certainly, it would deprive parents of fair opportunity to
procure for their children instruction which they think important and we cannot say is
harmful." Id. at 298.
Accordingly, the Court concluded, "We, of course, appreciate the grave problems
incident to the large alien population of the Hawaiian Islands. These should be given due
weight whenever the validity of any governmental regulation of private schools is under
consideration; but the limitations of the Constitution must not be transcended." Id. at 299.
As in Pierce, without special comment, Justices Holmes and Sutherland joined the
unanimous Farrington opinion. Presumably, they agreed that Hawaii did not rationally
address its diversity problems by banning "foreign language schools," but rather, irrationally
imposed untoward burdens and extracted discriminatory fees.
642. That the mordant, bigoted, insufferable Justice McReynolds (see, supra note 635)
authored these seemingly enlightened elaborations of natural law constitutionalism is
puzzling, especially as "McReynolds is remembered as the longest-sitting of the 'Four
Horsemen,' a quartet of Supreme Court Justices [McReynolds, Pierce Butler, George
Sutherland, and Willis Van Devanter] who generally could be counted on to vote to strike
down progressive legislation", including even child labor laws. Weinberg, supra note 635 at
140. Regarding why someone of Justice McReynolds' temperament and tastes took the
position he did as author of Meyer and its progeny, "The explanation may lie in the fact that,
although Meyer's result was pluralist and libertarian, its underlying philosophy was
emphatically reactionary." Woodhouse, supra note 635, at 1084. Prof Weinberg similarly
explained,
The striking down of laws compelling attendance in public schools, the permission
to parents to home-school their children, the disapproval of English-only teaching
following upon a veritable flood of immigration, all served the interests of those who
might wish to exploit child labor. McReynolds understood the value to employers of
helping distressed families sell their children's labor. He understood the value to
employers of permitting parents to deny their children the education which might
offer them escape in later life from the sweat shops and factories of that period.
McReynolds' effort, in this view, had been to loosen the web of progressive-era
legislation that sought to protect a child from its parents.
McReynolds, that most reactionary ofjudges, might well have thought that immigrant
parents ought to have the "liberty" of diminishing their children's opportunity to
obtain a secular public education in the English language. Those children, at once or
later, could furnish a cheap, submissive, and trapped pool of workers.
Weinberg, supra note 635, at 157-58 (emphasis in original).
350 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART II- DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
grandiloquence when reviewing the sweep of implied rights, ... "6 By
contrast, quoting Meyer's pivotal precept four justices fervently and, this
writing urges, aptly disagreed: "As this Court has long recognized, the
institution of marriage ... is central to human life, requires and enjoys
community support, and plays a central role in most individuals' 'orderly
pursuit of happiness."'6 4 More importantly, at the dawn of the new
millennium, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized Meyer 's observation
that due process indeed enforces the "orderly pursuit of happiness."'s Thus,
into the Twenty-First Century, the manifest connection between the
Constitution and the Declaration -- "the orderly pursuit of happiness" --
remains fundamental, supreme law as recognized by federal 6 " and state
courts.6 7
b. Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter and Harlan Usher in the Modern
Theory ofSubstantive Due Process Predicated on Unbiased Reason --
Hurtado, Hutton, Meyers and their immediate progeny substantiate the
Constitution's "'natural law' bent"'" -- its role as enforcer of the Declaration
-- forcefully but without substantial elucidation to guide future
643. Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2134 (2015) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J., with
Roberts, C.J. and Thomas, J.).
644. Id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., with Ginsberg, Sotomayor and Kagan, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added; quoting, Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. at 399).
645. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291 (1999) (Noted "conservative" Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, acknowledged that Meyer and its progeny set the general
standard for substantive due process); see also, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (citing Meyer).
646. As the Southern District of Georgia very recently admonished, "Historically, the
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause included the right 'generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men."' Daniels v. Upton, No. 6:16-cv-94, 2017 WL 3158766, at *2 (S.D. Ga. 2017)
(quoting, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)). See also, e.g., Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 209 (3rd Cir. 2007); Women's Medical Professional Corp. v.
Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 611 (6th Cir. 2006); Robertson v. Hecksel, 420 F.3d 1254, 1257 (1lth
Cir. 2005); Renaud v. Wy. Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d 723, 726 (10th 2000); Edelson
v. Chapel Haven, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-1862, 2017 WL 810274, at *15 (D. Conn. 2017).
647. E.g., Teague v. Schimel, 375 Wis.2d 458, 494 (2017); State v. Floyd, 217 Conn. 73,
85 (1991); People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d 202, 211 (1986) (no "fundamental right to appear
nude in public"); Frink v. Prod, 31 Cal.3d 166, 175 note 12 (1982) (right to pursue a lawful
profession).
648. Alschuler, supra note 44, at 522.
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applications.649 It fell then to three of the Court's most respected Twentieth
Century jurist-scholars who, although ardently supporting "judicial
restraint," provided substantive due process' natural law heritage its needed
principled expression and explication. Justices Benjamin Cardozo, Felix
Frankfurter, and, the second John Marshall Harlan, read together, espoused a
systemic framework of substantive due process duly respectful of American
history and tradition but ultimately defined by overarching principles of
morality discern through impartial reason. The Cardozo-Frankfurter-Harlan
construction of due process fairness is the judicially recognized basis upon
which to review claims of fundamental constitutional rights."so Indeed,
recent federal and state precedent confirms the correctness of Justice
Cardozo's due process analysis as explicated by Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan. 5
i. Justice Cardozo's Due Process Jurisprudence --
"Immutable principles ofjustice" coupled with the natural law thrust of
Meyers-Pierce-Farrington comprised the backdrop65 2 which, although not
directly cited, is fully consistent with and surely informed Justice Benjamin
649. For instance, writing for a perhaps unusual plurality consisting of himself and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg, Chief Justice Rehnquist, "conceded the general principle that
substantive due process prohibited arbitrary government action, but contended
that Hurtado did nothing to define the proper scope of substantive due process." Michael T.
Carton, Constitutional Law - Fourteenth Amendment - the Fourth Amendment, Rather Than
Substantive Due Process, Must Be Used to Judge A S 1983 Claim Alleging A Violation ofan
Individual's Right to Freedom from Prosecution without Probable Cause -- Albright v. Oliver,
114 S. Ct. 807 (1994), 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1560, 1590 (1995) (note) (discussing, Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (per Rehnquist, C.J., with O'Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg,
Ji.).
650. Ironically, the Supreme Court recently so recognized in McDonald v. City of Chicago,
561 U.S. 742, 760 (2010), although misconstruing precedent to apply the deeply rooted
principles standard rather than dignity paradigm of substantive due process. See, infra notes
771-98 and accompanying text.
651. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minn., 552 U.S. 264, 269 (2008) (quoting Cardozo); Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (same); Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 801 (9th
Cir. 2017); Aka v. U.S. Tax Court, 854 F.3d 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Rogers v. Lee City,
Miss., No. 16-60537, 2017 WL 1242114, at * 8 (5th Cir. 2017); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75,
93 (2d Cir. 2005); Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 643 (8th Cir. 2002) (en bane); McKinney
v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1556 (1 Ith Cir. 1994); State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883 (Ohio 2017); State
v. Sherman, 378 P.3d 1060 1068 (Kan. 2016); State v. Dixon, 141 A.3d 810, 820 (Conn. 2016);
Blake v. Jossart, 884 N.W.2d 484, 498 (Wisc. 2016); Jackson v. State, 191 So.3d 423, 428
(Fla. 2016).
652. See, supra notes 633-47 and accompanying text
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Cardozo'S6 5 3  explication of substantive due process in Palko v.
Connecticut,6 54 perhaps the most famous Twentieth Century encapsulation of
the "natural law bent." Indeed, Cardozo's explication of due process in Palko
653. Benjamin Cardozo is highly regarded for his legal erudition, writing both as a scholar
and as ajudge. His slim volume The Nature of the Judicial Process, "remains the most widely-
cited pre-1960's work ofjurisprudence behind those of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr." Michael
E. Parrish, Andrew L. Kaufman, Cardozo, 43 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 216,217 (1999) (book review).
Of course, Cardozo is especially renowned for his influential eighteen-year judicial tenure on
the New York Court of Appeals from 1914-1932 where he authored 566 opinions that set
national standards for contracts, torts, property and similar private common law. Kaufman,
chs. 12-22 (1998). Indeed, "Cardozo's judicial opinions and other legal writings are still
frequently cited, marking him as one of the most influential jurists in the history of the
American legal system." Lynn D. Wardle, Cardozo. By Andrew L. Kaufman, 16 CONST.
COMMENT 459, 459 (1999) (book review).
It was, sadly, an ill and frail Cardozo who President Herbert Hoover elevated to the
Supreme Court in March 1932, to fill the seat recently vacated by the equally esteemed Oliver
Wendell Holmes. As an associate justice, Cardozo served short of six years before his death.
While lauding his term as "one of the greatest short tenures on the Court in its history .... "
Hon. Richard A. Posner, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 8 (1990), Judge Posner maintains
that Cardozo's lasting impact as a Supreme Court justice has been slight:
Whether because Cardozo was thejunior member of a court in which cases were
not assigned by rotation, or because Chief Justice [Charles Evans] Hughes hogged a
disproportionate number of the best cases for himself, or because Cardozo was
frequently in dissent, or because the work or working conditions of the Supreme
Court did not suit his temperament, or because many of the issues that preoccupied
the Court in the 1930s have proved transitory (but torts and contracts are eternal), or
because six years is too short a time for a Supreme Court justice to make his mark
(given the exceptional breadth of the Court's jurisdiction and the relatively small
number of majority opinions that each justice writes) -- and Cardozo did not have a
full six years of actual service on the Court, because of his terminal illness -- Cardozo
did not place a strongly individual imprint on any field of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. ... Cardozo's opinions, both majority and separate, are above the
average for Supreme Court opinions, then or now, but they lack the verve and punch
of his opinions for the New York Court of Appeals, and a sense of constraint is
palpable.
Id. at 121-22 (quoted in, Robert M. Jarvis and Phyllis Coleman, Benjamin N. Cardozo: New
York Giant, 13 MARQUETTE SPORTs L. REv. 63, 88 note 191 (2002)).
This writing is not in a position to doubt Judge Posner's assessment except in the realm
of substantive due process where, as noted in the text above, Justice Cardozo brought vigor
and clarity to that doctrine's natural law principles. Setting the fabric that Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan later elucidated and enriched, Cardozo's due process jurisprudence remains
authoritative for American courts. E.g., Dragash v. Saucier, No. 17-12031-JJ, 2017 WL
5202252, at *2 (11 th Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Guba v. Huron County, Ohio, 695 Fed. Appx.
98, 103 (6th Cir. 2017); Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 255-56 (2d Cir. 2015); Browder v.
City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1078 (10th Cir. 2015).
654. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (protection against double jeopardy is not
encompassed under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), o., Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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aptly has been denoted as, "that seminal opinion ... [which] established a
standard -- employed ever since in American Constitutional Law -- to
determine whether a claimed right, liberty, protection, or prohibition is
fundamental, and therefore, guaranteed against every level of government in
the nation."655 True, for all its potency, Justice Cardozo's standard is highly
abstract, lacking tangible intermediary criteria elucidating his foundational
concepts sufficiently for discrete applications. Indeed, the same may be said
for Justices Frankfurter's and Harlan's due process theories, discussed
presently, 6 56 predicated on the Cardozo formulation. Such is the very
deficiency, however, that Deontological Originalism's appeal to Kantian
morality solves. The deontology of Immanuel Kant provides correct,
applicable measures -- abstract to be sure, but intelligible and serviceable --
to effectuate the due process standard Cardozo introduced, Frankfurter
explicated, and Harlan perfected.6 5 7
Writing for Palko's eight-justice majority, in prose now iconic, Cardozo
explained that governmental conduct infringing principles "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," violates "due process of law." 65 8 Importantly,
Cardozo accented that understanding the concept of "ordered liberty," and
discerning whether a specific espoused right is subsumed thereunder,
requires more than empirical research and historical analysis. Rather,
adjudicators and critics can only discern the meaning and impact of history,
tradition and similar relevant considerations through unbiased reason, what
Cardozo called "the perception of a rationalizing principle which gives to
discrete instances a proper order and coherence." 659
Pursuant to that "rationalizing principle," Cardozo invoked the familiar
concepts of arbitrariness, transcendent justice, and fairness as proper
standards to discern whether the challenged governmental behavior offends
655. Vincent Martin Bonventre, Aristotle, Cicero and Cardozo: A Perspective on External
Law, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 645, 649 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also, Nicholas J.
Eichenseer, Reasonable Doubt in the Rear-View Mirror: The Case for Blakely-Booker
Retroactivity in the Federal System, 2005 Wisc. L. REV. 1137, 1163 note 187 (2005) (note)
(denoting Palko as a "seminal" due process opinion).
656. See, text accompanying infra notes 687-770.
657. See, text accompanying supra notes 899-1020.
658. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. Similarly, three years earlier, writing for the Court, Cardozo
defined procedural due process as ensuring that, "Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will
be kept inviolate and inviolable, ... " Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934)
(emphasis added), o. in part, Malloy v. Hogan, 371 U.S. 1 (1964). Such, presumably, would
be, as Cardozo accented in Palko, "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
659. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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ordered liberty. 660  Based on his general framework, Justice Cardozo
accented that official conduct violates ordered liberty if it is "oppressive and
arbitrary," 66 1 thereby flouting qualities of "a fair and enlightened system of
justice,"6 6 2 qualities so essential, "that neither liberty nor justice would exist
if they were sacrificed."6 63  Roughly seven decades later, addressing the
neutral "rationalizing" process that informed the Palko Court, Justice John
Paul Stevens rightly offered that, "Implicit in Justice Cardozo's test is a
recognition that the postulates of liberty have a universal character ... [that
may be] conceptualized as ... a seamless web of moral commitments [that]
... transcend the local and the particular." Stevens' interpretation steeped
in transcendent, uniform morality is eminently correct given the natural law
backdrop underlying Cardozo's Palko rationale. That is, the Supreme
Court's natural law due process analysis, particularly in Holden, Hurtado,
and Meyer, set the standards from which Cardozo, always respectful of
precedent, derived his principle of "ordered liberty." Thus, although Cardozo
did not explicitly cite those ruling, implicitly Holden, Hurtado, and Meyer
informed his Palko rationale.665
660. Id. at 325-27.
661. Id. at 327.
662. Id. at 325.
663. Id. at 327 (citing, Twining, 211 U.S. at 99).
664. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 871 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
665. As one commentator well observed, through Palko and other "tradition-defining
opinions" he authored, "Cardozo specifically sought to reclaim the doctrine of Hurtado ... "
Colin Starger, Exile on Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95
MARQ. L. REv. 1253, 1313 (2012). Cardozo indeed had referenced that doctrine when he
wrote for the Court shortly before Palko, American government, state and federal, is, "free to
regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and
fairness, unless in so doing it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S.
97, 105 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). While his Snyder
opinion does not quote Hurtado's homage to natural law constitutionalism, Cardozo's
emphasis in Palko that due process analysis must be based on "the perception of a rationalizing
principle which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence," Palko, 302 U.S. at
325, coupled with his invoking arbitrariness, transcendent justice, and fairness as relevant
considerations to discern whether challenged governmental conduct offends "ordered liberty,"
id. at 325-27 (discussed, supra at notes 660-63 and accompanying text), evince that Cardozo
understood and accepted the link between immutable morality and due process as implored in
Hurtado and its ilk.
Granted, in his seminal work on basic jurisprudence, Cardozo very generally
admonished, "the judge is not to 'concern' himself with Natural law ... " Ellis Washington,
Reply to Judge Richard A. Posner on the Inseparability ofLaw and Morality, 3 RUTGERS J. L.
& RELIGION 1, [no page number] n. 32 (2001) (quoting, DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF
SEPARATION (1989) (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
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In that regard, commentators view Palko as a liberal invitation for
expansive application of the Due Process Clauses. 6 6 Conservative critics
such as Judge Robert Bork call Palko "pretty vaporous stuff' as contrasted
with the purported greater specificity of the Bill of Rights.6 7 Specifically,
Bork claimed,
Whatever line-drawing must be done [regarding the Bill of Rights] starts
from a solid base, the guarantee of freedom of speech, of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the like. By contrast, the judge-
created phrases [within Palko and its progeny] specify no particular
freedom, but merely assure us, in sonorous phrases, that they, the judges,
will know what freedoms are required when the time comes.m8
JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921)). However, Coardozo's concem was not with the
paradigmatic principles of legitimate government set forth in the Declaration and
commemorated in the Constitution. Rather, "Cardozo rejected natural law theory [regarding],
'The common law [which] does not work from pre-established truths of universal and
inflexible validity to conclusions derived from them deductively. Its method is inductive, and
it draws its generalizations from particulars."' Richard Langone, The Science ofSociological
Jurisprudence As A Methodology for Legal Analysis, 17 TOURO L. REv. 769, 776-77 (2001)
(quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS at 23);
see also, e.g., Brady Coleman, Lord Denning & Justice Cardozo: The Judge As Poet-
Philosopher, 32 Rutgers L.J. 485, 512 (2001) (denoting Cardozo, insofar as the common law
is concerned, a "pragmatist" strongly affected by the American Legal Realist Movement).
Understandably and by contrast, in the rarified realm of constitutional rights,
Cardozo's carefully phrased approach, in Jason F. Robinson's words, "implicitly appeals to
natural law." Jason F. Robinson, Book Review: Gerber's to Secure These Rights, 12 J.L. &
POL. 123, 140 n. 22 (1996) (discussing Palko). Indeed, noted scholar Sanford H. Kadish
stated, "In recent times the most influential exponents of flexible-natural law due process have
been Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter." Sanford H. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 326 (1957) (discussing, inter
alia, Palko). Likewise, Prof. Hindes could smartly summarize, "The 'ordered liberty'
approach is the general natural law standard for interpreting the fourteenth amendment taken
from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)." Thomas
L. Hindes, Morality Enforcement Through the Criminal Law and the Modern Doctrine of
Substantive Due Process, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 344, 384 . 68 (1977); see also, Jordan Steiker,
Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There A Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 862, 901 (1994) (referring to "Justice Cardozo's
natural law formulation" regarding substantive due process).
666. E.g., David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, The Mainstreaming of Libertarian
Constitutionalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 56 (2014).
667. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
118 (1990) (quoted in, Paul Brickner, Robert Bork's Quest for Certainty: Attempting to
Reconcile the Irreconcilable, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 49, 59 (1991)).
668. Id. at 118-19 (quoted in Paul Brickner, Robert Bork's Quest for Certainty: Attempting
to Reconcile the Irreconcilable, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 49, 58-59 (1991)).
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Bork's facially weak critique, typical of substantive due process'
detractors, 6 69 then, "seems to lump the Supreme Court's decision in Palko
with the liberal left rulings that he so abhors."670 In stark contrast stand
miserly interpretations such as that of Administrative Law Judge Paul
Brickner who maintains that uninformed persons might,
mistakenly conclude that Palko was an early example of the High Court
and its justices writing into the Constitution new rights that do not appear
in the Constitution. On the contrary Palko, can be read as a restrictive
decision drawing the line on incorporating into the fourteenth amendment
all of the Bill of Rights. An ailing Justice Cardozo, less than a year before
669. Contrary to Bork's banal accusation, neither Justice Cardozo nor any of his successors
claim that the mere invocation of, in Bork's terms, "sonorous phrases" alone will reveal the
nature and application of due process rights. "Ordered liberty," for example, is not an
incantation that magically evokes meaning; rather, it is a paradigmatic principle from which
to discern more specific concepts that together form a meaningful analytical fabric from which
to perceive and to apply specific due process values. Indeed, Deontological Originalism
provides the structure, implicit in Cardozo's phrase "ordered liberty, " from which to
determine whether, in any given constitutional dilemma, a fundamental right is implicated
and ifso, how that right determines that dilemma's correct outcome.
Moreover, as Bork well knew, what he called the "solid base" of the Bill of Rights
provides a level of specificity so vague and imprecise that it is hardly more tangible than what
Bork sneered to be the "vaporous stuff' of Cardozo's Palko opinion. Nearly half a century
ago the Second Circuit remarked, "The variety of views expressed by the courts when
resolving challenges by prisoners to the constitutionality of prison rules reflects the ambiguous
mandate of the Bill of Rights and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments when construed
together." Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1337-38 (7th Cir. 1973). Likewise, one need
not consult the thousands of judicial decisions attempting to determine what is or is not an
unlawfully "unreasonable" search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment to realize that by
itself, the Amendment's proscription is neither self-defining nor self-executing. E.g., N.G. v.
Conn., 382 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable"
searches, a somewhat amorphous standard whose meaning varies with the context in which a
search occurs and the circumstances of the search."). Such uncertainly, not surprisingly, was
the situation at this Nation's founding: "'[]t is astonishing to discover that the debate on a Bill
of Rights was conducted on a level of abstraction so vague as to convey the impression that
Americans of 1787-1788 had only the most nebulous conception of the meanings of the
particular rights they sought to insure."' City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 550 (1997)
(O'Connor, J., with Breyer, J., dissenting; quoting, L. Levy, Essays on American
Constitutional History 173 (1972)).
Indeed, as discussed earlier (supra notes 565-87 and accompanying text), the Bill of
Right's Fifth Amendment itself contains a Due Process Clause constraining every office and
actor at the Federal level but offering no further defining nor explication regarding what
exactly "due process of law" means. In sum, Judge Bork may not have approved of Palko 's
attempt to provide some precise meaning to the term "due process," but his criticism that Palko
is imprecise while the Bill of Rights provides significantly greater precision is empty.
670. Paul Brickner, Robert Bork's Quest for Certainty: Attempting to Reconcile the
Irreconcilable, 17 J. CONTEMP. L. 49, 58 (1991).
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he died, did not write in Palko a formula for use by judges wishing to
create or invent new rights for incorporation into the Constitution through
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.6 7 '
While Justice Cardozo strongly espoused judicial restraint,6 72 Judge
Brickner's assessment of the scope and depth of Palko's meaning is too
narrow. Just as we ought not feel bound by how the Founders might have
resolved particular constitutional matter but rather respect their original
intent to enforce under the Constitution the natural law principles of the
Declaration of Independence, 673 likewise it is immaterial that almost
certainly, Justice Cardozo and the Palko Court would not have embraced
contemporary constructions of due process such as validating same-sex
marriages and invalidating mandatory racial segregation in all levels of
public schools. Rather, what is important is that Palko sets a framework for
analysis that is fully consistent with the natural rights due process paradigm
-- rulings such as Hurtado, Hutton, and Meyer -- that Palko enforces. If in
Judge Brickner's stingy words, Palko "merely rationalized the existing case
law,"17 1 it was a most sublime rationalizing bringing new light to the Court's
natural law jurisprudence predicated on natural rights derived from impartial
reason.
As recounted above, speaking for the Court, Cardozo summarized due
process as "ordered liberty" understood through "a rationalizing principle
which gives to discrete instances a proper order and coherence," 675 to unearth
671. Id. at 59.
672. "Felix Frankfurter associated his position on judicial restraint with Justices Holmes,
Brandeis and Cardozo." Nomi M. Schlotzenberg, Un-Covering the Tradition of Jewish
"Dissimilation": Frankfurter, Bickel, and Cover on Judicial Review, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
809, 818 (1994) (footnote omitted). For Cardozo, restraint especially meant not substituting
judicial policy for legislative policy. RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN
CARDOZO: PERSONAL VALUES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 195-96 (1997) (discussed in, Jack
B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government Of By, and For the People: Notes for The
Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 19 (2008)). Moreover, Cardozo
famously accented that respect for stare decisis promotes judicial necessary judicial efficiency
not simply to save time, but to foster respect for and reasonable reliance on Judiciary. "[Tlhe
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of bricks on the secure
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (quoted in, Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and
Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459, 1467 note 38 (2013)).
673. See, supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
674. Brickner, supra note 670, at 60-61.
675. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
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and nullify official behavior that, being "oppressive and arbitrary," 676 defies
the attributes of "a fair and enlightened system of justice,"6 77 attributes of
such profundity "that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." If Cardozo's "rationalizing principle" is nothing more than an
uncritical recounting and acceptance of prevailing American traditions,
customs or preferences, then the meaning of "a fair and enlightened system
ofjustice" predicated on practices "that neither liberty norjustice would exist
if they were sacrificed" becomes not a matter of higher morality, as the
Founders rightly thought and Cardozo indicates, but rather, a matter merely
of historical research wherein the Judiciary concludes that some standard
(likely based on the partisan preferences of the group that originally set that
standard) has become traditional, regardless whether such comports with the
moral meaning of "unalienable Rights" under natural law."9 No court
attempting to actualize the natural law principles of late-Eighteenth Centwy
through early-Twentieth Century American jurisprudence could advocate a
due process framework relegating judges into credulous empiricists -- not
guardians of constitutional law but instead historical bookkeepers.
Of course, "Cardozo, in Palko, did not create new rights that were not
in the Constitution. His opinion merely rationalized the existing case law,
[was] hardly ... the go ahead to write their own version of the
Constitution."6so The same must be said for Justices Frankfurter and Harlan,
as next will see next. But, while judges surely cannot "write their own
version of the Constitution," neither may they flinch from their duty to apply
the Due Process Clauses through understanding the strictures of morality
676. Id. at 327.
677. Id. at 325.
678. Id. at 327 (citing, Twining, 211 U.S. at 99).
679. Under such a standard, citing a prevalent example, Brown v. Board of Education was
wrongly decided because racially segregated public schools were still traditional in 1954. As
Prof McDonald noted, "American public opinion would not support official desegregation
efforts in the South until after Brown was decided some sixty years later--and even then the
South stiffly resisted Brown for more than a decade, until Northern public opinion had shifted
in favor of its enforcement." Barry P. McDonald, A Reluctant Apology for Plessy: A Response
to Akhil Amar, 39 PEPP. L. REv. 91, 98 (2011) (citing, Michael J. Klarman, UNFINISHED
BUS[NESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 157-59, 164, 177-78 (2007)).
See also, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Michael W. Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of
Education, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 429, 486-47 (2014) (noting fifteen states' constitutions
mandated racially segregated public education); Mark A. Rothstein, Health Care: Public and
Private Systems in the Americas, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 612, 621 (1996) ("In 1954, the United
States Supreme Court overturned the then-common practice of racial segregation in public
schools.").
680. Brickner, supra note 670, at 60.
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stemming from natural law. That truth is not offset by Judge Brickner's
presumptuous earlier quoted conclusion that, "An ailing Justice Cardozo, less
than a year before he died, did not write in Palko a formula for use by judges
wishing to create or invent new rights for incorporation into the Constitution
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 6 8' Not
surprisingly, Brickner offered no attributions to support his cold, hasty
contention that weakness born of illness influenced Cardozo to espouse a
frail, timid, and bland template for that most imperative and notable among
constitutional provisions, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Conversely, one might imagine that for a mind and consciousness as
lively, brilliant and insightful as were Cardozo's,682 the immediate specter of
mortality could inspire a judge like him not to embrace the arrogance of
creating rights, but rather to better understand the true vastness, perspicacity,
and importance of the Founders' natural law undertaking, described in the
Declaration and formalized in the Constitution, the new nation's highest law.
As Ninth Circuit Judge the Hon. Kim McLane Wardlaw explained, Justice
Cardozo's judicial restraint was, as it must be, judicious, that is, sensible and
apt, but neither diffident nor craven: "judges must, consistent with their
constitutional powers, declare as impermissible an act falling outside the
bounds of the law. But they may not pass upon the wisdom of those
permissible acts that do fall within the bounds of the law." 68 1
Cardozo recognized that to properly perform their functions, "judges
serve the public when they give voice to democratic principles." 68 But of
utmost urgency, Cardozo further understood, "That the judicial power must
be exercised within its constitutional bounds does not mean 'that a judge is
powerless to raise the level of prevailing conduct.' Throughout history,
judges have played a central role in our collective progression toward a more
perfect union."685 To illustrate that crucial duty, Cardozo summoned the
681. Id. at 59.
682. Respected scholar Grant Gilmore, for instance, "observed about Cardozo that, [] he
was "'a truly innovative judge' ... " Christopher L. Eisgruber, Teaching Law Through
Contracts and Cardozo, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1511, 1519 (2000) (quoting, Grant Gilmore, The
Ages of American Law 75 (1977)). See also, supra note 653 (discussing Justice Cardozo's
influence on American law).
683. Hon. Kim McLane Wardlaw, Umpires, Empathy, and Activism: Lessons from Judge
Cardozo, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1629, 1660 (2010).
684. Id. at 1662.
685. Id. at 1660 (quoting, Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 108
(1921)).
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guiding force of this writing's deontology, Immanuel Kant, whose moral
philosophy, Cardozo explicitly reminded us, is not simply a potentially
applicable framework but indeed is a lynchpin of American
constitutionalism: "Our jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's categorical
imperative, 'Act on a maxim which thou canst will to be law universal.' It
has refused to sacrifice the larger and more inclusive good to the narrower
and smaller."68 6 While the foregoing quote references societal "good," not
the "right," the clear implication is that courts do wrong by kowtowing to the
will of elites when those elites treat other persons merely as means, treatment
that never could be willed as a universal maxim. By referencing Kant,
Cardozo infers his appreciation that the deontology of dignity animates "our
jurisprudence," meaning constitutional law, especially due process liberty.
ii. Justice Frankfurter's Due Process Jurisprudence
Along with Justice Cardozo, Justice Felix Frankfurter understood due
process of law as a precept of absolute morality to attain, in his enthusiastic
expression, "ultimate decency in a civilized society."687 Indeed, as next
recounted, arguably no other Supreme Court justice expressed so well, if not
always applied, the paradigmatic principles of the due process clauses. In
that regard, like Justice Cardozo, although his efforts as an associate justice
failed to attain the greatness many had expected, Frankfurter's contributions
to due process theory remain a testament to his perspicacity and pluck.
Unlike Cardozo, however, the cause of Frankfurter's failure was not
illness of his body but malaise of his character. The accounts of Felix
Frankfurter's troubled tenure as a Supreme Court justice are as numerous as
they are saddening. Considering his bravura pre-judicial career as attorney,
diplomat, Harvard law professor, confidant to Holmes and Brandeis, and key
architect of the New Deal, Frankfurter was expected but by most accounts
failed to be the intellectual successor to his mentor Oliver Wendell Holmes
and thereafter Benjamin Cardozo, both of whom had held the very seat that
Frankfurter assumed on the Court.688 Despite the deep wisdom of his
686. Id. at 1660-61 (quoting, Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
138 (1921)).
687. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also,
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (Brennan, J., concurring).
688. Alfred S. Neely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Iconography of Judging, 82 KY. L. REV.
535, 540 note 11 (1993/1994) (citing Fred Rodell, Nine Men: A Political History of The
Supreme Court From 1790 To 1955, 273 (1955)) (derisively but plausibly, Prof Fred Rodell
denoted Frankfurter as, "the New Deal Court's outstanding disappointment"). See also, Hon.
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paradigmatic statements on due process, Frankfurter is remembered as a
cantankerous, egoistic, pedantic, unpleasant person who more disrupted the
Court and annoyed his colleagues than contributed to any lasting
jurisprudence. 68 9 Accounts of Frankfurter's reputed obnoxiousness may be
Stuart Shiffman, More Pieces ofthe Puzzle, 75 JUDICATURE 278, 278 (1992) (For that reason,
some aver that, "No justice of the Supreme Court remains a more enigmatic figure than Felix
Frankfurter"). But see John D. French, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter, 57. N.Y.U. L. REV.
330, 330-31 (reviewing H. N. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (New York: Basic
Books, 1981) (commentary by a former Frankfurter law clerk posits, "Frankfurter was
undoubtedly complex, ... But does that make Frankfurter enigmatic? ... In any event, even
Prof. Hirsch does not find Frankfurter enigmatic. He finds him neurotic.).
Indeed, many commentators believe that Felix Frankfurter's life of extraordinary
successes and momentous disappointments do not bespeak an enigmatic nature, but rather
mirror the conflicting aspirations of his youth, common traits among ambitious European
immigrants of the early 1900s, to be esteemed by the privileged, staid society of, in
Frankfurter's case, "Boston Brahmins" while simultaneously remaining foremost among
liberal, Jewish social reformers in the mold of Louis D. Brandeis whose causes challenged the
Brahmins' dominion of entitlement and elitism. Id. at 332-37.
Concurrently, many of Frankfurter's admirers misunderstood his constitutional
philosophy, expecting that, in the style of Justice William 0. Douglas, Frankfurter the judge
would continue the work of Frankfurter the tireless social reformer, promoting from the bench
the liberal legal politics that marked him as an attorney and Harvard law professor. However,
as a prominent disciple of Holmes, Frankfurter was vehemently anti-Lochner; therefore, he
staunchly practiced judicial restraint by deferring to the popular will unless, in his estimation,
the Constitution clearly commanded otherwise. So concerned was Frankfurter not to appear
Lochnerian that, as we will see, he espoused broad, elegant principles of due process yet
applied them with arguably excessive parsimony lest, by his reckoning, he transformed
himself from magistrate to policymaker. Cf, Steven G. Calabresi, Julia T. Rickert,
Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 95 (2011) (criticizing as "extreme
New Deal judicial restraint" Frankfurter's majority opinion in Goeseart v. Cleary, 333 U.S.
464 (1948) upholding a Michigan law forbidding women from "serving as a bartender unless
she was the wife or daughter of the man owning the bar.").
Many, myself included, believe that, in needless defiance of his beautifully expressed
due process doctrine, Frankfurter excessively erred on the side of restraint. Thus,
Frankfurter's failure to ascend to the ranks of Holmes, Brandeis, John Marshall, and Joseph
Story may better be understood not as arising from some enigmatic aspect of his character, but
rather resulting from his arguably unwarranted fear of hypocrisy that he might mistake his
political leanings for constitutional doctrine.
689. Prof. Hirsh, for instance, explained that unlike any other of his prior positions,
Frankfurter as an associate justice had to contend, "with strong-willed colleagues who resented
his attempts to influence and lead them. ... He shared power-equally-with eight other men;..."
Hirsh, supra note 688, at 127-28 (quoted in French, supra note 688, at 336.) According to
Hirsh, "Frankfurter had a self-image as intellectual leader of the Court, and he found it
challenged." French, supra note 688, at 337.
Unkindly denoted as, "the quintessential ego warrior,"' Kenneth C. Haas and Phillip
J. Cooper, Battles on The Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court. Lawrence: University
Press ofKansas, 1995, 41 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 503, 504 (1997), "Frankfurter 'personalized every
dispute, no matter what its cause."' Howard Ball and Phillip Cooper, Fighting Justices: Hugo
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true to the extent that, as one of Frankfurter's biographers, Melvin Urofsky,
"confesse[d,] ... the more he learned about Frankfurter, the less he cared for
him." 69 Whatever may have been the reasons, Judge Shiffman sadly but
aptly concluded, "Frankfurter's legacy came to be far different than 1939
prognostications. ... A quarter century [now, half century] after his death his
opinions are all but ignored by both the courts and legal scholars." 69 1
L. Black and William 0. Douglas and Supreme Court Conflict, 38 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 1, 12
(1994). Frankfurter was manipulative and, some claim, deceitful. For instance, Frankfurter
habitually would praise colleagues' work while mocking them behind their backs. To cite one
often recounted example, "in a letter to [Judge] Learned Hand, Frankfurter described [Justice]
Stanley Reed as 'largely vegetable - he had managed to give himself a nimbus of
reasonableness but is as unjudicial-minded, as flagrantly moved, at times, by irrelevant
considerations for adjudication as any of [the justices]."' Haas and Cooper at 504 (quoting,
Phillip J Cooper, Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside the Supreme Court, 108 LAWRENCE:
UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KANSAS, 1995).
Historian Phillip J. Cooper attributed Frankfurter's petulance particularly to his,
"growing dislike of [Justice] William Douglas, his rivalry for intellectual leadership with
[Justice] Hugo Black, or his strong views on the principle of stare decisis and the limits of the
First Amendment." Kenneth C. Haas, Phillip J. Cooper, Battles on the Bench: Conflict Inside
the Supreme Court, 41 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 503, 504 (1997) (discussing, Cooper text but page
not designated). Along these lines, Cooper and co-author Howard Ball documented the
legendary Frankfurter-Douglas feud. Among other things, Frankfurter, "vilified Douglas in
diary notes and in letters to friends on and off the Court. Douglas was 'one of the two
completely evil men I have ever met;' 'malignant;' 'narrow minded;' 'the most cynical,
shamelessly amoral character I've ever known;' and a 'mommser' (a yiddish epithet meaning
bastard)." Ball and Cooper, at 13 (footnote omitted).
Still, the bad behavior was not one-sided. Justice Douglas did not hesitate to hurl
insults, "refer[ing] to [the diminutive] Frankfurter as 'Der Fuehrer;' 'a little bastard;' 'the little
Giant;' 'Machiavellian;' 'divisive;' and a 'prevaricator."' Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, as
Frankfurter's former law clerk John D. French aptly noted, "in the highly charged atmosphere
of a Court packed with powerful and contentious minds, it may well be asked who goaded
whom." French, supra note 688, at 343.
Still, the consensus remains that Frankfurter either did not understand or did not care
that his penchant for self-importance and self-promotion made life on the Court tense and
disagreeable for his colleagues. In fact, regarding Frankfurter's proclivity during Court
conferences to reassume his stance as pompous law professor, lecturing at length on the given
topic, Chief Justice Earl Warren lamented that the, "only way to handle [Frankfurter] in
conference is [to] shut him up. I let him go 2-3 times, ignoring him. He would nag and nag.
Then you'd put him in his place and he'd be quiet for a while." Roger K. Newman, The
Warren Court and American Politics: An Impressionistic Appreciation, 18 CONST. COMM.
661, 676 (2001) (quoting, "Drew Pearson diary, August 23 [, 1966], Pearson papers" Lyndon
Baines Johnson Library).
690. Shiffman, supra note 688, at 278 (citing but without specific page reference, Melvin I.
Urofsky Twayne Publishers, FELIX FRANKFURTHER: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES, NEW YORK. 1991).
691. Shiftman, supra note 688, at 278.
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Yes, Justice Frankfurter's "third act" -- his Supreme Court tenure --
recalls John Greenleaf Whittier's famous lament, "For, of all sad words of
tongue or pen, The saddest are these: 'It might have been!"' 6 92 Still, not too
far beneath his ego-laden, haughty, seemingly interminable, sometimes
impenetrable prose, one finds in Frankfurter's due process theory something
important, honest and worthwhile: a true respect for immutable morality as
the dominant principle of American constitutional law. If Frankfurter
himself declined to follow his principles to their ending points, if he was
troubled at the thought of applying his concepts to their fullest extent, we his
successors, inspired by his due process theory, can devise in the style of
Kantian morality, a realm of due process loyal to Frankfurter's theory but not
necessarily to his discrete applications. 69 3
a. Frankfurter's Methodology Steeped in Impartial Judicial
Reason --
Consistent with his espousal of judicial restraint,694 Frankfurter
appropriately accented that discerning due process liberty is not a matter of
judicial fiat; "The vague contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave
judges at large."6 95 Specifically, "In enforcing [liberty principles] this Court
does not translate personal views into constitutional limitations. [Rather,] the
Court enforces those permanent and pervasive feelings of our society as to
which there is compelling evidence of the kind relevant to judgments on
social institutions."6 96 Yet, and most importantly, while accenting regard for
history and American customs, and while aptly cautioning restraint and
political neutrality, Justice Frankfurter understood that ultimately judicial
692. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65
HARv. L. REv. 721,728 (1952) (citing John Greenleaf Whittier, MAUD MULLER).
693. Bayer, Deontology and Originalism, supra note 7, at Section 3-c (Kantian ethic's
defined).
694. See, e.g., Boysen v. Treadway Inn of Lake Harmony, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 96, 98 (E.D. Pa.
1971); See also, Duke v. James, 713 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11 th Cir. 1983) (noting Frankfurter's
admonition "the propriety of restraint in the exercise ofjurisdiction"); Streight v. Ragland,
655 S.W.2d 459, 466 (Ark. 1983) ("As no less a personage than Justice Felix Frankfurter
points out, judicial restraint is the 'essence in the observance of the judicial oath."'); Accord,
Mark A. Grabber, False Modesty: Felix Frankfurter and the Tradition of Judicial Restraint,
47 WASHBURN L. REv. 23 (2007); Mark B. Rotenberg, Politics, Personality and Judging: The
Lessons of Brandeis and Frankfurter on Judicial Restraint, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1863 (1983)
(book review).
695. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (citation omitted).
696. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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decisions must conform with principles transcending and greater than greater
Society's partiality: "Even though the concept of due process of law is not
final and fixed, these limits are derived from considerations that are fused in
the whole nature of our judicial process. ... These are considerations deeply
rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession."6 97
Lest there be any doubts about the judicial role, five years earlier,
Frankfurter accented that because it must be politically neutral, only the
Judiciary has competence to be due process' final authority. Specifically, he
urged that rather than unthinking submissiveness to history, due process
concerns "the impersonal standards of society which alone judges, as the
organs of Law, are empowered to enforce."698
Certainly Frankfurter was deeply respectful of American social and
historical traditions which, due to their empirical nature, encourage judicial
restraint. Still, as the above-quotes demonstrate, Frankfurter realized that a
true appreciation of constitutional matters requires specialized professional
training -- "the compelling traditions of the legal profession" -- imparting apt
sensitivity to impartial, "impersonal standards of society," based on unbiased
"reason," an analysis "which alone judges, as the organs of Law, are
empowered to enforce." Therefore, Frankfurter knew that properly
discerning the principles of due process cannot be solely and exclusively an
empirical-societal process according mechanical deference to even long-
standing traditions evincing the popular will (however that might be
determined). Indeed, commenting on the unique demands of the Judiciary,
Frankfurter remarked that judging, "so dependent on the scientific spirit of
truth-seeking, without the aids of scientific verification, depends ultimately
on those rare men in whom disinterestedness is an intellectual and moral
habit, discernment on inadequate data almost a prophetic talent." 699
The relatively direct, empirical task of identifying deeply rooted
traditions, while not to be disparaged, does not require the dedication,
training, perspicacity, and uprightness that Frankfurter finds both necessary
and rare among individuals. If discerning due process morality were nothing
more than such an empirical exercise, surely neither Frankfurter, nor Cardozo
697. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added) (citing, Hon. Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature
ofthe Judicial Process; The Growth ofthe Law; The Paradoxes ofLegal Science, (1982)).
698. State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
699. Felix Frankfurter, The Spirit ofLiberty, N.Y. Herald Tribune, May 18, 1952, at § 6, 1
(reviewing Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (Irving Dillard ed., 1953) (emphasis added)
(quoted in, Alfred S. Neely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's 1conography of Judging, 82 KY. L.J.
535, 573 (1994)).
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before him, would have demanded such an extraordinary measure of selfless
ability. Thus, comprehending due process, Frankfurter rightly pronounced,
is not the business of amateurs, hobbyists, empiricists, and politicians;
rather, it is the responsibility ofdispassionate professional jurists who alone
hold ranks requiring the non-political intellectualism and self-sacrifice that
demarcates a judge from a charlatan.
Identically, Justice Frankfurter stressed that to avoid judicial
consequentialist rulings, judges must perform "an evaluation based on
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science. . . ."' Certainly, his
earlier explication, "considerations deeply rooted in reason" 01 coupled with
the "spirit of science" evoke impartial reason which cannot simply accept an
empirical reporting of American custom as self-legitimating due to its
persistence. Rather, because "considerations deeply rooted in reason," when
conjoined with the scientific method, becomes a system to seek truth, due
process analysis surely is no apologist for either consequentialist preferences
or tradition qua tradition. As Frankfurter explained shortly after Rochin,
Since due process is not a mechanical yardstick, it does not afford
mechanical answers. In applying the Due Process Clause judicial
judgment is involved in an empiric process in the sense that results are
not predetermined or mechanically ascertainable. But that is a very
different thing from conceiving the results as ad hoc decisions in the
opprobrious sense of ad hoc. Empiricism implies judgment upon variant
situations by the wisdom of experience.7 02
In that regard, it is worth reiterating Frankfurter's opinion in Resweber
urging that judges cannot indulge an unthinking submissiveness to history
because due process entails, "the impersonal standards of society which
alone judges, as the organs of Law, are empowered to enforce."7 03 While a
bit vague, consistent with his philosophy, the term "impersonal standards"
surely does not mean some principle arguably attributed to "society" in the
sense of societal preferences even when historically constant, to be applied
categorically and automatically by courts. This is especially so because, as
700. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172; see also, Harrington v. Almy, 977 F.2d 37, 43-44 (1st
Cir. 1992) (per curiam denial of rehearing en banc) (discussing Rochin).
701. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171.
702. Irvine v. People of California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., with Burton,
J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
703. State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 470 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added).
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just quoted, judges "alone ... are empowered to enforce [the Constitution],"
therefore, they must exercise some degree of reasonable interpretive
discretion rather than acting as mere empiricists, mechanically discerning and
applying American traditions regardless whether such actually comport with
due process morality encapsulated as "fundamental fairness." Thus,
"impersonal standards" should be taken as synonymous with "considerations
deeply rooted in reason" discerned through "the spirit of science," denoting
things divorced from the partialities and preferences of both judges and
greater society, but rather derived through neural rational thought.7"
b. Frankfurter's Definition ofDue Process'Meaning --
Having delimited the analytical process, Frankfurter turned to defining
the essence of due process itself: "It is the compendious expression for:all
those rights which the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free
society."70 s Two years prior to the foregoing depiction in Wolf citing both
Magna Carta and the Court's natural law-based due process exemplar
Hurtado v. California,7" Justice Frankfurter explained that such "rights ...
basic to our free society" are found among,
broad, inexplicit clauses of the Constitution, ... But broad as these clauses
are, they are not generalities of empty vagueness. ... The safeguards of
'due process oflaw' and 'the equal protection ofthe laws'summarize the
meaning of the struggle for freedom of English-speaking peoples. They
run back to Magna Carta but contemplate no less advances in the
conceptions ofjustice andfreedom by a progressive society.7 07
704. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 61-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Malloy 378 U.S.
1 (1964) (again invoking reason, Justice Frankfurter stated that courts must "logically" discern
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which Bill of Rights protections are
essential to liberty and which are not).
705. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion); See also,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643 (1961).
706. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion) (citing,
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 521 (1884)). See also, supra notes 514-20 and
accompanying text (Hurtado's explanation that the Constitution recognizes substantive due
process and that substantive due process constrains the legislative as well as the executive
branches).
707. State ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 466-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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Because, as the just-quoted excerpt from Francis states, due process
captures "the meaning of the struggle for freedom," by logical extrapolation,
due process addresses the questions: Why do we want to be free? and What
does freedom afford us? Therefore, while mindful of its Magna Carta origins,
to resolve those inquiries, due process is forward looking, the repository of,
as the Francis passage adds, "advances in the conceptions of justice and
freedom by a progressive society." It is worth re-emphasizing that, as the
above panoply of his writings recount, according to Frankfurter, pivotal ideas
such as freedom and justice must not be understood merely as political
constructs, but instead, as the product of impartial "reason" discerned "in the
spirit of science" as informed by "the compelling traditions of the legal
profession." 708 Frankfurter, then, must have perceived that freedom, justice,
liberty, and their ultimate meaning -- why be free? -- derive from what reason
in the "spirit of science" reveals.
Some irritable critics dismiss Frankfurter's admonitions as essentially
insubstantial. Prof. Greenwalt, for instance, sniffed, "Frankfurter is confident
that judges can apply [substantive due process principles] disinterestedly, but
all his rhetoric about the 'spirit of science' ... does not provide much of a
guide about how judges can rise above their own personal evaluations." 70
To the contrary, expounding on his references to Magna Carta and Hurtado's
legacy, in his Francis concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter made a
pronouncement as profound as it is broad: "The Fourteenth Amendment did
not mean to imprison the States into the limited experience of the eighteenth
century. It did mean to withdraw from the States the right to act in ways that
708. Of course, his wary phrasing "spirit of science" reminds us that Frankfurter did not
consider law to be a science in the sense of mathematics, physics, and other sciences that,
according to Frankfurter, were subject to indubitably correct measurements and verification.
"Whether one skilled in the art of science would agree with Frankfurter's implication that there
is certainty and precision in the sciences, it is clear that Frankfurter does not find the same in
the process ofjudging. The further implication is that, for Frankfurter, law cannot be a science
without deceptive simplification ... " Alfred S. Neely, Justice Frankfurter, Universal Camera
and A Jurisprudence ofJudicial Review ofAdministrative Action, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 34
(1994) (footnotes omitted).
Still, the evocative term "spirit of science," joined with the other significant quotes in
this writing text, evince, perhaps in the spirit of Kant, the hope yet uncertainty whether
individuals routinely can both discern and apply neutral principles applicable to given legal
issues. His admonition that judges are more apt to do so given their training and special
vocation certainly underscores Frankfurter's faith in neutral judging. See, supra note 699 and
accompanying text.
709. Kent Greenawalt, Variations on Some Themes of A "Disporting Gazelle" and His
Friend: Statutory Interpretation as Seen by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 176, 206-07 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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are offensive to a decent respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his
freedom."7 1 Of course, the Court had frequently and unequivocally held that,
within the strictures of the Due Process Clauses, government at all levels may
innovate, changing legal practices and standards that might have been time-
honored under English and Colonial antecedents, and into America's early
Constitutional experience. 711 However, in Francis, Justice Frankfurter
explicitly linked the "dignity of man," "the meaning of the struggle for
freedom," and Humankind's quest for "justice," as factors affecting how the
Due Process Clauses restrain such innovation. Thus, he anticipated the
dignity paradigm that this writing urges, as contrasted with the deeply rooted
principles standard, rightly implements the Framers' intent to enforce
through the Constitution the natural law principles of the Declaration of
Independence.
In this regard, consistent with the Founders expectations that future
generations would both correct their errors and improve upon their ideas,7 12
Frankfurter aptly explained that, as with all concepts legal and otherwise,
apprehending "due process of law" is a process of studying, exploring,
questioning, imagining, and, learning. That surely is why, referring to Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, Frankfurter stated:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. ... But basic rights do not become petrified as of any one
time, even though, as a matter of human experience, some may not too
rhetorically be called eternal verities. It is of the very nature of a free
society to advance in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and
right. Representing as it does a living principle, due process is not
confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a given time be
deemed the limits or the essentials of fundamental rights.7 i3
True, "The real clue to the problem confronting the judiciary in the
application of the Due Process Clause is not to ask where the line is once and
for all to be drawn but to recognize that it is for the Court to draw it by the
710. La. ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 468 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
711. As Justice Cardozo expressed it for the Court, a state, "is free to regulate the procedure
of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness, unless in so doing
it offends some principle ofjustice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted).
712. See, supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
713. Wolf 338 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added) (discussing, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 327 (1937)).
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gradual and empiric process of 'inclusion and exclusion."'7 14 However, as
already accented, the practice of testing -- of "inclusion and exclusion" -- so
that "a free society [may] advance in its standards of what is deemed
reasonable and right" to better understand the "living principle" called "due
process of law" does not render due process' meaning a function of either
popular will or partisan politics even if long-standing enough to be
considered "deeply rooted." Rather, as Frankfurter informed in earlier
passages, due process exposition is a progression in the "spirit of science,"
"rooted in reason" to discern for the sake of the "dignity of man" the
meanings of "freedom" and "justice."7 15 Thus, this writing's Deontological
Originalism urges that, in Frankfurter's words, "the compelling traditions of
the legal profession" 716 is the deontological morality that the Founders
commemorated in the Declaration of Independence.
Equally profoundly, having defined "due process," and noting that
understanding its meaning is an endeavor sounding in reason and "the spirit
of science," Frankfurter explained the extraordinary latitude courts must
exercise to ascertain when governmental action is "offensive to a decent
respect for the dignity of man, and heedless of his freedom."717 Specifically,
while "great tolerance toward a State's conduct is demanded of this Court", 718
Once we are explicit in stating the problem before us in terms defined by
an unbroken series of decisions, we cannot escape acknowledging that
[due process of law] involves the application of standards of fairness and
justice very broadly conceived. ... the standards for judicialjudgment are
not narrower than 'immutable principles ofjustice, which inhere in the
714. Id. (quoting, Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1887)).
715. Similarly, five years earlier, Frankfurter explained that "The safeguards of 'due
process of law' and 'the equal protection of the laws' summarize the history of freedom of
English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and reflected in the constitutional
development of our people." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Accordingly, while surely informed by history and the
accumulated wisdom of the American public, due process, "expresses a demand for civilized
standards of law. It is thus not a stagnant formulation of what has been achieved in the past
but a standard for judgment in the progressive evolution of the institutions of a free society."
Id. at 414 (Frankfurter, J., concurring; emphasis added).
Again, we see that discerning the true meaning of due process requires "judgment,"
neutral judgment Frankfurter seems to mean, consistent with "the progressive evolution of the
institutions of a free society," rather than popular judgment, even if born of wisdom, but
nonetheless inevitably the fruit of political, lay evaluation. Id.
716. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 171.
717. State ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 468 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
718. Id. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
370 [Vol. 43: 1
2017] PART II - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
very idea of free government', fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions,
[and] 'immunities *** implicit in the concept ofordered liberty', ... Such
were recently stated to be 'the controlling principles '.
Again, to define due process of law, Justice Frankfurter implores ideas
sounding in deontological morality. Surely, due process' vindication of
nothing less that the "freedom" -- that is, I take it, the liberty -- inherent in
and essential to the "dignity of man [Humankind,]" enforced as "standards
of fairness and justice very broadly conceived," cannot be reduced solely to
a judicial recounting of either American traditions or what happens to
predominate as American custom at the time of the relevant due process
litigation. Nor can "'immutable principles ofjustice, which inhere in the very
idea of free government', 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which
lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions', [and] 'immunities *
* * implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"' rightly be discerned only
through an uncritical recounting of historical and contemporary American
popular practices. Founded as they are on natural law principles, 72 0 discerned
through America's "judicial process" that applies not partisan politics but
rather "notions deeply rooted in reason," the "immutable principles of
justice" that define due process must allow reviewing judges to defer to
American customs, practices, traditions and preferences only insofar as they
are consistent with immutable, transcendent moral precepts deriving from
natural law as instructed in America's founding documents. In that regard,
it is prudent to repeat Frankfurter's pivotal admonition, "The Fourteenth
Amendment did not mean to imprison the States into the limited experience
of the eighteenth century. It did mean to withdraw from the States the right
to act in ways that are offensive to a decent respect for the dignity of man,
and heedless of his freedom. "721
And, to assuage any remaining doubts, almost seventy years ago
Frankfurter yet again vividly explicated due process' inextricable connection
to moral precepts:
719. Id. (emphasis added; quoting, Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. at 389; Hebert v. State of
Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926); Palko, 302 U.S. at 324, and, Malinski v. N.Y., 324 U.S.
401, 438 (1945) (Stone, C.J., with Roberts, Reed and Jackson, JJ., dissenting)).
720. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. at 389; Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. at 530-31.
721. State ex rel. Francis, 329 U.S. at 466-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
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It is now the settled doctrine of this Court that the Due Process Clause
embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due
Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair
and right andjust. The more fundamental the beliefs are the less likely
they are to be explicitly stated. But respect for them is of the very essence
of the Due Process Clause."722
Although referring to "traditions and feelings of our people,"
Frankfurter, as was his wont, added a careful, extra-societal dominating
factor: "Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what
is fair and right and just."7 23 I highlighted the word "the" to accent that
"deepest notions of what is fair and right and just" do not refer back to his
immediately preceding sentence referencing the popular will, specifically,
"[T]he Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as
to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our whole
history." 724 Had he wished such a relation-back, Frankfurter would have
written (as emphasized in italics): "the Due Process Clause embodies a
system of rights based on moral principles so deeply embedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a
civilized society as conceived by our whole history. Due Process is that
which comports with those deeply embedded notions of what is fair and right
and just." That, of course, is not what he wrote. Rather, Frankfurter first
stated that due process relates to American tradition and beliefs, but, then
added "Due Process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what
is fair and right and just,"72 5 evincing that beyond "the traditions and feelings
of our people" there could be more profound, more true understandings --
that is, "the deepest notions" --which might be assessable tojudges but either
not yet known or not yet acknowledged by the public-at-large.
Yes, Frankfurter claimed to eschew the inevitability of right answers.726
Nevertheless, as his references to "reason," "spirit of science," and,
722. Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
723. Id. at 16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
724. Id.
725. Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
726. For example, during his formative years, "In 1912, [while law officer of the Bureau of
Insular Affairs and about to commence his remarkable tenure as professor at Harvard Law
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"impersonal standards" underscore, Justice Frankfurter must have conceived
judicial due process analysis to discern actual truths about fairness and
justice. Otherwise, he would have had to admit candidly that, no matter how
careful and forthright they may be, the absence of deontological moral truth
renders any determination of due process the personal preferences of the
reviewing judges.727 Given his respect for judicial restraint, Frankfurter
School, the 30-year-old Frankfurter] said that, 'if facts are changing, law cannot be static. So-
called immutable principles must accommodate themselves to facts of life . . . ."' Joseph
Gumina, From Austria to Sacco and Vanzetti: The Development of Frankfurter's
"Fundamental Rights" Theory, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 389, 404 (2008) (quoting Helen
Shirley Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar on the Bench 172 (1960) (quoting Felix
Frankfurter, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, Address at the Harvard Law Review Twenty-fifth
Anniversary Dinner (Mar. 30, 1912))). Indeed, Daniel Gordon opined that, like his mentor
Louis Brandeis, "Frankfurter would adopt Holmes' skeptical view of natural law [comes as]
no surprise. Natural law reflects the dominant Christian culture of Europe and America ...
grounded in Christian Scripture." Daniel R. Gordon, Revisiting Erie, Guaranty Trust, and
Gasperini: The Role ofJewish Social History in Fashioning Modern American Federalism,
26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 213, 237 (2002) (footnotes omitted; discussing as well many other
reasons for natural law skepticism).
In further support of the argument that Frankfurter was a postmodernist, Prof Paulsen
offered, "Frankfurter's perspective on religious conviction is that of the quintessential modem
secular liberal: There is no such thing as religious truth. Indeed, there are no objectively right
answers at all to moral, religious, or philosophical questions, and thus no proper basis for
moral absolutism. ... [F]or example, Frankfurter writes that 'no single principle can answer
all of life's complexities."' Michael S. Paulsen, The Unconscionable War on Moral
Conscience: Robert P. George, Conscience and Its Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of
Liberal Secularism. By Robert P. George, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1167, 1172 (2016)
(quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940)[, o., W. Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)]).
Of course, there can be different reasonable interpretations of given quotes. That
Frankfurter opined, "no single principle can answer all of life's complexities" does not mean
that he believed there are no moral principles emanating from sources greater than human
imagining and human preferences. Indeed, I take Frankfurter's Gobitis quote simply to be
stating that whether deontological or consequentialist, no single idea will yield the correct
answer to any given dilemma. Rather, answers arise from a host of interactive "principle[s],"
likely varying in levels of order, but no one of which comprises a universal cure for all
problems. As Zachary Shemtob put it, "Frankfurter believed that courts could not mask their
every decision behind inflexible absolutes, but had to recognize the contextual nature of
judging." Zachary B. Shemtob, The Conflicted Constitution: The Textual Absolutism of
Justices Black and Thomas Versus the Balanced Restraint ofJustices Frankfurter and Breyer,
I BRIT. J. AM. LEG. STUDIEs 217, 223 (2012).
Paulsen's chosen quote cannot prove that Justice Frankfurter derided deontological
morality.
727. Such personal preferences might not reflect given judges' deliberate substitution of
their personal moral precepts for constitutional law. Judges might enforce their personal
preferences to respect precedent and similar canons of judicial restraint. Or, they might
enforce their personal inclinations to respect the "will of the people" by not substituting the
People's penchants with a purportedly elitist judicial viewpoint. The point is, however, absent
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would not have embraced a constitutional philosophy holding that, even
though often exceptionally well informed, judges' personal moral
preferences should trump Society's.
Indeed, Frankfurter did write, "canons of decency and fairness ... are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were prescriptions in a
pharmacopoeia."7 28 And, granted, Frankfurter never explicitly stated a firm
and unwavering belief in deontological morality; therefore, his grandiose
prose might be interpreted to hide ambivalence -- a coy hedging of
intellectual wagers allowing for the legitimacy of both deontological and
consequentialist theory. Nevertheless, as shown in the text and
accompanying notes supra, so many of Frankfurter's pronouncements in so
many judicial opinions strongly implicate natural law theory understood
through scientific methodology and neutral reasoning. Such pronouncements
make no sense absent a deontological bent. Therefore, I stand by my
conclusions that his jurisprudence, so influential, as we will see, on Justice
Harlan, promotes the Deontological Originalism this writing proposes.
Accordingly, the only justification Frankfurter could offer to explain
why the wisdom ofjudges should dominate is that, based on their status and
training, judges can and will resist the urge to conflate subjective partialities
with the meaning of constitutional law. To be true to that duty, there is no
other available method except to seek through impartial reason the
immutable moral principles of due process. In that regard, interpreting him
as an adherent, if a reluctant one, to such jurisprudence, respected legal
scholar Sanford Kadish aptly concluded, " ... on the contemporary Court
Justice Frankfurter, the storm center of the natural law-due process
controversy, ... "729
finding -- or at least attempting to discern -- immutable moral precepts, any judicial
determination purporting to apply due process morality must be based on the reviewing
judges' personal moral biases.
Accordingly, I must disagree with Zachary Shemtob's assessment that, "Frankfurter
believed judicial decision making was irreducible to a series of absolute rules, and the outer
limits of law, whether unprecedented scenarios or vaguely worded provisions, therefore forced
judges to make admittedly subjective determinations." Shemtob, supra note 726, at 227.
728. Id. (quoting, Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945).
729. Kadish, supra note 665, at 327. Similarly, Prof. Yassky identifies Frankfurter's due
process jurisprudence as essentially a modernized "natural law" reformulation of Justice
Bradley's natural law-based dissent in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 86 U.S. [6 Wall.] 36, 49-52
(1872) (regarding the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g.,
"But even if the Constitution were silent, the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens, as such, would be no less real and no less inviolable than they now are." Id. at 52
(Bradley, J., dissenting)). David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and
Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 658 (2000). See also, e.g., Trisha Olson, The
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iii. The Second Justice Harlan's Due Process Jurisprudence --
Along with Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter, Justice John Marshall
Harlan is the third major influence on the meaning of due process. Most
particularly, Harlan understood and fully accepted that, pursuant to the due
process clauses, Government must comply with its unalienable moral duty to
comport with "fundamental fairness."7 30 Harlan famously penned his most
thorough explication of that duty in Poe v. Ullman,73 1 an exposition that justly
has been lauded as "remarkable,"732 "seminal,"733 and, in the words of Judge
Natural Law Foundation ofthe Privileges or Immunities Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,
48 ARK. L. REV. 347, 361 (1995) ("Justice Frankfurter conceived of a richer understanding of
natural law than natural rights.").
As with Justice Cardozo (see particularly, supra notes 675-86 and accompanying text),
Justice Frankfurter's anti-Lochnerism and embracing of a pragmatic common law does not
mean that he completely eschewed the belief in natural law principles to define fundamental
natural rights. As Prof. Steven G. Calibresi concluded after reviewing relevant materials,
"Justice Frankfurter recommended using a historically glossed, natural law approach to the
judicial role to deal with the problem he saw in the open-endedness of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism,
Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment the Bill ofRights: Creation and Reconstruction. by
Akhil Reed Amar. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1998) Pp. xv, 412, 87
GEO. L.J. 2273, 2298 (1999).
I note in passing that one can find a seemingly direct exhortation by Justice
Frankfurter: "In the history of thought 'natural law' has a much longer and much better
founded meaning and justification than such subjective selection." Adamson, 332 U.S. at 65
(Frankfuter, J., concurring). Some commentators have taken this direct reference to conclude
that, "Frankfurter defended "natural law" theories,..." Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient
Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1025 (2009)
(quoting Adamson). I do not disagree. Moreover, Frankfurter did hint that natural law might
inform judicial rview of constitutional matters. "In the numerous cases either granting or
denying judicial review, grant or denial were reached not by applying some 'natural law' of
judicial review ... However useful judicial review may be, it is for Congress and not for this
Court to decide when it may be used-except when the Constitution commands it." Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 314 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
However, as I have not found similar direct references in other Frankfurter opinions, I
am hesitant to cite his Adamson concurrence as sufficient proof. But, certainly, coupled with
the tenor of his due process jurisprudence, Prof. Burnett's determination is apt.
730. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 177 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See supra note
459 for a brief iteration of Justice Harlan's legacy and why he is referred to as the "second"
Justice John Marshall Harlan
731. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
732. Hon. Robert H. Henry, Madison Lecture: Living Our Traditions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
673, 675 (2011) (discussing Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman).
733. Robert J. Smith & Zoe Robinson, Constitutional Liberty and the Progression of
Punishment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 413, 459 (2017); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4, 103 n.485 (2003);
375
THURGOOD M4RSHALL LAW REVIEW
Robert H. Henry, "perhaps the most eloquent defense of nonliteralism ever
written by a conservative ... "734 Indeed, albeit now in some question, the
Supreme Court has adopted Harlan's elucidation of due process.73 5
Dissenting from the Court's dismissal of the petitioners' constitutional
challenge to Connecticut's law criminalizing the use of contraception by
married couples,7 36 Justice Harlan embraced the traditional account that the
moral imperative of fundamental fairness means that violations of due
process comprise "arbitrary impositions" or "purposeless restraints" 73 7 that
defy, using Justice Cardozo's famous phrasing, the very "the concept of
ordered liberty."73 8
Like his predecessors, the cautious and meticulous Harlan 73 9 appreciated
the need to respect history and tradition. 740 He recognized as well that the
Constitution does not redress every conceivable grievance.74 ' While, ala
Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard ofJudicial Review,
51 DuKE L. J. 75, 90 (2001).
734. Henry, supra note 732, at 680.
735. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-849 (1992);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 618-619 (1984); but see, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (urging
that Harlan's Poe stance has been replaced by the deeply rooted traditions paradigm).
736. The Poe majority decided on prudential grounds that the petitioners had failed to state
a justiciable claim, that is, their record did not evince a likelihood that Connecticut actually
would enforce its criminal prohibition against them as married couples. "The true controversy
in this case is over the opening of birth-control clinics on a large scale; it is that which the
State has prevented in the past, not the use of contraceptives by isolated and individual married
couples. It will be time enough to decide the constitutional questions urged upon us when, if
ever, that real controversy flares up again." Poe, supra note 157, at 509 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
737. Id. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring, reasserting without fully repeating his Poe
dissent).
738. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Inexplicably, although citing Palko
elsewhere in his Poe dissent, Harlan did not acknowledge Justice Cardozo as the originator of
that idiom.
739. "Harlan has been called the 'paradigm of the true conservative judge."' Henry, supra
note 732, at 679 (quoting BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 375
(1993)).
740. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
741. Shortly after Poe, Harlan expressed his concern over what he sensed was a rising
sentiment,
that every major social ill in this country can find its cure in some constitutional
'principle,' and that this Court should 'take the lead' in promoting reform when
other branches of government fail to act. The Constitution is not a panacea for
every blot upon the public welfare, nor should this Court, ordained as a judicial
body, be thought of as a general haven for reform movements.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 624-25 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Frankfurter, cognizant of proper judicial restraint,742 Justice Harlan
recognized, as did Frankfurter, that judges must rely on unbiased rationality
to discern the meaning of "due process of law":
[P]recisely because it is the Constitution alone which warrants judicial
interference in sovereign operations of the State, the basis ofjudgment as
to the Constitutionality of state action must be a rational one, ... [A]s
inescapable as is the rational process in Constitutional adjudication in
general, nowhere is it more so than in giving meaning to the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment and, where the Federal Government is
involved, the Fifth Amendment, against the deprivation of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. 743
Based on the foregoing, Justice Harlan offered his paradigmatic
understanding of due process, not simply in terms of empirically researching
time-honored traditions, but in terms of fairness and decency. Specifically,
due process envisions a seamless, overarching fabric of compatible rights
discerned through impartial rational contemplation:
This 'liberty' is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the
taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to
keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints, ... Each new claim to Constitutional protection
must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as
they have been rationally perceived and historically developed. Though
we exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no
"mechanical yardstick," no "mechanical answer." The decision of an
Deontological Originalism has no quarrel with Harlan's stance, although that paradigm
likely would embrace more controversies than the Justice would include under the strictures
of his Poe dissent. The point is, so long as there is no moral problem, governmental policies
are not subject to judicial nullification under the Due Process Clauses even if any challenged
policy truly is a "blot upon the public welfare." Like "due process" as envisioned by Harlan,
Deontological Originalism applies only when reviewed governmental action violates a
fundamental right emanating from natural law.
742. "If the supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam where
unguided speculation might take them." Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
743. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539-40 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Similarly, later in
his opinion, Justice Harlan accented, "supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has
of necessity been a rational process, ... " Id. at 542.
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apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on
well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take "its
place in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what
is to come." 7"
Justice Harlan climaxed his insightful discussion by quoting Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion in Rochin, to reiterate for a fouth time that due
process analysis is, "deeply rooted in reason."745 Indeed, it could hardly be
some other process to discern those concepts, "which are considered to
embrace those rights 'which are ... fundamental; which belong ... to the
citizens of all free governments,' ... for 'the purposes (of securing) which
men enter into society,' ... "746
I read Justice Harlan's intricate and detailed Poe dissent as consistent
with the principles of deontological moral reasoning urged in this writing.
Granted, the ever cautious and unassuming Harlan claimed that the process
requires balancing, "The best that can be said is that through the course of
this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between
that liberty and the demands of organized society."747 Regardless, pursuant
to Justice Harlan's above-quoted dynamic and resolute rationale, we know
that pursuant to the overarching "rational continuum" that is "liberty," unjust
"demands of organized society" manifest as "arbitrary impositions and
purposeless restraints" are unlawful deprivations of "liberty." Thus, there
can be no truly just "demands of organized society" that infringe actual
"liberty" because such would be the very tyranny the Declaration of
Independence explains is illegitimate. Accordingly, the overarching thrust
of his Poe dissent evinces Harlan's appreciation that, in actuality, there is no
744. Id. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Irvine v. California,
347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); accord, e.g., Krainski v. Nevada ex
rel. Bd. of Regents of Nevada System of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 969 (9th Cir. 2010);
Zalewska v. County of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2003) (municipal transit
authority's rule requiring all affected personnel to wear pants did not violate female
employee's liberty interests); Neinast v. Bd of Trs. of Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585,
595 (6th Cir. 2003).
745. Poe, 367 U.S. at 544-45 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952)).
746. Id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, F. Cas.546, 551 (Cir.
Court, E.D. Pa. 1823) and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (DalI.) 386, 388 (1798)).
747. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, because due process is
predicated on deontological morality, in this one regard, Harlan was mistaken. See supra notes
536-50 and accompanying text explaining that due process rights are not "balanced."
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"balance;" the only constitutional "demands of organized society" are those
that comport with liberty's rational continuum.
Indeed, as the Justice himself accented, "The full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the
precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution."74 8 If such "full scope of liberty" derives merely from an
empirical discovery of "deeply rooted" traditions, then all of Harlan's careful
and intricate reasoning, particularly due process' link to reason, means
absolutely nothing because no such intricate, thoroughgoing intellectual
exercises are needed to discern whether some "deeply rooted" tradition
applies in some given instance. Thus, although informative, if deeply rooted
traditions are not the only matters germane to what outside of the
Constitution's text informs the meaning of "due process of law," then,
Harlan's emphasis on a "rational continuum" must relate to what are,
coalesced herein as Deontological Originalism. Justice Harlan's explication
of due process infers the Deontological Originalism espoused by this writing,
even if, like Frankfurter and Cardozo before him, Harlan might have been
disinclined to so acknowledge.
I feel justified, therefore, in completing the journey charted by the Poe
dissent, as well as by Justice Cardozo's Palko opinion and the amassed
wisdom of Justice Frankfurter, regardless whether those jurists would or
would not have been willing to acknowledge the journey's end embedded in
their due process precepts. 749 It is a course that, based on prior judicial
decisions, Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter and Harlan rightly modernized
through "suggesting aspects of the natural law approach, ... We must be
true to where the voyage they charted actually takes us. Just as we should
apply the Founders' natural law principles even if doing so discredits discrete
practices and traditions that the Founders themselves were loath to
condemn, 75 1 so too must we follow the path of Cardozo-Frankfurter-Harlan
748. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
749. Adapting the phrasing the Ninth Circuit employed regarding Congress, "However, at
journey's end we are left where we began, and conclude that [Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter,
and Harlan] meant what [they] said." Saipan Stevedore Co. Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers'
Comp. Programs, 133 F.3d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1998).
750. R. Randall Kelso, The Natural Law Tradition on the Modern Supreme Court: Not
Burke, but the Enlightenment Tradition Represented by Locke, Madison, and Marshall, 26 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 1051, 1082 n. 103 (1995). See also, e.g., Unattributed, Supreme Court, 1976
Term, 1. Constitutional Law, D. Due Process 1. Protection of Family Interests, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 128, 134 n. 52 (1977) (noting, ustice Harlan's invocation of natural law jurisprudence in
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
751. See supra notes 280-87 and accompanying text.
379
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
although it transports us to places they did not think are on "due process of
law's" map.
True, many scholars assert that the apparent sweeping breadth and depth
of Harlan's Poe dissent is atypical and out-of-place for ajustice so steeped in
the principles of judicial restraint.752 Noted scholar Cass Sunstein, for
instance, expressed the common interpretation that Harlan limited the range
of substantive due process "to long-standing traditions."75 3 Therefore, some
urge that academics ought not read the Poe dissent too expansively (meaning,
I think, do not read it too literally) for, indeed, Harlan himself harbored a
narrow view of the panoply of unspecified rights deriving not from the Bill
of Rights but from the Constitution's guarantee of "due process of law."754
Hence, analysts have noted with bemusement that numerous "liberal" legal
theorists happily enlist Harlan, via his Poe dissent, as a proponent of
expansive due process analysis. 7ss
752. In a commendably thorough and thoughtful note, Andrew B. Schroeder recounts many
of the critics who have found it difficult to reconcile Harlan's purported judicial conservatism
with his Poe dissent. Andrew B. Schroeder, Keeping Police Out ofthe Bedroom: Justice John
Marshall Harlan, Poe v. Ullman, and the Limits ofConservative Privacy, 86 VA. L. REV. 1045,
1046-1049 (2000) (note).
753. Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1543, 1565 (2008)
("In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499-502 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in Court's
striking as violating substantive due process, Connecticut's statute denying married couples
access to birth control and to educational sources addressing birth control), Justice Harlan ...
attempted to discipline the use of substantive due process, by reference to long-standing
traditions, and this view is now taken to provide the most plausible understanding of
Griswold." (footnote omitted) (quoted in, Richard M. R6, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v.
Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y, 1031, 1075 n.182 (2010)).
754. For example, "Significantly, Justice Harlan included abortion, euthanasia, and suicide
among those controversial moral issues about which states generally should be free to
legislate." David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court,
75 MARQUETTE L. REV. 975, 1061 (1992) (citing, Poe, 367 U.S. at 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
Accordingly, some may aver that it was irresponsible for the Court after Harlan's death to use
the "rationale continuum" aspect of his Poe dissent to support a due process privacy right to
abortion. E.g., Mary Kathryn Nagle, Abortion Post-Glucksberg and Post-Gonzales: Applying
an Analysis that Demands Equality for Women Under the Law, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 293, 297-302 (2009) (decrying subsequent Supreme Court decisions that seem to reject
Harlan's "rational continuum" approach).
Similarly, Justice Harlan likely would not have joined the Obergefell Court because,
"Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids altogether,
but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the
institution of marriage, an institution which the State not only must allow, but which always
and in every age it has fostered and protected." Poe 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoted in Smolin, supra note 754 at 1061).
755. "Many commentators perceive Justice Harlan, the quintessential conservative judge,
as liberal in his interpretation of substantive due process. This perception makes Justice
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Of course, the art of critical appraisal is fraught with perils as critics
must be careful not to accent only those passages which please them while
hastily ignoring or improperly underplaying those that do not.756 Still,
disagreeing with Anthony Cicia's analysis, 7 this writing maintains that, akin
to Frankfurter, Harlan left significant and meaningful leeway to rebuff
"tradition" in the rare but important instances when sober, unbiased, erudite
judicial reasoning reveals that "tradition," even if longstanding and deeply
held, defies fundamental fairness.
As his prime example, Cicia offered:
Justice Harlan believed that "Each new claim to Constitutional protection
must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as
they have been rationally perceived and historically developed." This
demonstrates that, although Harlan believed in looking to "constitutional
purposes," which sounds aspirational, he relied on how these purposes
have "historically developed." Thus, Justice Harlan's substantive due
process formulation is confined to protecting only those rights that have
enjoyed traditional protection in the United States.7 11
Cicia's conclusion is hasty. First, regarding Harlan's phrasing, "Each
new claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a
background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally
perceived and historically developed," Cicia completely ignores the
significant term "rationally perceived" which implies resort to neutral reason
to negate the influence of selfish, biased, uninformed preferences that might
Harlan's formulation appealing even to some liberal fundamental rights theorists. A closer
inspection, however, reveals Justice Harlan's substantive due process formulation as very
restrictive." Anthony C. Cicia, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of Justice
Harlan's Substantive Due Process Formulation, 64 FORD. L. REv. 2241, 2266 (1996)
(footnotes omitted). Accordingly, Cicia criticizes "liberal" scholars who, he believes, have
carelessly isolated some of Justice Harlan's more expansive prose from his true framework
for Harlan, Cicia argues, "tempered his language with emphasis on the common law tradition.
Justice Harlan severely limited the scope of his substantive due process formulation by
grounding it in tradition." Id. at 2247.
756. Certainly, commentators may not treat authors' points as they might, "look out over
the heads of the crowd and pick out [their] friends." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution
and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 36 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (crediting this
metaphor to Hon. Harold Leventhal) (quoted in, John F. Manning, Lessons from a
Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAMEE L. REv. 1541, 1563 n.63 (2008)).
757. See supra note 755.
758. Cicia, supra note 755, at 2247-48 (emphasis added; quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 544
(Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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underlie the particular "historical development" under review. If Harlan's
verb-phrasing "must be considered" means that "a background of
Constitutional purposes" is the only legitimate basis to review a claimed due
process right, then his modifier "as [those purposes] have been rationally
perceived" compels judges to consider not only the "historical development"
of the relevant "Constitutional purposes," but also to discern if rational
perception actually justifies legitimizing as constitutionally valid, that
"historical development." Scrupulous judges make such assessments not by
consulting and imposing their own subjective preferences. Rather, through
neutral reason,"' judges discern what the applicable "background of
Constitutional purposes" truly means. That assessment, as we now know,
depends on whether the purported due process right does or does not emanate
from the natural rights principles of the Declaration of Independence.
Accordingly, under Cicia's reading, Harlan's deliberate phrase
"rationally perceived" means nothing, which, of course, is unlikely in the
extreme given his emphasis, derived particularly from Justices Cardozo and
Frankfurter, on rational analysis to explicate "due process of law."
Otherwise, surely Justice Harlan would not have included the term
"rationally perceived." Rather, he would simply have written, "Each new
claim to Constitutional protection must be considered against a background
of Constitutional purposes, as they have been raienally perczivzd and
historically developed" I certainly am hesitant to negate -- to declare as
slapdash surplusage -- Justice Harlan's term "rationally perceived" by in
essence melding that term into the companion term "historical
development. "760 The better understanding then is that while undoubtedly
759. As recounted in the text, Harlan repeatedly emphasized rational analysis encapsulated
by his identification of due process as a, "rational continuum which, broadly speaking,
includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints," Poe,
367 U.S. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See, supra notes 74248 and accompanying text.
760. Generally, "interpretations resulting in textual surplusage are typically disfavored."
U.S. v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 2013 A.M.C. 1843, 1853 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted;
concerning statutory analysis); See also, e.g., Wisc. Cen. Ltd. v. U.S., 856 F.3d 490, 494 (7th
Cir. 2017) (citing, U.S. v. Ressam, 53 U.S. 272, 277 (2008)). This instance is completely
different from my earlier argument that, by rightly identifying the Due Process Clauses as the
Constitution's value monism, the Judiciary rendered almost the entire Bill of Rights plus the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause redundant. See, supra notes 554, 583 and
accompanying text. The technical surplusage of enumerated fundamental rights in the Bill of
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment is unavoidable given the Due Process Clauses' role as
repository for all fundament rights, or, to use the declaration's term, "unalienable Rights."
By contrast, one would wrongfully alter Harlan's due process standard, "rationally
perceived and historically developed," by declaring the term "rationally perceived" to be
surplusage. That is because, not only the text "rationally perceived and historically
382 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART II - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
related, rational development may well be different from how the "historical
development" actually manifested, thus requiring two separate enquiries by
reviewing judges.76 1
Moreover, even if "rationally perceived" were taken to mean not
unbiased reason, but the personal "rational" perspectives of the individuals
who collectively have formed the germane "historical development,"
Harlan's standard requires, as earlier quoted, that to be true to the "rational
continuum" that coprises "liberty," "Each new claim to Constitutional
protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional
purposes, as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed."
He aptly did not write, "Each new claim to Constitutional protection [must
be judged only and entirely] against a background of Constitutional purposes,
as they have been rationally perceived and historically developed;" rather his
operate verb form is "must be considered." Indeed, the recognized definition
of the verb "consider" is, "Think carefully about (something), typically
before making a decision."7 62 To consider implies, therefore, that the
applicable "background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been
rationally perceived and historically developed" is something that must be
contemplated and, given the nature ofjudicial review, accorded considerable,
but not dispositive respect. Therefore, consideration of the applicable
"background of Constitutional purposes, as they have been rationally
perceived and historically developed" would be an embarking point, not an
inevitable, unassailable final destination.
To borrow the popular advertising phrase, "But wait. There's more."
Cicia's quote omitted the modifying sentences Justice Harlan included to
explicate his term "rationally perceived and historically developed:"
"Though we exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment, yet there is no
developed," but also the entire corpus of his due process jurisprudence presented supra in the
text informs that Justice Harlan never envisaged that "due process of law's" meaning emanates
solely and exclusively from its "historical development."
761. For instance, in a sex discrimination claim, the historical development of some law or
tradition may defy rational perception. A law requiring women in opposite-sex marriages to
perform all legal endeavors such as opening bank accounts or buying property under their
"married names" may be explained under an historical development that, as a matter of
rational perception demeans and disparages such women's individuality by compelling them
against their will to be identified under their husband's surnames.
762. Consider, ENGLISH OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES (2018). Essentially identically, The
Law Dictionary, an online source, defines "consider" as, "the term that means to think about,
or to ponder or study and to examine carefully." The Law Dictionary (Featuring Black's Law
Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary Free Online Legal Dictionary 2nd Ed.),
https://thelawdictionary.org/consider/ (accessed August 4, 2018).
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'mechanical yardstick,' no 'mechanical answer.' The decision of an
apparently novel claim must depend on grounds which follow closely on
well-accepted principles and criteria. The new decision must take 'its place
in relation to what went before and further [cut] a channel for what is to
come."'
By accenting that "is no 'mechanical yardstick,' no 'mechanical
answer"', Harlan tells us that even the admittedly intricate and demanding
empiricism attendant to discerning deeply-rooted traditions is insufficient for
due process analysis, at least in hard cases. Were it otherwise, he would have
been direct and clear, I believe, in clarifying that judges ought never go
beyond historical inquiry. Instead, using undeniably metaphorical more than
explicit prose, Justie Harlan recognizes that courts must understand and test
"well-accepted principles and criteria" by using "restrained" but sound
"judgment." Like Cardozo and Frankfurter before him, Harlan cannot
renounce the judges' duty to judge, meaning, to discern based on rational
anslysis whether a given government practice, regardless of persistence and
provenance, comports with the demands of "fundamental fairness," that is,
devoid of "arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints." Ultimately, that
determination must rest with unbiased (one hopes) courts and not partisan
Society.
I conclude this analysis with an observation by Justice Harlan that
perhaps even more fundamentally deflates the analysis of Cicia and like
critics. Four years after issuing his Poe dissent, citing Justice Frankfurter,
Harlan explained that,
Judicial self-restraint ... will be achieved in [substantive due process
analysis], as in other constitutional areas, only by continual insistence
upon respect for the teachings of history, solid recognition of the basic
values that underlie our society, and wise appreciation of the great roles
that the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers have played in
establishing and preserving American freedoms.763
763. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. at 501 (emphasis added) (Harlan, J., concurring; citing,
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), o. in part, Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
Interpreters understand Justice Harlan's Griswold concurring opinion to aver that, "the
natural law approach was the acceptable way to recognize privacy as a fundamental right. Lisa
Jane MaGuire, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of Identification
May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 480 n. 84 (2000). Indeed, in his
perceptive article, Richard M. R6 mentions that many commentators have embraced Harlan's
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Harlan's significant term "solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society" denotes an analytical factor distinct from the empirical
research needed to discern American values and traditions -- "respect for the
teachings of history" -- and deference to the Constitution's structure of
government, "the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers." "Solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society," it seems to me,
restates his pivotal claim in Poe that the "liberty" protected by "due process
of law," "is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of [enumerated
rights but rather] a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,
"7 Delineating that "rational continuum" (or its various synonyms 765) is
Poe dissent over allegedly more expansive theories such as Justice William 0. Douglas'
"controversial constitutional 'penumbras' analysis [in Griswold]... that seemed capable of
justifying any number of privacy rights." Richard M. Rd, Can Congress Overturn Kennedy v.
Louisiana?, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y, 1031, 1075 (2010) (discussing, Griswold v. Conn.,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J., with Warren, C.J., and Brennan and Goldberg, JJ.,
expressing the "opinion of the Court").
Perhaps ironically, Douglas cited Harlan's Poe dissent as the main support for his
"penumbras" theory. Id Significantly, Justice Harlan refused to join the Douglas opinion, "I
fully agree with the judgment of reversal, but find myself unable to join the Court's opinion."
Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's reason was that he understood Douglas to espouse
essentially a strict incorporation doctrine approach: The Douglas standard "seems to me to
evince an approach to this case very much like that taken by my Brothers [Justice Hugo]
BLACK and [Justice Potter] STEWART in dissent, namely: the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not touch this Connecticut statute unless the enactment is found
to violate some right assured by the letter or penumbra of the Bill of Rights." Id; see also, id.
at 500 (Harlan. J., concurring). Rather, quoting Justice Cardozo's opinion for the Court in
Palko and referencing his own Poe dissent, Justice Harlan reasoned that the challenged
Connecticut statute limiting married couples' access to contraception was constitutionally
infirm because it violated, "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'.. . Id
(Harlan, J. concurring). Accordingly, Harlan concluded, "While the relevant inquiry may be
aided by resort to one or more of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is not dependent on
them or any of their radiations. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands,
in my opinion, on its own bottom." Id. (Harlan, J. concurring).
R6 cunningly interprets Harlan's Griswold concurrence to imply a view not more
restrained than Douglas', but rather, because it is not limited to enumerated rights under the
Bill of Rights, arguable larger. In support, R6 referenced the Poe dissent, "Harlan's discussion
in Poe is quite varied. He canvassed an argument much like Douglas's 'penumbras' analysis
in the Griswold majority opinion." R6 at 1075. Thus, R6's analysis deflates Cicia's much
more limited reading of Harlan's expansive prose.
764. Poe, 367 U.S. at 543-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
765. It is worth recalling that Harlan expressed the concept of "a rational continuum" in
related ways throughout his Poe dissent. He accented the discernment of due process that is
"deeply rooted in reason," Id. at 544-44 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rochin v. Cal., 342
U.S. 165, 171 (1952) (per Frankfurter, J.), and as a "background of Constitutional purposes,
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an independent judicial determination, surely informed through and
respectful of, but never categorically dictated by historical development,
tradition and custom. As this writing continually emphasizes, were it
otherwise, the judicial role would only be as uncritical bookkeeper collecting
accounts of "basic values that underlie our society," but failing to judge
whether, on a "rational continuum" that, of course, must be "deeply rooted in
reason," those popular accounts truly conform with values "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."7 "
In sum, consistent with the constitutional theory of his Supreme Court
colleague Felix Frankfurter, Justice Harlan's due process framework respects
America culture, history and tradition, and, indeed, is inclined to defer to the
accumulated wisdom of the American experience revealed through statutes,
referenda, and other expression of popular will. 76 7 However, in accord with
Frankfurter and Cardozo, Harlan was a professional judge who believed that
judges must judge, that is, substitute their more-learned judgment but only
when necessary and only to the extent needed and no further.768 I agree then,
with respected jurisprudent, professor and former Associate Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Charles Fried, who commends
Harlan's Poe dissent as epitomizing, "belief in the possibility - indeed,
inevitability - of reasoning and judgment in applying the Constitution."769
as they have been rationally perceived" that Cicia himself quoted. Cicia, supra note 755, at
2247 (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
766. Moreover, the task of discerning what the American public believes to be "basic values
that underlie our society" or some variant thereof, is not simply a matter of quick research
yielding unassailable results. As Justice Hugo Black nicely summarized in his Griswold
dissent, "the scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court
can use to determine what traditions are rooted in the '(collective) conscience of our people."'
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting, discussing the opinion of
Justice Arthur Goldberg that the Ninth Amendment's protection of "those liberties that are 'so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'
invalidates the Connecticut ban prohibiting married couples from acquiring contraception.);
see also, Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., with Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring; quoting
Snyder v. Comm. of Mass. 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), o., Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
767. The tenor of Harlan's judging, often stated as "conservative," comprises an "approach
... that embraces judicial self-restraint, federalism, and a resistance to dramatic change."
Schroeder, supra note 752, at 1049.
768. As he must, Justice Harlan accepted Chief Justice John Marshall's admonition that it
is "emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is, ... "
Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
769. CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION -A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 73 (Simon & Schuster 1991) (quoted in Lawrence G. Sager, Memoirs ofa General
in the Inglorious Revolution, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1992)). In a similar vein, in his
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The Hon. Jeff Brown offered an apt summary, "As they wrestled with the
judiciary's role in a representative democracy, certainly the Founding Fathers
envisioned a Harlan-type judge -- deferential to the majority, yet cognizant
enough to recognize when it exceeded its constitutional limits."m
VI. KANTIAN DEONTOLOGY AND "DUE PROCESS OF LAW" --
A. The Infirm Structure of the "Deeply Rooted Principles" Paradigm --
As metatheory demands, the prelude has been long, intricate and
relatively thorough to establish what once was beyond dispute, but became
lost in a morass of Twentieth Century postmodernism-inspired constitutional
revisionism: The very foundation of the United States as formalized in the
Constitution, is fulfilling the moral promises of the Declaration of
Independence. We are now ready to confront exactly how the Supreme Court
applies the Founders' and the Reconstruction Congress' command -- the
requirement of Deontological Originalism -- that through the Due Process
Clauses, the Judiciary must discern and apply fundamental "unalienable
Rights" by assuring that any governmental conduct under review is moral.
As earlier noted, the Supreme Court engages two incompatible yet
extant paradigms to resolve due process issues, the deeply rooted principles
standard and the dignity paradigm. The deeply rooted principles standard is
predicated on what this writing urges is a misreading, or at least a reimagining
excellent law review note, disagreeing with most interpretations, Andrew B. Schroeder rightly
urges that the Poe dissent is fully consistent with Harlan's respect for judicial restraint
tempered by his awareness that, when needed, judges must protect fundamental liberties of
which the right to privacy in one's home from unreasonable state intrusions is paramount.
Accordingly, Harlan's due process framework in Poe is wholly loyal to a cautious,
"conservative" judge's determination to use juridical authority as sparingly as possible, but to
use it as fully as it may be needed to protect fundamental privacy rights.
In Schroeder's words:
Justice John Marshall Harlan believed that the right to privacy could be used to
invalidate substantive criminal enactments, which he did in Poe v. Ullman ... In
utilizing the right to privacy in this way, Justice Harlan was not employing a vague
constitutional concept as a mask for patrician social values, economic privilege, or
political conservatism. ... [Rather, his] use of privacy remained firmly rooted in the
context in which the doctrine developed: protecting citizens from egregious searches.
Schroeder, supra note 752, at 1094.
770. Hon. Jeff Brown, The Platonic Guardian and the Lawyer's Judge: Contrasting the
Judicial Philosophies of Earl Warren and John M. Harlan, 44 Hous. L. REv. 253, 282-83
(2007) (footnote omitted).
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of Justice Benjamin Cardozo's invocation that due process protects rights,
"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.""' Three-quarters of a century later, in its pivotal McDonald
v. City of Chicago,772 the Supreme Court attempted to fashion from an
amalgam of compatible but confusing benchmarks, a single, controlling due
process norm based solely on the deeply rooted principles standard.
McDonald summarized,
The Court used different formulations in describing the boundaries of due
process. For example, in Twining [v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)],
the Court referred to "immutable principles ofjustice which inhere in the
very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard." 211 U.S., at 102, 29 S.Ct. 14 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78
L.Ed. 674 (1934), the Court spoke of rights that are "so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."
And in Palko [v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)], the Court famously
said that due process protects those rights that are "the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty" and essential to "a fair and enlightened system
ofjustice." 302 U.S., at 325, 58 S.Ct. 149.773
The McDonald majority dedicated several pages to recounting the
history of due process analysis; 774 but, notably, to employ a clich6, they
stacked the constitutional deck by omitting a few significant due process
cards, the ones that employ the dignity paradigm. That is, nowhere in
McDonald's review of the Due Process Clauses' history did it so much as
intimate that a significant line of due process decisions employed the dignity
paradigm. Neither the term dignity nor citations to cases applying the dignity
paradigm can be found in McDonald's due process analysis.77 5 The line of
771. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (per Cardozo, J.); See also,
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). As earlier
explained, Cardozo's critical due process formulation, considered in full, supports this
writings assertion of Deontological Originalism. See supra notes 652-86 and accompanying
text.
772. McDonald, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (Second Amendment applies to the States via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
773. Id. at 760.
774. Id. at 759-66.
775. By contrast, in dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the pivotal due process concepts that
the majority chose to ignore. After noting the fundamental "principle" that the Due Process
Clauses embrace substantive as well as procedural matters, id. at 861-64 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting), Stevens accented, "The second principle woven through our cases is that
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decisions employing the dignity paradigm comprises a central part of
fundamental rights constitutional history that the McDonald Court pretended
does not exit. That the issue therein was whether the Second Amendment
sets a fundamental right only underscores the McDonald Court's clumsiness
because, as with any issue involving "partial incorporation," 776 the ultimate
question is whether, under the abstract principles of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the claimed right is essential to "ordered
liberty." Such is the same "ordered liberty" that determines wither any
enumerated constitutional right is "fundamental," thus applicable to all levels
and offices of government. 777  Therefore, as Justice Stevens correctly
highlighted consistent with this writing's Deontological Originalism, the
Judiciary always has, "recogni[zed] that the postulates of liberty have a
universal character." 7 78 In that regard, whether deliberate or inadvertent,
McDonald's failure to consider and to discredit the Court's dignity paradigm
renders suspect its claim that, based on precedent, due process is understood
through the deeply rooted principles standard.
substantive due process is fundamentally a matter of personal liberty. For it is the liberty
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that grounds our most important holdings in this field. It
is the liberty clause that enacts the Constitution's 'promise' that a measure ofdignity and self-
rule will be afforded to all persons." Id. at 864 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added;
quoting, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa, v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)).
Explicating his point, Justice Stevens rightly accented, "The clause safeguards, most basically,
'the ability independently to define one's identity,' ... [including] the right to be respected as
a human being. ... dignity and respect [are among] the central values we have found implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 879-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added;
quoting, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619, (1984)).
In further support, Stevens quoted Palko and Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe, to stress
the "moral" character implicit in due process of law's protection of human dignity. Id. at 871-
72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In that regard, Stevens alluded, inter alia, to Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (states may criminalize homosexual sodomy only to the extent that they
may criminalize heterosexual sodomy) as an instance of the Due Process Clauses protecting
personal dignity. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 811 (Stevens, J., dissenting). (See, infra notes 945-
1020 and accompanying text discussing the "homosexual rights" cases as prime examples of
the dignity paradigm.) Based on the McDonald majority's failure to account for the dignity
paradigm, Justice Stevens aptly concluded, "In this respect, too, the Court's narrative fails to
capture the continuity and flexibility in our doctrine." Id. at 871 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
776. See, supra notes 565-87 and accompanying text.
777. And, such is the same "ordered liberty" that as well discerns whether an unenumerated
right applies via the Due Process Clauses to all levels and offices of government. Id Indeed,
at some length, this writing has demonstrated that equal protection, indeed virtually all
constitutionally enumerated rights, are subsets of basic due process jurisprudence. See, supra
notes 521-98 and accompanying text.
778. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 871 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Accordingly, from the outset, the McDonald majority engaged in a
disingenuous review of due process theory by deliberately omitting from its
analysis the important dignity paradigm. As the Court's avowed project was
to discern one controlling due process framework, it is at the very least
disappointing that McDonald declined forthrightly to confront the dignity
paradigm either to explain how that approach can be harmonized with the
deeply rooted traditions standard (which, in actuality, it cannot),. or
forthrightly to declare the dignity paradigm no longer valid.
Based on what we now understand to be an incomplete review of
applicable precedent, the Court announced its unsurprising choice of
applicable standard,
With this framework in mind, we now turn directly to the question
whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is
incorporated in the concept of due process. In answering that question,
as just explained' we must decide whether the right to keep and bear arms
is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty, Duncan [v. Louisiana],
391 U.S. [145,] 149, 88 S.Ct. 1444 [(1968)], or as we have said in a
related context, whether this right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition, " Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117
S.Ct. 2302, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 779
Again, the Court's analysis is deceptive. The above-quoted McDonald
"framework" accepted Washington v. Glucksberg's "whether this right is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"' and Duncan v.
Louisiana's "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty." However, as
the McDonald Court itself earlier quoted,780 Palko v. Connecticut, from
which "fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty" originated, crucially
added that due process concerns, "those rights that are 'the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty' and essential to 'a fair and enlightened system of
justice. "'781
The Court's formalistic infirmity -- its intellectual trickery-- is clear
because with neither acknowledgement nor explanation, McDonald accepted
the half of Palko's formulation it preferred while spurning without comment
the equally important phrase, "essential to a fair and enlightened system of
justice." Along identical lines, McDonald conspicuously omitted from its
779. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767 (emphasis added).
780. See supra note 773 and accompanying text.
781. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added; quoting, Palko, 302 U.S. at 325).
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designated standard a principle it dutifully had quoted when describing the
judicial history of substantive due process, specifically, the 1908 Twining
decision's pronouncement that due process covers, "immutable principles of
justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member
of the Union may disregard."782 Yet, McDonald's text quite correctly does
not list Twining among the several decisions that, according to the McDonald
majority, the Court had fully abandoned in subsequent precedent.7 83 Thus,
as McDonald implicitly acknowledged, Twining was good law that the
McDonald Court did not affirmatively pronounce superseded.
By discarding Palko's "essential to a fair and enlightened system of
justice" and Twining's "immutable principles of justice which inhere in the
very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard,"
and by ignoring the dignity paradigm precedents altogether, McDonald
apparently attempted to expunge "due process of law's" proven links' to
deontological morality, natural law, natural rights, "unalienable Rights," and
such otherjudicial standards that render history and culture insufficient bases
in and of themselves to premise constitutional decisions.7 84 If the Court
decided both to forego over a century of precedent culminating in the
inspired due process jurisprudence of Justices Cardozo, Frankfurter and
Harlan, and, to repudiate Originalism by revoking the Founders' will that
"due process" is uniquely a matter of 'justice, " not exclusively afunction of
traditions, it should have done so more honestly.
Not surprisingly given the composition of the McDonald majority, the
avowed benefits of the deeply rooted principles standard sound in separation
of powers and judicial restraint. Deeply rooted principles purports to be
essentially objective, "and intrudes much less upon the democratic process"
than do paradigms predicated on moral standards.78" Accenting its primary,
nearly exclusive reliance on historical review, and indulging the familiar
consequentialist error, Justice Scalia argued that "deeply rooted," "is less
subjective because it depends upon a body of evidence susceptible of
reasoned analysis rather than a variety of vague ethico-political First
Principles whose combined conclusion can be found to point in any direction
782. See supra note 773 and accompanying text (discussing the Twining Court's inclusion
of "immutable principles of justice" that McDonald itself noted is part of the Court's due
process history).
783. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 764-66.
784. Perhaps that is why in concurrence, Justice Scalia hastened to aver that regarding
substantive due process analysis, "the traditions of our people are paramount." Id. at 792
(Scalia, J., concurring).
785. Id. at 804 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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the judges favor."78 6 As the Court urged a decade earlier, given its claimed
relative simplicity, the deeply rooted principles framework minimizes
judicial analysis, particularly "balancing" purported rights against purported
governmental interest, thus ostensibly optimizing separation of powers.7 87
Even accepting the dubious propositions that it is relatively easy to
apply7 88 and promotes a limited judicial role thereby respecting separation of
786. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
787. As the Court claimed roughly a decade before McDonald,
In our view, however, the development of this Court's substantive-due-process
jurisprudence, ... has been a process whereby the outlines of the "liberty" specially
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment - never fully clarified, to be sure, and
perhaps not capable of being fully clarified - have at least been carefully refined by
concrete examples involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our
legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective elements that are
necessarily present in due-process judicial review ... [and] avoids the need for
complex balancing of competing interests in every case.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997).
788. Arguably, as with most theories, application of the deeply rooted principles standard
is not as effortless as proponents claim. "Determining whether a right is deeply rooted in
tradition is not easy. For example, subtle issues arise concerning how one identifies a tradition,
the level of generality to be used in defining the relevant tradition, or the degree to which
tradition changes." Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26
U.S.F. L. REv. 625, 656 note 51 (1992) (citing, Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-
28 n. 6 (1989) ("father of child born to a woman married to another man at time of conception
has no fundamental right to visit child")). In that regard, Justice Black briskly noted, "the
scientific miracles of this age have not yet produced a gadget which the Court can use to
determine what traditions are rooted in the '(collective) conscience of our people."' Griswold,
381 U.S. at 519 (Black, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting, discussing the opinion of Justice Arthur
Goldberg that the Ninth Amendment's protection of "those liberties that are 'so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' invalidates the
Connecticut ban prohibiting married couples from acquiring contraception. Id. at 487
(Goldberg, J., with Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., concurring, quoting Snyder v. Comm. of
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934), o., Maloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
The proposition was encapsulated neatly by Adam Wolf,
[R]elying on tradition sanctions jurists' personal beliefs because the judges, acting
as historians, interpret history from the only perspective they know: their own.
Their positionality and political ideology necessarily affect their analyses of
history and tradition. For instance, thejudge as historian should, though she almost
never does, ask, "whose history?" As Professor John Hart Ely wondered: "Whose
traditions? America's only? Why not the entire world's? (Justice Frankfurter liked
to refer to the traditions of the 'English-speaking peoples.') And what is the
relevant time frame? All of history? Anteconstitutional? .. . And who is to say
that the 'tradition' must have been one endorsed by a majority?" Typically, white,
straight, wealthy, male jurists will rely on a white, straight, wealthy, male history
and historical perspective.
Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 101, 103 (2002) (quoting, John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 39 (1978) (footnotes omitted
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powers, the deeply rooted principles paradigm is fatally flawed because it
denies the very Deontological Originalism from which "due process of law"
arose and attained its meaning.7 " Standards such as, Palko's "essential to a
fair and enlightened system ofjustice" and Twining's "rights that are the very
essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and essential to a fair and enlightened
system of justice," signify, as they should, the highly abstract moral
principles that define the natural law philosophy of the Declaration, codified
into the Constitution as "due process of law." Indeed, such is the thrust of
Justice Cardozo's complete due process analysis, 79 0 brought to fruition by
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.79 1
By contrast, the standard adopted in McDonald, rights "deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition," asks only an empirical account of history,
thereby, illicitly eschewing the Supreme Court's original paradigm of moral
principles sounding in "fundamental fairness" as augmented by the true
apostles of judicial restraint, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Harlan. Thus, the
irredeemable flaw of the deeply rooted principles standard is that it defies the
very premises of "due process of law's" promise to assure governmental
actions are, if nothing else, neither arbitrary nor capricious, but rather,
fundamentally fair.792 True, contested governmental action that fails the
For instance, the McDonald majority argued that the right to firearm possession for
self-protection is "deeply rooted" in American tradition. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767-78.
Justice Stevens, by contrast, averred that,
although it may be true that Americans' interest in firearm possession and state-law
recognition of that interest are "deeply rooted" in some important senses ... it is
equally true that the States have a long and unbroken history of regulating firearms.
The idea that States may place substantial restrictions on the right to keep and bear
arms short of complete disarmament is, in fact, far more entrenched than the notion
that the Federal Constitution protects any such right.
Id. at 899 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
789. See supra Sections. 2 & 3 (the Founders and their society circa 1776-1791), and
Section 4 (the Reconstruction Congress).
790. See supra notes 652-86 and accompanying text.
791. See supra notes 687-728 (Frankfurter), 729-70 (Harlan), and accompanying text.
792. See supra notes 600-23 and accompanying text. Thus, again, we see that the deeply-
rooted traditions paradigm eschews the judge as anything except an empiricist -- an observer
and determiner -- of when some practice is entrenched enough to be "deeply rooted," a role
better suited to uncritical historians than to the class of government officials entrusted with
preserving the actuality of "due process of law" from of both the excesses ruling elites and
majoritarian abuse. Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories ofSubstantive Due Process, 85 N.C. L.
REv. 63, 92-93 (2006) (supporting the deeply-rooted traditions standard); but see, e.g., Wolf,
supra note 788, at 102 ("For six reasons I conclude that a tradition of protecting or denying a
purported fundamental right should not be a factor when assessing the alleged fundamentality
of the right.").
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deeply rooted principles framework nonetheless may be challenged as utterly
lacking a rational basis under the "rational basis" standard which, beause it
strongly presume the legality of official action, portends that the particular
governmental action will be constitutionally vindicated.793 But the relatively
remote possibility of success under "mere rationality," as often it is called,
does not diminish either the chicanery of the Supreme Court's modem
deeply-rooted traditions paradigm, nor that paradigm's infidelity to
Deontological Originalism.
In sum, no matter what the pragmatic benefits may be, any due process
framework that abdicates the definition of "fundamental fairness" to an
empirical, basically uncritical inquiry of what some portion or portions of the
American population, past or present, think is tolerable, violates the intent of
the 1787 and 1868 Framers who both incorporated natural law morality into
the Constitution and established the Judiciary to make independent
assessments of what is or is not constitutional. 794 A true originalist, therefore,
must accept that the McDonald standard is inappropriate, infirm
constitutional law.
Indeed, five years after McDonald, while invalidating state restrictions
on same-sex marriages, the Obergefell Majority rightly rejected the deeply
rooted principles approach:
If rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received
practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups
could not invoke rights once denied. ... [In interpreting the Equal
793. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 703, 712 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (no deeply rooted tradition for seriously ill
persons to have access to experimental medical treatments when all other alternative medical
interventions have been exhausted; and, Governmental bans against such access are not
necessarily irrational). Regarding the various "levels of scrutiny" courts use in due process
and equal protection litigation, see infra, notes 984-90 and accompanying text.
794. See supra Secs. 2-4 (intent of the Framers) and infra notes 804-44 and accompanying
text (role of the Judiciary). It is interesting to note in passing that not only does the deeply-
rooted traditions standard deny judges their proper role under our Constitution, it renders them
inadequate historians as well:
[U]sing tradition as an analytical tool in fundamental rights opinions perpetuates
discrimination in ways that defy an educational purpose of history. That is, blind
obedience to history subverts an important objective of history: to learn from it in
order to follow (and improve upon) what is worthy of replication and to avoid
returning to that which should not be repeated. Not distinguishing between odious
and laudatory traditions allows the reinvigoration of oppression that our nation
knows intimately.
Wolf, supra note 788, at 104.
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Protection Clause, the Court has recognized that new insights and societal
understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged. 
Similarly, reminding us why "due process of law" must include a
substantive component, 796 dissenting Justice Stevens detailed in McDonald
the principles accented in this article, worth quoting at length:
More fundamentally, a rigid historical methodology is unfaithful to the
Constitution's command. For if it were really the case that the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of liberty embraces only those rights "so rooted
in our history, tradition, and practice as to require special protection,"
Glucksberg, 521 U.S., [702] at 721, n. 17, 117 S.Ct. 2258 [(1997)], then
the guarantee would serve little function, save to ratify those rights that
state actors have already been according the most extensive protection.
That approach is unfaithful to the expansive principle Americans laid
down when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and to the level of
generality they chose when they crafted its language; it promises an
objectivity it cannot deliver and masks the value judgments that pervade
any analysis of what customs, defined in what manner, are sufficiently
"'rooted"'; it countenances the most revolting injustices in the name of
continuity, for we must never forget that not only slavery but also the
subjugation of women and other rank forms of discrimination are part of
our history; and it effaces this Court's distinctive role in saying what the
law is, leaving the development and safekeeping of liberty to majoritarian
political processes.797
Honest constitutionalists, therefore, must confront the deeply rooted
principles standard directly as did Justice Stevens who, recognizing its
claimed deference to separation of powers, devastated that standard as,
"judicial abdication in the guise ofjudicial modesty."7 98
Having shown that the deeply rooted principles standard is not
plausible, the only available option in the dignity paradigm which, indeed,
comports with due process morality.
795. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2603. The Court's reference to the Equal Protection Clause
does not affect this writing's analysis because, as earlier proved, the meaning of "equal
protection" derives from the morality of due process. See supra notes 570-82 and
accompanying text.
796. See supra notes 408-72 and accompanying text.
797. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 875-76 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
798. Id. at 876 (Stevens., J., dissenting).
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B. The Misconception that Judges Cannot Legitimately Engage in Moral
Analysis --
Before explicating the dignity paradigm, this writing confronts one last
contention proponents of the deeply rooted standard assert -- a contention
that purports nothing less than the preservation of the United States as a
republic. Consistent with its claim to vindicate separation of powers,
advocates of the deeply rooted theory argue, predictably, that installing
judges as the Nation's ultimate arbiter of what is or is not moral under the
Constitution creates an authoritarian class of virtually untouchable elites who
will superimpose their personal, selfish moral preferences for those of the
greater population. Moreover, this argument avers, the rarified and
privileged status of the Judiciary likely will encumber judges' moral grasp
because they tend to hold themselves apart from, and therefore likely will be
insensitive to the grassroots upon whom they would render moral judgments.
Chief Justice John Roberts recently expressed the contention in conclusory
terms: "a Justice's commission does not confer any special moral,
philosophical, or social insight sufficient to justify imposing those
perceptions on fellow citizens under the pretense of 'due process."'
7 9 9
Asserting, therefore, that the Obergefell Court's decision invalidating official
disparate treatment of same-sex marriages, "is an act of will, not legal
judgment,"80  Roberts undoubtedly asked the correct question about the role
ofjudges, "Just who do we think we are?"8 1
That the Chief Justice articulated the right question does not change the
fact that his answer is completely backwards. Discerning the moral meaning
of the Constitution is neither foreign to nor merely an incidental aspect of,
but that, is an essential facet of the Judiciary's responsibility to engage in
"judicial review" of the Constitution, and rightly so. Consequently, judges
who faithfully follow their commissions indeed will seek, and hopefully
attain, to appropriate partially Chief Justice Roberts' phrasing, "special
moral, philosophical, or social insight[s] sufficient to justify [not] imposing
[but enforcing] those perceptions on fellow citizens under [their duty to
enforce] 'due process."'8 02 Roberts' compound-argument that moral analysis
is not part of the Judiciary's function and that judges are not especially
competent to make moral judgments is tired, trite, and stale, not to mention
799. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
800. Id. (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
801. Id. (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
802. Id. (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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untrue. It should have been put to pasture decades ago; that it has not evinces
the need to detail herein what has been determined elsewhere, most notably,
at the founding of the United States. 8 03
1. The Judiciary Acts as the Constitution's "Final Arbiter" --
As the starting point, it is axiomatic, of course, that the Constitution and
attendant documents require interpretation; therefore, some official office or
offices must assume that role and effectively have the last word on any given
issue. The necessity of correct explication is especially acute regarding the
Due Process Clauses which, as earlier noted, is the Constitution's most
fundamental concern, indeed, that charter's value monistic principle from
which essentially all other constitutional matters arise." As highly regarded
constitutional commentator A.E. Dick Howard summarized,
Even while it commands fidelity to its great purposes and design, the
Constitution requires interpretation. This is especially true of those
provisions that have a history grounded in English law and
constitutionalism. Thus due process of law, whose history reaches back
to Magna Carta's "law of the land," has seen manifold applications in
American constitutional law.805
803. As implied above in the text, the urgency to revisit the appropriateness of judicial
review is particularly acute when, as with due process, the meaning and application of law are
matters of moral judgment. Compare, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Are Enumerated Constitutional
Rights the Only Rights We Have? The Case ofAssociational Freedom, 10 HARv. J. L. & PUB.
PoL'Y 101 (1987) (because the Constitution rests on natural rights theory, courts should play
an active role), with Walter Bems, Judicial Review and the Rights and Laws ofNature, 1982
SUP. CT. REv. 49 (because the Constitution rests on natural rights theory, courts should play a
limited role).
804. See supra notes 551-98 and accompanying text.
805. A.E. Dick Howard, The Bridge at Jamestown: The Virginia Charter of 1606 and
Constitutionalism in the Modern World, 42 U. RICH. L. REv. 9, 27 (2007) (emphasis added).
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Although perhaps it need not have so developed,80 6 although not an
inherent proposition of natural law, 8 0 7 and while other effective mechanisms
might be imagined, prodigious evidence supports the conclusion that the
Framers intended judicial management of the Constitution,8 08 a then unique
and innovative mechanism, 809 but not utterly lacking English and Colonial
precursors.s 0 Indeed, the now undeniable precept of judicial review holds
806. As one theorist explained,
[T]he proposition that the Constitution must be understood in light of the
Declaration has no necessary implications for the question of judicial review, which
is a distinct (albeit related) problem. That the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution
... viewed democracy as instrumental rather than fundamental -- might lead one to
conclude that there is nothing problematic about unelected judges' invalidating
democratically enacted legislation in the name of individual rights, ... But this is
merely a possible and not a necessary conclusion. For just as those who emphasize
the democratic character of American government can disagree about the proper
nature and scope of judicial review, so too can those who emphasize its liberalism.
Himmelfarb, supra note 136, at 186.
807. "[Tlhe natural law itself confers no authority on judges to go beyond the text, logic,
structure, or original understanding of the Constitution to enforce principles of natural justice
as they understand them. If and when judges possess such authority, they possess it, not as a
matter of natural law, but, rather, as a power conferred upon them by the Constitution."
George, supra note 41, at 2304; See also Id. at 2279.
808.
[A major source] of historical data concerning judicial review is the federal
constitutional convention and the ratification process. This source offers the most
fruitful support for the concept of judicial review. At the Convention almost every
statement of a delegate that might be implied as reflecting on the subject ofjudicial
review ofthe constitutionality offederal laws indicates an acceptance ofthat concept
in some general form. ... However, the undefined nature of the judicial power
referred to at the Convention leaves the historical support for the current concept of
judicial supremacy unclear. In the ratification process The Federalist Papers endorsed
a concept of judicial review using arguments very close to those that [Chief Justice
John] Marshall used in Marbury [v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803)], but
Anti-Federalists disputed the extent of this power.
Rotunda and Nowak, I TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 1.4(b)(ii), The Historical Antecedents of the
Marbury Opinion, Historical Antecedents (accessed at WestlawNext) (emphasis added;
footnotes omitted).
809. As two leading constitutional scholars explained,
One can conclude from the historical data that some form ofjudicial review seems to
have been accepted by a number of the drafters of the Constitution and that the
concept, at least in part, had been endorsed by some of the states prior to the date of
the Marbury decision. However, it must be remembered that this power was a truly
unique American invention and at its earliest stages was so undefined that debate over
the original understanding of the concept can be virtually endless.
Id. § 1.4(b)(i) (November 2017 Update) (accessed at WestlawNext) (discussing Corwin,
Marbury v. Madison and the Doctrine ofJudicial Review, 12 MICH. L. REv. 538, 552 (1914)).
810.
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that, in the words of Justice Stevens, "The task of giving concrete meaning
to the term 'liberty', like the task of defining other concepts such as
'commerce among the States,' 'due process of law', and 'unreasonable
searches and seizures' was a part of the work assigned to future generations
of judges."' That proposition, today almost needing no citations to
authority, was perhaps best and certainly categorically spoken by Chief
Justice John Marshall, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."8 12 As the
Court stressed 160 years after Marbury, "[A] denial of constitutionally
protected rights demands judicial protection; our oath and our office require
no less of us.""' So great, important and entrenched is judicial review,
particularly in the realm of fundamental liberty, that, as one California
jurisdiction aptly restated, "the courts have not hesitated to resort to their
inherent equitable power to fashion appropriate remedies where necessary to
guarantee to citizens their constitutionally protected rights."814
Accordingly, "Throughout history, judges have played a central role in
our collective progression toward a more perfect union."si' That quest for
perfection includes, pivotally, the unhesitant vindication of constitutional
rights in their full array. Thus, the generally accepted established shorthand
The English precedents forjudicial review and the colonial experience were the
first source of historical antecedents that gave rise to judicial review in America.
There is the widely quoted statement of Lord Chief Justice Edward Coke in Dr.
Bonham's Case: "When an Act of Parliament is against common right and reason,
the common law will control it and adjudge such Act to be void." But there is also
no solid historical basis for finding any form of judicial review in British judicial
practice.
Id., 1 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 1.4(b)(ii) (November 2017 Update) (accessed at WestlawNext)
(quoting Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638; 8 Coke Rep. 107, 116-121 (1610)).
Nor was there a strong history of such judicial review among colonial courts. While
the evidence is weak prior to the start of the Nineteenth Century, "Between 1800 and 1820,
the concept of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes received widespread
acceptance" in state courts, although arguably "[t]he growth of the concept was ... adopted
out of necessity, if not historical accuracy." Id. (citing Norris v. Clymer, 2 Pa. 277, 281
(1845)).
811. Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. OF MIAI L. REv. 277,
291 (1986).
812. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord, e.g., King v. Burwell,
135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015); N.L.R.B. v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014).
813. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (voting rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment).).
814. Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 220 Cal. App. 3d 765, 779 (Cal. CL App. 1990).
815. Wardlaw, supra note 683, at 1660.
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seems to be that, aside from the rare instance of a constitutional amendment,
the Supreme Court acts as, "final arbiter of the United States Constitution
... "816; and, as the Court is empowered to interpret any such amendments,
even the act of amending is not the last word.
Admittedly there remains an on-going debate whether, ultimately, the
American people in fact are and were originally intended to be the
Constitution's "final arbiters." For example, "[Constitutional scholar Larry
D.] Kramer has insisted that rather than crowning the judiciary supreme in
constitutional interpretation, the Constitution actually took for granted that
the people were the final arbiters of the Constitution's meaning and that they
would influence and discipline the federal branches through voting,
petitioning, and mobbing.".. Similarly, "Jefferson continued to believe that
the people acting in convention were the final arbiters of the constitution."8s
For the purposes of this article, although in a very technical sense the
power to amend the Constitution places that charter's ultimate meaning in
the hands of the people,819 it seems proper to agree with the bold assertions
of the Supreme Court (even though the justices certainly have an arguable
816. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 9 (1995); see also, e.g., Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605, 621 (1989) (quoting Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940); Wilson v.
Wichita State U., 662 Fed. App'x. 626, 629 n.3 (10th Cir. 2016); Viloria v. Lynch, 808 F.3d
764, 769 (9th Cir. 2015).
817. Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV.
1539, 1539-40 (2005) (discussing, LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)).
818. William J. Watkins, Jr., Popular Sovereignty, Judicial Supremacy, and the American
Revolution: Why the Judiciary Cannot Be the Final Arbiter of Constitutions, I DUKE J.
CONST.L. & PUB. POL.'Y 159, 254 (2006) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William
Johnson (June 12, 1823), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, at 322 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943)).
Prof. Watkins likewise concludes that,
Whereas popular sovereignty provides clear support for the doctrine of judicial
review, it provides no support for judicial supremacy. Popular sovereignty explicitly
rejected the proposition that a mere branch of government had the final word on
fundamental law. Unlike judicial review, judicial supremacy is not an outgrowth of
popular sovereignty. Instead, it is a regression to an older theory of sovereignty that
existed prior to the American Revolution. Judicial supremacy places the Supreme
Court in the position of Parliament. Having the final word in constitutional
interpretation, the Court can make or unmake any law as it sees fit. Other than a very
difficult amendment process, the people can do nothing to control it.
Id. at 257.
819. While full explication of the following proposition is postponed for a future article, the
principles of Deontological Originalism naturally limit the "People's" authority to amend the
Constitution in one material regard. Consistent with natural law, the Constitution may not be
amended in any way that seeks to thwart the moral principles of the Declaration of
Independence.
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biased interest in the matter). Because the Judiciary is tasked with
interpreting and applying the Constitution, including its amendments, absent
either an apt new amendment or proper Article l legislation circumventing
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, this writing will not challenge the
premise that the courts enjoy the right of final say on matters constitutional.
The authority to act as the final arbiter discerning the fundamentals of
"a more perfect union" requires, of course, courage and fortitude820 tempered
by humility sufficient both to respect the expertise of the co-ordinate
branches82 1 and to preclude judges from misconstruing their duty to discern
law with discretion to foist policy.822 Thus, if as indeed is the reality, judges
must apprehend morality to understand constitutional rights, then,
apprehending morality is integral to the scope and duty ofjudicial review no
matter how distasteful some find that actuality.
2. The Anti-Democratic Character ofJudicial Review Renders Judges the
Proper Governmental Actors to Issue Moral Judgments --
Proposing an interesting, perhaps devious twist on the counter-
majoritarian perspective, Alexander Hamilton, denoted by some as, "the
Federalist elitist who cared little for ordinary people whom he viewed as
hostile to his nationalist ambitions,"8 23 offered that, should the Constitution
be ratified as drafted, the Judiciary would enjoy the power of review because
such would be the will of the people. He opined:
820. "It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before
him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants."
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967); accord, Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1228
(10th Cir 2014) (Utah's prohibition against homosexual marriage is unconstitutional).
821. For instance, courts understandably are chary to intrude into matters affecting foreign
policy except when absolutely necessary. "Unlike the President and some designated
Members of Congress, neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the
day with briefings that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people. The
law must accord the Executive substantial authority to apprehend and detain those who pose
a real danger to our security." Boumedeine v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796-97 (2008).
822. "As policymakers, it is the duty of the Congress and of the executive branch to exercise
political will. Although courts should not be unquestioning, we should respect the other
branches' policymaking powers. The judicial power is a limited power. It is the duty of the
judicial branch not to exercise political will, but only to render judicial judgment under the
law." Gonzales v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1356 (llth Cir. 2000).
823. KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR. ET AL., Construing Confrontation-The Ante-Bellum
Years, 30A FED. PRAC. & PROC. EvID., § 6355 (1st ed.) (Westlaw).
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Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the
judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the
people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature,
declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared
in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather
than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the
fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.82 4
In his renowned Federalist No.78, Hamilton, then, cleverly if perhaps
circularly argued that the courts have assumed the anti-democratic mantel
because that is what the people, through the ratification process, so willed.
For those inclined to think Hamilton might have been a bit too glib, a more
complete justification is in order.
Doubtless, the judicial task to discern the moral meaning of the
Constitution is anti-democratic, but, indeed such is the very essence of
judicial review itself in that courts may invalidate legislation, regulations and
other purported acts of the public will regardless of how broadly and deeply
that public will favors the now-expunged laws.8 25  The well-known
justification is that, given the habitual willingness of "the majority" to vote
its own interests regardless whether doing so violates the tenets of natural
law as enforced by the Due Process Clauses and other enumerated rights,
counter-majoritarianism frequently is the only available bulwark to protect,
"the constitutional rights and liberties of individual citizens and minority
groups against oppressive or discriminatory government action."82 6
Thus, the familiar principle contends, the rightfulness of judicial
review, particularly when determining moral aspects of law, it is not that
legislators, executives, administrators, and the lay public inherently are less
dedicated to and intellectually capable of sound moral judgment than are
824. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 The Judicial Department at 467-68 (Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
825. As one federal appellate judge explained, "In most constitutional cases, courts face
what is often referred to as the 'counter-majoritarian difficulty.' Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch [sic] 16-23 (1962). We, unelected federal judges, interpret the
Constitution to determine whether the pre-commitment strategy of the Founders invalidates
the choices of current electoral majorities. The 'counter-majoritarian difficulty' goes directly
to our legitimacy in a constitutional system." Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450
F.3d 1082, 1114 (10th Cir. 2006) (Lucero, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also, e.g., Williams v. Att'y. Gen. of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1244 n.14 (1lth Cir. 2004)
("courts ... often serve as an antimajoritarian seawall . .. .").
826. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (quoting, U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,
192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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judges. Rather, legislators, executives, administrators and the lay public are
more likely to allow their political and personal biases to cloud moral
judgment, and less likely to correct their errors of moral judgment if doing
so jeopardizes the utilitarian and political outcomes they seek. In that regard,
the theory of judicial review conspicuously purports that the Judiciary is
more reliable on matters of constitutional meaning -- which we now know is
moral meaning -- than are legislators, administrators and the lay public. As
Edward Foley ably encapsulated the recognized rationale, "The whole point
of putting the Bill of Rights into the Constitution was so that it would be
enforced, by honest judges immune from political pressure and exercising
the relatively objective craft of legal interpretation, against majoritarian
sentiment that might conflict with those rights."827 Consequently, according
to such liberal theory, the lure of the judicial role will attract persons of high
quality and integrity.
Moreover, even assuming that as a matter of fact, individuals, including
judges, cannot or will not suppress their selfish inclinations, and thus are
incapable of sufficiently unbiased reasoning (propositions that adherents to
Deontology must reject),8 2 8 the Judiciary as a class still is better suited to set
and apply constitutional standards because, unlike most government
operatives, judges are expected to perform their work -- to render judgments
-- untainted by personal partisan preferences. 82 9 That is, under our system,
we expect the Legislature and, in great measure, the Executive to be
politically partisan. Not so the Judiciary. Therefore, even if utterly devoid
of other motives such as devotion to the rule of law or dedication to honest
public service, attaining what likely would then be their foremost selfish
preference -- to be esteemed by their peers -- requires judges to render
judgments as unsullied as possible by partisan preferences. Because their
immediate colleagues, the greater legal community, and, likely at least some
segments of the public-at-large, will not respect a judge whose opinions are
tarnished by political considerations, the occasional cheater
notwithstanding, judges have a domineering self-interested incentive that
827. Edward B. Foley, Is Lawrence Still Good Law?, 65 OMo ST. L. J. 1133, 1135-36
(2004) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 439 (1789)).
828. See generally, Part : Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-e.
829. Granted, other offices in Government are not necessarily as political as are the
Congress and the Presidency. Arguably, many administrators and military personnel do not
set policies, but rather enforce laws and standards impartially. But, wih the exception of
administrative law judges and military judges, their roles involve little if any interpretation of
law.
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other professionals often do not: to ensure that, to the extent humanly
feasible, their personal predilections do not influence their work.830
Understandably then, the likely most quoted authoritative source is The
Federalist No. 78,831 aptly entitled The Judicial Department, wherein
Alexander Hamilton directly linked an independent judiciary to the
preservation of constitutional rights:
The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one
which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority;
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium ofcourts ofjustice, whose
duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
830. As one commentator explained, "Evidence for the theory that people conform to the
normative expectations of others is strongest in the context of small groups. As Timothy Stein
reports, the social psychology of small groups is such that esteem is granted to those who
exemplify their group's normative ideal. The standard by which judges can gain the respect
of their colleagues is by exemplifying the normative ideal they all share, irrespective of
background or perspective, namely skilled and impartial legal analysis andjudicial reasoning."
Tom Dannenbaum, Nationality and the International Judge: The Nationalist Presumption
Governing the International Judiciary and Why It Must Be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
77, 184 (2012) (citing, Bruce J. Biddle, Recent Developments in Role Theory, 12 ANN. REV.
SOcIOL. 67, 79 (1986); R. Timothy Stein, High-Status Group Members as Exemplars: A
Summary of Field Research on the Relationship of Status to Congruence Conformity, 13
SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR 3, 14-15 (1982); Roland J. Pellegrin, The Achievement of High
Statuses and Leadership in the Small Group, 32 Soc. FORCES 10 (1953); Alex Kozinski, What
I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision Making, 26 Lov. L.A. L. REV.
993, 994-95 (1993)).
Thus, over and above the inherent allure ofjudgeships, the enticement of regard, likely
enhanced by the appealing pomp and circumstance, combine to make the demands of the
Judiciary attractive to the most qualified, most upright applicants. Along these lines, "John
Adams sought to attract the most talented individuals into public service by means of symbolic
public honors that would gratify their desire for fame." Michael Madow, Private Ownership
ofPublic Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 150 n. 106 (1993)
(citing Bruce Miroff, John Adams: Merit, Fame, and Political Leadership, 48 J. POL. 116, 118,
122-26 (1986)).
831. The singular importance of The Federalist No. 78 is widely recognized. E.g., Evan
Bernick, Reason's Republic, 10 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 522, 567 (2016) (discussing,
"Alexander Hamilton's seminal argument for judicial review in Federalist 78."); Christopher
L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics ofConstitutional Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV.
1203, 1208 (footnote omitted) ("Hamilton's argument is widely regarded as an important
precursor to [Chief Justice] Marshall's [in Marbury].").
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Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights
or privileges would amount to nothing.83 2
The very nature of the Judiciary under the Constitution renders it the
right and natural "last word" on the meaning and application of that charter.
Indeed, accenting the Constitution's supremacy over acts of Congress, 8 33
Hamilton argued that only the courts could independently and unbiasedly
assess the constitutionality of legislation. As the proposed text accorded
Congress no such definitive duty of restraint, self-judgment, and
unselfishness,
It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to
enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of
their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the
legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the
limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and
must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any
particular act proceeding from the legislative body.834
832. The Federalist No. 78 The Judicial Department at 438 (Hamilton) (Isaac Kranmick ed.,
1987) (emphasis added).
833.
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a
delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can
be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the
people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers,
may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
Id. at 426 (E. H. Scott ed., 1898)
834. Id. 438-39 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). Initially, Jefferson too accepted that "The laws
of the land, administered by upright Judges, would protect you from any exercise of power
unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States." I Charles Warren, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 259-60 (1924) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Archibald H. Rowan (Sept. 26, 1798). Later on, however, Jefferson was not so confident. See,
e.g., Letter of Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 20, 1807)
http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl180:
The leading principle of our Constitution is the independence of the Legislature,
executive and judiciary of each other, and none are more jealous of this than the
judiciary. But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject
to the commands of the latter, & to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several
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The foregoing underscores why Hamilton unequivocally stated that the
then-proposed Constitution's limitations on the power of government, "can
be preserved in practice in no other way than through the medium of courts
of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the constitution void .... [Otherwise] all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing."8 35 As the noted jurisprudent,
law professor, and former Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court justice
Charles Fried concluded vindicating the spirit of Hamilton's stance, "It is
encouraging that the best recent writing in moral and legal philosophy has
abandoned sophomoric cynicism about the objectivity of values. The
ultimate solution lies in the accession ofjudges who believe that law is more
than just a continuation of politics by other means."836
Judicial restraint, of course, is the familiar and serious limitation
cautions that the courts must not abuse their mandate by becoming "super-
legislatures" usurping the authority of the people, an illegitimate act
confounding separation of powers. 3 That admonition undoubtedly is
correct in the realms of policy and partisan politics -- the allocation of "guns
and butter" in their various forms -- where, sage or not, the majority will may
dominate so long as no fundamental rights are jeopardized.83' But, it is
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north
to south & east to west, and withdraw him entirely from his constitutional duties?
Intruding on his celebration of Christmas Day, 1820, Jefferson again wrote of his
distress about courts: "The judiciary of the United States is the subtle corps of sappers and
miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confederated
fabric. They are construing our constitution from a co-ordination of a general and special
government to a general and supreme one alone." Thomas Jefferson Letter to Thomas Richie
(December 25, 1820) http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-
thomas-jefferson/jefl263.php. Comparably, Jefferson believed that each branch is the rightful
judge of the constitutionality of its own affairs. E.g., Letter to Judge Spencer Roane
(September 6, 1819) http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-
jefferson/jefl257.php.
835. The Federalist No. 78 The Judicial Department (Hamilton).
836. Brown v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 669 F.2d 913,919 (4th Cir. 1981) (Russell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Charles Fried, The New York Times (Nov. 10, 1981)).
837. Justice William 0. Douglas expressed the idea classically, "We do not sit as a super-
legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482
(1965) (plurality opinion). The invocation of that term by the federal courts may be traced
back nearly a century to Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) wherein, writing
for himself and Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis ended his dissent by stating that the majority
opinion is an, "exercise of the powers of a super-Legislature-not the performance of the
constitutional function ofjudicial review." Id. at 533 (dissenting opinion).
838. Certainly, the prevailing "standard that is true to the principle that the Fourteenth
Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States their views of what
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equally axiomatic that when litigation concerns the constitutionality of
govermnental conduct, particularly the claim that the specific conduct
offends fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clauses, the courts,
based on their singular role and unique expertise, may supplant the will of
the people and their elected representatives.839 As the Supreme Court
recently encapsulated decades of constitutional practice,
constitutes wise economic or social policy." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970)
(footnote omitted) (equal protection case). Dissenting over one-hundred-fifty years ago in
Dred Scott, Justice Curtis offered the classic elucidation that such usurpation converts us from
a constitutional republic into a government without grounding principles:
Political reasons have not the requisite certainty to afford rules of juridical
interpretation. They are different in different men. They are different in the same'
men at different times. And when a strict interpretation of the Constitution, according
to the fixed rules which govern the interpretation of laws, is abandoned, and the
theoretical opinions of individuals are allowed to control its meaning, we have no
longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the
time being have power to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own
views of what it ought to mean.
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 620-21 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
839. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598. Recognizing the importance of fundamental rights as a
backstop against tyranny, Ronald Dworkin offered what Gregory Bassham denoted a "boldly
different" interpretation of the Constitution's structure, but, one that, in fact, is both direct and
obvious. Dworkin urged that, "the essence of democracy is equal citizenship, not majority
rule. And because judicial review premised on the moral reading (if rightly conducted) is an
effective means of protecting and promoting equal citizenship, such a reading is not only
consistent with democracy, but may in fact serve to advance it." Gregory Bassham, Freedom 's
Politics: A Review Essay of Ronald Dworkin's Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1258 (1997) (quoting RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW (1997); then citing, inter alia, DAVID RICHARDS, THE MORAL
CRITICISM OF LAW 50-51 (1977)).
Specifically, Dworkin argued that, "moral membership in a democracy requires that
each person be given an equal stake in the community by being treated as equally worthy of
respect and concern. The intuition underlying this condition is that a political community in
which a majority treats a minority with contempt is not only unjust but undemocratic as well."
Id at 1264 (citing FREEDOM'S LAW at 25). Accordingly, "only if independent judges (or other
political officials) are empowered to enforce strong constitutional limitations on majority will
are the conditions of moral membership likely to be effectively maintained. In the American
governmental system this responsibility rests ultimately with the justices of the Supreme
Court." Id. at 1265 (discussing, FREEDOM'S LAW at 7).
Prof. Bassham respectfully but unequivocally criticizes Dworkin's argument. Id at
1266-76. Dworkin, however, is correct. As argued in the text, because the meaning of
constitutional law is premised on deontological morality, there must be an office of designated
experts entrusted to understand abstract morality at a breadth and depth the lay public could,
but routinely does not. So understood, Dworkin rightly notes that the role of moral interpreter
falls to the Judiciary with the Supreme Court having the last say.
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The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not
await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The
Nation's courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to
vindicate their own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An
individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection when he or she
is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the legislature
refuses to act [or acts wrongfully]. The idea of the Constitution "was to
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy,
to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." This is why
"fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections.""
If, as Chief Justice Robert's Obergefell dissent presumes, the moral
meaning of due process disputes such as governmental bans against same-
sex marriages at bottom are solely policy issues, courts would have no
constitutional competence to enter that debate, much less replace the popular
will with theirs. Such, however, is not the case at all. We now understand
that the moral standards raised by the Due Process Clauses neither require
nor permit courts to assess the "wisdom and utility of legislation," policies
about which reasonable persons may disagree and, therefore, properly left to
the pleasure of the popularly elected branches."'
Of equal importance, contrary to the frequent erroneous assertion, due
process moral analysis does not, "[b]y gradually replacing the meaning of the
Due Process Clause, [allow] the judiciary [to] exercise[e] judicial review of
the Constitution itself, for conformity with the judiciary's own subjectivistic
concept of inalienable rights and liberties."84 2 Rather, as we now know, when
properly performed, moral analysis is not subjective, consequentialist and
political, but rather, objective, dispassionate and deontological.84 3
Correspondingly, as likewise we now know, the Constitution itself is
predicated on deontological morality because its foremost purpose is
enforcing the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration of
840. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2605-06 (quoting, West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
841. Eg., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) ("Under the system of government
created by our Constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and
utility of legislation.").
842. Hyman, supra note 472, at 51; see also, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 8-11, 16-18 (1990).
843. See Bayer, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Part III (Deontology) and IV
(Kantian Morality).
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Independence. 8 4 Because the Declaration's natural rights philosophy sounds
in the deontology of natural law, the only way reviewing courts properly can
assess the constitutionality of governmental action is by determining whether
the challenged law or official conduct is moral. Identically to questions of,
say, interstate commerce, executive oversight of foreign affairs, and state
"police powers," when properly done, judicial review of natural rights issues
eschews partisan politics for unbiased reasoning.
3. Judges Are Fully Capable of Rendering Moral Judgments --
Concurrent with the proper status of the Judiciary as America's
constitutional morality authority, only ingenuous commentators believe that,
"Moral theory is not something that judges are, or can be, made comfortable
with or good at, it is socially divisive, and it does not mesh with the actual
issues in cases." " Grasping the tricky legal intricacies of matters such as
commerce, "separation of powers," and "police powers," requires judges to
become experts in the Constitution's esoterica even though, prior to their
appointments, they surely lacked practical experience in, and deep
understanding of, the constitutional panoply that is now their solemn duty to
decipher."' Part of that duty, indeed arguably the most integral part, is
discerning the meaning of constitutional rights and applying that meaning to
discrete scenarios. Because those meanings and applications sound in
deontological morality, judges are entrusted to become experts in that
philosophy just as they must become experts in other comparably abstract
and cryptic concepts arising from the constitutional text. Even if discerning
the nature and practice of constitutional rights actually were more demanding
than any other judicial duty, it is neither unfeasible nor impractical, and
certainly worthy of the high and prestigious office that is the Judiciary.
True, some scholars assert that, "Most judges are not comfortable with
the largest questions of political morality, ... As [Prof. Cass] Sunstein notes,
844. See supra notes 17-203 and accompanying text.
845. Posner, supra note 37, at 1639.
846. As Adam Gershowitz noted in a slightly different context, "Setting aside polyglots like
Judge Richard Posner, few judges are experts on everything from CERCLA [Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.] to tax
law to regulatory takings. Yet, they do not simply turn away cases because they have little
background in certain doctrinal areas. If judges can learn complicated legal doctrine on the
job, they can learn how to impose search protocols." Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley
Search Warrant: Search Protocols and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L.
REv. 585, 625 (2016).
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most judges lack the time, training, or fact-finding capacity to do such
theorizing well, ... "8 Even if so, the fault is not inherent in judicial review,
but rather stems from inadequate training, something cured relatively easily.
As noted above but worth reiterating, the same might well be said of almost
every issue that judges face which arise neither from common experience nor
a particular judge's wellspring of pre-judicial practice. Judges with no prior
proficiency rule on intricate matters involving economics, such as antitrust,
securities regulation and corporate dealings. 84 8  Similarly, they review
complex scientific issues concerning medical malpractice, patents, FDA
approvals, environmental regulations and like concerns raising knotty
questions requiring the assistance of specialized experts. 84 9 Indeed, when
called upon,judges are expected to become adroit at all manner of law, public
and private, regardless of complexity, difficulty, and intricateness.
Understanding morality requires no greater intellectual capacity.
Indeed, no less an authority than Learned Hand admonished judges to a
high standard of worldly knowledge (including some knowledge of
Immanuel Kant) to undergird their appreciation of American law:
I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass
on a question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance
with Acton and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with
Homer, Dante, Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and
Rabelais, with Plato, Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which
have been specifically written on the subject. For in such matters
everything turns upon the spirit in which he approaches the questions
before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels into which he
847. Bassham, supra note 839, at 1247-48 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Earl Warren is Dead,
NEw REPUBLIC, 37 (1996) (book review); then citing John Rawls, The Idea ofan Overlapping
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987)); see also, e.g., CONNIE S. ROSATI, THE MORAL
READINGS OF CONSTITUTIONS (2016); THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN, Wil Waluchow and
Stefan Sciaraffa, eds., (forthcoming)
http://www.academia.edu/12882570/TheMoral Reading_ofConstitutions,at 18-21.
848. "The more efficient handling of disputes by judges who understand the complex
economics and legal principles that apply to commerce will free upjudicial resources for other
litigants." R. Franklin Balotti & Roland E. Brandel, Business Bench, Bus. L. Today,
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 1995, at 25, 26.
849. The "Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, Third Edition ... [published by] the
Federal Judicial Center and the National Academies' Committee on Science, Technology, and
Law ... includes an introductory essay by Justice Stephen Breyer on the need
for judges to understand science in general and to make well-informed decisions about the
integrity of scientific testimony offered in litigation." Joe S. Cecil, Science Education for
Federal Judges, JUDGES' J. 1, 8, 9 (2017).
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can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, nor
supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or
class. They must be aware that there are before them more than verbal
problems; more than final solutions cast in generalizations of universal
applicability. They must be aware of the changing social tensions in every
society which makes it an organism; which demand new schemata of
adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly confined.'
Doubtless, "we should expect that conscientious judges will differ in the
constitutional morality they believe best fits and justifies the extant law";851
and, indeed, even if there is agreement, "conscientious judges," nonetheless
prone to human frailty, will make errors regarding the content of moral
precepts and their proper application in specific litigation. But, if lack of
unanimity over theory is a criticism of the Judiciary as an institution, then the
852 C -itS
entire legitimacy of that branch of government is suspect.82 Courtsand
850. Thomas E. Baker, Mastering Modern Constitutional Law, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 927,
929 n.8 (1998) (quoting Learned Hand, Sources of Tolerance, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY,
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 81 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1974) [also found
at 79 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1930)]. Implying that Judge Hand's admonition reflects more
the hoped for than the actuality, noted scholar Philp B. Kurland remarked, "Learned Hand['s]
statement ... probably tells more about him than about his judicial colleagues[.]" Philip B.
Kurland, Judicial Biography: History, Myth, Literature, Fiction, Potpourri, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
489, 500 (1995).
I note in passing that surly Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit grumbled: "Hand's list are authors one reads, or starts to read, in one's
youth, as he did. They leave a residue and may be reread at successive stages in one's life. But
if one hasn't become familiar with such works in college (or before), one isn't going to read
them, for the first time, in middle age." Richard A. Posner, What Books on Law Should Be,
112 MICH. L. REv. 859, 863 (2014). Understandably, given the somewhat off-handed tone of
his prose, Posner did not bother to verify his empirical assumption with authority; still, lack
of citations aside, experience and logic may advise that he is correct.
For what it is worth, however, I began my study of Hume and Kant not during my
college and graduate years, but in my forties and fifties when it became clear that, if I wished
to write seriously about abstract constitutional and general legal morality, I would have to
acquire at least a working knowledge of those and other regarded philosophers. So too, those
who have recently attained judgeships might, out of a sense of responsibility, self-educate to
enhance their appreciation of domains such as morality, economics, and history. The purpose,
naturally, would not be to acquire commanding knowledge, but rather to become familiar with
basic concepts, perhaps discard popular but faulty stereotypes and presumptions, and
otherwise become better prepared for the erudite challenges attendant to a judicial tenure.
Indeed, a brief but intense course in moral philosophy could be part of any state or federal
mandatory training for judicial newbies.
851. Rosati, supra note 847, at 20-21 (footnote omitted).
852. By perhaps obvious contrast, one would expect diversity within a legislature which,
presumably, consists of elected representatives reflecting the preferences of different
411
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
judges habitually are not of one mind regarding the meanings and
applications of law8 5 3 from the grandest constitutional principles to the most
minute and specific technical regulations establishing, for instance, how
many insect parts might lawfully be found in butter or tomato paste.8 54 We
have a hierarchical judiciary, culminating in federal and state courts-of-last-
resort, to resolve such disagreements. The hope, of course, is that courts-of-
last-resort will decide matters correctly; but if we cannot be certain in all
instances, then, at least, highest courts fulfill the practical necessity of
concluding matters so that we can conduct our respective affairs with some
suitable measure of certitude. As Justice Robert H. Jackson famously sighed
about the Supreme Court, "We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final."855
In sum, the onerousness of the judicial task and the lack of unanimity
among judges on legal-philosophic matters are insufficient bases upon which
to claim that judges are not fit to be moral arbiters. 856
constituencies, resulting in some if not much diversity of opinion. Indeed, a lack of honest
division in a legislature would be very unusual, if not suspect.
853. "[.Tudges often disagree about what is and is not necessary to the resolution of a case."
U.S. v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 914 (9th Cir. 2001) (Kozinski, J.). Similarly, the Southern
District of Texas noted, "District courts across the country often disagree as to their
interpretations and applications of the law, but allowing that consideration to qualify a
question for interlocutory appeal in every instance would severely undermine the general rule
against piecemeal litigation in federal courts." Adkihari v. Daoud & Partners, 2010 WL
744237 *6 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
854. Cf., U.S. v. 1,500 Cases More or Less, Tomato Paste, 236 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1956);
338 Cartons, More or Less, of Butter v. U.S., 165 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1947).
855. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment); Dietz
v. Bouldin, 136 S.Ct. 1885, 1896 (2016) (quoting Justice Jackson).
856. One noted federal appellate judge wrote that,
Much of the judge-centered scholarship in contemporary law schools assumes that
judges have the leisure to examine subjects deeply and resolve debates wisely. ...
Pfah! ... In 1989 I issued 67 published opinions and was responsible for perhaps 30
unpublished opinions. You can work it out that I participated in approximately 300
cases, with perhaps three issues presented in the average case. Judges have a broad
understanding of the law, not a deep one. Who can study 900 issues in depth? With
luck, pluck, and awareness of intellectual limits, ajudge may succeed in holding the
rate of error as low as 5%. You may rest assured that we lack the rigorous training in
music, metaphysics, mathematics, and gymnastics that Plato thought essential to his
guardians-and that the process for selecting judges does not check whether the
candidate has the acquaintance with the conduct of the Peloponnesian Wars that
Learned Hand thought essential. The demands of the office preclude the ongoing
intellectual study and extended discourse that would help a judge fulfill the
expectations others have of judicial work.
Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 773, 778-79
(1990) (footnote omitted).
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A related common criticism in the form of a question asks, "Is your
argument that judges are smarter than legislators, administrator, executives
and the people?" The answer, of course, is, "No." It is not that judges as a
class are cleverer and more intelligent than other professional and lay classes.
Rather, as highlighted above, the unbiased discernment of law, including
moral precepts premising law, is the very meaning of judges' work.' In
addition, at the federal level and, often at the state level, we confer the
protection of life-tenure judges to minimize political and similar corrupting
influences on the impartial pursuit of legal knowledge. 88 Because it is their
unique job to be the moral arbiters of the Nation, judges have a responsibility
to learn and to apply the neutral principles of morality.
By contrast, while we hope they will act in conformity with moral
precepts, legislators and executives make and enforce policy. Policy makers
and enforces should act morally, but need not become proficient, as must
judges, because judges ultimately have the final say whether any challenged
official action is moral, that is, satisfies constitutional "fundamental
I mean no disrespect to Judge Easterbrook who surely knows whereof he speaks, but I
say "Pshaw" to his "Pfah." Given that they are required to apply the strictures of the
Constitution's enumerated and unenumerated rights (plus similar strictures of civil rights,
criminal and other statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, and official policies that implicate,
indeed enforce the morality of those rights), it behooves judges to have sufficient knowledge
of moral theory to render plausible rulings. If nothing else, this writing proves that so-called
"common sense," experience, or "good judgment" are no more sufficient in the realm of
morality than they would be in the realms of economics, science, business, family relations,
or any other abstract concepts that gird legal issues. In other contexts, judges must research
and study rather than simply intuiting what comprises commerce, reasonable searches,
probable cause, statistical significance, and other similar ideas commonly employed in judicial
decisions. Likewise, they cannot leave to purported intuition or familiarity the meaning of
constitutional morality.
857. Prof. Charles Fried well summarized the principle:
It is not because judges are smarter or better than other people that we give them
the ultimate power -- ultimate only in the sense that it is last. It is because it is their
particular job to know the law and to apply it truthfully. And only because of that
peculiarly potent and impotent role did it a long time ago seem natural to give judges
-- all judges -- the authority to hold ordinary laws unconstitutional: because the
Constitution is law and it is the province and duty of the judicial branch to say what
the law is -- with knowledge and in truth.
Charles Fried, A Meditation of the First Principles of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REv.
1227, 1233 (2004) (footnote omitted).
858. As Hamilton stressed, "That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts ofjustice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission."
See generally, The Federalist No. 78, The Judicial Department (Hamilton) at 546 (H. Dawson
ed. 1876).
413
THURGOOD MARSHALL LA WREVIEW
fairness."85 9 Correspondingly, whilejudges must attain some familiarity with
relevant policy to understand what moral precepts apply and how to apply
them, they need not become policy experts as should legislatures and
executive offices because on such matters the People, by referendum or
through their representatives, enjoy the final word. 86 0
In this regard, perhaps expressing the classic counter-majoritarian
principles, Hamilton accented that the cooler, neutral minds of judges would
be needed
to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of
particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which ... have a tendency ... to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party
in the community."8 6 '
True, Learned Hand bristled at the specter of judges as philosopher
royalty: "For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do
not." 862 But, as distasteful as it may be to some,judges indeed are and should
be philosopher sovereigns in that they rightly are the final arbiters of the
moral precepts of the Constitution. It cannot be otherwise for, as one trial
court judge superbly expressed his obligation to substitute his presumably
unbiased wisdom for attitudes often predominately motivated by politics,
"Judges must follow their oaths and do their duty, heedless of editorials,
859. "What qualifies judges as being particularly well-situated to decide difficult, abstract
questions is simply that they do, by requirement of their office, produce a thorough and
rigorous justification for every decision they make, a process which legislators and voters need
not regularly engage in themselves." Scott M. Noveck, Is Judicial Review Compatible with
Democracy?, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL.'Y & ETHICS J. 401, 422 (2008).
860. E.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 57 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting)
(Judges are not "policy-makers;" quoting, Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 348 (2d Cir. 2006)
(Parker, J., dissenting)).
861. The Federalist No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
862. Learned Hand, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) (quoted in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 526-27 (1965) (Black, J., with Stewart, J., dissenting). Similarly, one federal
judge recently warned, "We should resist the temptation to become philosopher-kings,
imposing our views under the guise of constitutional interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1192, 1240 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., concurring
that plaintiffs have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Utah marriage statute and
dissenting from the Court's ruling that Utah's ban against homosexual marriage is
unconstitutional).
414 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART I - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
letters, telegrams, picketers, threats, petitions, panelists, and talk shows. In
this country, we do not administer justice by plebiscite."863
C. The Dignity Paradigm, the Correct Application ofDeontological
Originalism --
1. The Dignity Paradigm in General --
We now come to the crucial aspect. Perhaps in response to the
infirmities of its own deeply rooted liberties standard, and consistent with its
early post-Bellum jurisprudence,86 4 the Supreme Court conceived the dignity
paradigm. Unlike the deeply rooted liberties standard, the dignity paradigm
faithfully implements Deontological Originalism by enforcing the natural
law precepts of the Declaration through a "due process of law" exemplar
effectively grounded in Kantian morality although the Court has not cited
that philosopher's works (nor, indeed, any Enlightenment thinkers or modern
scholars who espouse Enlightenment inspired principles).86 5 Specifically, the
dignity paradigm declares that: because the Due Process Clauses protect
liberty by forbidding official behavior that is arbitrary or capricious -- that is,
offends "fundamental fairness" -- courts must invalidate any laws or other
governmental actions that offend individual "dignity." Put more simply,
pursuant to a distinctly Kantian attitude, official conduct that offends human
dignity is unconstitutionally unfair. Appropriately, then, dignity is the
decisive principle defining and informing the meaning and applications of
"due process of law. "
Perusingjudicial opinions in hope of finding explications, some scholars
uncharitably but excusably aver that the Court's seemingly Kantian approach
is, in the words of Prof. Rex Glensey, "steady, although inconsistent and
haphazard, so that there is a partially developed body of American
863. Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. CRIM.97-0433, 1997 WL 694119 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Nov. 10, 1997) at *1 (per Hon. Hiller B. Zobel) (emphasis added; quoted in Hon. Abner J.
Mikva, The Judges v. The People: Judicial Independence and Democratic Ideals, 19 CARDOzO
L. REv. 1771, 1777 (1998) (and quoting as well 1 Annuls of Cong. 439 (1789)).
864. See, supra notes 480-520 and accompanying text, particularly notes 514-520
discussing Hurtado v. California
865. Glensey, supra note 402, at 86. Prof. Glensey noted, "it is the Kantian vision of dignity
that seemingly animates" the Court. Id. See also, e.g., Goodman, supra note 402, at 748-53,
757, 772-78 (discussed in, Meghan J. Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the
Backdrop ofthe Eighth Amendment, 2016 U. ILL. L.REv. 2129, 2178 (2016)).
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constitutional law that deals with some semblance of the right to dignity.""
Similarly, Prof. Neomi Rao observed, "Judges and lawyers, however, do not
usually take up such lofty contemplations about man's higher nature. ...
Courts rarely focus on the meaning of dignity. Instead, they are concerned
with what is required by human dignity -- what types of rights, freedoms, or
entitlements may flow from 'dignity' as a legal concept."867
866. Glensey, supra note 402 at 86.
867. Neomi Rao, Three Concepts ofDignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
183, 202 (2011). 1 note in passing that while many of Prof Rao's general observations are
profound, she seems to embrace a more consequentialist than deontological understanding of
the meaning and nature of human dignity. Rao initially expresses a Kantian concept of dignity:
the inherent worth of every human being arises solely from their humanness. "Such dignity
exists merely by virtue of a person's humanity and does not depend on intelligence, morality,
or social status. Intrinsic dignity is a presumption of human equality -- each person is born
with the same quantum of dignity." Id. at 187. But, she accords as well a form of dignity based
on societal conformance that enforces collective "substantive values."
Protections for dignity can often reflect community norms. In this context,
dignity is a value invoked to hold the individual and the community to shared social
values or to maintain some conception of public order. Unlike intrinsic human
dignity, positive conceptions of dignity choose a particular view of what constitutes
the good life for man, what makes human life flourish for the individual and also for
the community. Communities will have different understandings of dignity, but in
each instance the content of dignity will depend on a particular understanding of what
is valuable or good.
Id. at 222-23.
From this, Rao concludes,
By requiring evaluations and conformity to social norms, substantive dignity is
often in tension with inherent or universal dignity. The conflict arises because
socially defined forms of dignity must be acquired and maintained through
conformity with social norms that may conflict with individual desires and pursuits.
Legal enforcement of social standards of dignity will often conflict with inherent or
equal dignity and may impinge upon human agency by overriding individual free
choice in favor of the dignity chosen by the community.
Id. at 226.
This writing must respectfully disagree with Prof. Rao's assessment because, as we
now know, there cannot be bonafide conflicting community and individual dignity standards.
Moral imperatives can never conflict, rather they always are compatible, harmonized though
the formative moral principle that is the value monism from which all discrete, sub-principles
or sub-categories arise. See, supra notes 536-50 and accompanying text. Therefore, the same
moral imperatives and resolutions of moral dilemmas that command individuals identically
command groups up to and including greater society. See generally, Part I: Originalism and
Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, b. Individual persons and groups might misperceive
their actual moral duties or defiantly refuse to perform their rightly perceived moral duties;
but there cannot be rightful moral duties ofindividuals that conflict with rightful moral duties
ofa given society.
For example, as I explained in Bayer, supra note 125, under Kantian morality, while
acting charitably is praiseworthy, the prosperous have no perfect moral duty -- no affirmative
obligation (see generally, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 3-d-5-
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Accepting that dignity's "importance, meaning, and function are
commonly presupposed but rarely articulated,"868 and despite frustration with the
Judiciary's disinclination to clarify its standard,869 the discerning researcher can
c discussing perfect and imperfect duties) -- to aid even the starving, homeless poor so long as
those prosperous individuals did not deliberately cause the latter's poverty. However, the
Government of the society in which the poor and the prosperous reside has a perfect duty --
that is, an immutable moral obligation -- to use tax or other revenue to alleviate poverty at
least enough to allow the poor meaningful opportunities to fend for themselves and, thus, not
be in a slave-like status begging of sustenance. Bayer, supra note 125, at 907-13. It is true,
then, that Government has a moral duty to help indigent citizens while more prosperous
citizens, as discrete individuals, have no comparable moral obligation. But, that is because
the very structure of the society enforced by its particular government has permitted some of
its citizenry, often through no fault of that citizenry, to be so destitute that, to attain food and
shelter, they must compromise their personal dignity by begging. Accordingly, greater Society
is to blame for the population of beggars, while individual citizens themselves, at least
according to Kant, have no such blame. Because the widespread poverty is Society's fault,
Society has the duty to fix it.
Thus, it is not that Society has a special moral duty that individuals do not. Rather, it
is that Society and its constituent residents have the same moral duty to respect the dignity of
others; therefore, when one breaches that moral duty, however that breach may occur, the
breacher has the immutable duty to make amends as fully as possible.
Of course, consistent with Kantian morality, the above-discussed governmental duty
to tax or otherwise raise revenue to aid the destitute cannot be exercised in immoral ways,
meaning ways that disregard either taxpayers or the recipients of government largesse as ends
in themselves. For instance, requiring the poor to support a particular political party in order
to receive largess treats those persons merely as means for the benefitted political party's ends.
Had the Government respected its indigent citizens as ends in themselves, it would not have
corrupted its program by requiring recipients to forsake their right of political participation to
receive largesse. Thus, while wealthy individuals may have no moral duty to relieve the
suffering of the poor, the Government may have such a duty.
The question whether a duty exists stems from one body of moral principles applicable
equally to individual persons and the governments they create. Pursuant to that unified body
of moral principles, individuals may have specific duties that Government does not,
Government may have specific duties individuals do not (as we see regarding the duty to tax
to alleviate indigency), and both may have certain identical duties. However, all such
particular moral duties work in harmony; they cannot conflict. See, supra notes 536-50 and
accompanying text (discussing "value monism"). Accordingly, insofar as Prof. Rao avers that
"social standards" of dignity can conflict with individuals "inherent or equal dignity," she
misperceives the deontological aspect of human dignity.
868. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 169, 172
(2011).
869. "It is not that the right to dignity has to be shapeless by its very nature, and thus is
subject to inconsistent use, but rather, that so far there has been no coalescence (particularly
in the United States) around the rational possibilities that exist for a coherent legal theory of
human dignity." Glensey, supra note 402, at 107-08. Similarly, Prof. Rao averred that
international covenants, constitutions and judicial opinions may declare a recognition of
general human dignity, but leave "open the question of what is required by such intrinsic
dignity" except, of course, a given case may describe how and possibly why dignity is or is
not offended in the given circumstances. Rao, supra note 867, at 202-03 (discussing, inter
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uncover what actually rests not too deeply beneath the surface of the Court's
dignity paradigm: the Kantian perspective that Government violates due process
liberty interests by treating individuals and groups merely as means for some
governmental end without concurrently respecting such individuals and groups
as ends in themselves.87 0
It is true that none of the pivotal opinions discussed below specifically
acknowledge the Kantianism of the dignity paradigm. Nonetheless, Prof. Wright
astutely observed that while courts rarely quote much less cite either "Kant [or]
any other philosopher[, p]opular versions of philosophical accounts of dignity
are an element of the jurisprudential air we breathe. Inevitably, philosophical
accounts inform our constitutional case law on the meanings, sources, and roles
alia, at 202, "the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217
(Ill) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(lll), at art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948)).
870. In this regard, it is worth re-emphasizing that groups no less than individual human
beings must comport with Kant's Categorical Imperatives, otherwise individuals could evade
their moral duties simply by forming groups. Indeed, under Kant's C13, Government is
legitimate only insofar as its conduct and edicts comport with Cli (Kant's equivalent of the
"Golden Rule") and Cl 2 (persons must treat all other persons not merely as means, but as ends
in themselves). See generally, Part 1: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, Sections 2
(Deontology) and 3 (Kantian morality).
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of dignity."87 ' In sum, although not directly acknowledged, 872 Kantprovided the
framework and principles, particularly the three formulations of the Categorical
871. R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts ofConstitutional Values: The Case ofFree
Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 527, 537-38 (2006) (footnote omitted).
A Westlaw search conducted on August 07, 2018, accessing the library entitled
"Cases" and using the search term "Immanuel Kant," yielded only forty-three judicial
opinions, twenty-eight federal (one Supreme Court, eight Court of Appeals, sixteen District
Courts, two Bankruptcy Courts, and, one Tax Court) and fifteen state (six from state supreme
courts and the rest from various state appellate courts). Within the appellate decisions is a mix
of majority opinions and dissents.
According to this perhaps hasty search, the single most prominent topic judicially
reviewed is Kant's famous proposition, predicated on CI2, "that the state should never do
anything to a criminal that humiliates and degrades his dignity as a human being." State v.
Perry, 610 So.2d 746,767 (La. 1992) (citation omitted). Based on this general principle, courts
have noted that, according to Kant, "'Juridical punishment can never be administered merely
as a means of promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil
society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted
has committed a crime."' State v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 634-35 (Utah 1997) (quoting,
Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law (W. Hastie tr. 1887), in Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes 137 (5th ed. 1989)); see also, e.g., U.S. v. Blarek,
7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing Kant's theory of retributive criminal
justice); U.S. v. Cole, 622 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (same principle).
Regarding another noteworthy Kantian maxim addressing moral enforcement of
criminal justice, the California Supreme Court aptly ruled that it is not per se reversible error
in a death penalty case for prosecutors to quote Kant's plea, "The last murderer on earth has
to be punished, the last, otherwise there is no justice." People v. Schmeck, 37 Cal.4th 240,
302, 118 P.3d 451, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 397 (Cal. 2005) (citing, People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149,
1222, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487 (Cal. 2005) (no citation in the Schmeck decision for
the Kant quotation), abrogated on other grnds., People v. McKinnon, 130 Cal. Rptr.3d 590,
259 P.3d 1186, 52 Cal. 4th 610 (Cal. 2011). A little over a decade earlier, in a particularly
nasty dissent, Justice Scalia quoted that same Kantian plea for undiluted morality,
Today, obscured within the fog of confusion that is our annually improvised Eighth
Amendment, "death is different" jurisprudence, the Court strikes a further blow
against the People in its campaign against the death penalty. Not only must mercy be
allowed, but now only the merciful may be permitted to sit in judgment. Those who
agree with the author of Exodus, or with Immanuel Kant, must be banished from
American juries-not because the People have so decreed, but because such jurors do
not share the strong penological preferences of this Court.
Organ v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 751-52 (1992) (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas,
J., dissenting; footnote omitted).
On a different tack, in a civil suit, one exasperated judge mercilessly whipsawed
Plaintiffs' counsels' use of CIi (Kant's statement of the "Golden Rule") to salvage deficient
pleadings:
Plaintiffs have presented the Court with an amended complaint that, more than simply
being overrun with grammatical, typographical, and conceptual errors, has as its
gravamen an ongoing series of conclusory statements barren of any factual content.
From the complaint there emerges no coherent story, no sense of what actors
committed which acts, and no hint that any of the defendants haled into court actually
subjected plaintiffs to any legally cognizable injuries. Applying Kant's categorical
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imperative to the decision not to dismiss the claims in the complaint, as plaintiffs
urge, would result in an outcome analogous to the case of the despondent man
attempting to universalize a rule allowing suicide in the face of despair: such a
principle "would contradict itself," as the purpose of the legal system is not to allow
a plaintiff with "a largely groundless claim" to "take up the time of a number of other
people." Kant's theories for an a priori basis of morality do not aid plaintiffs' case.
Wicks v. Anderson, 2010 WL 4916712 at *11 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (emphasis in original; citing,
Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals (Thomas Kingsmill
Abbott ed., Gutenberg Project 2005) and quoting, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
558, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S.
336, 347 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Occasionally a judge will radically misstate Kant's basic concepts. For instance,
instead of explaining that, pursuant to Cl 2, persons may treat other persons as "means," but
only so long as they simultaneously treat such others as "ends in themselves," the District of
Alaska wrote, "Judge Noonan did not mention Immanuel Kant, but he echoes an important
variation on Kant's categorical imperative, that we must view all of the men and women with
whom we come in contact as ends, never as means to our ends." U.S. v. Stevens, 29 F. Supp.
2d 592, 612 (D. Alaska 1998) (emphasis added; citing, Brendan E.A. Liddell, KANT ON THE
FOUNDATION OF MORALITY-A MODERN VERSION OF THE GRUNDLEGUNG
152-57 (Indiana Univ. Press 1970)), vac., 197 F.3d 263 (9th Cir. 1999).
Not surprisingly, this search found no serious use of Kantian morality to explicate,
much less to define the meaning of "due process of law."
872. One may speculate on the reasons for the Supreme Court's lack of candor for surely
the justices are aware of their dignity paradigm's actual or at least apparent expropriation of
Kantian ethics. Part of the answer likely stems from the general but not wholly accurate
perception of the philosopher that the noted Kantian scholar Allan W. Wood condensed as,
"the stiff, inhuman, moralistic Prussian ogre everyone knows by the name Immanuel Kant."
Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS at xii (2008). Consistent with Deontology, Kant is
renown, indeed infamous for espousing moral duties that are as inflexible as they are
immutable. Given the many and varied unhappy outcomes faithful moral comportment may
produce, judicial reluctance explicitly to associate legal doctrine with Kant (or any
deontological theorist) is understandable. Courts certainly do not enjoy touting: the applicable
constitutional standard will make many people unhappy and will cause much undeserved
suffering, but it is consistent with the immutable morality of natural law.
For example, Kant famously interpreted the innate dignity of human beings to mean
that, pursuant to the Categorical Imperative, lying is per se immoral no matter what the
circumstances. E.g., Rebecca B. Cross, Ethical Deception by Prosecutor, 31 FoRD. URBAN L.
J. 215, 230 (2003) (student comment) (footnotes omitted). Ridiculing such an absolutist stance
as absurd (id. (citing sources)), some critics conclude that, "Kant would direct the Nazis to the
Jews, reasoning that one is not responsible for actions stemming from the truth, only those
stemming from deception." Id. at 230-31 (footnote omitted) (the author herself ultimately
embraced the anti-Kantian proposition that, "prosecutors should be permitted to use deceit
when the benefits will significantly outweigh any costs involved." Id. at 233).
This is not the place to explain fully why such interpretations are infirm. (Briefly,
while any lie is immoral, nothing in Kant prevents a person from refusing to answer when
asked, for example, "Where are the Jews hiding?" The duty not to lie does not necessarily
mandate a parallel duty always to answer questions.) Rather, the point is, at the risk of
understatement, despite his notoriety and acclaim, "Kant's views are controversial ... " Jeremy
Waldron, Kant's Legal Positivism, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (1996). Similarly, but with
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Imperative,8 73 that the Supreme Court, via its dignity paradigm, rightly has
adapted as the meaning of the Due Process Clauses. Thus, as Prof. Wright
astutely observed, "[N]o broad formula, including the formula of ends, can be
applied without intelligence, good faith, and sensible judgment. However,
society has been able to make important, critical use in the law of Kant's formula
of ends while minimizing the relevance of typical criticisms of Kant."874 Indeed,
as earlier quoted, Justice Benjamin Cardozo, whose opinion for the Court in
Palko v. Connecticut is instrumental in our understanding of "due process of
law,"8 75 unequivocally linked Kant to the entirety of American law: "Our
more intensity, Prof R. George Wright bluntly averred, "Kant's formula of ends remains a
radical insight and a radical agenda, and not an achievement of the late Eighteenth Century
revolutions." Wright, supra note 871, at 321. Likewise, popular critiques "current from almost
the moment that it was published" of basic Kantian morality -- critiques that, this writing avers,
are misplaced --- aver that: "The demands and status of the categorical imperative are
unreasonable, inhuman, and, worst of all, empty or circular." Charles Fried, Heaven: What
Sense Can It Make To Say that Something Is Absolutely Wrong?, 59 UCLA L. REv.
DISCOURSE, 58, 68 (2011) (recounting frequent criticisms). Relatedly, Prof Robert P. Bums
described Kant's "moralism" as "notorious." Robert P. Bums, A Jury between Fact and Norm,
82 Cm- KENT L. REv. 643, 658 (2007).
Conceivably, the Court does not wish to link unambiguously the meaning of due
process with the theories of such a provocative philosopher, one who insists that all persons
must obey moral commands no matter how catastrophic resulting outcomes may be: "Justice
[must] be done even if the world should perish," Immanuel Kant, TOWARD PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER WRITINGS ON POLITICS, PEACE, AND HISTORY 102 n. 16
(Pauline Kleingeld ed., David L. Colclasure trans., 2006). Thus, Kant has become the
Supreme Court's furtive collaborator, possibly known but never acknowledged.
Along similar lines, the dignity paradigm denotes that indeed courts claim themselves
capable of both discerning abstract moral precepts and correctly applying such precepts to
discrete factual situations, assertions that the lay public -- and perhaps as well many legal
professionals -- might consider arrogant, conceited, elitist, impudent, inappropriate, and
misguided if not actually dishonest. E.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., with
Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). In his livid Obergefell dissent, for instance, Chief Justice
Roberts asserted that the majority, "omits even a pretense of humility, openly relying on its
desire to remake society according to its own 'new insight' into the 'nature of injustice."' Id.
at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (quoting, the majority opinion
at 2598, 2605). Directly naming Kant as the Court's muse might only make the Chief Justice's
charges, although erroneous, all the more credible to both the lay and expert critics.
873. See generally, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 3-d-4, 5.
874. Wright, supra note 871, at 325 (footnotes omitted); see also, e.g., Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L. J. 1417, 1436 (2004) (Kant's concepts of various
"duties" is "useful"); but see, e.g., Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern
Israel's Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1903, 1922 (2000) (Kant's
Categorical Imperative is an "empty formula").
875. See, supra notes 652-86 and accompanying text.
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jurisprudence has held fast to Kant's categorical imperative, 'Act on a maxim
which thou canst will to be law universal." 87 6
This article's exploration of Deontology in general and Kantian morality in
particular has shown that indeed there is a formula -- applicable principles of
morality -- not utterly precise but precise enough for reasonable interpreters
including judges to apply reasonably. Therefore, the Court overly cautioned:
"The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of
the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, 'has
not been reduced to any formula "'877 Indeed, pursuant to the "judicial duty" so
aptly acknowledged in the above Obergefell quote,"' the Supreme Court
established a workable, if, as critics note, undetailed formulation. While hardly
a complete deontological theory, the Court has expounded some abstract
concepts to premise an ever-developing body of practical caselaw, enabling
subsequent courts and litigants to devise over time a coherent and correct
framework enforcing the dignity paradigm.879
876. Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 139 (1921)
(quoted in, Wardlaw, supra note 683, at 1660-61).
877. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598, 2597 (emphasis added; quoting, Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); other citations omitted).
878. As Justice Thurgood Marshall nicely summarized roughly forty years earlier, "It is the
duty of appellate courts to establish the legal standards by which the facts are to be judged."
U.S. v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526, 572 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring). The Ninth
Circuit offered a detailed explication of the Judiciary's responsibility:
Precedential opinions are meant to govern not merely the cases for which they
are written, but future cases as well. ...
The rule of decision cannot simply be announced, it must be selected after due
consideration of the relevant legal and policy considerations. Where more than one
rule could be followed - which is often the case - the court must explain why it is
selecting one and rejecting the others. Moreover, the rule must be phrased with
precision and with due regard to how it will be applied in future cases. A judge
drafting a precedential opinion must not only consider the facts of the immediate case,
but must also envision the countless permutations of facts that might arise in the
universe of future cases. ... Writing a precedential opinion, thus, involves much more
than deciding who wins and who loses in a particular case. It is a solemn judicial act
that sets the course of the law for hundreds or thousands of litigants and potential
litigants. When properly done, it is an exacting and extremely time-consuming task.
Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted).
879. As earlier mentioned but worth brief reiteration, the arguable indeterminacy of ideas
such as morality and dignity certainly does not per se render those ideas unfit for legal
applications. Indeed, the law is replete with similarly imprecise concepts that, despite their
imprecision, are essential to any fair and just legal system. Perhaps the most ubiquitous
exemplar is the law's reliance on reasonableness and unreasonableness in any number of
significant contexts both civil and criminal. As the Supreme Court recently remarked, "The
term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to define. That said, it is a common term in the legal
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2. The Proper Role of History and Tradition --
Under the dignity paradigm, the controlling concept, understandably, is
"human dignity," with American history and traditions possibly informing
but never displacing dignity as the basis for discerning the meaning of "due
process of law:"
The fundamental liberties protected by th[e Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process] Clause include most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. In addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices
that define personal identity and beliefs. ...
The identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part
of the judicial duty to interpret the Constitution. ... [To do so,] courts ...
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so
fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. That process is
guided by many of the same considerations relevant to analysis of other
constitutional provisions that set forth broad principles rather than
specific requirements. History and tradition guide and discipline this
inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. That method respects our
history and learns from it without allowing the past alone to rule the
present.8 80
As quoted above, rather than simply applying historical traditions and
practices pursuant to an essentially uncritical acceptance of their own
persistence, courts must enforce the core idea of human dignity. American
traditions in-and-of-themselves, no matter how "deeply rooted," neither
define "due process of law," nor alone legitimize under the Due Process
Clauses any governmental actions. True to its Kantian premises, principles
of "ordered liberty" may help discern the nature of human dignity under the
Constitution, but, contrary to the deeply rooted principles standard,"' such
world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning." Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (federal habeas corpus statute review); accord., Wood v. Allen, 558
U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (quoting Taylor). Addressing a different context, the Court likewise
accented, "'Reasonableness' standards are not foreign to sentencing law. ... [W]e think it fair
... to assume judicial familiarity with a 'reasonableness' standard. And that is why we believe
that appellatejudges will prove capable of... applying such a standard across the board." U.S.
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 262-63 (2005).
880. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2598 (citations omitted).
881. See, supra notes 771-98 and accompanying text.
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history or practices can never be constitutional ends in themselves.
Therefore, as the Obergefell Court aptly instructed, the proper interpretive,
"method respects our history and learns from it without allowing the past
alone to rule the present."8 8 2  Prof. Kenji Yoshino rightly accented the
liberating brilliance of the dignity standard:
In making the ingenious intentionalist argument that the Framers wished
to free us of their specific intent, [the Court] struck the chains of history
from due process jurisprudence. ... The importance of this move ... is
difficult to overstate. Prior to [the dignity paradigm], history often
operated as a significant constraint on the recognition of new due process
rights. Even opinions that recognized such rights did so after paying
obeisance at the altar of history, regardless of how impoverished that
offering might be.883
3. The Link between Dignity and Due Process ofLaw --
Having established human dignity as the paradigm, the question
becomes: has the Judiciary adequately articulated the link between dignity
and due process? To help make that determination Prof. Barroso noted,
"[T]he first role of a principle like human dignity [is] to be a source of rights
-- and, consequently, duties -- including non-enumerated rights that are
882. Id. at 2598.
883. Yoshino, supra note 581, at 780-81 (footnote omitted); see also, supra notes 771-98
and accompanying text explaining the infirmity of the deeply rooted principles standard's sole
and total reliance American history and traditions.
Prof. O'Rourke cautioned, "Such end-of-history claims may be premature, however.
[The Court's review of governmental hostility to same-sex marriages] is predicated on a
historical analysis of how power has been allocated between the federal government and the
states with respect to regulating marriage." Anthony O'Rourke, Windsor Beyond Marriage:
Due Process, Equality & Undocumented Immigration, 55 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2171, 2176
(2014) (footnote omitted). O'Rourke is correct, but I do not agree with his attempt to dampen
Prof. Yoshino's enthusiastic and vigorous interpretation of the dignity paradigm. Certainly,
even at its most ardent, no proper application of the dignity paradigm would ignore history
and experience as bases to test relevant moral interpretations. I do not take Yoshino to argue
otherwise; but, rather, he rightly observes what this writing likewise urges: that history and
tradition are no longer shackles inextricably binding constitutional analysis. As Justice
Kennedy for the Court wrote in the case holding that states may not criminalize homosexual
sodomy more stringently than it may criminalize heterosexual sodomy, "history and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process
inquiry." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US. 558, 572 (2003) ((quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). History has its place at the table,
but not at the head of the table.
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recognized as part of a mature democratic society."m8 Barroso's point
comports with Prof. Glensey's pertinent observation,
884. Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There, And Everywhere: Human Dignity in
Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 331,
356 (2012) (emphasis added). Interestingly, regarding what he identifies as its second "major
role," Barroso inadvertently underplays, I think, the magnitude of human dignity: "The other
major role played by the principle of human dignity is interpretive. Human dignity is part of
the core content of fundamental rights, such as equality, freedom, or privacy. Therefore, it
necessarily informs the interpretation of such constitutional rights, helping to define their
meaning in particular cases." Id. at 365 (emphasis added).
I stress Barroso's language because it typifies how even astute commentators too often
underestimate the most vital concept: human dignity is not "part of the core content of
fundamental rights," it is the entire content offundamental rights. As this article's sections
on Kant have shown, it is from human dignity that all persons are at once entitled to the
protections of the three categorical imperatives and required to obey those imperatives
regarding their interactions with other persons. See generally, Part 1: Originalism and
Deontology, supra note 7, at Part IV. Accordingly, dignity does not "help[| to define [rights']
meaning in particular cases." Rather, the only relevant question is whether the challenged
conduct is consistent with human dignity, and thus lawful, or whether it offends human
dignity, and therefore is unlawful.
Perhaps, I am seriously over-reading Barroso's words; but, any delineation that would
allow some aspect to supplant human dignity's status as a sine qua non -- a "necessary cause"
-- to "the core content" of any fundamental right threatens to weaken dignity's stature. We
know that the deeply rooted principles standard would oust dignity as the defining trait of
fundamental rights, indeed that standard would eliminate dignity altogether as an informative
concept in due process analysis. Therefore, I worry about a formulation that could be
interpreted to allow some idea, possibly ordered liberty, to challenge dignity's supremacy on
the theory that dignity may be "part of the [right's] core content," but not necessarily essential
to the legitimacy of the given right.
Similarly, as with Prof. Rao (see supra, note 867), 1 must disagree with Prof Barroso's
seemingly utilitarian understanding of human dignity. "Dignity as a community value,
therefore, emphasizes the role of the state and community in establishing collective goals and
restrictions on individual freedoms and rights on behalf of a certain idea of the good life."
Barroso at 374 (citing, ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 128 (1995)). Not surprisingly, Barroso
attempts to hedge his consequentialist emphasis by urging that the overarching question is how
to know when such limitations on autonomy are legitimate, especially when the State must be
neutral and allow, if not encourage, diverse conceptions of "the good life." Accordingly, to
be legitimate, constraints must be justified as fostering "(1) the protection of the rights and
dignity of others, (2) the protection of the rights and dignity of oneself, and (3) the protection
of shared social values." Id. (citing, inter alia, Deryck Beyleveld & Roger Brownsword,
HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 29-38, 63-66 (2001)). Accordingly,
one might say that Barroso joins the legion of consequentialists who long to be deontologists.
See, Bayer, Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at notes 161-79 and accompanying
text. While Prof Barroso's standards fall short of pure Kantian morality, they go far towards
preventing a consequentialist usurpation of his theory.
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The most sweeping impact that one could give to the right to dignity
would be to view it as a separate independent right, upon which
individuals could assert a private action against both the government and
other private parties, and which would require the government to provide
a minimum set of standards to ensure that each person's human dignity is
protected. ... This concept implies that respect for human dignity is not
merely a vague goal, but a normative abstraction given substance through
both general principles of law and more specific legal rules."'
What Profs. Glensey and Barroso posit is, this writing urges, exactly
what the Supreme Court has done. Indeed, Obergefell explicitly
reaffirmed8 86 what a decade earlier the Court had elevated from plurality
opinion status to positive constitutional law: 8 87 the concept of human dignity
espoused by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and, Souter in Planned
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey:
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy,
are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.'
Consistent with our exploration of Deontology and Kantian morality,
the Court's above-quote recognizes, indeed emphasizes the inseparable link
between human dignity and the pursuit of happiness, that is, the "right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life." 8 89  In that regard, within a dissent rightly
885. Glensey, supra note 402, at 111.
886. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2597.
887. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (government may not criminalize acts
of homosexual sex performed in private by consenting adults).
888. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (emphasis added) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter, JJ.), cited as controlling rationale, Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (government may not criminalize acts of homosexual sex
performed in private by consenting adults).
889. Justice Harry Blackmun illustrated this principle, "We protect the decision whether to
have a child because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self-definition, not
because of demographic considerations or the Bible's command to be fruitful and multiply. ...
And we protect the family because it contributes so powerfully to the happiness of individuals,
not because of a preference for stereotypical households." Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
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recognized as "famous," 890 Justice Harry Blackmun famously and poetically
identified the very heart of human dignity, although he did not use that
explicit term, and explained why constitutional vouchsafing of dignity is
essential. "We protect [fundamental] rights not because they contribute, in
some direct and material way, to the general public welfare, but because they
form so central a part of an individual's life. '[T/he concept of privacy
embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and not others nor
to society as a whole."'
89 1
While evincing a profound understanding of dignity, as we now know,
the Supreme Court's formulation alone is insufficient because it does not
expressly acknowledge that the pursuit ofhappiness must conform with moral
strictures.892 At most, without more, the Constitution's respect for human
dignity measured as individual self-fulfillment can only obey Kant's CL1 , the
prohibition against hypocrisy.8 93 That is, we have not yet determined whether
the Court has set any moral limits on pursuing happiness other than,
consistent with Cli, an equal protection/due process requirement that
205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., with Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting; citations
omitted), o., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
890. Gary L. Young, Jr., The Price ofPublic Endorsement: A Reply to Mr. Marcosson, 64
UMKC L. REv. 99, 113 (1995).
891. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., with Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting) (emphasis added; quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 note 5 (1986) (STEVENS, J., concurring), quoting Fried,
Correspondence, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 288-89 (1977), o., Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
892. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text
893. See generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 3-
d-4 (discussing Kant). Kant's Cli states that any moral maxim an individual employs cannot
simply benefit that person and those she chooses to likewise be benefitted. Rather, any moral
precept must be generally applicable to all similarly situated persons. Ch clearly embraces
that aspect of "due process of law" concerning "equal protection of the law." See, supra notes
570-82 and accompanying text.
For example, under Cli, which might hastily be denoted Kant's statement of the
"Golden Rule," a person cannot morally espouse her claimed right to same-sex marriage while
denouncing the same right for other similarly situated individuals. But, the fact that a person
would apply any espoused moral standard equally to all similarly situated persons including
herselfdoes not itself prove that the particular standard indeed is moral. Indeed, the particular
proposed standard could be immoral such as if a person claims that she and anyone similarly
situated who is verbally insulted may kill the offender. Even if the proposer sincerely
acknowledges that she rightfully could be killed for verbally insulting someone else, thus
meeting Cli, that standard unequivocally fails C12 by assailing the innate dignity of the
offender; that is, death is so excessive a punishment for the perceived offense-spoken
insults-that it treats the offender merely as a means to promote the offended party's excessive
lust for vengeance.
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Government cannot prevent similarly situated persons from pursuing
identical modes of happiness.
4. Does the Judiciary Properly Understand from Whence Comes Dignity? --
While as earlier noted, they have employed the terms "dignity" and
"human dignity" fairly frequently, 894 one immediate concern is whether the
courts rightly understand the source that generates such dignity? Arguably,
the Supreme Court's dignity jurisprudence mistakenly implies that human
dignity is bestowed by Government's recognition of the human condition. In
particular, US. v. Windsor89 5 struck section 3 of The Defense of Marriage
Act ("DOMA"), codified at I U.S.C. sec. 7, prohibiting the Federal level
from recognizing same-sex marriages lawfully performed in those states
then-allowing such nuptials. As part of its rationale, the Windsor Court
stated, "The State's power in defining the marital relation is of central
relevance in this case quite apart from principles of federalism. Here the
State's decision to give this class of persons the right to marry conferred
upon them a dignity and status of immense import." 896 Properly responding,
albeit in the subsequent Obergefell v. Hodges, dissenting Justice Clarence
Thomas scolded that the Court wrongly, "rejects the idea - captured in our
Declaration of Independence - that human dignity is innate and suggests
instead that it comes from the Government. This distortion of our
Constitution not only ignores the text, it inverts the relationship between the
individual and the state in our Republic." 897
894. See, supra notes 884-93 and accompanying text.
895. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 810 (2013).
896. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court wrote,
By its recognition of the validity of same-sex marriages performed in otherjurisdictions and then by authorizing same-sex unions and same-sex marriages, New
York sought to give further protection and dignity to that bond. For same-sex couples
who wished to be married, the State acted to give their lawful conduct a lawful status.
This status is a far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship
between two people, a relationship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the
community equal with all other marriages.
Id. at 769 (emphasis added).
Shortly thereafter, Windsor added, "Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the
dignity and integrity of the person." Id. at 772. These quoted portions certainly imply that
dignity is a commodity dispensed, if not created, by governmental actors.
897. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., dissenting). Thomas
pertinently continued:
Human dignity has long been understood in this country to be innate. When the
Framers proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are created
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Justice Thomas' general understanding of human dignity as protected
by the Constitution's enforcement of the Declaration correctly articulates
Deontological Originalism, particularly the unalterable quality of human
dignity as described in this article (although Thomas failed to appreciate how
discrimination against same-sex marriages violates the very principles of
human dignity). Regardless, to the extent they do so, the Windsor-Obergefell
Court's insinuation that the Government bestows dignity was a careless
expression of what I take to be the Court's true meaning, that the inherent -
the innate -- dignity of same-sex couples, and the children their raise, requires
Government at all levels to treat opposite-sex and same-sex marriages
equally. Indeed, the idea that dignity emanates from positive law certainly
seems anathema to the Windsor and Obergefell majorities' stance that
individuals' dignity is safeguarded, but not defined by, their Government. 89 8
If, however, in any degree the Court indicated otherwise, Justice Thomas'
reproach, of course, is correct and must be espoused in future Court dignity
doctrine.
5. The Prohibition against "a Bare Desire to Harm" -- The Dignity Due
Process Paradigm and Kant's CI2 --
What is required, then, is ajudicial equivalent of CI2 because that second
formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative explains how to obey Cli
within the requisites of moral comportment.8 9 The Supreme Court espouses
equal" and "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights," they referred
to a vision of mankind in which all humans are created in the image of God and
therefore of inherent worth. That vision is the foundation upon which this Nation was
built.
The corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by
the government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their
humanity) because the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in
internment camps did not lose their dignity because the government confined them.
And those denied governmental benefits certainly do not lose their dignity because
the government denies them those benefits. The government cannot bestow dignity,
and it cannot take it away.
Id. at 2639 (Thomas, J., with Scalia, J., dissenting).
898. See infra notes 971-1020 and accompanying text.
899. As earlier noted, Cli holds that a moral proposition must be universally applicable to
all like cases. One might take that to be a requirement of equal protection or, very generally,
Kant's expression of The Golden Rule. CI2 requires individuals to treat themselves and others
as ends and not merely as means. See generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology,
supra note 7, at Section .3-d-4. The relevant principles were described briefly supra at note
893 and accompanying text.
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a particularly appropriate, if still abstract, definition of unconstitutionally
harmed dignity. Specifically, due process liberty -- the moral philosophy of
fundamental fairness derived from the principle of natural rights emanating
from natural law9' -- prohibits governmental actions that evince, "a bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group. "0 While that benchmark
invites charges of ambiguity,902 a charge that surely might be brought against
most foundational legal standards, arguably no profounder encapsulation of
constitutional morality is required because, as next detailed, "a bare desire
to harm" denotes Kantian morality, particularly CI2. That is, the victim has
been treated not as an end in herself but solely as a means -- a dehumanized
object -- upon which the offending governmental office enforced its "bare
desire to harm. " As such official conduct by definition is immoral, no
rational person could consent to live in a society whose Government legally
inflicts its "bare desire to harm" upon any person under its jurisdiction
whether citizen, resident, lawful visitor, or even trespasser.9 03
900. See, supra notes 599-623 and accompanying text.
901. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 769 (citing United States Department ofAgriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534- 35 (1973)); see also, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996);
City ofCleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446-47 (1985).
902. See supra notes 864-79 and accompanying text.
903. For example, imposing imprisonment on a person who has not committed a crime
evinces Government's bare desire to harm - in this case to deprive liberty - for an immoral
reason such as trying to silence a person engaged in lawful dissidence, or using the criminal
justice system to extract retribution for unrelated perceived wrongs, or despite her innocence,
using the defendant as an example to deter criminal conduct. By contrast, levying a justly
proportionate sentence upon a defendant duly convicted of a crime comports with due process
of law by imposing ajust punishment against a proven deserving offender. Legitimate -- moral
-- process renders legitimate both the desire to inflict and the resulting "harm" that necessarily
arises from the imposition of punishment. See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, KANT: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 108 (1994); Thomas E. Hill, Jr., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN
KANT'S MORAL THEORY 180-84 (1992); generally, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have
a Theory ofPunishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509 (1987).
Likewise, contrary to much accepted theory, imposing disproportionate punishment as
a means to dissuade future criminal conduct by the perpetrator and by others, should be
considered an abuse of due process. That is because, to the extent her punishment exceeds the
severity of her crime, the criminal's punishment, as the common saying goes, does not fit her
crime. Rather, to the extent her punishment exceeds her culpability, she is being used merely
as a means to dissuade her or unknown third parties from committing crimes. "Kant highlights
the retributivist nature of punishment when he argues that the scope of punishment should be
determined by the harm done by the criminal (lex talonis) and match the inner viciousness of
the criminal." Ekow N. Yankah, Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: Arthur Ripstein's Force
and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 255, 259 (2012)
(citation omitted).
430 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART II - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Identically, because it would mean treating oneself merely as a means,
an immoral act in and of itself,904 no person rationally could consent to suffer
Government's "bare desire to harm." Even if some self-sacrificing individual
earnestly believed that accepting such abuse would engender some greater
good, martyring herself violates CI2.90 5 Thus, the Court's "bare desire to
harm" shorthand aptly captures classic instances when, even to attain
commendable goals, governmental actors unconstitutionally affront affected
persons' individual dignity.'
904. See, supra note 125, and see generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology,
supra note 7, notes 263-67 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of rightful honor).
905. Again, referring to the example of criminal penalties, a convicted felon cannot morally
condone being subjected to excessive punishment even if she is so wracked with guilt that she
is happy to endure the immoral penalty as a salve to her conscience. Doubtless, lamenting her
criminal behavior is both commendable and moral; and, the same is true for her desire to pay
her "debt to society." Nonetheless, that repentant felon acts immorally if, to assuage her
rightful feelings of guilt, she seeks, or even personally accepts as rightful, an excessive
penalty. By condoning more punishment than she morally deserves, she has impugned her
own dignity -- treated herself merely as a means to justify unjustifiably excessive criminal
sanctions.
906. As this writing will shortly accent, of utmost importance, the "bare desire to harm"
does not imply that the relevant desire to harm was the offender's sole or even predominate
desire. See, infra, notes 924-934 and accompanying text- Nor, does "bare desire to harm"
mean that the Due Process Clauses proscribe only governmental actions intentionally
calculated to cause untoward harm. Rather, the dignity paradigm, as it must, recognizes what
might be called a claim of "disparate impact," meaning unintended or unpredicted harm
(which unlike "disparate impact" under civil rights statutes, might be proven by, but does not
requires statistical- based proof that a given group is harmed by a significat proportion more
than some other group). See, infra, notes 935-44 and accompanying text.
In regard to the dignity paradigm's breadth, depth and, indeed, very existence, I note
the perhaps unsurprising actuality that even its most ardent naysayers recognize, if reluctantly
dignity's constitutional legitimacy. For instance, as might be expected, Justice Scalia
unabashedly castigated "dignity" as one of a number of empty ideas that "simply decorate a
value judgment and conceal a political choice." Casey, 505 U.S. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Yet, two cases challenging mandatory,
suspicionless bodily searches demonstrate that when it suited him, the same incredulous
Justice Scalia was quite comfortable discerning whether challenged governmental actions are
unconstitutionally "offensive to personal dignity." NTEU v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, employing his typical immodesty, Scalia declared the
resolutions of the dignity issues not merely discernable, but "obvious."
Von Raab upheld U.S. Customs Service's policy that, absent probable cause or
reasonable suspicion of illicit drug use, required agents seeking assignments involving drug
interdictions to provide urine samples. Fervently dissenting, Scalia stated, "In my view the
Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic
opposition to drug use." Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). And, again
evoking dignity as self-evident, Scalia accented in an unexpectedly Kantian manner that
governmental offenses against dignity injure and affront not only the victim, but as well, the
entire society in which the offense occurred.
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Before discussing exactly how the courts have applied this remarkable
standard, a few additional preliminary points of clarification are needed.
Those who lose because of the lack of understanding that begot the present
exercise in symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity is
thus offended, but all of us -- who suffer a coarsening of our national manners that
ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content, and who become subject to the
administration of federal officials whose respect for our privacy can hardly be greater
than the small respect they have been taught to have for their own.
Id. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Six years after Von Raab, Justice Scalia authored Veronia School Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995), upholding that school district's random thus suspicionless urinalysis
requirement to participate in interscholastic athletics. Distinguishing Von Raab, Scalia
claimed that due to their immaturity and vulnerability, children under state supervision, therein
students attending public school, are subject to greater legitimate control than are adult
governmental employees. Accenting, inter alia, the purportedly unobtrusive nature of
collecting the samples, and concerned about a purported potential epidemic of illicit drug use
among American high school students, Scalia wrote the opinion sustaining District 47J's
program although, as just noted, he had dissented from Von Raab's validation of mandatory
drug testing, "where there was no documented history of drug use by any customs officials."
Id. at 663.
I do not write this footnote to support Acton, a ruling with which I disagree for the
reasons well expressed by the dissenting justices. Id. at 666-86 (O'Connor, J., with Stevens
and Souter, JJ., dissenting). I simply underscore that when pressed, contrary to his vehement
assertions, Justice Scalia recognized that dignity is a profound, fathomable concept essential
to resolving claims of constitutional rights. Equally, because "dignity" is a moral concept,
Scalia implicitly debunked his own assertions that judges cannot and ought not attempt to
render moral judgments. See, supra notes 799-803 and accompanying text.
Of course, it may be unreasonable to expect pristine theoretical consistency from any
theorist. An unusual or very limited anamolous instance may well be insufficient to debunk
an otherwise sound general premise. But, Justice Scalia's unabashed embracing of dignity
theory in Von Raab and Acton is extraordinarily substantial, premising the very menaing of a
fundamental right, therein the Fourth Amendment, and neither easily nor properly limited to
only those cases whatever Scalia might otherwise wish to claim. Indeed, Scalia accented that
governmental offenses to individual human dignity engender constitutional harm, as well, to
the entire American Society. E.g., L. Camille H6bert, Divorcing Sexual Harassmentfrom Sex:
Lessons from the French, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 37 (2013) (Justice Scalia, "argued
that not only these employees but the entire society would suffer from this 'affront to . . .
dignity"'). As one commentator similarly remarked regarding the Von Raab dissent, "Even
Justice Scalia, a noted advocate of law-and-order policies, described a particular special needs
case as 'destructive of privacy and offensive to personal dignity.' Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680
(Scalia, J., dissenting)." Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L. J. 787, 799
note 49 (1999) (emphasis added). Indeed, using the example of Von Raab, one critic lamented,
"Justice Scalia, at one time, understood the dangers inherent in intruding upon individual
rights." George M. Dery III, The Coarsening ofOur National Manners: The Supreme Court's
Failure to Protect Privacy Interests of Schoolchildren-Vernonia School District 47j v. Acton,
29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 693, 734 (1995).
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a. Why the "Bare Desire to Harm" Standard Is Not Millian --
At first blush, courts and commentators might conflate "a bare desire to
harm" with the famous "harm principle," a consequentialist hypothesis set
forth prominently by the highly respect theorist John Stuart Mill. However,
I believe the Supreme Court correctly implies Kant more than Mill in its
dignity paradigm. In brief, Mill urged that "society may interfere with an
individual's decision to do or not do as he or she wishes ... [when such]
individuals act or decline to act in ways that cause harm to important interests
of others." 90 7 As the Eleventh Circuit recently summarized, "John Stuart
Mill's celebrated 'harm principle,' [] would allow the state to proscribe only
conduct that causes identifiable harm to another." 90 8
As a crucial threshold matter, Mill expressly eschewed any metatheory
of morality to undergird his harm principle. In Mill's words, "I forego any
advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract
right as a thing independent of utility." 909 Thus, Mill himself declined to
construct a purely conceptual meaning of morality to delimit "harm, ". a
challenge, by contrast, Kant assumed while purging consequentialist hokum
from moral theory.9 10 This is critical because, as the previous sections of this
907. Bayer, supra note 125, at 882 (discussing, Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The
Liberty of Free Riders: The Minimum Coverage Provision, Mill's "Harm Principle," and
American Social Morality, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 374, 389 (2012) (discussing, John Stuart Mill,
ON LIBERTY 139 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859)).
Specifically, Mill wrote in his classic work ON LIBERTY,
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and
control . . . . That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others.
John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859) (quoted in, Bernard
E. Harcourt, The Collapse ofthe Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 120-21
(1999)).
908. Williams v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing, John
Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1978) (1859)).
909. Note, The Limits of State Intervention: Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85
YALE L.J. 826, 846 (1976) (quoting, J.S. Mill, ON LIBERTY 12 (D. Spitz ed. 1975)).
910. Mill "did not evoke the rationalism of Kant." Vincent J. Samar, The First Amendment
and the Mind/Body Problem, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 521, 531 (2008); cf, David Shelledy,
Access to the Press: A Teleological Analysis of a Constitutional Double Standard, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 430, 464 (1982) (note) ("As a utilitarian, Mill specifically disclaimed the belief
that freedom is inherently valuable ... "). As distinguished theorist Jeremy Waldron
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writing have proved, regarding due process "fundamental fairness," the only
legitimate use of the Supreme Court's "bare desire to harm" standard is to
help us determine the moral bonafides of challenged governmental action --
that is, as the Court rightly asserts, whether the discerned harm has or has not
impugned the harmed party's innate dignity. Consequently, as Mill proffered
not a moral meta-theory, but rather, a mid-level theory, and, as "due process
of law's" enforcement of "unalienable Rights" derived from "God and
Nature's God" requires a metatheory of morality, Mill's harm principle must
be applied pursuant to the best available moral paradigm which, as we know,
is Kantian.911 In sum, to the extent it helps ease of understanding and
application, the Millian harm principle may be a useful adjunct, but only an
adjunct to proper enforcement of Kant's deontology.
In that regard, Mill evidently was no deontologist. Fully consistent with
consequentialist theory, many, perhaps most analysts understand Mill's
"harm principle" to be predicated on the utilitarian practice of enforcing,
using Profs. Purdy and Siegel's term, "contemporary social morality," chiefly
through law. 9 12 "Such reasoning is classic Consequentialism: the belief that
the proper moral answer derives from 'contemporary social morality'
summarized, "Following the lead of John Stuart Mill, the tendency is almost always to try to
ground individual rights in considerations relating to the importance of truth, progress and
social utility, and to avoid adducing justifications for rights which are themselves right-based."
Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual
Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 857 (1993) (footnote omitted).
911. See, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-3
(discussing Deontology and Kantian morality).
912. Jedediah Purdy & Neil S. Siegel, The Liberty ofFree Riders: The Minimum Coverage
Provision, Mill's "Harm Principle, " and American Social Morality, 38 AM. J. L. & MED. 374,
385, 388 (2012); see also, e.g., Jeremy J. Ofseyer, Taking Liberties with John Stuart Mill,
1999 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 395, 402 (1999) ("explain[ing] Mill's utilitarianism[:] Given a
utilitarian conception of rightness and the alleged link between autonomy and happiness, Mill
proposes the harm principle as the right way for society to act towards the individual."); Liam
Murphy, Beneficence, Law, and Liberty: The Case ofRequired Rescue, 89 GEO. L.J. 605, 626
(2001) (footnote omitted) ("The harm principle was not, for Mill, a departure from
utilitarianism, but rather a specification of what utilitarianism, properly understood, implied
about interferences with people's liberty.").
For example, Prof. Roberts recently accented that, "Yet not all actual harms are
similarly situated. ... [Plerhaps most complex-aspect of the harm principle is severity. As one
scholar put it, harm for purposes of the harm principle must involve 'a minimum quantity of
welfare."' Jessica L. Roberts, Rethinking Employment Discrimination Harms, 91 IND. L.J.
393, 421 (2016) (quoting, Nils Holtug, The Harm Principle, 5 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 357, 366 (2002)). In sum, "a harm [must be] sufficient to invoke the authority of the
harm principle ... " Id. at 422-23. While how to make such assessments was not Prof. Roberts'
project, id., the very idea of sufficiency portends the weighing of outcomes, that is,
Consequentialism.
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reflecting the purported best overall outcome measured by some quantum of
societal satisfaction." 913 Indeed, Mill himself made plain that his harm
theory is linked inextricably to consequentialist theory. To expand the earlier
quoted portion of his On Liberty, Mill left little doubt: "I forego any
advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract
right as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal
on all ethical questions."9 14
Prominent Mill expert and commentator Prof. John Lawrence Hill
credibly has posited,
The most important consequence of the harm principle is that it rejects, as
inconsistent with the principles of a free society, laws which prohibit
private or 'self-regarding' acts on grounds that the majority believes the
activity to be morally objectionable. ... [Thus, for instance, to] the extent
that the right to privacy is understood in Millian terms, it would immunize
from constitutional attack all such laws [such as proscriptions against
homosexual conduct], at least to the extent that they do not directly harm
third parties.915
Accordingly, Mill may be numbered among those consequentialists who
have attempted to expunge from consequentialist theory too-literal
Utilitarianism that would morally justify any behavior so long as it
maximizes aggregate happiness. In that regard, as noted in Part I, many,
perhaps most consequentialists try to modify strict Utilitarianism with moral
principles nobler than gratifying base human desires.9 16 Such modifications
are all well and good; indeed, they bespeak a laudable hidden hope to find a
viable theory of deontological moral theory as a bulwark against the excesses
913. See, Bayer, Part : Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-3
(discussing Deontology and Kantian morality).
914. John Stuart Mill, ON LIBERTY 14 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberty Arts Press 1956)
(1859) (quoted in, Gerald Dworkin, Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality,
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 927, 934 (1999)).
915. John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1,
3-4 (2010). Accordingly, what in the upcoming text I argue is essential Kantian, Prof. Hill
sees as evoking Mill: "Over the course of the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has
adopted an increasingly Millian gloss to its Due Process jurisprudence." Id. at 4. (While I
disagree with his evaluation of relevant precedent, I mention in passing that, having known
him for over twenty-five years, I can attest that, as both a friend and a scholar, Prof. John Hill
is "one in a Millian.")
916. See, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at notes 161-78 and
accompanying text.
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of Consequentialism itself.9 17 However, insofar as Mill's harm principle
remains a specie of Consequentialism, it cannot suffice as moral theory.
Thus, the harm the Court refers to in its "bare desire to harm" corollary
to its dignity paradigm cannot be Millian consequentialist. Indeed, if the
dignity paradigm is consequentialist, then it is no different from the deeply
rooted traditions standard because, as a matter of outcomes, applying the
deeply rooted traditions presumably will engender greater societal happiness
if, as likely, those traditions replicate the greater preferences of the relevant
society or subclass thereof. And, if perchance such is no longer the case, that
is, some germane old tradition no longer pleases the relevant sector of
American society, then applying Millian harm theory still would be
consequentialist because the courts would remain unconcerned with the
dignity of the challenger, but rather, would attempt to find the new "deeply
rooted" principle that seems to maximize that relevant sector's happiness.
Lamenting the too glib conclusion that, "The initial appeal of the harm
principle derives in part from the empirical gloss normally accorded the
concept" 9 8 , Prof. Hill offers a more robust and convincing perception of
what Mill meant by "harm," specifically, "The concept of harm, however,
cannot be reduced to a strictly physical, financial, or even a psychological
commodity." 9 19 That is, Mill's model cannot be "value neutral" because
logic and experience teach us that harm is not simply something that
adversely affects a given person. Rather, harms must, "involve the kind of
invasion of one's physical, emotional, or economic interests [that renders
them] genuine harms," 920 thus, regulable by law. To be regulable, that is, to
be legitimately proscribed by law, and thus something that law rightfully may
force the perpetrator to suffer criminal and civil penalties, a harm can only
be a, "wrongful injury or setback of interests ... [because p]ersons may be
injured or have their interests thwarted in a litany of morally permissible
ways." 92 1 Thus, as Prof Hill rightly extrapolates, the law may only regulate
917. Id.
918. Hill, supra note 915, at 15.
919. Id. at 16.
920. Id. at 44 note 213.
921. Id. (emphasis added) (citing, John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 141 (Gertrude Himmelfarb
ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859)). Hill offered useful illustrations, "Examples include when
one person injures another in the course of self-defense; when one person permissibly out-
competes a second person for a prize or a scarce commodity; when the harmed individual has
consented to, or assumed the risk of, an injury; and, when one person is justified in invading
the personal or property interests of another, as in cases of public necessity, among others."
Id. (footnote omitted).
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immoral harms.9 22 But, despite John Hill's noble project clearly linking
Millian harm theory to moral wrongs, the consequentialist error underlying
Mill's theory persists. 92 3
b. A "Bare Desire to Harm" Does Not Mean a Sole or even
Predominate Desire to Harm --
In light of the foregoing discussion of Mill, it is this writing's contention
that the cases applying the dignity paradigm must eschew a Millian
comparative or balancing approach. Rather, under the dignity paradigm, "a
bare desire to harm" means Government has disparaged the particular
victims' dignity in an illegitimate way even when some, indeed even
overwhelming, arguable societal good results. That is, the term "bare " does
not mean the sole, exclusive, or predominate "desire to harm. " Rather,
"bare" connotes a manifest, a blatant, a naked, or an apparent "desire to
harm, " or even a once hidden but ultimately revealed, thus now-bare "desire
to harm. " Such is consistent with the common meanings of bare that include,
"lacking a natural, usual, or appropriate covering" and "open to view." 924
Accordingly, that any given "bare desire to harm" accompanies one or
more lawful -- moral -- causes does not necessarily salvage the challenged
governmental conduct. Once again, the dominant concept is that
understanding the dignity paradigm to balance comparative measures of
happiness or outcomes offends the deontological premises of the United
States', meaning, the Declaration of Independence's principle of
"unalienable Rights" that the Founders and the Reconstruction Congress
preserved in the Constitution. As we know, morality is not relative; if an act
is immoral, it remains immoral even if promoting a great good or even if
inspired by arguably proper motives.9 25 Therefore, the inquiry under "due
922. Id. at 16-17; see also, e.g., John Stanton-Ife, What Is the Harm Principle for?, 10 CRIM.
L. & PtL. 329, 332 (2016) (most modem Millians reject pure Utilitarianism for some form of
outcome measurements based on moral principles).
923. Regarding the meaning of morality, Hill recognizes that, while it may dismay "purer
Millians," "Contemporary Millians have frequently reverted to a utilitarian balancing formula.
They permit intervention when the gravity and the probability of potential harm outweigh the
infringement on the liberty interests of the individual." Hill, supra note 915, at 42 (footnote
omitted).
924. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/bare
(accessed, August 20, 2018); see also, English Oxford Living Dictionaries,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bare (accessed, August 20, 2018) ("not clothed or
covered," "without the appropriate, usual, or natural covering").
925. See, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, b.
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process of law's" doctrine of "fundamental fairness" 926 always is whether the
challenged governmental action is moral by treating adversely affected
parties not merely as means, but as ends in themselves. Accordingly, if it
enacts an unjust law, promulages an immoral regulation or ruling, issues an
unethical judicial opinion, conducts a corrupt investigation, or otherwise acts
immorally by regarding adversely affected persons merely as means,
Government violates "due process of law" no matter how much societal
benefit that immoral action engenders, and no matter how pure the motives
underlying that immoral behavior may be. 92 7
The logic of precedent explains why the shorthand "bare desire to harm
a politically unpopular group" does not mean that the "desire to harm"
necessarily was Government's sole, overarching or dominant motivation.
For example, U.S. Dept. ofAgriculture v. Moreno,928 apparently the Court's
first express use of the term "bare desire to harm,"92 9 struck under the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act
of 1964 that reduced eligibility solely to "households" where all residents are
926. See, supra notes 599-623 and accompanying text
927. See, supra notes 599-770 and accompanying text. Along similar lines, as was
emphasized during the discussion of Deontology, acting morally does not guarantee that moral
persons will escape harm even when that moral person is Government itself. Moral
comportment does not assure that innocent persons will not suffer. Indeed, the heartrending
reality is that moral comportment may cause more underserved harm than would immoral
behavior. See, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Section 2-f (why
we must be moral). Nevertheless, if Government acts in ways that satisfy Kantian ethics, those
acts comport with due process of law even if innocent persons suffer harm. The rationale is
not that by acting morally Government did everything it could to avoid harming innocents.
Rather, by acting morally, Government did all it constitutionally was required to do.
For example, as noted in this writing's Part I, if lawful authority criminally convicts
someone-say, Smith-through means that fully comport with due process of law, Smith has
no moral claim against the Government even if Smith is innocent and subsequent events reveal
Smith's innocence. Id. Doubtless, Smith was harmed, likely severely and certainly
undeservedly so, by the Government's erroneous criminal prosecution, conviction and
imposition of punishment. But, by scrupulously following the strictures of due process, the
Government fulfilled its duty to act morally even though the outcome caused Smith unearned
detriment That Smith suffered unmerited harm at the Government's hands does not per se
render that governmental conduct immoral and, thus, does not engender a governmental duty
to rectify that harm as fully as possible. Rather, the Government only has a duty to rectify
injuries that it caused through immoral conduct. Such is consistent with the correct and
constant admonition of the courts that "[A person] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect
one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S.
604, 619 (1953); United States v. Roy, 855 F.3d 1133, 1135 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. den., 138
S. Ct. 1279 (2018); Faria v. Harleysville Worcester Ins. Co., 852 F.3d 87, 97 (1st Cir. 2017).
928. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
929. Id. at 534
438 [Vol. 43:1
2017] PART H - DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
familiarly related. Congress' enacted the 1971 amendments principally to
prohibit "hippie communes" from receiving food stamps. Although the mere
existence of such communes broke no federal laws, members of Congress
disapproved of the supposedly unproductive, sexually permissive, grubby,
drug permeated idleness of the so-called "hippy lifestyle."
The Moreno Court declared Congress' 1971 Food Stamp amendments
unconstitutional because they were enacted to, and indeed caused undeserved
harm to hippy-individuals who had done nothing immoral, much less
unlawful, to deserve such treatment.930 Moreno easily fits the Kantian
analysis proposed in this writing because as they were undeserving of the
harmful treatment imposed against them, Congress treated hippies and their
communes not as ends in themselves but merely as means to satisfy
Congress' vindictive and otherwise immoral animus.
As matter of constitutional law, the Moreno Court concluded that,
"[T]he classification here in issue ... is wholly without any rational basis." 931
Importantly, orthodox constitutional "rational basis" review advises that a
challenged governmental action is constitutional so long as there is some --
any -- rational basis to support that action regardless whether such rational
basis actually motivated the challenged action.932 Under that standard,
Moreno erroneously averred that the invalidated 1971 amendments to the
Food Stamp Act were unsupported by "any rational basis." Certainly, by
limiting the type of households that can obtain food stamps, the Federal
Government would have saved money which surely is a legitimate
governmental interest.93 3 Nonetheless, denying food stamps to households
that shelter one or more non-familial individuals was unconstitutional
because Congress' effectuated intent -- its bare desire to disadvantage hippies
930. Bayer, supra note 17, at 400 (footnotes omitted). See also Bayer, supra note 383, at
34-35.
931. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534-35.
932. E.g., Ryan v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 2017 WL 2829521 at *5 (6th Cir. 2017);
Puckett v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government, 833 F.3d 590, 608 (6th Cir. 2016);
Zia Shadows, L.L.C. v. City of La Cruses, 829 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir. 2016); see generally,
Bayer, supra note 383, at 10; see also, infra notes 984-86 and accompanying text (discussing
the "levels of scrutiny" usually associated with due process and equal protection analysis).
933. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., 566 U.S. 673, 684 (2012). Furthermore,
Congress could have asserted that limiting food stamp eligibility only to households consisting
of families helps to maintain healthy and intact families. The prospect of family nutrition via
food stamps, for instance, might dissuade otherwise frustrated parents from abandoning their
children if doing so meant that the children were cared for by non-family members which
might, then, invalidate that household's food stamp eligibility,. Such a goal is rational even
if, by so doing, impoverished persons in non-family households receive no government
nutrition assistance.
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-- was infirm. Such treatment, Moreno rightly concluded, is fundamentally
unfair, thus, unconstitutional even if, secondarily, it furthered lawful goals
such as reducing governmental expenses and sustaining intact families in the
face of poverty.934
In sum, "a bare desire to harm" need not be Government's sole
motivating force, nor even its predominate or substantial motivation; rather,
the "desire to harm" renders the challenged governmental action
934. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
662-63 (1969) and citing Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982)). To offer one brief
additional example, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) overturned
Cleburne, Texas' zoning ordinance requiring group homes for mentally challenged persons to
obtain unique permits not required of other proposed group homes. Specifically, Cleburne
held that, "the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home
would pose any threats to the city's legitimate interests . . . sufficient to justify the singular
requisite for a special use permit for this facility when other case and multiple-dwelling
facilities are freely permitted." Id. at 448.
Although not expressly quoting the "bare desire to harm an unpopular group" standard,
the Court essentially applied that benchmark. Concluding that the City treated such group
homes differently than other group homes due to unfounded stereotypes arising from the
political unpopularity of mentally challenged persons, Cleburne's special zoning standards
were unconstitutionally irrational because, "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated
by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for
treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, multiple
dwellings and the like." Id. Therefore, according to the Court, "the record does not reveal
any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the
city's legitimate interests, ... " Id.
While not discussed in the Cleburne opinion, certainly group homes for mentally
disabled individuals could reduce the property value of neighboring homes and businesses,
and otherwise make such neighborhoods less attractive for commercial and residential
development. Preserving and enhancing property values are rational bases for governmental
regulation, particularly regarding property. "[T]he desire to 'enhance property values' may
'easily serve as the rational basis for a municipal zoning ordinance."' Sumner v. Board of
Adjustments of City of Spring Valley Village, TX, 2013 WL 1336604 at *6 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(quoting Yur-Mar, L.L. C. v. Jefferson Parish Council, 451 Fed. App'x 397, 401 (5th
Cir.201 1)). Accordingly, despite the Supreme Court's blunt assertion, the discriminatory
ordinance was supported by a classic, legitimate rational basis, economic incentives. Thus,
the ordinance's infirmity was: despite plausible financial justifications, Cleburne indulged
baseless, offensive, bigoted stereotypes depicting mentally disabled persons as unworthy
neighbors when in fact they did not comprise any "special threat to the city's legitimate
interests." In other words, Cleburne evinced "a bare desire to harm" the "politically unpopular
group" of mentally disabled persons; thus, financial justifications notwithstanding, Cleburne
treated that class merely as a means to foster untoward popular prejudices by excluding them
from mainstream society, utterly disregarding mentally disabled persons as ends in
themselves.
Therefore, it did not matter whether Cleburne's bigotry was the sole, primary or a
secondary motivation. By treating mentally disabled persons so dismissively, the City
unconstitutionally disregarded their innate dignity.
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unconstitutional if it treats adversely affected persons merely as means and
not as ends in themselves.
c. The Dignity Paradigm's "Bare Desire to Harm" Standard
Proscribes Both Unintentional and Inadvertent Failures by
Government to Treat Individuals and Groups as Ends in Themselves --
Addressing another corollary of great importance, although its text
arguably implies affirmative intent, the dignity paradigm's "bare desire to
harm" standard may be understood to cover both unintentional and
inadvertent failures by Government to treat individuals and groups as ends
in themselves. After all, the moral question always is whether challenged
conduct is or is not moral, not whether the alleged offender intended to act
immorally, although certainly that latter inquiry may be very informative. 9 35
To offer an example, O'Brien v. Skinner invalidated under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, that portion of New York State's
absentee ballot statute that disparately impacted classes of incarcerated
persons. Specifically, the O'Brien Court noted that, under New York's
revised law, an incarcerated New York resident who is eligible to vote but is
incarcerated in his home country cannot obtain an absentee ballot. By
contrast,
If a New York resident eligible to vote is confined in a county jail in a
county in which he does not reside, paradoxically, he may secure an
absentee ballot and vote and he may also register by mail, presumably
because he is 'unavoidably absent from the county of his residence.' N.Y.
Election Laws 1 7(1)(b) (1964).
Thus, under the New York statutes, two citizens awaiting trial - or even
awaiting a decision whether they are to be charged - sitting side by side
in the same cell, may receive different treatment as to voting rights. As
we have noted, if the citizen is confined in the county of his legal
residence he cannot vote by absentee ballot as can his cellmate whose
residence is in the adjoining county. Although neither is under any legal
935. See, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at Sections 2-f and 3-d
(generally explaining that the duty of moral comportment cannot be breached due to
inadvertence).
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bar to voting, one of them can vote by absentee ballot and the other
cannot.93 6
O'Brien rightly invalidated the relevant portion of New York's election
code because there is no sensible reason why an otherwise qualified voter
incarcerated in her home county is unfit to vote by absentee ballot, while a
different eligible voter, incarcerated outside of her home county, is deemed
qualified to obtain an absentee ballot. The happenstance of being or not being
incarcerated in one's county of residence is completely unrelated to any
legitimate concern regarding the integrity of elections and the legitimate
qualification of voters (at least, this writing cannot conceive a valid
reason).93 7 Thus, the Court understandably concluded that, "New York's
election statutes, as construed by its highest court, discriminate between
categories of qualified voters in a way that, as applied to pretrial detainees
and misdemeanants, is wholly arbitrary."938
For the purposes of this writing, the important point from O'Brien is that
New York violated the challenger's fundamental rights even though, as one
astute commentator noted, "there was manifestly no discriminatory purpose
at work." 939 Despite an arguable lack of clear "discriminatory purpose" to
explain the logic of its prohibition, by its clear design, the infirm election
legislation evokes a bare desire to harm, in that case, harm to otherwise
eligible voters who sought absentee ballots while incarcerated in their home
counties because that is the very class directly and adversely affected by the
challenged election law.
936. 414 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1974) (footnote omitted).
937. As an obvious example, Smith jailed in a county neighboring her home county could
obtain an absentee ballot. But, if she suddenly were moved before the election to a prison in
her home county, possibly only a mile away, she would be unable to cast her absentee ballot.
There is no sound basis why being relocated to the second jail suddenly rendered Smith unfit
to vote yet New York law had deemed her fit when, perhaps only seconds before, she was
incarcerated in the nearby jail that happened to be outside her home county.
If incarcertation itself rendered voters disqualified, New York would not have
constructed its idiosyncratic system, therefore, the challenged law could not be justified under
the argument a jailed person does not deserve to vote.
938. O'Brien, 414 U.S. at 530.
939. Nelson Lund, From Baker v. Carr to Bush v. Gore, and Back, 62 CASE WESTERN
RESERVE L. REv. 947, 958 note 62 (2012). Surely, the New York State Legislature did not
purposefully draft the absentee ballot law specifically to harm otherwise eligible incarcerated
voters, but only if incarcerated in their home counties. There is no coherent reason historical
or logical why lawmakers would single out among all others that particular, unusual class to
be deprived absentee voting rights. See, supra notes 936-38 and accompanying text.
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Indeed and equally, courts regularly have, "found violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment in voting-related cases by declaring certain
classifications 'invidious' without confronting the intentional discrimination
question."940 In such cases, under Kantian analysis, government failed to
respect the dignity of the harmed individuals -- abridged without sufficient
cause their fundamental right to vote -- thus treated them merely as means to
advance some obscure electoral purpose, although government did not
expressly intend to cause the harm the unconstitutional laws engendered. By
negligently failing to respect the unduly harmed voters as ends in themselves,
Government acted immorally albeit unintentionally, but nonetheless in
violation of the Constitution.941 In sum, while often the product of actual
animus, the dignity paradigm 's stricture against official acts evincing a "bare
intent to harm a politically unpopular group," applies equally to
governmental behavior that is inadvertently immoral.942
940. Roseann R. Romano, Devising a Standard for Section 3: Post-Shelby County Voting
Rights Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REv. 387, 397 (2014) (note) (discussing applicable precedents
in id. at 397-99).
941. To underscore this point with more examples, fighting crime and punishing criminals
certainly are legitimate governmental goals. But, as numerous Bill of Rights provisions
instruct, the government may not do so in an unreasonable-arbitrary or capricious-manner.
Therefore, even if the given criminal misdemeanor trial otherwise was due process letter
perfect, because the lay defendant almost certainly cannot present a suitable defense absent
the assistance of a lawyer, refusing to appoint competent legal counsel for the indigent
defendant violates the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel provision. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963). Regardless whether all other due process requisites are fully followed,
by denying the essential assistance of counsel and consequently jeopardizing a fair trial, the
prosecution uses the defendant merely as a means; this likely enhances the probability of a
conviction.
Of course, it is immaterial whether, in fact, unlawful deprivations of "right to counsel"
actually were motivated by a desire to harm criminal defendants, certainly a politically
unpopular group. Even if the relevant record proves beyond cavil that the government denied
defense counsel not out of hostility or animus, but for seemingly legitimate reasons such as
saving money in light of severe budget constraints, the deprivation would be no less
unconstitutional. Regardless of motive, the government treated the adversely affected criminal
defendants merely as means, disregarding them as ends in themselves worthy of fundamental
rights protections. Similarly, one court noted, "the defendants' claim that it would be
reasonably [sic] expensive to alleviate unconstitutional overcrowding in the Milwaukee
county jail is not compelling. In my view, the defendants' reliance on 'cost' as a defense is
not sufficient to relieve them of their duty to hold pretrial detainees in a facility meeting
minimal constitutional requirements." Jordan v. Wolke, 460 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (E.D. Wisc.
1978) (citations omitted), rev. on other grnds., 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980).
942. Accordingly, a thoughtful Kantian approach seriously questions the Supreme Court's
general conclusion reiterated recently that, "'liability for negligently inflicted harm is
categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process."' Kingsley v. Henrickson,
135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849
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Pursuant to the foregoing examples, it is not hyperbolic to conclude that
the dignity standard is applicable to any controversy involving one or more
constitutional rights. As Justice Scalia rightly recognized, "[T]he impairment
of individual liberties cannot be the means of making a point; [] symbolism,
even symbolism for [a] worthy a cause ... cannot validate an [impairment of
individual liberties such as] otherwise unreasonable search."9 43 That is, the
rubric that Government may not evince "a bare desire to harm" a person or
group, particularly a "desire to harm" a politically unpopular group due to its
unpopularity, describes every judicial opinion addressing both due process
(1998) (emphasis added) and further quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)
"Historically, this guarantee of due process has been applied to deliberate decisions of
government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property")). Doubtless, Kingsley
rightly avers, "if an officer's Taser goes off by accident or if an officer unintentionally trips
and falls on a detainee, causing him harm, the pretrial detainee cannot prevail on an excessive
force claim." Id. But, such instances are akin to "acts of God" beyond the reasonable control
of the persons involved. As the Fourth Circuit noted almost nine decades ago, "It is quite true
that one is not liable for an injury caused by an act of God, ..." American Coal Co. of Allegany
County v. De Wese, 30 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1929); see also, e.g., West v. Drury Co., 412
Fed. Appx. 663, 670 (5th Cir. 2011). Because under "act of God" scenarios, the relevant actors
have been robbed of their capacity to act consciously, that is deliberately, they cannot have
acted immorally.
Logically, however, "if the negligence of the defendant concurred with such act in
producing the injury, or in any manner contributed thereto, then liability exists." De Wese, 30
F.2d at 352. As the earlier discussed O'Brien decision shows, the Fourth Circuit in De Wese
correctly ruled that deliberate acts rendering unintended negative impacts may be immoral,
and, indeed, therefore unlawful. See supra notes 935-39 and accompanying text; see also,
e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employment tests or standards that
disproportionately disadvantage members of classes protected by The Fair Employment Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., violate that statute unless justified by a "business necessity," even
if the relevant defendant employer did not intent its test or standard to cause such "disparate
impact").
943. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 687 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). The reader will recall that in his Von Raab dissent, Justice Scalia unequivocally
and enthusiastically employed human dignity theory as a pivotal factor in Fourth Amendment
analysis. See, supra, note 906.
For instance, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (alterations and ellipsis omitted),
ruled that Arizona's statute banning "Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals" ("DACA"), 8
C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3), recipients from obtaining drivers licenses lacks any legitimate rational
bases. Rather,
Defendants' policy appears intended to express animus toward DACA recipients
themselves, in part because of the federal government's policy toward them. Such
animus, however, is not a legitimate state interest. "If the constitutional conception
of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that
a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest."
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"fundamental fairness" in terms of Kantian ethics and due process' progeny
of specific natural rights derived from natural law. 9 "
d. The Dignity Due Process Paradigm and "Homosexual Rights" --
An especially notable, some might well say extraordinary, application
of the dignity paradigm, particularly that aspect concerning the "bare desire
to harm" principle, arises from the Supreme Court's "homosexual rights"
decisions of the late-Twentieth Century and into the burgeoning Twenty-First
Century. The first instance, Romer v. Evans, invalidated a referendum known
as "Amendment 2," amending the Colorado Constitution to require that any
future legal protection of homosexual individuals as a class must be enacted
exclusively through state constitutional amendment, and, repealing all
statutes, ordinances and state precedents specifically prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships."94 5 Speaking through Justice Kennedy,
the Romer Court accented Amendment 2's far-reaching destructive impact:
"A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial
of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 9 46 Romer implicitly
pronounced that Government must have not simply legitimate, but rather
significant justification to impose such enormous limits on any class' access
to law and legal relief. Underscoring the mammoth depth and breadth of
Amendment 2's impediments onto LGBTQ classes (and the individuals who
comprise those classes), 947 Justice Kennedy wrote, the "Amendment ... is at
944. Therefore, this writing must disagree with Prof Barroso's conclusion that, "the
Justices have never considered human dignity to be a stand-alone or autonomous fundamental
right, but rather a value underlying express and unenumerated rights." Barroso, supra note
884, at 347. Technically, he is correct that the Court may not have labeled dignity as a right
in itself. Indeed, we will see that, perhaps understandably but somewhat frustratingly, the
Court is coy about the definition of"dignity." Still, analysis of those instances where the court
expressly has referenced dignity demonstrate that concept as the source and meaning of
constitutional rights.
945. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
946. Id. at 633.
947. For the sake of convenience and clarity, this writing will employ the now-common
acronym LGBTQ. Enhanced understanding of the biology, psychology and sociology of
"sexual preference" or "sexual orientation," particularly regarding the nature of discriminatory
attitudes, has led to the truncation LGBTQ, standing for "lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender,
and queer ... " Velasquez-Banegas v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 2017). Some have
instead attributed to the letter "Q" the term "Questioning." E.g., Students and Parents for
Privacy v. United States Department of Education, 2016 WL 3269001 at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
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once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then
denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a
class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in ourjurisprudence."948
It is a fair interpretation, I think, that, according to Romer, Colorado
assailed LGBTQ individuals' human dignity949 by imposing only on them
oppressive and extraordinary limits on their capacity to obtain civil rights
protections under law, thus shattering, in one commentator's words, their
"equal status before the law."950 Not surprisingly, Romer grounded its
rationale on the constitutional premise that, "'a bare ... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.' ... We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not
to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else." 951
On that basis, Romer rejected the claimed justifications for Amendment
2's assault on the dignity of LGBTQ individuals and classes.952  "The
primary rationale the State offers for Amendment 2 is respect for other
citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or
Either way, LGBTQ deftly encapsulates those particular classes who suffer from what
generally might be called anti-homosexual bias.
948. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
949. "In the gay rights canon of Supreme Court cases, Romer is definitively a case about
unconstitutional animus. Dignity was not specifically invoked by Kennedy but Romer was a
| decision in which privacy issues had been eventually couched in the language and
sentiments of dignity. There were, in the subtext, whisperings or murmurings of humanity that
will help draw the jurisprudence for gay rights toward concepts of dignity and respect."
Jeremiah A. Ho, Find Out What It Means to Me: The Politics ofRespect and Dignity in Sexual
Orientation Antidiscrimination, 2017 UTAH L. REv. 463, 496 (2017). See also, e.g., Katie
Aber, When Anti-Discrimination Law Discriminates: A Right to Transgender Dignity in
Disability Law, 50 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 299, 316 (2017) (note) ([T]he anti-
subordination and anti-humiliation principles on which it relies are at the heart of the Court's
dignity jurisprudence.").
950. Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted Principles of Equal Liberty, Not "Argle Bargle":
The Inevitability ofMarriage Equality After Windsor, 23 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 17,37 (2014).
951. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634, 635 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). See, supra note 899-
944 for a general discussion of the constitutional meaning of the "bare desire to harm"
principles, especially as it relates to Deontological Originalism.
952. Romer rightly rebuffed Colorado's claim that Amendment 2 was not predicated on any
discriminatory animus because LGBTQ individuals still could enjoy the protection of statutes
according protections to non-suspect classes. While understandably skeptical that, moved by
the spirit if not the text of Amendment 2, Colorado courts truly would accord the full
protections of such statutes, the Romer Court retorted that whether such neutral laws protect
LGBTQ individuals is irrelevant to the fact that Amendment 2 itself is a violation of LGBTQ
individuals' right to equal protection and due process. Romer, 517 U.S. at 630.
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employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.
Colorado also cites its interest in conserving resources to fight discrimination
against other groups."95 3  The aghast Court responded,
The breadth of the amendment is so far removed from these particular
justifications that we find it impossible to credit them. We cannot say that
Amendment 2 is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete
objective. It is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it
is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the
Equal Protection Clause does not permit.954
Writing for himself and two colleagues, Justice Scalia feverishly
dissented, claiming that anti-LGBTQ bias is a legitimate basis for
governmental action that Scalia denoted to be, "a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against
the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through
use of the laws." 9 55 This would not be Scalia's last such dissent, as the
following explication of the "homosexual rights" cases shows. For now, it is
enough to say that, consistent with the deeply rooted traditions standard he
so earnestly embraced, Justice Scalia and those who endorse his dissents,
view the various challengers' overall constitutional position not as sounding
in basic human dignity, nor as emanating from a general privacy right
allowing adults to engage in privately performed, consensual sexual acts, but
as, "whether there [is] a legitimate rational basis for ... the prohibition of
special protection for homosexuals."9 5 6
953. Id. at 635.
954. Id. A fair reading of the majority opinion supports the dissenting justices' accusation
that Romer's constitutional rationale is conclusory, long on suppositions and short on
thoughtful explanations. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
("I turn next to whether there was a legitimate rational basis for the substance of the
constitutional amendment-for the prohibition of special protection for homosexuals. It is
unsurprising that the Court avoids discussion of this question, since the answer is so obviously
yes." (footnote omitted)). As explained infra at notes 961-1020 and accompanying text, as
with all of the Court's "homosexual rights" decisions post-dating Romer, Romer itself
correctly applied the equal protection component of"due process of law" because Amendment
2 treated LGBTQ individuals merely as means to placate to unjustifiable bigotry of a
significant portion of the Colorado's citizenry. Still, as this writing will emphasize, the Court's
lack of thorough analysis of its pivotal dignity paradigm is lamentable.
955. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
956. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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It is no surprise that the palpable infirmity of Scalia's constitutional
argument permeates all of his dissents in the LGBTQ cases, as well as fouls
his meagre fundamental rights awareness in other contexts. Despite his
claimed devotion to original intent,9 57 Scalia's infirm precept rebukes
Deontological Originalism. As we now understand, under Deontological
Originalism, there is but one dominating right from which all others derive -
- one right that unifies those 'unalienable Rights" emanating from "Nature
and Nature's God." Specifically, as acknowledged by the Due Process
Clauses, all persons under the jurisdiction of the United States have the right
of freedom from "arbitrary or capricious" governmental treatment, or, as the
courts often put it, the right to "fundamental fairness." 9 58
The proper measure of fundamental fairness is respect for inherent
human dignity, which means that Government may not treat any individual
as merely a means without regard for the individual as an end in herself.
Whether identified by the "bare desire to harm" principle or some equally
valid measure, the immutable duty to safeguard human dignity, as explicated
by Kantian morality, tells us that there are no "special rights" -- or, using
Justice Scalia's term, no "special protections" -- under the Constitution.
Rather, regardless how novel or unfamiliar the context, if a challenger
proves that the challenged governmental conduct violates the challenger's
dignity, then the challenger does not obtain a "special" right or protection,
but instead at last receives the constitutional protection to which she always
had been entitled. Appropriately, then, the Romer challengers did not seek
"special rights," but rather, successfully asserted that Colorado had no
legitimate justification to abridge for LGBTQ individuals what properly is
accepted as a general principle of fundamental fairness: "A law declaring that
in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others
to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense." 959
Thus, as the Romer Court properly discerned, "The rights that
homosexuals seek to acquire are basic rights, available to virtually every
other member of American society. In characterizing this campaign as one
for special rights, opponents operate on the premise that homosexuality is
957. See generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7, at 4-G-2
(Fainthearted Originalism).
958. See, supra notes 600-623 and accompanying text.
959. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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intrinsically wrong, and that courts and legislatures should not entitle gays
and lesbians to rights that are truly equal."960
Seven years after Romer, reversing its earlier opinion, 961 Lawrence v.
Texas ruled that government may not per se criminalize homosexual sodomy
performed in private between consenting adults. Sensibly accenting dignity,
the Lawrence Court, again under Justice Kennedy's pen, ruled that, "It
suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon [an
intimate personal] relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."962 Moreover,
understandably similar to its findings in Romer, Lawrence emphasized that
Texas had failed to prove that treating homosexual intimacy equally with
heterosexual intimacy would cause any cognizable societal harm other than
offending the sensibilities of bigoted individuals who disapprove of
homosexuals and homosexuality. In that regard, the Court unequivocally
stated, "The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime."963
960. Scott K. Kozuma, Baehr v. Lewin and Same-Sex Marriage: The Continued Struggle
for Social, Political and Human Legitimacy, 30 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 891, 915 (1994) (note)
(discussing same-sex marriage).
961. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), o., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
962. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added). It is worth recalling that, as Justice
Thomas correctly has accented albeit in dissents, dignity is innate and, thus, cannot be revoked
or mitigated by individuals and their governments. See, supra notes 894-98 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, ifthe phrasing in Lawrence, "still retain their dignity," means that dignity
can be taken away by Government, by private parties, or by both, the Court severely
misconstrued dignity's meaning in terms of natural rights. The better and, I think, completely
compatible meaning of "still retain their dignity" recognizes that, while immoral to do so,
dignity may be disregarded as it is when Government acts contrary to the "unalienable Rights"
emanating from "the laws of Nature and of Nature's God." See, supra notes 907-60 and
accompanying text.
I make the foregoing assertion because, the Supreme Court's dignity paradigm's
emphasis clearly will not change whether dignity is deemed destructible or merely ignorable.
The Court's concern under the dignity paradigm is that Government not impugn dignity
however such impugning might occur. Accordingly, as had been earlier proved, it is due and
proper to effectuate the true meaning of the dignity paradigm by interpreting terms such as
"still retain their dignity" to mean Government may not act as though individuals affected by
government policies have no innate dignity. See supra notes 894-98 and accompanying text.
963. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Although the majority opinion did not use the phase,
implicit in its decision, as Justice O'Connor expressly recognized, is the principle that
Government cannot act based on, "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group ... "
Id. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concurred on the basis that the Texas
statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, in contrast with the
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By so stating, surely the Lawrence, as does Romer, implies Kantian
morality. That is, because gratifying the biases of those who find LGBTQ
life-styles offensive was a reason underlying the criminalization of same-sex
sodomy, the law treated LGBTQ individuals merely as means to gratify those
biases, and not an ends in themselves -- as persons whose indulgence in same-
sex sexual gratification are entitled to the same regard as heterosexual
individuals engaging in sodomy.964
Not surprisingly, as in Romer, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented accenting, inter alia, that because
the Court did not expressly declare a "fundamental right" of homosexual sex,
any constitutionally cognizable interest in such behavior, like "All other
[non-fundamental] liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to
a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state
majority's stance that the law offends that amendment's Due Process Clause. However, given
the constitutional fact that equal protection is a subset of due process (see supra, notes 570-82
and accompanying text), Justice O'Connor's distinction does not connote a significant
constitutional difference. The true question is whether, when limiting the pursuit of happiness
of some person or groups, the applicable law does so in a way that does not impugn that
person's or group's human dignity.
964. In that regard, let me add two quick additional points. First, had defenders proved that
somehow homosexual sodomy engendered constitutionally cognizable harms that
heterosexual sodomy does not, such proof would not per se constitutionalize criminalizing
only homosexual sodomy. Rather, even taking such harms into account, the reviewing court
would still have to determine whether the harms were significant enough that the disparate
treatment the adversely affected persons and groups suffered does not demean their dignity,
that is treat them merely as means and not as well as ends in themselves. We always must
recall that, pursuant to deontological principles, the issue never is whether there are
counterveiling social concerns justifying official limitations on human dignity. Rather, this
issue is whether of ends and means proves that the official limitations do not impugn individual
dignity. See, Bayer, Part I, supra note 7, at Sections 2-a, b, f.
For example, it is worth recalling the example of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
that invalidated as lacking any rational basis the City of Cleburne's special zoning ordinance
imposing special restrictions on group homes for mentally disabled individuals while zoning
requirements for other forms of group homes were less stringent. The Court rejected the
argument that because they may be unsightly, or discomforting, or might engender crime or
accidents, limiting access of the mentally disabled is justified. Moreover, the Court did not
even address the likely possibility that group homes for mentally disabled persons might lower
property values overall -- surely a legitimate rational basis, but one that presumably would not
justify Cleburne's special zoning laws. See, supra notes 924-34 and accompanying text
(discussing that Govermnet's desire to harm need not be the sole or predominate motive).
Turning to a second point, Lawrence did not address laws that, regardless of sexual
preference or orientation, criminalize all privately performed acts of sodomy between
consenting adults. However, given the tenor of Lawrence and other decisions addressing
sexual privacy, almost certainly a blanket ban on such sodomy would be unconstitutional
under the Court's dignityparadigm. E.g., MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154 (4th Cir. 2013).
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interest." 9 65 Discerning no "deeply rooted" American tradition favoring a
right to homosexual sexual practices, the dissenters concluded that
criminalizing such practices is constitutional.9 66
The Scalia dissent castigated the Court for not clearly setting a "standard
of review," and for purportedly ignoring or actually overturning precedents
without so stating: "I address some aspersions that the Court casts upon
Bowers' conclusion that homosexual sodomy is not a 'fundamental right'-
even though, as I have said, the Court does not have the boldness to reverse
that conclusion." 967 However, when at last he addressed whether, as a matter
of fact, aside from offending the sectarian or secular sensibilities of
opponents, same-sex sexual practices cause any harm unknown to lawful
heterosexual practices, Justice Scalia had very little to say:
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that
certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable," Bowers
[v. Hardwick], supra, [478 U.S.] at 196, 106 S.Ct. 2841-the same
interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery,
adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity. Bowers held that this was a
legitimate state interest. The Court today reaches the opposite conclusion.
... [Lawrence] effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as
the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not
even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can
survive rational-basis review. 96 8
965. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
966. Id. (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
967. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting). This writing
addresses the issue of the Court's reluctance, perhaps adamant refusal, to designate a "level of
scrutiny" in "homosexual rights" cases infra at notes 984-90 and accompanying text.
968. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., with Rehnquist C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting). One
immediately notices within his almost hysterically-tone prose how Justice Scalia artfully
constructed his list of long-time proscribed marriage and sexual practices that are rendered
constitutionally problematic under Lawrence. He seemingly chose those practices that
notionally cause no harm except alarming the sensibilities of third parties, the very type of
governmental intrusion we now understand Deontological Originalism's definition of "due
process of law" delegitimates. Accordingly, if any within Scalia's categories cause harm, the
inquiry would proceed to whether nonetheless governmental bans violate the dignity of the
adversely affected parties. And, indeed, Scalia's list of likely sex-based candidates for
constitutional protection itself is problematic.
For instance, one researcher opined, "There is very little research on incest; the
extreme taboo and victim-blaming have made it a difficult subject for empirical study.
Virtually all of the scant research focuses onthe most prevalent type, which is adult-child
incest, in particular father or stepfather and daughter." Cynthia Godsoe, Redrawing the
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Boundaries of Relational Crime, 69 ALA. L. REV. 169, 193 (2017) (note 135, "Sandra S.
Stroebel et al., Father-Daughter Incest: Data from an Anonymous Computerized Survey, 21 J.
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 176, 177-178 (2012) (noting the research difficulties in
studying incest"). Still, as Prof Godsoe strongly asserts, sufficient bases exist to indicate the
following conclusions:
[V]ertical incest poses a great risk of L harm because it inherently entails power
differentials that call into question whether real consent is possible. The inability
of adults to meaningfully consent to sex with other adults in a power relationship
is an established legal principle. Moreover, both psychological research and the
experiences of persons who have engaged in adult incest demonstrate that vertical
incest, particularly parent-child adult incest, is a situation where meaningful
consent by the child, even as an adult, is virtually impossible. Psychologists, for
instance, consider incest to be "abusive when the individuals involved are
discrepant in age, power, and experience." Some experts go further and describe
incest in general "as a form of sexual violence ... a form of sexual assault ...
relationships [that are] normally one-sided and abusive."
Id. at 192 (emphasis added) (quoting, Richard P. Kluft, Ramifications of Incest,
27 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at 3, and, Harrison Faigen, "Game of Thrones"
Romanticizing of Incest Could be Problematic, DAILY TITAN (Aug. 28, 2017, 1:34 PM),
https://dailytitan.com/2017/08/gane-thrones-romanticizing-incest-problematic/ (quoting
Janna Kim, Associate Professor of Child and Adolescent Studies at California State
University, Fullerton).
In a like vein, Prof Hornel wrote
[Ilt would be premature to conclude that in all constellations of adult incest, factual
consent must be regarded as valid consent. For two subgroups of adult incest, it is
plausible to assume invalid consent despite the fact that the young woman or young
man was legally an adult. The first constellation consists of cases in which sexual
acts started as sexual abuse or/and rape while the younger one was still a child or
juvenile, and then were continued in a habitual way. ...
There might be a second exception ... if the context is a parent-child relationship.
Even if the sexual relationship began ... at a time when both persons were legally
adults, validity of consent can be challenged if the social roles are such that there
is a clear and evident social split into "weaker partner" and "powerful partner."
Tatjana Hrnle, Consensual Adult Incest: A Sex Offense?, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 76, 89, 90
(2014).
If Profs. Godsoe and Hornel are correct, as they well may be (see, Godsoe at 193-204;
Hornel at 89-101), then Government can raise a likely defense that the presumptions of mature
adulthood notwithstanding, adult vertical incest comprises treating one participant merely as
a means often enough that, if not subject to a complete ban as is adult-minor incest, adult incest
is at least regulable.
To cite one more instance, Scalia's inclusion of bestiality in his list of likely doomed
traditional bans may be challenged. Indeed, Kant opined that bestiality is a violation of the
duty of rightful honor by degrading one's body and moral purity. John Kleinig, The
Paternalistic Principle, 10 CRTM. L. & PHIL. 315, 320 note 14 (2016) (citations omitted). See,
supra note 125, and see generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology, supra note 7,
notes 263-67 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of rightful honor). Such is reflected
in modern criminal codes even if the drafters were not steeped in Kantian theory. "Bestiality
laws, for reasons unrelated to the welfare of the exploited creature, try to prevent humans from
having sex with nonhuman animals, who in human society are relegated to a lower plane of
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Importantly, the dissenters could not identify any genuine societal harm
that actually justifies criminalizing homosexual sodomy while
simultaneously sustaining the legality of sodomy between opposite-sex
existence." Catharine A. MacKinnon, The Road Not Taken: Sex Equality in Lawrence v.
Texas, 65 OIo ST. L.J. 1081, 1093 (2004) (citing, See ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
Agruably, without more, any such self-chosen denigration might be insufficient
grounds to uphold anti-bestiality laws. However, "With the advent of the animal rights
movement, it is not too far fetched to suggest that protecting animals from harm is a legitimate
state interest rationally furthered by bans on bestiality." Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning
Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex and Limits State Power to Vindicate the Moral
Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSAL. REv. 95, 147 (2003) (article vehemently reproving the
Lawrence decision and arguing that, "So, most of the critters in Justice Scalia's parade of
sexual monsters can be reined in by state laws designed to prevent demonstrable harms." Id.
at 147-48). Allison's snide tone notwithstanding, there are strong moral arguments supporting
the criminalization of human intercourse with beasts. "Cruelty statutes have been enacted in
most states because suffering--including animal suffering--should never occur absent extreme
justifying circumstances, and because society recognizes that the act of cruelty has a negative
effect on the abuser." Justin P. Nichols, The Hidden Dichotomy in the Law of Morality, 31
CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 605 (2009) (citing, Luis E. Chiesa, Why Is It a Crime to Stomp a
Goldfish?-- Harm, Victimhood and the Structure ofAnti-Cruelty Offenses, 78 Miss.
L.J. 1, 40-58 (2008)).
Certainly, sexual acts on and with animals might cause pain and other physical, even
emotional harm to such animals. "While it may seem silly to think in terms of an animal's
emotional distress, there can be no doubt that bestiality, even where it does not physically
injure the animal, harmfully traumatizes it in some manner." Chase J. Sanders, Ninth Life: An
Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 847 note 267 (1994).
Accordingly, bestiality is anti-Kantian because, while Kant presumed that non-human
lifeforms lack the intellectual capacity to conceive moral precepts, the deliberate, wanton
inflection of pain on "lower" beings violates moral precepts. "[A]ccording to Kant, man
possesses an indirect duty toward nonhuman animals. Cruelty to nonhuman animals harms the
moral character of humans, while kindness to such animals supports humanity; 'a master
[who] turns out his ass or his dog, because it can no longer earn its keep, shows a small mind."'
Ani B. Satz, WOULD ROSA PARKS WEAR FUR? TOWARD A NONDISCRIMINATION APPROACH TO
ANIMAL WELFARE, I J. ANIMAL L. & ETH. 139, 143 (2006) (quoting, Immanuel Kant, Lectures
on Ethics 239-41 (Louis Infield trans., Methuen 1930)).
Moreover, our deeper understanding of moral duties informs that palpable injury is not
a requirement; after all, morality is not consequentialist. "Like children, non-human animals
are unable to be fully informed, communicate consent, or to speak out about their abuse. Thus,
Dr. Frank Ascione has stated that 'bestiality may be considered cruel even in cases when
physical harm to an animal does not occur (this is similar to the case of adult sexual activity
with children where consent is presumed to be impossible).' Lee Hall, Interwoven Threads:
Some Thoughts on Professor Mackinnon's Essay of Mice and Men, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J.
163, 212 note 14 (2005) (quoting, Frank R. Ascione, Children Who Are Cruel to Animals: A
Review of Research and Implications for Developmental Psychology, Anthrozo6s Vol. 6 (4),
No. 4 (1993) at 229 (parenthetical in the original)).
Therefore, Justice Scalia's claim that Lawrence would lead to wholesale invalidation
of time-honored taboos is not only bad constitutional analysis, it is as well weak logic.
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couples. The Scalia dissent cites no claims of increases in crime, untoward
violence, singular physical or mental illnesses, loss of business opportunities,
loss of production of goods and services, or any other detriments that might
justify regulating conduct causing such injuries. Instead, classically applying
the deeply rooted traditions standard, the dissenters say it is enough that
criminalizing homosexual sodomy assuages the mere sensibilities of either a
majority of a given segment of society, or some powerful elite therein.969
Under that standard, as has been earlier discussed, Brown v. Board of
Education might well have been decided in favor of states' authority to
administer segregated school systems given the arguably deeply rooted
American tradition of racial discrimination prevalent in 1954.970
Justice Scalia is correct that, pursuant to the dignity paradigm, no longer
will the Due Process Clauses accept either bald assertions by Government or
persistent historical intolerance as sufficient proof that some conduct is
immoral and, thus, regulable up to and including designating such conduct to
be criminal. Indeed, consistent with Romer, Lawrence correctly held: courts
fail their duty by simply and uncritically accepting that some popular
determination -- some "deeply rooted" tradition -- is constitutional justified
due to its mere persistence. Rather, to fulfill the dignity paradigm's unspoken
969. Indeed, their refusal to turn any sort of critical eye towards Texas' criminalization of
homosexual sexual practices, certainly the hallmark methodology of the deeply rooted
traditions standard, renders inadvertently ironic and shallow the dissenters' earnest assertion
that only "principle and logic" should determine "the decisions of this Court." Id. at 605
(Scalia, J., with Rehnquist C.J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
970. See, supra notes 570-82 and accompanying text. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia
repeated the infirmities of his Lawrence and Romer dissents when dissenting in the same-sex
marriage decisions next discussed. Indeed, while Justice Scalia, among others, has attempted
an originalist argument supporting Brown, emphasizing in particular the first Justice Harlan's
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the consensus among scholars is, as Prof. Ronald Turner
summarized, while one may pose as "a serious ... whether Brown can be squared with
originalism as that interpretive methodology is defined and conceptualized by Justice Scalia,
... [his] mere conclusory statement that Brown is consistent with Justice Harlan's 'thoroughly
originalist' dissent is unconvincing, as is his nonoriginalist and traditionalist approach to and
defense of the Court's seminal 1954 ruling." Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin
Scalia's Originalist Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
170, 184 (2014); see also, e.g., Ronald Turner, Justice Antonin Scalia's Flawed Originalist
Justification for Brown v. Board of Education, 9 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 179 (2017);
but see, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education,
19 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 457 (1996) (accenting early post-ratification enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments and post-Bellum civil rights acts); Patrick J. Kelley, An
Alternative Originalist Opinion for Brown v. Board ofEducation, 20 S. ILL. U. L. J. 75 (1995).
Of course, had Justice Scalia embraced the Deontological Originalism proven in this
writing, he could have expressed a perfectly plausible originalist defense of Brown v. Board
of Education.
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demonstrably manifest connection to natural law, Government must prove
that its intrusions into individuals' personal choices -- its impositions limiting
the Pursuit of Happiness, if you will -- respect affected individuals' innate
dignity by treating them not merely as means to fulfill even valid
governmental goals, but as ends as well.
Accordingly, as the dissenting justices rightly observed, under
Lawrence, "due process of law" cannot be satisfied by stark declarations and
longstanding traditions that LGBTQ individuals' preferred sexual conduct is
immoral and regulable while like conduct by opposite-sex couples, again by
stark declaration and longstanding traditions, is moral and protected by the
Constitution. Therefore, although the Lawrence Court did not make as
explicit as it might have the meaning of dignity, as a matter of judicial
restraint, a thorough explication, while likely informative, arguably would
have exceeded the rationale needed to invalidate Texas' criminalization of
homosexual conduct Even the dissenting opinion failed to provide cogent
evidence proving either that homosexual conduct actually evokes cognizable
societal harm, or that any such harm exceeds the harm engendered by
identical sexual practices performed in private by consenting heterosexual
adults. Absent such proof, nothing more was needed to demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of Texas' ban on homosexual conduct.
This at last brings us to the two Supreme Court decisions that together
require all levels and offices of American government to treat same-sex
marriages identically with opposite-sex marriages. On June 26, 2015, the
Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that state laws prohibiting same-sex civil
marriages contravene the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 71  Just two years prior, the Court's US. v.
Windsor9 7 2 struck as violative of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
§ 3 of the Congress' Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"),9 7 3 banning the
Federal Government from officially recognizing same-sex marriages
lawfully performed in states then permitting such nuptials. 9 74 As it must, the
971. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584. Concurrently and logically, Obergefell overturned state
statutes barring official recognition of same-sex marriages lawfully performed in other
jurisdictions.
972. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
973. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §l738C, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); 1
U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
974. Section 3 of DOMA amended, unconstitutionally as it turned out, I U.S.C. § 7 (2012)
to read, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife."
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core legal rationale for both Obergefell and Windsor holds that pursuant to
the Constitution's guarantee of "due process of law," all acts and edicts of
every office, agent or level of American government must be morally sound,
that is, respect the dignity of affected persons. Specifically, together,
Obergefell- Windsor deduces that discrimination against same-sex marriages
unjustifiably offends the innate human dignity of individuals who wish to
engage in same-sex civil marriages, and of such unions' children.
Reaffirming that due process exists to protect and preserve dignity,9 5
and accenting that the institution of marriage is a most profound expression
of such dignity,976 the Court unsurprisingly concluded that, pursuant to their
individual and combined dignity, individuals comprising same-sex couples
are entitled to the benefits of marriage equally with opposite-sex couples.9 7 7
Integral to that proposition, of course, is the Court's reiteration that
homosexuality qua homosexuality poses no untoward societal harms
justifying discriminating against otherwise legally eligible same-sex couples
who wish to marry.9 78 Specifically, Obergefell explained the wrongful
historical persistence of anti-LGBTQ animus,
Even when a greater awareness of the humanity and integrity of
homosexual persons came in the period after World War II, the argument
that gays and lesbians had ajust claim to dignity was in conflict with both
975. "In addition, these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual
dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs."
Obergefell, 135 S. CL at 2597-98 (citations omitted).
976. "There is dignity in the bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and
in their autonomy to make such profound choices." Id. at 2599 (citation omitted). Indeed,
"[a] first premise of the Court's relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy[, denoting an] abiding
connection between marriage and liberty ... " Id Along these lines, Obergefell accented that,
"[T]he right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other
in its importance to the committed individuals." Id
Identically, Windsor accented that marriage is Society's imprimatur permitting
couples, through the solemnization of official ceremony, "to define themselves by their
commitment to each other." Windsor, 133 S. CL at 2689.
977. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2606.
978. At this juncture this writing's phrase "no untoward societal harms" should be neither
mysterious nor confusing. Out of caution, as we approach the final themes, I repeat one of
Deontology's fundamental propositions: moral comportment does not guarantee that either
moral actors or innocent persons affected by moral actions will escape undeserved harm. That
is because of Deontology's most basic premise: moral compliance promises the right result,
not a good result. Therefore, "societal harms" resulting from morally sound behavior are
unfortunate but not "untoward." See generally, Bayer, Part I: Originalism and Deontology,
supra note 7, at Section 2, particularly, 2-f.
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law and widespread social conventions. Same-sex intimacy remained a
crime in many States. Gays and lesbians were prohibited from most
government employment, barred from military service, excluded under
immigration laws, targeted by police, and burdened in their rights to
associate .979
Turning to the formerly similar opinions of the medical community, the
Court added, "For much of the 20th century, moreover, homosexuality was
treated as an illness. ... Only in more recent years have psychiatrists and
others recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal expression of
human sexuality and immutable."9 80
Of equal magnitude, bans and lesser discriminatory disadvantages
imposed on same-sex marriages disparage the human dignity of children
raised by a same-sex couples who wish to marry or whose marriages are
treated by governmental offices differently - inevitably as less worthy,
thereby less protected - from opposite-sex marriages. Denouncing such
disparate treatment, Obergefell explained, "As all parties agree, many same-
sex couples provide loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether
biological or adopted. And hundreds of thousands of children are presently
being raised by such couples. ... This provides powerful confirmation ... that
gays and lesbians can create loving, supportive families."9 8 1 Considering
979. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing Brief for Organization of American Historians
as Amicus Curiae In Support of Respondent Edith Windsor, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.
CL 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307)).
980. Id. (citations omitted). As detailed momentarily in the text, the Court's arguably brief
and cursory review of the nature and meaning of homosexuality may not be correct in all
significant regards although its ultimate holding invalidating official disparate treatment of
same-sex marriages is certainly right under Deontological Originalism. See infra notes 1012-
18 and accompanying text. To accent one aspect implicit in the above-quote, even assuming
homosexuality indeed is "immutable," that characteristic ought not be determinative, or even
significant in deciding whether regulation is unconstitutional. Commentaries seriously
challenge the concept of "immutability" as useful in anti-discrimination jurisprudence. E.g.,
Jessica A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 25 YALE L.J. 2 (2015); Peter Brandon Bayer,
Debunking Unequal Burdens, Trivial Violations, Harmless Stereotypes, and Similar Judicial
Myths: The Convergence of Title VII Literalism, Congressional Intent, and Kantian Dignity
Theory, 89 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 401 (2015) (lead article in symposium on Title VII); Peter
Brandon Bayer, Mutable Characteristics and the Definition ofDiscrimination under Title VII,
20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 769 (1987).
981. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing, Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-
574). Underscoring that American law has in great measure rightfully come to respect same-
sex couples as parents, Obergefell added, "Most States have allowed gays and lesbians to
adopt, either as individuals or as couples, and many adopted and foster children have same-
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both the importance of marriage as a social institution and the proven
capacity of homosexual individuals as a class to parent children equally with
heterosexuals as a class, the Court concluded,
Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.
They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by
unmarried parents, relegated through no fault of their own to a more
difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue here thus
harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. 982
Closing its opinion as it should by re-emphasizing human dignity, the
Court summarized the core constitutional concern: same-sex couples wishing
to marry, "respect [that institution] so deeply that they seek to find its
fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in
loneliness, excluded from one of civilization's oldest institutions. They ask
for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that
right. 9 83
Like Romer and Lawrence before them, Windsor and Obergefell are
noteworthy not only for what they say-their adamant emphasis on the
breadth of human dignity as constitutionally protected-but as well for
something they did not mention. Usually in constitutional civil rights
opinions, courts will open by ascribing the particular controversy a "level of
scrutiny," the purported importance of which is setting ajudicial presumption
regarding which side is likely to win, thus, which side, carries the evidentiary
burden to persuade the given court. The "level of scrutiny" spectrum
sex parents, ... " Id (citing Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574) at 5).
982. Id. at 2600-01 (citation omitted).
983. Id at 2608 (emphasis added).
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ostensibly ranges from "strict" 98 to "middle level'9 5 to "rational basis." 9 86
Importantly and, I think, most appropriately, neither Obergefell nor Windsor
specify the applicable level of scrutiny. That omission frustrated the
dissenters, 987 but rightly underscores a crucial point: identifying technical
984. The first level is "strict scrutiny," pertaining to discrimination based on a "suspect
class" of which the predominating two are race or ancestry. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex at Austin,
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013). Courts likewise use strict scrutiny standards to review certain
violations of fundamental rights such as regulations that discriminate against speech based on
viewpoint or content. McCullen v. Cokley, 134 S. Ct 2518, 2530 (2014).
Because, "any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race or
ethnic origin is inherently suspect," Fisher, 133 S. Ct at 2419 (quoting, Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)), under strict scrutiny, the Government bears
the burden of proving both that the presumptively unconstitutional use of race or ethnicity is
legitimate and that such use is "narrowly tailored," meaning, no reasonably available
alternative non-discriminatory mode of regulating can attain the same important governmental
goals. Id. at 2418-19 (citations omitted).
985. The second level of scrutiny, called "middle" or "intermediate," applies, inter alia, to
governmental distinctions predicated on sex and illegitimacy of childbirth. J.E.B. v. Ala. ex
rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n.6 (1994) (sex discrimination); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-26 (1982) (same); Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983)
(legitimacy); Morales-Santana v. Lynch, 804 F.3d 520, 528 (2d Cir. 2015) (sex
discrimination); Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39, 50 (2d Cir. 2013) (legitimacy). That level
applies, as well, in certain instances of alleged violations of fundamental rights such as so-
called "content neutral regulations" claimed to violate free speech. BBL, Inc. v. City of
Angola, 809 F.3d 307, 325-36 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that often such claims actually involve
speech restrictions that may not be content neutral but are justifiable absent reference to
content).
"[L]ike 'strict scrutiny,' [middle level] requires the government to prove the
constitutional validity of the challenged enactment. Unlike strict scrutiny, however, the State's
burden [requires only that] '[tlhe classification must be substantially related to an important
governmental objective."' Bayer, supra note 17, at 337 (quoting Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,
461 (1988)).
986. All judicial review not sounding in strict or intermediate scrutiny, purportedly
engenders "rational basis" review. "[O]ften referred to somewhat demeaningly as 'mere
rationality,' ... any governmental classification reviewed for 'mere rationality' is
presumptively valid unless, 'the one attacking the legislative arrangement ... negative[s] every
conceivable basis which might support it."' Bayer, supra note 17, at 337 (quoting Regan v.
Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983)); see also, e.g., Armour v. City of
Indianapolis, Ind., 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080-81 (2012) (citations omitted). Common instances
subject to rational basis review include economic regulations, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns,
Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-314 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483
(1955), and, governmental regulation premised on age or disability, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dept.
of Agri., 553 U.S. 591, 605 (2008) (age discrimination, citing Mass. Bd. of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314-17 (1976) (per curian)); Ragsdell v. Regional Housing Alliance
of La Plata County, 603 Fed. Appex. 653, 656 (10th Cir. 2015) (disability discrimination,
citing DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 725 (10th Cir.1988)).
987. A justifiably exasperated Justice Scalia wrote, "The opinion does not resolve and
indeed does not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether,
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levels is not as important as presenting a thoughtful, lucid rationale
determining the challenged official action's constitutional bonafides vel non.
Rather than spend pages on the distractions of setting scrutiny levels, a
determination that actually and needlessly may be more complex than
under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are
reviewed for more than mere rationality." Windsor, 133 S. Ct at 2706 (Scalia, J., with
Thomas, J., dissenting); see also, id. at 2716 (Alito, J., dissenting, citing id at 2695, that the
Majority refers to some vague "heightened" level of analysis that the offending portions of
The Defense of Marriage Act fail to satisfy). The dissenters are right. The origin of setting
levels of review is attributed to U.S. v. Carolene Products Co, 304 U.S. 144, 153 note 4 (1938).
E.g., William Woodyard & Glenn Boggs, Public Outcry: Kelo v. City of New London-A
Proposed Solution, 39 ENVTL. L. 431, 446 (2009). Specifically, "The concept of strict scrutiny
can be traced back to Korematsu v. United States[,323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)]. The case
[upheld] the constitutionality of a military decree whereby Americans of Japanese descent
were evacuated and interned in camps during World War II[,] ... declar[ing] that the
government could take whatever steps were necessary to 'prevent espionage and sabotage.'
More importantly, the Court approached the equal protection challenge in a new light, holding
that 'all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect' and warrant the use of 'the most rigid scrutiny."' Paul Enriquez, Deconstructing
Transnationalism: Conceptualizing Metanationalism As A Putative Model of Evolving
Jurisprudence, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1265, 1328-29 (2010).
Four years later in Carolene Products, after noting that courts review economic
regulation on the presumption that it is at least constitutionally rational, thus lawful, in the
famous "footnote 4," the Court stated, "[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may
be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." Indeed, the Court did not actually set up a
framework for analysis. Rather, emphasizing consistently throughout footnote 4 that there
was no "need" within the Cerolene Products opinion to discern whether there is a higherarchy
of rights analysis, the Court dropped perhaps unsubtle hints that some constitutional rights are
more momentous than others. Subsequent courts picked up that hint transforming what might
have been considered an innocent, innocuous aside into what commonly is referred to as, "the
most famous footnote in constitutional law. ... Almost no one cites it without paying tribute
to its fame and influence. It has been called '[t]he great and modern charter for ordering the
relation between judges and other agencies of government'; and if this is something of an
optimistic overstatement, it is at least partly true." Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four:
A History of the Carolene Products Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 165 (2004) (quoting,
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 6 (1979)).
Like a collector who buys her first two items but shortly thereafter seeks more in
qualitity and diversity, thus began what might be called a judicial fetish to discern levels and
sub-levels of scrutiny to cover the vast variety of matters arising under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses. As Prof. Fletcher succinctly stated, "The difference is supposedly
only one of degree, and there can be various levels of scrutiny between the two extremes [of
rational basis and strict scrutiny]." George P. Fletcher, In God's Image: The Religious
Imperative ofEquality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1608, 1624 (1999); see also, infra note
988. So, yes, the Obergefell dissenters make a valid point: If the Court is going to forego its
long-standing tradition of according scrutiny levels, it should say as much with frankness.
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resolving the substantive due process issue itself,98 8 the Windsor and
Obergefell Courts went straight to the heart of the matter: denying the right
to marry to otherwise eligible, responsible adult couples who happen to be of
the same sex irrefutably imposes unjustified severe detriment upon the
couples and their children.
Perhaps the Court is signaling that choosing the level of scrutiny, once
though a helpful, efficiency-enhancing exercise, has too often become a
bewildering disruption of the judicial review process threatening not simply
to waste time but worse, possibly hindering the proper resolution of the
substantive constitutional question.98 9 The "homosexual rights cases," then,
988. The idea of levels of scrutiny has the surface allure of setting a seemingly logical set
of legal niches that helps parties and the courts follow an order of evidentiary proof However,
in response to the unique complexity of many constitutional issues, determining which level
appropriately applies to any given matter has become a challenge in itself.
For instance, Prof. Mark M. Harrold, "notes that the Supreme Court itself may be
responsible for the proliferation in these odd [First Amendment establishment of religion]
cases by interpreting the Constitution 'in a vague, sometimes intellectually dishonest, manner,
erecting a confusing maze of balancing tests and fluid levels of scrutiny....'" MARC M.
HARROLD, OBSERVATIONS OF WHITE NOISE: AN 'ACID TEST' FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT 75
(2005) (quoted in, Michael J. Gorman, 75 Miss. L.J. 1167, 1170 (2006) (student book
review)). Such complexity cum uncertainty understandably inspires courts to dodge assigning
a level of scrutiny if at all possible. E.g., Wollshlaeger v. Governor of Fla., 848 F.3d 1293,
1308 (11 th Cir. 2017) (en bane) (court does not have to determine if the apparently "content-
based" speech regulations at issue are subject to "strict" or lesser-level "heightened" scrutiny
because, "the record-keeping, inquiry, and anti-harassment provisions ... fail even under
heightened scrutiny ... "); Culp v. Madigan, 2015 WL 13037427 at *14 (C.D. Ill. 2015)
(depending of specific facts, "Determining the correct level of scrutiny [can be] difficult" in
firearms regulation cases).
Another ploy is not assigning a level but rather testing the challenged governmental
action under the highest and lowest levels of scrutiny. If the challenged action survives the
former it must be constitutional, alternatively, if it fails the latter it cannot be constitutional;
either way, the reviewing court dodges the task of actually declaring what level of scrutiny
actually fits the given litigation. E.g., St. Louis Dev'1 Disabilities Treatment Ctr. Parents
Ass'n v. Mallory, 591 F. Supp. 1416, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (even though strict scrutiny is
not the applicable level of scrutiny, because the challenged statute would survive "strict
scrutiny" review, the court need to determine what actually is the correct level of scrutiny,
which relieves the court of the "more difficult" determination whether to apply rational basis
or intermediate level review).
989. As noted in Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the
Lens of The Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1404 (2011) (citing, Suzanne B.
Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004)):
Moreover, the marriage debate casts a more general shadow of skepticism over
the tiers of scrutiny themselves. ... Recall that the [lower federal and state] courts
ruling in favor of marriage equality have done so under every standard of review,
suggesting that the formal tiers may be of more rhetorical than substantive
significance. Romer and Lawrence, both decided under a form of rational basis
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may portend a welcome abandonment of the "levels of scrutiny" approach in
favor of directly confronting the substantive issue in each constitutional
rights case: based on the record, applying moral analysis, does the
governmental action at issue respect the innate dignity of the challengers,
thus is fundamentally fair, that is, neither arbitrary nor capricious?990
Although the issue of standards and levels of scrutiny are important, not
surprisingly, the deepest urgency of the unusually passionate dissenting
opinions centered not on procedural matters such as levels of scrutiny, but
rather on Windsor's and Obergefell's substantive pronouncements. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, dissented on the
expected premise that the Judiciary lacks the constitutional competence to
strike laws discriminating against same-sex marriages. Significantly but
predictably given the state of modern knowledge, the dissenters' core claim
does not sound in purported societal harm from permitting same-sex
marriages, but rather that defining marriage is a political question left to the
vox populae expressed though legislation, referenda or some comparable
review, point in the same direction. All of this suggests that standard political process
analysis, tied as it is to levels of scrutiny, is something of a distracting sideshow--one
that might be avoided by deploying a singular standard that takes into account, as
appropriate, a range of factors, including objections to the underlying political
process that generated a challenged law.
990. Indirectly, the courts have experimented with abandoning technical levels of scrutiny
in favor of reminding the relevant parties that resolving rights issues is a matter of
constitutional morality informed by the given facts of the particular case: did the challenged
conduct comport or not comport with the relevant constitutional provision. A good example
is "rationality with bite."
Traditional rational basis review only asks whether any theoretical, or hypothesized,
rational relationship exists to a legitimate governmental interest; the challenger must
essentially prove a negative by eliminating any real or imagined basis for the
enactment. By way of contrast, under "rationality with bite," the government bears
the burden of establishing the actual reason for the law that would be advanced by
applying the law on the facts presented at bar. Although the standard of judicial
review ostensibly remains the same--rationality--shifting the burden of proof to the
government significantly improves the odds of success for plaintiffs, as does the
requirement that the government establish the actual reason for the enactment. Thus,
the government's obligation goes well beyond merely suggesting a purely theoretical
interest that might or might not have actually motivated the legislative body that
adopted the law in the first place.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and
the (Underappreciated) Merits ofSmith, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1189, 1197 (2008).
This writing respectfully urges that, if it ever was useful, levels of scrutiny now
engenders unnecessary complexity diverting the courts and the parties from the true task at
hand: determining the constitutional bonafides of challenged governmental conduct.
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manifestation of popular opinion." Of course, the dignity paradigm
debunks the argument that the meaning and extent of natural rights should be
decided by public ballots rather than through the practiced, reasoned
deliberations of impartial judges. 9 2
The dissenters' second major substantive proposition is a weak
implication that opposite-sex marriage's historical persistence implies its
constitutional acceptability.993 Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous dictum well
expresses the shady circularity of using any law's longstanding endurance as
its own justification: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." 9 94 Something more
substantive must premise ajudicial ruling on fundamental rights.
Turning to what once might have been expected to be the dissenters'
prime substantive proposition, only Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas, averred with much passion but scant empirical
support, a presumptive correspondence between "traditional" marriage and
societal welfare. Importantly, given the unassailable empirical record
confirming that, "many same-sex couples provide loving and nurturing
homes to their children, whether biological or adopted," 995 Roberts foreswore
what formerly had been the overarching arguments underlying "disapproval"
of homosexuality: that homosexuality is "unnatural," "immoral" and
"destructive of society." 996 Instead, the sole substantive harm urged by the
991. The dissenters angrily accented that, "[T]he Court invalidates the marriage laws of
more than half the States and orders the transformation of a social institution that has formed
the basis of human society for millennia, for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the
Carthaginians and the Aztecs." Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, with Scalia and
Thomas, J., dissenting); see also, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714-2715 (Alito, J., dissenting).
992. See supra notes 845-63 and accompanying text.
993. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting);
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2714-15 (Alito, J., dissenting).
994. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
Indeed, the Seventh Circuit quoted Holmes as part of its pre-Obergefell rationale striking as
unconstitutional Wisconsin's statute banning same-sex marriages. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d
648, 666-67 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Price v. Stevedoring Services ofAm., Inc., 697 F.3d
820, 842 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Holmes regarding issues arising under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Comp. Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.).
995. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (citing Brief for Gary J. Gates as Amicus Curiae In Support
of Petitioners, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2600 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, and 14-574) at 4).
996. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO.
L.J., 459, 54849 (1990). Perhaps most dominate among the now well and fully debunked
professed dangers attendant to homosexuality is, "the concern with the 'predatory
463
THURGOOD MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Chief Justice concerns children, but not that children raised in same-sex
households endure physical, developmental or psychological harm
intolerably disproportionate to that suffered in the aggregate by children
raised in opposite-sex households. Rather, Roberts claimed that, pursuant to
principles of procreation, the better environment in which to raise a child is
within a marriage of the child's two birth parents."' The Chief Justice wrote:
[Marriage] arose in the nature of things to meet a vital need: ensuring that
children are conceived by a mother and father committed to raising them
in the stable conditions of a lifelong relationship. ...
The premises supporting this concept of marriage are so fundamental that
they rarely require articulation. The human race must procreate to
survive. Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and
a woman. When sexual relations result in the conception of a child, that
child's prospects are generally better if the mother and father stay together
rather than going their separate ways. Therefore, for the good of children
and society, sexual relations that can lead to procreation should occur only
between a man and a woman committed to a lasting bond."'
Chief Justice Roberts, with Justices Scalia and Thomas, may believe that
the superiority of opposite-sex marriage over same-sex marriage is so
obvious that it "rarely require[s] articulation." 9 Of course, a Supreme Court
homosexual,' who was synonymous with the 'sexual psychopath' and, for many law
enforcement officers, the 'child molester."' William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the
Construction of the Closet: American Regulation ofSame-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 IOWA
L. REv. 1007, 1059 (1997).
997. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
Somewhat similarly, in Windsor, Justice Alito asserted the non-controversial generality that,
"The family is an ancient and universal human institution. Family structure reflects the
characteristics of a civilization, and changes in family structure and in the popular
understanding of marriage and the family can have profound effects." Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at
2715 (Alito, J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
998. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Although sources one might have expected a lengthy litany of authority,
in support the Chief Justice G. QUALE, A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE SYSTEMS 2 (1988), J.Q.
WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 41 (2002) and denoted M. Cicero, DE OFFIclis 57 (W.
Miller transl. 1913).
999. That very lack of specifics supports Prof. Marc Spindelman's reproach that Robert's
argument comprises an unfortunate attempt to resurrect the notion that marriage's prime
legitimacy is fusing the individuals comprising the marital couple into a single entity,
specifically, a characterless copulation machine to assure the continuance of Humankind
through procreation. Marc Spindelman, Obergefell's Dreams, 77 OHIO STATE L.J. 1039, 1096
(2016). In Spindelman's description,
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justice's written opinion, even if dissenting, extolling the purported
constitutional bona fides of governmental discrimination against same-sex
marriages surely is an extraordinarily suitable occasion for the
comprehensive "articulation" that the Chief Justice declined to supply.oo
Rather, there is an unbecoming timidity in his prose for such an important
proposition, implying perhaps his own recognition of his argument's
insipidness.i 1m
As just quoted, Roberts opined, "When sexual relations result in the
conception of a child, that child's prospects are generally better if the mother
and father stay together rather than going their separate ways."l002 Stating
Within the dissent's mindset, heterosexual coitus is an essential, maybe the most
essential, feature of what marriage symbolizes and secularly sacralizes. A vision of
the two-in-one-flesh union of man and woman that operates through their sexual
conjunction as a single reproductive force that, for so long as it lasts, is made up of
them both, is imbedded in the dissent's normative structure. The conjugal couple at
marriage's core is, like Obergefell, a man-woman, male-female, but also greater than
the sum of its parts.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
1000. Courts traditionally pride themselves on demanding empirical and logical proof while,
concurrently, eschewing as manifestly improper, ruling in favor of parties' unproven
assertions of law or fact. For example, in 2005, the Supreme Court noted, "Without concrete
evidence that direct shipping of wine is likely to increase alcohol consumption by minors, we
are left with the States' unsupported assertions. Under our precedents, which require the
'clearest showing' to justify discriminatory state regulation ... this is not enough." Granholm
v. Healed, 544 U.S. 460, 490 (2005) (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc., 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994));
see also, e.g., Prot. Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson,
390 U.S. 414, 438-39 (1968) ("[T]he record contains solid facts ... point[ing] to the probable
existence of valid and valuable causes of action. Balancing these facts are nothing but bald
assertions to the contrary and general conclusions for which foundations nowhere appear.");
LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Gossett v. Du-Ra-Kel Corp., 569 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[B]ald assertions of ultimate
facts are ordinarily insufficient to support summary judgment."); Yufa v. TSI, Inc., 652 Fed.
Appx. 939, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("unsupported assertions are insufficient to defeat summary
judgment. See Lujan v. Nat'1 Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990) (a party may not avoid
a motion for summary judgment by resting on "conclusory allegations of the complaint" or by
answering "with conclusory allegations of an affidavit." (citation omitted))."); Michael J.
Garrisona & J. David Reitzel, Zoning Restrictions and Marketability of Title, 35 REAL EST.
L.J. 257, 278 (2006) ("The courts' failure to articulate a cogent legal theory for the 'existing
violation' exception creates uncertainty in its application.").
1001. I raise here some rebuttals that likely would spring to the mind of any reasonable
person reviewing Robert's opinion. I claim no originality and, given the multitude of articles
written in support of the Obergefell decision, too many reasonably to review prior to drafting
one's own work, I in no matter assert that any idea now presented has not already been heavily
explored by others.
1002. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., with Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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that a "child's prospects" are "generally better" if raised by both birth parents
within a traditional marriage "damns," as they say, "with faint praise." It is
not that, with scant exception, the "child's prospects" are considerably
improved or that absent the care of married birth parents the "child's
prospects" are considerably jeopardized. Rather, according to the Chief
Justice, overall life for children likely will be better - perhaps a little bit,
perhaps somewhat more, Roberts never elucidates - but not exceptionally
improved in a married household consisting of her birth parents.
Of course, conscientious parents want their offspring to enjoy every
available advantage. Still, even assuming the Chief Justice's proposition to
be true,100 3 reasonable minds crave more constitutional justification than
some inexact, unsubstantiated likelihood that children's "prospects are
generally better" if they happen to be raised by their married birth parents.
Given its status as a fundamental right, reflecting its importance as a societal
institution,i" denying civil marriage to otherwise eligible same-sex couples
should be indisputably warranted, not merely the preferences of even a
majority of the population ostensibly to enhance children's happiness in some
vague capacity. If unacceptable harm to children is a reason, then proponents
should be able to demonstrate palpable, significant harm that reasonably
cannot be avoided except by banning same-sex marriages. Extraordinarily,
Roberts cited nothing whatsoever to support his anemic premise that States
rationally may ban same-sex marriages simply to better, not to salvage the
lives of children. The relatively slight purported disadvantage to children of
same-sex marriages, even if true, seems categorically inadequate to justify
the deep, manifold and multifaceted harms bans on same-sex marriages
inflict.
Indeed, Palmore v. Sidoti 00 calls the Chief Justice's entire
constitutional premise into grave doubt. Therein, after the parties' divorce, a
Florida court awarded custody of their then-three-year-old daughter,
Melanie, to the mother, Linda Palmore. However, roughly a year later, the
court reversed, granting custody to the father, Anthony Sidoti, because Ms.
Palmore was cohabitating with an African-American male whom she married
shortly thereafter. The Florida court based its revised custody order in large
1003. Prof. Dent, for instance, tries to salvage the Chief Justice's dissent by noting that, "The
literature substantiating [that c]hildren generally fare best when raised by their biological
mother and father ... is voluminous" George W. Dent Jr., Meaningless Marriage: The
Incoherent Legacy of Obergefell v. Hodges, 17 Appalachian J.L. 1, 57 and note 12 (2018)
(citations omitted; quote combines phraseology from Dent's page 57 and note 12).
1004. See supra note 976 and accompanying text.
1005. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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part on its belief that, "that despite the strides that have been made in bettering
relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will,
if allowed to remain in her present situation and attains school age and thus
more vulnerable to peer pressures, suffer from the social stigmatization that
is sure to come."
1 00 6
Explaining why Florida had violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, fully consistent with but not mentioning the dignity
paradigm, the unanimous Palmore Court unequivocally stated that, even
acknowledging, "the reality of private biases and the possible injury they
might inflict" on young Melanie, "Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. 'Public
officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may not avoid a constitutional duty
by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private racial prejudice that they
assume to be both widely and deeply held."'1 0 07
Controversially and arguably inaptly, courts interpret Palmore to permit
considerations of race in family law proceedings so long as race is not the
sole factor reviewed.1008 Regardless, although the Obergefell majority did
not cite Palmore in response, Palmore's logic should negate Chief Justice
Robert's assertion that the mere possibility that children of same-sex
marriages might be somewhat "better off" growing up in opposite-sex
marriages is a legitimate basis to deprive same-sex couples of the right to
marry. Surely, if nothing else, Palmore warns us that if purely hypothetical
"better off" were a permissible constitutional standard, children raised in any
form of "mixed marriage" could be relocated to non-mixed-marriage
environments so that they likely will be "better off." Indeed, even if the law
raised a strong presumption in favor of present family conditions, courts
would be empowered on a case-by-case basis to scrutinize every "non-
1006. Id. at 431.
1007. Id. at 433 (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61(1971) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
1008. In re Marriage of Gambla and Woodson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 441, 467 (Ill. App. 2006)
(citing cases), abb. on other grnds., People v. McKown, 236 Ill. 2d 278 (2010). Indeed, critics
who feel it failed to go far enough lament, "Unfortunately, the narrow language and brief
analysis in the Palmore opinion do not reveal the extent of the Court's holding." Eileen M.
Blackwood, Race As A Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes: Palmore v. Sidoti, 71
CORNELL L. REv. 209, 221 (1985). In fact, while cobbling together a unanimous court, see,
Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 558-72
(2014), commentators aver that, "Palmore was narrowly written precisely because Chief
Justice Burger wanted to leave open the possibility that race could continue to be a factor in
family law cases." Solangel Maldonado, Bias in the Family: Race, Ethnicity, and Culture in
Custody Disputes, 55 FAM. CT. REv. 213, 231 (2017) (discussing, Blackwood at 575).
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traditional" family to discern whether, in each instance, children therein
would be "better off' transferred into a "traditional" husband-wife
environment. Such intrusions into families' stability, not to mention the
propensity for erroneous court ordered transfers based on prejudice,
witlessness, and stupidity, promise to offend routinely the dignity of such
families as a whole, and the dignity of their members individually.
Accordingly, its purported reticence and imprecision notwhithstanding,
Palmore's principles discredit Chief Justice Robert's reasoning. 1009
Equally, Roberts' dissent, expressing the sentiments of a third of the
Court, fails to account for why civil law permits divorce, marital separations,
adoptions and other common conditions where children are not raised by
both, sometimes not by either, of their birth parents."olo Under the Chief
Justice's theory, divorce, separation, and like impingements on marriage
ought to be prohibited if the affected children would be "better off" under the
status quo. Nor do the dissenters explain why the Law refuses to mandate
1009. Although jurists could interpose some doctrine to the contrary, and Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984) notwithstanding, the premise of the Chief Justice's dissent plausibly
should apply as well to inter-racial marriages and marriages of mixed religions or of mixed
ethnicities, all of which could provide cause for state officials to relocate happy, well-adjusted
children into non-mixed environments on the supposition that, despite their perfectly decent
upbringings, such children would be "better off' outside of the mixed-marriage environment.
If Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas believe that enhancing the possible
happiness or comfort of children is a sufficient basis to justify banning same-sex marriages,
then the same deference to children's welfare should vindicate as well comparable bans on
interracial, interreligious, interethnic, and similar mixed-marriages.
Of course, the dissenters dare not make any such argument, not could they plausibly
do so. See, David J. Herring, Exploring the Political Roles of the Family: Justifications for
Permanency Planning for Children, 26 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 183, 258 (1995) ("Diverse families
produce diverse individuals, individuals who experience intimate associational relationships
outside of the state sphere from the very beginning of life and who acquire the basic
associational skills necessary to form powerful groups outside the state sphere."). If pressed,
they might well interpose some formalistic legal distinction based on "levels of scrutiny," that
race, religious and ethnicity discrimination claims are or should be reviewed under a more
exacting standard than claims based on homosexual animus. But, if the happiness -- indeed,
the dignity -- of children is at stake as these justices claim, then regardless of the applied level
of scrutiny, such children's welfare ought to trump the selfish marriage preferences of parents
or guardians who put their personal predilections ahead of their innocent and hapless
offspring's well-being.
Based on the principles of Deontological Originalism wherein levels of scrutiny cannot
be used to distort the meaning of dignity, Robert's appeal to enhancing the welfare of
presumably already well-cared-for children is unavailing.
1010. "[A]s high divorce rates in the United States attest, permitting different-sex couples to
marry does not guarantee that the children will be raised in a family setting by those parents."
Mark Strasser, Obergefell, Dignity, and the Family, 19 J. GENDER, RACE& JUSTICE 317, 337
(2016) (footnote omitted).
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the marriages of recalcitrant unmarried parents who fail to acknowledge the
harm remaining single, or marrying other persons, might inflict on their
children. Similarly, death tragically may prevent children from growing up
with both of their original parents. In such cases, under Robert's logic, the
law should mandate that, if the single parent does not remarry shortly, a same-
sex married couple may intervene to adopt the child if the record indicates
that the child might be "better off' with two same-sex adoptive parents than
with only one original parent.
In fact, assuming the Chief Justice is correct, his conclusion actuality
would seem to delegitimize familial arrangements other than the marriage of
birth parents lest society condones arrangements that are not "better" for the
affected children. Robert's crabbed constitutional standard threatens to shunt
aside as "non-traditional" all domestic settings except for the one that most
closely mimics a two-opposite-sex-parent household. As Prof. Strasser
chastised, "Roberts should be well aware that nontraditional families can
provide a setting in which children might flourish."'o' Indeed, both the
Obergefell dissents and majority might be accused of "marriage
exceptionalism," meaning, insensitivity to the many non-marital setting in
which children can and do flourish. 0 12
1011. Id. at 338 (citing, Mark Strasser, Adoption and the Best Interests of the Child: On the
Use andAbuse ofStudies, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 629,642 (2004)). For instance, as one student
note explained, in addition to "biological families (or an individual's family of origin),"
Th[e] standard scheme constructed along marriage and blood relationships conflicts.,
with the assertion of many lesbian and gay men that "families should not be
confounded with genealogically defined relationships." Instead, many gays and
lesbians subscribe to a broader definition of family, which encompasses "fictive kin,"
meaning family members that are "chosen" outside of blood relationships. These
nontraditional families, made up of chosen members, include friends, lovers, former
lovers, co-parents, adopted children, children from previous heterosexual
relationships, and children conceived through insemination.
Annick Persinger, Still Pioneers: Special Social and Economic Hardships for Elderly Gays
and Lesbians, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 137, 148 (2010) (note) (quoting, Kath Weston,
Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship 2, 106 (1991) and citing Weston at 3); see also,
e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity: Reforming the Inheritance Penalties Facing
Children in Nontraditional Families, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL.'Y 1, 3 note 2 (2015)
("Nontraditional families would include divorced families, remarried families with children
by different parents (blended families), same-sex families, unmarried cohabiting families,
children raised by relatives, stepparent families, and the like. See A Generation at Risk, GRIEF
SPEAKS (May 19, 2014), http://www.griefspeaks.com/idl13.html."); Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 107
(1996) (broad definition of family).
1012. E.g., Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth ofFreedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REv. 147, 168 (2015); Clare Huntington, Obergefell's Conservatism: Reifying Familial
Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 29 (2015).
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Along such lines, one cannot deny that the Windsor-Obergefell Court
does not offer comprehensive explications of the many propositions that it
rightly engaged to support their singular and magnificent application of the
dignity paradigm's clear if unattributed Kantian morality. Put kindly, the
majority opinion (and the dissents as well) comprise, "underdeveloped line[s]
of argument ... " Most particular is the question of how the justices
conceive homosexuality. As the foregoing discussion of the "homosexual
rights cases" show, there surely remains no doubt that, contrary to the
uninformed claims stemming from the lengthy history of untoward
prejudice,10 14 LGBTQ individuals and their associated sexual practices
portend neither new nor unique dangers not already tolerated for
heterosexuals and heterosexual sexual practices. Nonetheless, important
works such as Ann B. Goldstein's fascinating article explain how courts and
commentators often, "oversimplify[] and distort[] a complex historical record
... [and] misuse[] the relatively modem concept of 'homosexuality' to depict
the past."o1 s Even so, the empirical and logical proofs detailed in scholarly
1013. Mark Starsser, Obergefell, Dignity, and the Family, 19 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE
317, 318 (2016). One may suspect that Obergefell's lack of clarity and precision was due
more to timorousness -- fear that being too explicit and detailed would reveal all the more that
the Court believes in deontological Kantian morality -- than to a lack of intellectual ability to
elucidate nebulous ideas; but, such merely is speculation.
1014. As the Second Circuit rightly if curtly concluded, "It is easy to conclude that
homosexuals have suffered a history of discrimination. [Appellant Edith] Windsor and several
amici labor to establish and document this history, but we think it is not much in debate."
Windsor v. U.S., 699 F. 3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 2012), affd., U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675
(2013). Certainly, commentary confirms the Second Circuit's conclusion. E.g., Andrew
Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J., 89, 123-29
(1997); Dov Berger, Separating Civil Unions And Religious Marriage--A New Paradigm For
Recognizing Same-Sex Relationships, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 163, 169 (2007)
(footnote omitted) (student note arguing, inter alia, "The history of homosexuality is a long
and unfortunate one, filled with significant bigotry and danger."). Scholarship has noted the
"historical process by which the homosexual identity was labeled perverse by those in the
fields of science, medicine, psychology, and media [and one may well add, the law] over the
last century." Margaret Bichler, Suspicious Closets: Strengthening the Claim to Suspect
Classification and Same-Sex Marriage Rights, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 167, 168 (2008)
(note) (citing, Michel Foucault, I The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, 42-43, 97-101,
105-06 (1990)).
1015. Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the
Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L. J. 1073, 1081-89 (1988) (quote at
1086). For instance, "In classical Greece and Rome, sexual practices between men were not
uniformly condemned, and some were widely accepted; under Roman rule, even marriage
between men was possible until at least 342 A.D." Id. at 1086-87 (footnotes omitted); see
also, e.g., Berger, supra note 1014, at 168-69 (student note discussing, inter alia, various
marriage-like same-sex unions throughout history).
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literature' 0 16 provide sufficient bases to show that the Supreme Court's
"homosexual rights" jurisprudence properly has determined that
discrimination based on homosexuality (and, one would presume any
LGBTQ status)o is motivated by "a bare desire to harm" the "politically
unpopular group" of LGBTQ individuals and, thus, unconstitutionally treats
those individuals merely as means to promote immoral prejudices.Io0s
1016. E.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from History: The False Narratives of the
Obergefell Dissents, 92 IND. L.J. 1007 (2017); Kevin M. Barry, Brian Farrell, Jennifer L. Levi,
and, Neelima Vanguri, A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection
Clause, 57 B.C. L. REv. 507 (2016); Larry Mutz, A Fairy Tale: The Myth of the Homosexual
Lifestyle in Anti-Gay-and-Lesbian Rhetoric, 27 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 69 (2006); Polikoff,
supra note 996, at 549-61 (detailed discussion refuting claims that homosexuality is unnatural,
immoral and dangerous); articles cited supra at note 1011.
1017. E.g., Doe by & through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir.
2018), cert. filed, (NO. 18-658), Nov 19, 2018, (affirmed that, "the District Court correctly
refused to enjoin the defendant School District from allowing transgender students to use
bathrooms and locker rooms that are consistent with the students' gender identities as opposed
to the sex they were determined to have at birth."); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312 (11th
Cir. 2011) (equal protection violation to discharge a transgendered individual based on sexual
stereotyping. Firing of Ms. Glenn from her job as an editor in the Georgia General Assembly's
Office of Legislative Counsel "because of her gender non-conformity" was predicated on no
legitimate governmental interest bur rather reflected "a bare desire to harm" a member of a
politically unpopular group); Whitaker By Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No.
I Board of Education, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017) (transgendered students have standing to
sue and likely will prevail on the merits in suit claiming sexual stereotyping discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (popularly referred to
as "Title IX")); G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board, 654 Fed. Appx. 606, 607 (Mem)
(4th Cir. 2016) (Davis, S.J., concurring, "The First, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
all recognized that discrimination against a transgender individual based on that person's
transgender status is discrimination because of sex under federal civil rights statutes and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution." (citations omitted)); see generally, Barry et al,
supra note 1016.
1018. This writing notes in passing that even accepting that the Windsor-Obergefell
explication of rights may be incomplete and shallow, any arguable dearth if analysis cannot
validate what must be one of the most ridiculous and puerile substantive due process actions
ever conceived. Burdick v. Kennedy, 700 Fed. Appx. 984 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
rightly dismissed attorney Austin Burdick's Fifth Amendment due process claim against the
five justices in the Obergefell majority (yes, defendant Kennedy is Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy whose co-defendants are Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan). The
Court ruled that Burdick lacked standing because he alleged only "vague" and "abstract
assertions" to support his claim that, "he suffered a concrete injury when the Justices 'rendered
the Constitution a nullity' in Obergefell, preventing him from making certain arguments to
'protect his clients' constitutional rights' and depriving him of his interest in his law license."
Id. at 987, 985.
This amazingly bizarre suit is worth detailing just because it is so bizarre. Based on a
"thorough review" of the record, id. at 986, in a meticulous opinion for which none of the
judges take credit as the author, after carefully recounting the doctrine of constitutional
standing, the unsurprisingly unanimous Court explained,
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This is not to claim that the Court's explications (such as they are)
expounding the intricate nature and dynamics of being LGBTQ are wholly
or even predominantly correct aside from the legal conclusion that there is
no sufficient justification to withhold from same-sex couples the right to
many on terms identical to those available to opposite-sex couples. 1019
On this record, we cannot say that the district court erred - much less "belittle[d]"
Burdick's claim - by concluding that Burdick's general proposition that he
anticipates he will lose arguments that are based on legal theories that the Supreme
Court rejected in Obergefell does not implicate a "legally protected interest." Indeed,
at the hearing before the district court, Burdick acknowledged that he has not lost his
law license, and his participation throughout this case has revealed that he is still able
to practice law and make arguments in the federal courts. His only complaint, it
seems, is that the arguments he makes on behalf of his clients will not be successful
in light of Obergefell. But because there is no constitutional provision, statute, or
other authority to suggest that a court must accept a party's arguments, a lawyer has
no legally protected interest in winning those arguments.
Id. at 987 (citations omitted).
As though that were not enough to answer Burdick's inane complaint, the Court added,
"And even if Burdick had a legally protected interest in winning his constitutional arguments
- and plainly he did not - the district court did not err in concluding that Burdick's
allegations are 'vague,' 'abstract assertion[s]' that were insufficient to establish a concrete
injury. Burdick's complaint identifies no specific legal argument he has lost or will imminently
lose as a result of Obergefell. Nor does it identify any factual basis for his allegation that
Obergefell will cause him to lose income." Id. Having lavished substantial efforts resolving
the standing issue, the Circuit determined it did not have to address the matter of absolute
judicial immunity, an alternative basis the Northern District of Alabama used to dismiss
Burdick's action. See, Id. at 988 (declining to review, Burdick Kennedy, 2016 WL 7974648
at * 1-2 (N.D. Ala. 2016) (judicial immunity argument)).
For all its detail, the Eleventh Circuit did not explain why it expended precious
resources, much less why it gave any credence whatsoever, to Burdick's patently meritless
lawsuit. One might have thought a per curiam memorandum affirming without further
explanation the District Court's dismissal would have been all this appeal was worth, except
possibly to remand for a hearing on sanctions for frivolous litigation. As noted, among the
facts evincing his lack of standing, the Court mentioned that, "Burdick ... has not lost his law
license." Perhaps that state of affairs should be revisited in light of what Mr. Burdick thinks
is a sufficiently pleaded complaint. Even without the specter of sanctions, presumably since
July 28, 2017, the date Burdick was announced, the Obergefell majority, indeed judges
throughout America, are sleeping more securely.
1019. Indeed, some absorbing scholarship applauds the judicial recognition of LGBTQ
dignity while both worrying about and proposing solutions to the problem that relevant
opinions, particularly Obergefell, "describe[] sexuality as binary and suggests that sexual
orientation [exclusively] is immutable, normal, and constitutive of individual identity. As
scholars from Kenji Yoshino to Elizabeth Glazer have shown, the kind of binary definition of
sexuality articulated by Obergefell promises to exclude those with more fluid sexual identities
and experiences." Mary Ziegler, Perceiving Orientation, Defining Sexuality after Obergefell,
23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL.'Y 223, 224 (2016) (citing, inter alia, Elizabeth M. Glazer,
Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 998-1026 (2012) and Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic
Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000)).
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Consistent with the principles of Deontological Originalism espoused in this
article, the homosexual rights cases' application of the dignity paradigm
foretells, one may hope, a larger, equally apt constitutional holding that
because LGBTQ individuals and classes deserve the same respect bestowed
on "heterosexual" individuals and classes, governmental LGBTQ
discrimination however manifest is unconstitutional unless such
discrimination respects the dignity of LGBTQ individuals, an eventuality
unlikely in the extreme.' 020
For the purposes of this article, the Court's prevailing "homosexual rights" decisions
are correct in their most fundamental premise: whatever its authentic nature and descriptors,
LGBTQ discrimination treats those individuals and classes not as ends in themselves, but
rather, merely as means, likely to promote untoward bigotry. Therefore, it would distort,
indeed pervert the dignity paradigm to use some immaterial aspect of Obergefell to suggest
that Government may treat as merely means "those with more fluid sexual identities and
experiences."
1020. See, e.g., Berthiaume v. Smith, 875 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (district
court judge abused his discretion thus depriving homosexual criminal defendant a fair trial, by
rejecting defendant's motion that as part of the court's voire dire inquiry, the judge determine
whether any perspective jurors harbor discriminatory bias against gay or homosexual
individuals).
In that regard, evincing that Obergefell ought not be read narrowly, a short while ago,
the Supreme Court overturned an Arkansas law that refused, "to issue birth certificates with
the female spouse's name as a parent along with the birth mother's name." Pavan v. Smith,
137 S.Ct. 2075 (2017) (per curiam) (citation to Ark. Statutes omitted). The Court found that,
"As a result, same-sex parents in Arkansas lack the same right as opposite-sex parents to be
listed on a child's birth certificate, a document often used for important transactions like
making medical decisions for a child or enrolling a child in school." Id.at 2078 (citing, Pet.
for Cert. 5-7 (listing situations in which a parent might be required to present a child's birth
certificate). Accordingly, the disparate rules concerning birth certificates offend Obergefell's
determination that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, States may
not "'exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as
opposite-sex couples."' Id. (quoting, Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2605, and, citing id. at 2601
(specifically mentioning birth certificates among relevant "rights, benefits and
responsibilities" of civil marriage)).
Rejecting the State's argument that birth certificates are unrelated to the marital status
of children's parents, the Court concluded, "Arkansas has thus chosen to make its birth
certificates more than a mere marker of biological relationships: The State uses those
certificates to give married parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to
unmarried parents. Having made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell,
deny married same-sex couples that recognition." Id. at 2078-79. Moreover, as a separate
basis for invalidation under Obergefell, the discriminatory birth certificate law could
stigmatize the offspring of same-sex couples as different or less from those of opposite-sex
couples, married or not. Id. at 2078.
Thus, the Court is continuing the Deontological Originalist premises of Obergefell.
"Indeed, the holding in Pavan is consistent with Justice Kennedy's observation in Obergefell
that 'just as a couple vows to support each other, so does society pledge to support the couple,
offering symbolic recognition and material benefits to protect and nourish the union."'
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Perhaps, the time will come when for LGBTQ matters in particular as
well as for the entire panoply of conceivable due process claims, the Court at
last propounds the fullness of its dignity paradigm rather than hiding it.
Nonetheless, for the purposes of Deontological Originalism, the Court at least
provided the minima. Because it showed that there is no serious basis to aver
that the challenged laws protect Society from truly harmful conduct, that is,
governmental proscriptions against same-sex marriage enforced nothing
better than, "a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group," Obergefell
rightly concluded that same-sex marriage is not immoral, and, therefore, must
be treated equally with opposite-sex marriage. Accordingly, based on the
Kantian morality implicit in the Court's dignity paradigm, official
discrimination against same-sex marriages treats the couples seeking to
marry and their offspring not as ends in themselves -- human beings whose
Michael J. Higdon, Biological Citizenship and the Children of Same-Sex Marriage, 87 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 124, 158-59 (2019) (citing, "Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601 (emphasis
added)"); see also, Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over "Inherent
Differences" Between the Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REv. 169, 173-74 (2017) ("What the Court did
in Pavan ... was no small thing, ... [T]he Court genuinely scrutinized the government's
ostensibly biological justifications for treating the sexes differently in contexts where it has
traditionally declined to do so. ... the Court broke with this tradition. It did not give the
government a free pass, as it might have in the past, because the litigants challenging the laws
were gay, ... "); Billy Corriher, Putting Equality to A Vote: Individual Rights, Judicial
Elections, and the Arkansas Supreme Court, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 591, 611 (2017)
(quoting, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958), "In Pavan , the High Court again made it
clear that its marriage equality ruling 'can neither be nullified openly and directly by state
legislators or state executive or judicial officers nor nullified indirectly by them....'") see, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Jones in & for Cty. of Pima, 243 Ariz. 29, 31 (2017), cert. denied sub nom.
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 138 S. Ct. 1165 (2018) ("1 Under A.R.S. § 25-814(A)(1), aman
is presumed to be a legal parent if his wife gives birth to a child during the marriage. We here
consider whether this presumption applies to similarly situated women in same-sex marriages.
Because couples in same-sex marriages are constitutionally entitled to the "constellation of
benefits the States have linked to marriage," Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2601
(2015), we hold that the statutory presumption applies. We further hold that Kimberly
McLaughlin, the birth mother here, is equitably estopped from rebutting her spouse Suzan's
presumptive parentage of their son."); Appel v. Celia, 98 Va. Cir. 140 (2018) (at *1, single
judge's ruling in the form of a letter, "[Tihe Court must address two matters of first impression
in Virginia. First, should a child born through assisted conception to a woman in a same-sex
marriage be considered a child "born of the parties" for purposes of a final decree of divorce?
Second, should a child born through assisted conception to the other woman in the same-sex
marriage be considered a child "born of the parties" for purposes of a final decree of divorce
if the child was born while the couple was joined by a civil union? The Court answers both
questions in the affirmative."); In re Marriage of Hogsett & Neale, 2018 COA 176 (CO. CL
App. 2018) (requirements for common law marriage applies equally to same-sex and opposite-
sex claimed marriages).
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innate dignity makes them worthy of respect, -- but rather, merely as means
to perpetrate unjustified bigotry.
Based on the foregoing discussion, as exemplified by the "homosexual
rights" decisions, the dignity paradigm, not the deeply rooted principles
approach, fulfills the moral imperatives of Deontological Originalism's
enforcement through the Constitution of the Declaration of Independence's
theory of natural rights derived from natural law as explicated by Kantian
morality. Nearly 250 years after the signing of the Declaration of
Independence, Obergefell-Windsor is a stunning, bravura yet frustratingly
incomplete culmination-to-date of Deontological Originalism, the
vindication of individuals' natural rights discerned through neutral reason
and enforced via the Constitution as America's highest law.
VII. CONCLUSION --
This article, finished just after the thirtieth anniversary year of my first
law review publication,102 1 is the culmination of over four-decades of law
study, law practice and law teaching. It captures much of what I know -- or
at least what I think I know -- about, to purloin H.L.A. Hart's book title, the
concept of law.1 0 22  I end this work, then, by re-quoting from Part 1,
Originalism and Deontology, Oliver Wendell Holmes:
Read the works of the great German jurists, and see how much more the
world is governed to-day by Kant than by Bonaparte. ... The remoter and
more general aspects of the law are those which give it universal interest.
It is through them that you not only become a great master in your calling,
but connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal
law. 1023
Based on the aggregation of law and philosophy presented herein, I
believe that for all the political pragmatism and egotistic drives that haunted
their acts, the Framers circa 1776, 1787, 1791 and 1864, and us their
successors, share that same romanticism -- the faith that a "nation of laws"
1021. Bayer, supra note 980 (Mutable Characteristics etc.).
1022. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bullock & Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed.
1994) (1961). I am borrowing Hart's excellent book title, but, certainly not his stance on
positive law.
1023. O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 478 (1897).
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can and must elevate morality as its highest law, enforce that highest law
earnestly and successfully, and, by so doing, fulfill the promise of moral
comportment, in Holmes' elegant prose, "[to] connect ... with the universe
and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a
hint of the universal law." That is what Deontological Originalism is: the
quest for "the right," not "the good," as the utmost law of the Constitution
and the noblest endeavor of Humankind.
